Link security with MRO
Link security restricts the resources that a user can access, depending on the remote system from which they are accessed. The practical effect of link security is to prevent a remote user from attaching a transaction or accessing a resource for which the link userid has no authority.
Each link between systems is given an access authority defined by a link userid. A link userid for MRO is a userid defined on your sessions definition for this connection. Note that for MRO, unlike LU6.2, you can have only one sessions definition per connection, and there can be only one link userid per connection. If there is no preset session userid, the link userid is taken to be the region userid of the TOR region. The SECURITYNAME field on the connection definition is ignored for MRO.
- If the userids match, you will always only have one security check. This will be made either against the local region's default user (for ATTACHSEC=LOCAL) or against the userid in the received FMH-5 attach request (ATTACHSEC=IDENTIFY).
- If the userids do not match, then for ATTACHSEC=LOCAL, resource checks are done only against the link userid. For ATTACHSEC=IDENTIFY you will always have two resource checks. One check is against the link userid, and the other is against the userid received from the remote user in the attach request.
If a failure occurs in establishing link security, the link is given the same security authorization as defined for the local region's default user. This would happen, for example, if the preset session userid had been revoked.
Associate the SESSIONS definition with a RACF® user profile that has access to any protected resource to which the inbound transaction needs access. See RACF facilities for guidance on defining profiles.
If the sign-on fails, a sign-on failure message is sent to the CSCS security destination, and the link is given the security of the DFLTUSER in the receiving system; that is, it is able to access only those resources to which the default user has access.