WebSphere MQ

Security

Version 7.0

SC34-6932-00

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Note
Before using this information and the product it supports, be sure to read the general information under notices at the back of this book.

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This edition of the book applies to the following products:

- IBM WebSphere MQ, Version 7.0
- IBM WebSphere MQ for z/OS, Version 7.0

and to any subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions.

Contents

Figures

Tables

Chapter 1. Introduction

Security requirements are different for each application. This part of the information center covers the factors to consider when determining the scope of your security requirements, enabling you to make an informed choice from the options available.

You can use WebSphere® MQ for a wide variety of applications on a range of platforms. The security requirements are likely to be different for each application. For some, security will be a critical consideration.

WebSphere MQ provides a range of link-level security services, including support for the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS).

Security services

Security services are the services within a computer system that protect its resources. This chapter describes the five security services that are identified in the IBM® Security Architecture:

- "Identification and authentication"
- "Access control" on page 2
- "Confidentiality" on page 2
- "Data integrity" on page 3
- "Non-repudiation" on page 3

Security mechanisms are technical tools and techniques that are used to implement security services. A mechanism might operate by itself, or in conjunction with others, to provide a particular service. Examples of common security mechanisms are:

- Access control lists
- Cryptography
- Digital signatures

When you are planning a WebSphere MQ implementation, you need to consider which security services and mechanisms you require. For information about what to consider after you have read this chapter, see "Planning for your security requirements" on page 4.

For more information about the IBM Security Architecture, see *IBM Security Architecture: Securing the Open Client/Server Distributed Enterprise*, SC28-8135, which is available from the IBM Publications Center at: http://www.elink.ibmlink.ibm.com/publications/servlet/pbi.wss

Identification and authentication

Identification is being able to identify uniquely a user of a system or an application that is running in the system. *Authentication* is being able to prove that a user or application is genuinely who that person or what that application claims to be.

For example, consider a user who logs on to a system by entering a user ID and password. The system uses the user ID to identify the user and, at the time of logon, authenticates the user by checking that the supplied password is correct.

Here are some examples of the identification and authentication service in a WebSphere MQ environment:

- Every message can contain *message context* information. This information is held in the message descriptor and can be generated by the queue manager when a message is put on a queue by an application. Alternatively, the application can supply the information if the user ID associated with the application is authorized to do so.

  The context information in a message allows the receiving application to find out about the originator of the message. It contains, for example, the name of the application that put the message and the user ID associated with the application.
- When a message channel starts, it is possible for the message channel agent (MCA) at each end of the channel to authenticate its partner. This is known as *mutual authentication*. For the sending MCA, this provides assurance that the partner it is about to send messages to is genuine. And, for the receiving MCA, there is a similar assurance that it is about to receive messages from a genuine partner.

Access control

The *access control* service protects critical resources in a system by limiting access only to authorized users and their applications. It prevents the unauthorized use of a resource or the use of a resource in an unauthorized manner.

Here are some examples of the access control service in a WebSphere MQ environment:

- Allowing only an authorized administrator to issue commands to manage WebSphere MQ resources.
- Allowing an application to connect to a queue manager only if the user ID associated with the application is authorized to do so.
- Allowing a user's application to open only those queues that are necessary for its function.
- Allowing a user's application to subscribe only to those topics that are necessary for its function.
- Allowing a user's application to perform only those operations on a queue that are necessary for its function. For example, an application might need only to browse messages on a particular queue, and not to put or get messages.

Confidentiality

The *confidentiality* service protects sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.

When sensitive data is stored locally, access control mechanisms might be sufficient to protect it on the assumption that the data cannot be read if it cannot be accessed. If a greater level of security is required, the data can be encrypted.

Sensitive data should be encrypted when it is transmitted over a communications network, especially over an insecure network such as the Internet. In a networking environment, access control mechanisms are not effective against attempts to intercept the data, such as wiretapping.

Here are some examples of the confidentiality service that can be implemented in a WebSphere MQ environment:

- After a sending MCA gets a message from a transmission queue, the message is encrypted before it is sent over the network to the receiving MCA. At the other end of the channel, the message is decrypted before the receiving MCA puts it on its destination queue.
- While messages are stored on a local queue, the access control mechanisms provided by WebSphere MQ might be considered sufficient to protect their contents against unauthorized disclosure. However, for a greater level of security, their contents can be encrypted as well.

Data integrity

The *data integrity* service detects whether there has been unauthorized modification of data. There are two ways in which data might be altered: accidentally, through hardware and transmission errors, or because of a deliberate attack. Many hardware products and transmission protocols now have mechanisms to detect and correct hardware and transmission errors. The purpose of the data integrity service is to detect a deliberate attack.

The data integrity service aims only to detect whether data has been modified. It does not aim to restore data to its original state if it has been modified.

Access control mechanisms can contribute to data integrity insofar as data cannot be modified if access is denied. But, as with confidentiality, access control mechanisms are not effective in a networking environment.

Here are some examples of the data integrity service that can be implemented in a WebSphere MQ environment:

- A data integrity service can be used to detect whether the contents of a message have been deliberately modified while it was being transmitted over a network.
- While messages are stored on a local queue, the access control mechanisms provided by WebSphere MQ might be considered sufficient to prevent deliberate modification of the contents of the messages. However, for a greater level of security, a data integrity service can be used to detect whether the contents of a message have been deliberately modified between the time the message was put on the queue and the time it was retrieved from the queue.

Non-repudiation

The *non-repudiation* service can be viewed as an extension to the identification and authentication service. In general, non-repudiation applies when data is transmitted electronically; for example, an order to a stock broker to buy or sell stock, or an order to a bank to transfer funds from one account to another. The overall goal is to be able to prove that a particular message is associated with a particular individual.

The non-repudiation service can contain more than one component, where each component provides a different function. If the sender of a message ever denies

sending it, the non-repudiation service with *proof of origin* can provide the receiver with undeniable evidence that the message was sent by that particular individual. If the receiver of a message ever denies receiving it, the non-repudiation service with *proof of delivery* can provide the sender with undeniable evidence that the message was received by that particular individual.

In practice, proof with virtually 100% certainty, or undeniable evidence, is a difficult goal. In the real world, nothing is fully secure. Managing security is more concerned with managing risk to a level that is acceptable to the business. In such an environment, a more realistic expectation of the non-repudiation service is to be able to provide evidence that is admissible, and supports your case, in a court of law.

Non-repudiation is a relevant security service in a WebSphere MQ environment because WebSphere MQ is a means of transmitting data electronically. For example, you might require contemporaneous evidence that a particular message was sent or received by an application associated with a particular individual.

Be aware that neither IBM WebSphere MQ nor IBM Tivoli® Access Manager for Business Integration provides a non-repudiation service as part of its base function. However, this book does contain suggestions on how you might provide your own non-repudiation service within a WebSphere MQ environment by writing your own exit programs.

Planning for your security requirements

The purpose of this chapter is to explain what you need to consider when planning security in a WebSphere MQ environment. The considerations are discussed under three main headings:

- "Basic considerations"
- "Additional considerations" on page 5
- "Link level security and application level security" on page 7

Basic considerations

The basic considerations are those aspects of security you must consider when implementing WebSphere MQ. On i5/OS®, UNIX® systems, and Windows® systems, if you ignore these considerations and do nothing, you cannot implement WebSphere MQ. On z/OS®, the effect is that your WebSphere MQ resources are unprotected. That is, all users can access and change all WebSphere MQ resources.

Authority to administer WebSphere MQ

WebSphere MQ administrators need authority to:

- Issue commands to administer WebSphere MQ
- Use the WebSphere MQ Explorer
- Use the operations and control panels on z/OS
- Use the WebSphere MQ utility program, CSQUTIL, on z/OS
- Access the queue manager data sets on z/OS

This is an aspect of access control. For more information, see "Authority to administer WebSphere MQ" on page 25.

Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects

Applications can access the following WebSphere MQ objects by issuing MQI calls:

- Queue managers
- Queues
- Processes
- Namelists
- Topics

Applications can also use Programmable Command Format (PCF) commands to access these WebSphere MQ objects, and to access authentication information objects as well. Applications can also use PCF commands to access channels, in addition to the objects listed above. These objects are protected by WebSphere MQ and the user IDs associated with the applications need authority to access them.

This is another aspect of access control. For more information, see "Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects" on page 29.

Channel security

The user IDs associated with message channel agents (MCAs) need authority to access various WebSphere MQ resources. For example, an MCA must be able to connect to a queue manager. If it is a sending MCA, it must be able to open the transmission queue for the channel. If it is a receiving MCA, it must be able to open destination queues. The user IDs associated with applications need authority to use PCF commands to administer channels, channel initiators, and listeners.

This is another aspect of access control. For more information, see "Channel security" on page 37.

Additional considerations

The following are aspects of security you need to consider only if you are using certain WebSphere MQ function or base product extensions:

- "Queue manager clusters"
- "WebSphere MQ Publish/Subscribe" on page 6
- "WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru" on page 7

Queue manager clusters

A *queue manager cluster* is a network of queue managers that are logically associated in some way. A queue manager that is a member of a cluster is called a *cluster queue manager*.

A queue that belongs to a cluster queue manager can be made known to other queue managers in the cluster. Such a queue is called a *cluster queue*. Any queue manager in a cluster can send messages to cluster queues without needing any of the following:

- An explicit remote queue definition for each cluster queue
- Explicitly defined channels to and from each remote queue manager
- A separate transmission queue for each outbound channel

You can create a cluster in which two or more queue managers are clones. This means that they have instances of the same local queues, including any local queues declared as cluster queues, and can support instances of the same server applications.

When an application connected to a cluster queue manager sends a message to a cluster queue that has an instance on each of the cloned queue managers, WebSphere MQ decides which queue manager to send it to. When many applications send messages to the cluster queue, WebSphere MQ balances the workload across each of the queue managers that have an instance of the queue. If one of the systems hosting a cloned queue manager fails, WebSphere MQ continues to balance the workload across the remaining queue managers until the system that failed is restarted.

If you are using queue manager clusters, you need to consider the following security issues:

- Allowing only selected queue managers to send messages to your queue manager
- Allowing only selected users of a remote queue manager to send messages to a queue on your queue manager
- Allowing applications connected to your queue manager to send messages only to selected remote queues

These considerations are relevant even if you are not using clusters, but they become more important if you are using clusters.

If an application can send messages to one cluster queue, it can send messages to any other cluster queue without needing additional remote queue definitions, transmission queues, or channels. It therefore becomes more important to consider whether you need to restrict access to the cluster queues on your queue manager, and to restrict the cluster queues to which your applications can send messages.

There are some additional security considerations, which are relevant only if you are using queue manager clusters:

- Allowing only selected queue managers to join a cluster
- Forcing unwanted queue managers to leave a cluster

For more information about all these considerations, see WebSphere MQ Queue Manager Clusters. For considerations specific to WebSphere MQ for z/OS, see the WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide.

WebSphere MQ Publish/Subscribe

In a Publish/Subscribe system, there are two types of application: publisher and subscriber. *Publishers* supply information in the form of WebSphere MQ messages. When a publisher publishes a message, it specifies a *topic*, which identifies the subject of the information inside the message.

Subscribers are the consumers of the information that is published. A subscriber specifies the topics it is interested in by subscribing to them.

The *Queue Manager* is an application supplied with WebSphere MQ Publish/Subscribe. It receives published messages from publishers and

subscription requests from subscribers, and routes the published messages to the subscribers. A subscriber is sent messages only on those topics to which it has subscribed.

There are additional security considerations if you are using WebSphere MQ Publish/Subscribe. For more information, see the WebSphere MQ Publish/Subscribe User's Guide.

WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru

WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru is a WebSphere MQ base product extension that is supplied in SupportPac™ MS81.

WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru enables two queue managers to exchange messages, or a WebSphere MQ client application to connect to a queue manager, over the Internet without requiring a direct TCP/IP connection. This is useful if a firewall prohibits a direct TCP/IP connection between two systems. It makes the passage of WebSphere MQ channel protocol flows into and out of a firewall simpler and more manageable by tunnelling the flows inside HTTP or by acting as a proxy. Using the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), it can also be used to encrypt and decrypt messages that are sent over the Internet.

For more information about WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru, see *MS81: WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru*, available from the following address: http://www.ibm.com/software/integration/support/supportpacs/

Link level security and application level security

The remaining security considerations are discussed under two headings: link level security and application level security.

Link level security

Link level security refers to those security services that are invoked, directly or indirectly, by an MCA, the communications subsystem, or a combination of the two working together. This is illustrated in Figure 1 on page 8.



Figure 1. Link level security and application level security

Here are some examples of link level security services:

- The MCA at each end of a message channel can authenticate its partner. This is done when the channel starts and a communications connection has been established, but before any messages start to flow. If authentication fails at either end, the channel is closed and no messages are transferred. This is an example of an identification and authentication service.
- A message can be encrypted at the sending end of a channel and decrypted at the receiving end. This is an example of a confidentiality service.
- A message can be checked at the receiving end of a channel to determine whether its contents have been deliberately modified while it was being transmitted over the network. This is an example of a data integrity service.

Application level security

Application level security refers to those security services that are invoked at the interface between an application and a queue manager to which it is connected. These services are invoked when the application issues MQI calls to the queue manager. The services might be invoked, directly or indirectly, by the application, the queue manager, another product that supports WebSphere MQ, or a combination of any of these working together. Application level security is illustrated in Figure 1.

Application level security is also known as *end-to-end security* or *message level security*.

Here are some examples of application level security services:

- When an application puts a message on a queue, the message descriptor contains a user ID associated with the application. However, there is no data present, such as an encrypted password, that can be used to authenticate the user ID. A security service can add this data. When the message is eventually

retrieved by the receiving application, another component of the service can authenticate the user ID using the data that has travelled with the message. This is an example of an identification and authentication service.

- A message can be encrypted when it is put on a queue by an application and decrypted when it is retrieved by the receiving application. This is an example of a confidentiality service.
- A message can be checked when it is retrieved by the receiving application. This check determines whether its contents have been deliberately modified since it was first put on a queue by the sending application. This is an example of a data integrity service.

Comparing link level security and application level security

The following sections discuss various aspects of link level security and application level security, and compare the two levels of security.

Protecting messages in queues:

Link level security can protect messages while they are transferred from one queue manager to another. It is particularly important when messages are transmitted over an insecure network. It cannot, however, protect messages while they are stored in queues at either a source queue manager, a destination queue manager, or an intermediate queue manager.

Application level security, by comparison, can protect messages while they are stored in queues and applies even when distributed queuing is not used. This is the major difference between link level security and application level security and is illustrated in Figure 1 on page 8.

Queue managers not running in controlled and trusted environments:

If a queue manager is running in a controlled and trusted environment, the access control mechanisms provided by WebSphere MQ might be considered sufficient to protect the messages stored on its queues. This is particularly true if only local queuing is involved and messages never leave the queue manager. Application level security in this case might be considered unnecessary.

Application level security might also be considered unnecessary if messages are transferred to another queue manager that is also running in a controlled and trusted environment, or are received from such a queue manager. But the need for application level security becomes greater when messages are transferred to, or received from, a queue manager that is not running in a controlled and trusted environment.

Differences in cost:

Application level security might cost more than link level security in terms of administration and performance.

The cost of administration is almost certainly greater because there are potentially more constraints to configure and maintain. For example, you might need to ensure that a particular user sends only certain types of message and sends messages only to certain destinations. Conversely, you might need to ensure that a particular user receives only certain types of message and receives messages only from certain sources. Instead of managing the link level security services on a

single message channel, you might need to be configuring and maintaining rules for every pair of users who exchange messages across that channel.

There might be an impact on performance if security services are invoked every time an application puts or gets a message.

Organizations tend to consider link level security first because it might be easier to implement. They consider application level security if they discover that link level security does not satisfy all their requirements.

Availability of components:

As a general rule, in a distributed environment, a security service requires a component on at least two systems. For example, a message might be encrypted on one system and decrypted on another. This applies to both link level security and application level security.

In a heterogeneous environment, with different platforms in use, each with different levels of security function, the required components of a security service might not be available for every platform on which they are needed and in a form that is easy to use. This is probably more of an issue for application level security than for link level security, particularly if you intend to provide your own application level security by buying in components from various sources.

Messages in a dead letter queue:

If a message is protected by application level security, there might be a problem if, for any reason, the message does not reach its destination and is put on a dead letter queue. If you cannot work out how to process the message from the information in the message descriptor and the dead letter header, you might need to inspect the contents of the application data. You cannot do this if the application data is encrypted and only the intended recipient can decrypt it.

What application level security cannot do:

Application level security is not a complete solution. Even if you implement application level security, you might still require some link level security services. For example:

- When a channel starts, the mutual authentication of the two MCAs might still be a requirement. This can be done only by a link level security service.
- Application level security cannot protect the transmission queue header, MQXQH, which includes the embedded message descriptor. Nor can it protect the data in WebSphere MQ channel protocol flows other than message data. Only link level security can provide this protection.
- If application level security services are invoked at the server end of an MQI channel, the services cannot protect the parameters of MQI calls that are sent over the channel. In particular, the application data in an MQPUT, MQPUT1, or MQGET call is unprotected. Only link level security can provide the protection in this case.

Obtaining more information

Link level and application level security services are available for you to install, configure, and use. Some services are supplied with WebSphere MQ and WebSphere MQ base product extensions. The remainder are provided by other IBM products, vendor products, and the SNA LU 6.2 communications subsystem.

For more information about what is available for link level security, see:

- "WebSphere MQ support for SSL and TLS" on page 39
- "Other link level security services" on page 47

For application level security, see:

- "Access Manager for Business Integration" on page 64

You can also provide your own link level and application level security services by writing exit programs. This might involve significant effort in terms of developing and maintaining the exit programs. For more information, see:

- "Providing your own link level security" on page 57
- "Providing your own application level security" on page 70

Cryptographic concepts

This chapter describes the following concepts:

- "Cryptography"
- "Message digests" on page 13
- "Digital signatures" on page 13
- "Digital certificates" on page 14
- "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" on page 18

This chapter uses the term *entity* to refer to a queue manager, a WebSphere MQ client, an individual user, or any other system capable of exchanging messages.

Cryptography

Cryptography is the process of converting between readable text, called *plaintext*, and an unreadable form, called *ciphertext*:

1. The sender converts the plaintext message to ciphertext. This part of the process is called *encryption* (sometimes *encipherment*).
2. The ciphertext is transmitted to the receiver.
3. The receiver converts the ciphertext message back to its plaintext form. This part of the process is called *decryption* (sometimes *decipherment*).

The conversion involves a sequence of mathematical operations that change the appearance of the message during transmission but do not affect the content. Cryptographic techniques can ensure confidentiality and protect messages against unauthorized viewing (eavesdropping), because an encrypted message is not understandable. Digital signatures, which provide an assurance of message integrity, use encryption techniques. See "Digital signatures" on page 13 for more information.

Cryptographic techniques involve a general algorithm, made specific by the use of keys. There are two classes of algorithm:

- Those that require both parties to use the same secret key. Algorithms that use a shared key are known as *symmetric* algorithms. Figure 2 on page 12 illustrates symmetric key cryptography.
- Those that use one key for encryption and a different key for decryption. One of these must be kept secret but the other can be public. Algorithms that use public

and private key pairs are known as *asymmetric* algorithms. Figure 3 illustrates asymmetric key cryptography, which is also known as *public key cryptography*.

The encryption and decryption algorithms used can be public but the shared secret key and the private key must be kept secret.



Figure 2. Symmetric key cryptography



Figure 3. Asymmetric key cryptography

Figure 3 shows plaintext encrypted with the receiver's public key and decrypted with the receiver's private key. Only the intended receiver holds the private key for decrypting the ciphertext. Note that the sender can also encrypt messages with a private key, which allows anyone that holds the sender's public key to decrypt the message, with the assurance that the message must have come from the sender.

With asymmetric algorithms, messages are encrypted with either the public or the private key but can be decrypted only with the other key. Only the private key is secret, the public key can be known by anyone. With symmetric algorithms, the shared key must be known only to the two parties. This is called the *key distribution problem*. Asymmetric algorithms are slower but have the advantage that there is no key distribution problem.

Other terminology associated with cryptography is:

Strength
The strength of encryption is determined by the key size. Asymmetric algorithms require large keys, for example:

768 bits	Low-strength asymmetric key
1024 bits	Medium-strength asymmetric key
2048 bits	High-strength asymmetric key

Symmetric keys are smaller: 256 bit keys give you strong encryption.

Block cipher algorithm
These algorithms encrypt data by blocks. For example, the RC2 algorithm from RCA Data Security Inc. uses blocks 8 bytes long. Block algorithms are usually slower than stream algorithms.

Stream cipher algorithm
These algorithms operate on each byte of data. Stream algorithms are usually faster than block algorithms.

Message digests

Message digests are fixed size numeric representations of the contents of messages, which are inherently variable in size. A message digest is computed by a hash function, which is a transformation that meets two criteria:

- The hash function must be one-way. It must not be possible to reverse the function to find the message corresponding to a given message digest, other than by testing all possible messages.
- It must be computationally infeasible to find two messages that hash to the same digest.

A message digest is also known as a Message Authentication Code (MAC), because it can provide assurance that the message has not been modified. The message digest is sent with the message itself. The receiver can generate a digest for the message and compare it with the sender's digest. If the two digests are the same, this verifies the integrity of the message. Any tampering with the message during transmission almost certainly results in a different message digest.

Digital signatures

A digital signature is formed by encrypting a representation of a message. The encryption uses the private key of the signatory and, for efficiency, usually operates on a message digest rather than the message itself. See "Message digests" for more information.

Digital signatures vary with the data being signed, unlike handwritten signatures, which do not depend on the content of the document being signed. If two different messages are signed digitally by the same entity, the two signatures differ, but both signatures can be verified with the same public key, that is, the public key of the entity that signed the messages.

The steps of the digital signature process are as follows:

1. The sender computes a message digest and then encrypts the digest using the sender's private key, forming the digital signature.
2. The sender transmits the digital signature with the message.
3. The receiver decrypts the digital signature using the sender's public key, regenerating the sender's message digest.
4. The receiver computes a message digest from the message data received and verifies that the two digests are the same.

Figure 4 on page 14 illustrates this process.



Figure 4. The digital signature process

If the digital signature is verified, the receiver knows that:

- The message has not been modified during transmission.
- The message was sent by the entity that claims to have sent it.

Digital signatures are part of integrity and authentication services. Digital signatures also provide proof of origin. Only the sender knows the private key, which provides strong evidence that the sender is the originator of the message.

Note: You can also encrypt the message itself, which protects the confidentiality of the information in the message.

Digital certificates

Digital certificates provide protection against impersonation, because a digital certificate binds a public key to its owner, whether that owner is an individual, a queue manager, or some other entity. Digital certificates are also known as public key certificates, because they give you assurances about the ownership of a public key when you use an asymmetric key scheme. A digital certificate contains the public key for an entity and is a statement that the public key belongs to that entity:

- When the certificate is for an individual entity, the certificate is called a *personal certificate* or *user certificate*.
- When the certificate is for a Certification Authority, the certificate is called a *CA certificate* or *signer certificate*.

If public keys are sent directly by their owner to another entity, there is a risk that the message could be intercepted and the public key substituted by another. This is known as a *man in the middle attack*. The solution to this problem is to exchange public keys through a trusted third party, giving you a strong assurance that the public key really belongs to the entity with which you are communicating. Instead of sending your public key directly, you ask the trusted third party to incorporate it into a digital certificate. The trusted third party that issues digital certificates is called a Certification Authority (CA), as described in "Certification Authorities" on page 15.

This section provides the following information:

- "What is in a digital certificate" on page 15

- "Certification Authorities"
- "Distinguished Names" on page 16
- "How digital certificates work" on page 16

What is in a digital certificate

Digital certificates used by WebSphere MQ comply with the X.509 standard, which specifies the information that is required and the format for sending it. X.509 is the Authentication framework part of the X.500 series of standards. X.500 is the OSI Directory Standard.

Digital certificates contain at least the following information about the entity being certified:

- The owner's public key
- The owner's Distinguished Name
- The Distinguished Name of the CA that is issuing the certificate
- The date from which the certificate is valid
- The expiry date of the certificate
- A version number
- A serial number

When you receive a certificate from a CA, the certificate is signed by the issuing CA with a digital signature. You verify that signature by using a CA certificate, from which you obtain the public key for the CA. You can use the CA public key to validate other certificates issued by that authority. Recipients of your certificate use the CA public key to check the signature.

Digital certificates do not contain your private key. You must keep your private key secret.

Requirements for personal certificates

WebSphere MQ supports digital certificates that comply with the X.509 standard. Since MQ is a peer to peer system, in SSL terminology this is viewed as client authentication, which means that any personal certificate used for SSL authentication needs to allow a key usage of client authentication. Not all server certificates have this option enabled, so the certificate provider might need to enable client authentication on the root CA for the secure certificate.

Certification Authorities

A Certification Authority (CA) is an independent and trusted third party that issues digital certificates to provide you with an assurance that the public key of an entity truly belongs to that entity. The roles of a CA are:

- On receiving a request for a digital certificate, to verify the identity of the requestor before building, signing and returning the personal certificate
- To provide the CA's own public key in its CA certificate
- To publish lists of certificates that are no longer trusted in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). For more information, refer to "Working with Certificate Revocation Lists and Authority Revocation Lists" on page 127

Distinguished Names

The Distinguished Name (DN) uniquely identifies an entity in an X.509 certificate. The following attribute types are commonly found in the DN:

CN	Common Name
T	Title
O	Organization name
OU	Organizational Unit name
L	Locality name
ST (or SP™ or S)	State or Province name
C	Country

The X.509 standard defines other attributes that do not usually form part of the DN but can provide optional extensions to the digital certificate.

The X.509 standard provides for a DN to be specified in a string format. For example:

```
CN=John, O=IBM, OU=Test, C=GB
```

Any field within the DN that consists of more than one word requires quotes, either around the field contents or the entire DN. For example:

```
CN="John Smith", O=IBM, OU=Test, C=GB
```

or

```
"CN=John Smith, O=IBM, OU=Test, C=GB".
```

The Common Name (CN) can describe an individual user or any other entity, for example a Web server.

The DN can contain multiple OU attributes, but one instance only of each of the other attributes is permitted. The order of the OU entries is significant: the order specifies a hierarchy of Organizational Unit names, with the highest-level unit first.

How digital certificates work

You obtain a digital certificate by sending information to a CA. The X.509 standard defines a format for this information, but some CAs have their own format. Certificate requests are usually generated by the certificate management tool your system uses, for example the iKeyman tool on UNIX systems and RACF® on z/OS. The information comprises your Distinguished Name and is accompanied by your public key. When your certificate management tool generates your certificate request, it also generates your private key, which you must keep secure. Never distribute your private key.

When the CA receives your request, the authority verifies your identity before building the certificate and returning it to you as a personal certificate.

Obtaining personal certificates:

You obtain your personal certificate from a Certification Authority (CA).

When you obtain a certificate from a trusted external CA, you pay for the service. When you are testing your system, or you need only to protect internal messages, you can create self-signed certificates. These are created and signed by the

certificate management tool your system uses. Self-signed certificates cannot be used to authenticate certificates from outside your organization.

Figure 5 illustrates the process of obtaining a digital certificate from a CA.



Figure 5. Obtaining a digital certificate

How certificate chains work:

When you receive the certificate for another entity, you might need to use a *certificate chain* to obtain the *root CA* certificate. The certificate chain, also known as the *certification path*, is a list of certificates used to authenticate an entity. The chain, or path, begins with the certificate of that entity, and each certificate in the chain is signed by the entity identified by the next certificate in the chain. The chain terminates with a root CA certificate. The root CA certificate is always signed by the CA itself. The signatures of all certificates in the chain must be verified until the root CA certificate is reached. Figure 6 illustrates a certification path from the certificate owner to the root CA, where the chain of trust begins.



Figure 6. Chain of trust

When certificates are no longer valid:

Digital certificates are issued for a fixed period and are not valid after their expiry date. Certificates can also become untrustworthy for various reasons, including:

- The owner has moved to a different organization
- The private key is no longer secret

A Certification Authority can revoke a certificate that is no longer trusted by publishing it in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). For more information, refer to "Working with Certificate Revocation Lists and Authority Revocation Lists" on page 127.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a system of facilities, policies, and services that supports the use of public key cryptography for authenticating the parties involved in a transaction. There is no single standard that defines the components of a Public Key Infrastructure, but a PKI typically comprises Certification Authorities and other Registration Authorities (RAs) that provide the following services:

- Issuing digital certificates
- Validating digital certificates
- Revoking digital certificates
- Distributing public keys

The X.509 standard is a Public Key Infrastructure.

Refer to "Digital certificates" on page 14 for more information about digital certificates and Certification Authorities (CAs). RAs verify the information provided when digital certificates are requested. If the RA verifies that information, the CA can issue a digital certificate to the requester.

A PKI might also provide tools for managing digital certificates and public keys. A PKI is sometimes described as a *trust hierarchy* for managing digital certificates, but most definitions include additional services. Some definitions include encryption and digital signature services, but these are not essential to the operation of a PKI.

Cryptographic security protocols: TLS and SSL

Cryptographic protocols provide secure connections, enabling two parties to communicate with privacy and data integrity. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol evolved from that of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

Applications use TLS or SSL to establish secure connections between two communicating parties. The primary goal of both protocols is to provide privacy and data integrity. Other goals are as follows:

- Enabling interoperability between applications
- Providing an extensible framework that can readily incorporate new public key and bulk encryption methods
- Ensuring relative computational efficiency

Both TLS and SSL comprise two layers: a Record Protocol and a Handshake Protocol.

Although the two protocols are similar, the differences are sufficiently significant that SSL 3.0 and the various versions of TLS do not interoperate.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) concepts

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol enables two parties to communicate with privacy and data integrity. The TLS protocol evolved from the SSL 3.0 protocol but TLS and SSL do not interoperate.

The TLS protocol provides communications security over the internet, and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is private and reliable. The protocol has two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol, and these are layered above a transport protocol such as TCP/IP.

The TLS protocol evolved from the Netscape SSL 3.0 protocol. Although similar, TLS and SSL are not interoperable.

The TLS protocol applies when any of the following CipherSpecs are specified:

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MDS
- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MDS
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MDS
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_40_MDS

For more information about the TLS protocol, see the information provided by the TLS Working Group on the web site of the Internet Engineering Task Force at http://www.ietf.org.

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) concepts

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol enables two parties to communicate with privacy and data integrity. Although SSL and TLS are similar, the two protocols do not interoperate.

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) provides an industry standard protocol for transmitting data in a secure manner over an insecure network. The SSL protocol is widely deployed in both Internet and Intranet applications. SSL defines methods for authentication, data encryption, and message integrity for a reliable transport protocol, usually TCP/IP. SSL uses both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography techniques. Refer to the following web site for a complete description of the SSL protocol: http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/

An SSL connection is initiated by the caller application, which becomes the SSL client. The responder application becomes the SSL server. Every new SSL session begins with an SSL handshake, as defined by the SSL protocol.

Note that SSL does not provide any formal access control service, because SSL operates at the link level.

An overview of the SSL handshake

The SSL handshake enables the SSL client and SSL server to establish the secret keys with which they communicate.

This section provides a summary of the steps that enable the SSL client and SSL server to communicate with each other:

- Agree on the version of the SSL protocol to use.
- Select cryptographic algorithms.
- Authenticate each other by exchanging and validating digital certificates.
- Use asymmetric encryption techniques to generate a shared secret key, which avoids the key distribution problem. SSL subsequently uses the shared key for the symmetric encryption of messages, which is faster than asymmetric encryption.

For more information about cryptographic algorithms and digital certificates, refer to the related information.

This section does not attempt to provide full details of the messages exchanged during the SSL handshake. In overview, the steps involved in the SSL handshake are as follows:

1. The SSL client sends a "client hello" message that lists cryptographic information such as the SSL version and, in the client's order of preference, the CipherSuites supported by the client. The message also contains a random byte string that is used in subsequent computations. The SSL protocol allows for the "client hello" to include the data compression methods supported by the client, but current SSL implementations do not usually include this provision.
2. The SSL server responds with a "server hello" message that contains the CipherSuite chosen by the server from the list provided by the SSL client, the session ID and another random byte string. The SSL server also sends its digital certificate. If the server requires a digital certificate for client authentication, the server sends a "client certificate request" that includes a list of the types of certificates supported and the Distinguished Names of acceptable Certification Authorities (CAs).
3. The SSL client verifies the digital signature on the SSL server's digital certificate and checks that the CipherSuite chosen by the server is acceptable.
4. The SSL client sends the random byte string that enables both the client and the server to compute the secret key to be used for encrypting subsequent message data. The random byte string itself is encrypted with the server's public key.
5. If the SSL server sent a "client certificate request", the SSL client sends a random byte string encrypted with the client's private key, together with the client's digital certificate, or a "no digital certificate alert". This alert is only a warning, but with some implementations the handshake fails if client authentication is mandatory.
6. The SSL server verifies the signature on the client certificate.
7. The SSL client sends the SSL server a "finished" message, which is encrypted with the secret key, indicating that the client part of the handshake is complete.
8. The SSL server sends the SSL client a "finished" message, which is encrypted with the secret key, indicating that the server part of the handshake is complete.
9. For the duration of the SSL session, the SSL server and SSL client can now exchange messages that are symmetrically encrypted with the shared secret key.

Figure 7 on page 21 illustrates the SSL handshake.



Figure 7. Overview of the SSL handshake

How SSL provides authentication

During both client and server authentication there is a step that requires data to be encrypted with one of the keys in an asymmetric key pair and decrypted with the other key of the pair.

For server authentication, the client uses the server's public key to encrypt the data that is used to compute the secret key. The server can generate the secret key only if it can decrypt that data with the correct private key.

For client authentication, the server uses the public key in the client certificate to decrypt the data the client sends during step 5 on page 20 of the handshake. The exchange of finished messages that are encrypted with the secret key (steps 7 on page 20 and 8 on page 20 in the overview) confirms that authentication is complete.

If any of the authentication steps fail, the handshake fails and the session terminates.

The exchange of digital certificates during the SSL handshake is part of the authentication process. For more information about how certificates provide protection against impersonation, refer to the related information. The certificates required are as follows, where CA `X` issues the certificate to the SSL client, and CA `Y` issues the certificate to the SSL server:

For server authentication only, the SSL server needs:

- The personal certificate issued to the server by CA `Y`

- The server's private key

and the SSL client needs:

- The CA certificate for CA `Y` or the personal certificate issued to the server by CA `Y`

If the SSL server requires client authentication, the server verifies the client's identity by verifying the client's digital certificate with the public key for the CA that issued the personal certificate to the client, in this case CA `X`. For both server and client authentication, the SSL server needs:

- The personal certificate issued to the server by CA `Y`
- The server's private key
- The CA certificate for CA `X` or the personal certificate issued to the client by CA `X`

and the SSL client needs:

- The personal certificate issued to the client by CA `X`
- The client's private key
- The CA certificate for CA `Y` or the personal certificate issued to the server by CA `Y`

Both the SSL server and the SSL client might need other CA certificates to form a certificate chain to the root CA certificate. For more information about certificate chains, refer to the related information.

How SSL provides confidentiality

SSL uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption to ensure message privacy. During the SSL handshake, the SSL client and SSL server agree an encryption algorithm and a shared secret key to be used for one session only. All messages transmitted between the SSL client and SSL server are encrypted using that algorithm and key, ensuring that the message remains private even if it is intercepted. SSL supports a wide range of cryptographic algorithms. Because SSL uses asymmetric encryption when transporting the shared secret key, there is no key distribution problem with SSL. For more information about encryption techniques, refer to "Cryptography" on page 11.

How SSL provides integrity

SSL provides data integrity by calculating a message digest. For more information, refer to "Data integrity" on page 62.

CipherSuites and CipherSpecs

Cryptographic security protocols must agree the algorithms used by a secure connection. CipherSuites and CipherSpecs define specific combinations of algorithms.

A CipherSuite is a suite of cryptographic algorithms used by an SSL connection. A suite comprises three distinct algorithms:

- The key exchange and authentication algorithm, used during the SSL handshake
- The encryption algorithm, used to encipher the data
- The MAC (Message Authentication Code) algorithm, used to generate the message digest

There are several options for each component of the suite, but only certain combinations are valid when specified for an SSL connection. The name of a valid CipherSuite defines the combination of algorithms used. For example, the CipherSuite SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 specifies:

- The RSA key exchange and authentication algorithm
- The RC4 encryption algorithm, using a 128–bit key
- The MD5 MAC algorithm

Several algorithms are available for key exchange and authentication, but the RSA algorithm is currently the most widely used. There is more variety in the encryption algorithms and MAC algorithms that are used.

A CipherSpec identifies the combination of the encryption algorithm and MAC algorithm. Both ends of an SSL connection must agree the same CipherSpec to be able to communicate.

For more information about CipherSpecs, see the related information.

Security protocols in WebSphere MQ

WebSphere MQ supports both the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols to provide link level security for message channels and MQI channels.

Message channels and MQI channels can use the SSL protocol to provide link level security. A caller MCA is an SSL client and a responder MCA is an SSL server. WebSphere MQ supports Version 3.0 of the SSL protocol. You specify the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the SSL protocol by supplying a CipherSpec as part of the channel definition.

WebSphere MQ also supports Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

At each end of a message channel, and at the server end of an MQI channel, the MCA acts on behalf of the queue manager to which it is connected. During the SSL handshake, the MCA sends the digital certificate of the queue manager to its partner MCA at the other end of the channel. The WebSphere MQ code at the client end of an MQI channel acts on behalf of the user of the WebSphere MQ client application. During the SSL handshake, the WebSphere MQ code sends the user's digital certificate to the MCA at the server end of the MQI channel.

Note that queue managers and WebSphere MQ client users are not required to have personal digital certificates associated with them when they are acting as SSL clients, unless SSLCAUTH(REQUIRED) is specified at the server side of the channel.

Digital certificates are stored in a *key repository*. The queue manager attribute *SSLKeyRepository* specifies the location of the key repository that holds the queue manager's digital certificate. On a WebSphere MQ client system, the MQSSLKEYR environment variable specifies the location of the key repository that holds the user's digital certificate. Alternatively, a WebSphere MQ client application can specify its location in the *KeyRepository* field of the SSL configuration options structure, MQSCO, on an MQCONNX call. Refer to the WebSphere MQ support for more information about key repositories and how to specify where they are located.

Chapter 2. WebSphere MQ security provisions

This part describes the security services provided by WebSphere MQ:

- "Access control"
- "WebSphere MQ support for SSL and TLS" on page 39
- "Other link level security services" on page 47
- "Access Manager for Business Integration" on page 64
- "Providing your own link level security" on page 57
- "Providing your own application level security" on page 70

Access control

This section introduces the access control mechanisms that are provided by WebSphere MQ. It contains the following sections:

- "Authority to administer WebSphere MQ"
- "Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects" on page 29
- "Channel security" on page 37

Authority to administer WebSphere MQ

WebSphere MQ administrators need authority to:

- Issue commands to administer WebSphere MQ
- Use the WebSphere MQ Explorer
- Use the operations and control panels on z/OS
- Use the WebSphere MQ utility program, CSQUTIL, on z/OS
- Access the queue manager data sets on z/OS

Authority to administer WebSphere MQ on UNIX and Windows systems

To be a WebSphere MQ administrator on UNIX and Windows systems, you must be a member of the *mqm group*. This group is created automatically when you install WebSphere MQ. To allow users to perform administration, you must add them to the mqm group. This includes the root user on UNIX systems.

All members of the mqm group have access to all WebSphere MQ resources on the system, including being able to administer any queue manager running on the system. This access can be revoked only by removing a user from the mqm group. On Windows systems, members of the Administrators group also have access to all WebSphere MQ resources.

Administrators can use control commands to administer WebSphere MQ. One of these control commands is **setmqaut**, which is used to grant authorities to other users to enable them to access WebSphere MQ resources.

Administrators can use the control command **runmqsc** to issue WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) commands. When **runmqsc** is used in indirect mode to send MQSC commands to a remote queue manager, each MQSC command is encapsulated

within an Escape PCF command. Administrators must have the required authorities for the MQSC commands to be processed by the remote queue manager.

The WebSphere MQ Explorer issues PCF commands to perform administration tasks. Administrators require no additional authorities to use the WebSphere MQ Explorer to administer a queue manager on the local system. When the WebSphere MQ Explorer is used to administer a queue manager on another system, administrators must have the required authorities for the PCF commands to be processed by the remote queue manager.

For more information about authority checks when PCF and MQSC commands are processed, see the following:

- For PCF commands that operate on queue managers, queues, processes, namelists, and authentication information objects, see "Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects" on page 29. Refer to this section for the equivalent MQSC commands encapsulated within Escape PCF commands.
- For PCF commands that operate on channels, channel initiators, listeners, and clusters, see "Channel security" on page 37. Refer to this section for the equivalent MQSC commands encapsulated within Escape PCF commands.
- For MQSC commands that are processed by the command server on WebSphere MQ for z/OS, see "Command security and command resource security" on page 28.

For more information about the authority you need to administer WebSphere MQ on UNIX and Windows systems, see the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

Authority to administer WebSphere MQ on i5/OS

To be a WebSphere MQ administrator on i5/OS, you must be a member of the *QMQMADM group*. This group has properties similar to those of the mqm group on UNIX and Windows systems. In particular, the QMQMADM group is created when you install WebSphere MQ for i5/OS, and members of the QMQMADM group have access to all WebSphere MQ resources on the system. You also have access to all WebSphere MQ resources if you have *ALLOBJ authority.

Administrators can use CL commands to administer WebSphere MQ. One of these commands is GRTMQMAUT, which is used to grant authorities to other users. Another command, STRMQMMQSC, enables an administrator to issue MQSC commands to a local queue manager.

There are two groups of CL command provided by WebSphere MQ for i5/OS:

Group 1
To issue a command in this category, a user must be a member of the QMQMADM group or have *ALLOBJ authority. GRTMQMAUT and STRMQMMQSC belong to this category, for example.

Group 2
To issue a command in this category, a user does not need to be a member of the QMQMADM group or have *ALLOBJ authority. Instead, two levels of authority are required:

- The user requires i5/OS authority to use the command. This authority is granted by using the GRTOBJAUT command.

- The user requires WebSphere MQ authority to access any WebSphere MQ object associated with the command. This authority is granted by using the GRTMQMAUT command.

The following are examples of commands in this group:

- CRTMQMQ, Create MQM Queue
- CHGMQMPRC, Change MQM Process
- DLTMQMNL, Delete MQM Namelist
- DSPMQMAUTI, Display MQM Authentication Information
- CRTMQMCHL, Create MQM channel

For more information about this group of commands, see "Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects" on page 29.

For more information about the authority you need to administer WebSphere MQ on i5/OS, see WebSphere MQ for i5/OS System Administration Guide.

Authority to administer WebSphere MQ on z/OS

The following sections describe various aspects of the authority you need to administer WebSphere MQ for z/OS.

Authority checks on z/OS:

WebSphere MQ uses the System Authorization Facility (SAF) to route requests for authority checks to an external security manager (ESM) such as the z/OS Security Server Resource Access Control Facility (RACF). WebSphere MQ does no authority checks of its own.

This book assumes that you are using RACF as your ESM. If you are using a different ESM, you might need to interpret the information provided for RACF in a way that is relevant to your ESM.

You can specify whether you want authority checks turned on or off for each queue manager individually or for every queue manager in a queue-sharing group. This level of control is called *subsystem security*. If you turn subsystem security off for a particular queue manager, no authority checks are carried out for that queue manager.

If you turn subsystem security on for a particular queue manager, authority checks can be performed at two levels:

Queue-sharing group level security
Authority checks use RACF profiles that are shared by all queue managers in the queue-sharing group. This means that there are fewer profiles to define and maintain, making security administration easier.

Queue manager level security
Authority checks use RACF profiles specific to the queue manager.

You can use a combination of queue-sharing group and queue manager level security. For example, you can arrange for profiles specific to a queue manager to override those of the queue-sharing group to which it belongs.

Subsystem security, queue-sharing group level security, and queue manager level security are turned on or off by defining *switch profiles*. A switch profile is a normal RACF profile that has a special meaning to WebSphere MQ.

Command security and command resource security:

Authority checks are carried out when a WebSphere MQ administrator issues an MQSC command. This is called *command security*.

To implement command security, you must define certain RACF profiles and give the necessary groups and user IDs access to these profiles at the required levels. The name of a profile for command security contains the name of an MQSC command.

Some MQSC commands perform an operation on a WebSphere MQ resource, such as the DEFINE QLOCAL command to create a local queue. When an administrator issues an MQSC command, authority checks are carried out to determine whether the requested operation can be performed on the resource specified in the command. This is called *command resource security*.

To implement command resource security, you must define certain RACF profiles and give the necessary groups and user IDs access to these profiles at the required levels. The name of a profile for command resource security contains the name of a WebSphere MQ resource and its type (QUEUE, PROCESS, NAMELIST, TOPIC, AUTHINFO, or CHANNEL).

Command security and command resource security are independent. For example, when an administrator issues the command:

```
DEFINE QLOCAL(MOON.EUROPA)
```

the following authority checks are performed:

- Command security checks that the administrator is authorized to issue the DEFINE QLOCAL command.
- Command resource security checks that the administrator is authorized to perform an operation on the local queue called MOON.EUROPA.

Command security and command resource security can be turned on or off by defining switch profiles.

MQSC commands and the system command input queue:

Command security and command resource security are also used when the command server retrieves a message containing an MQSC command from the system command input queue. The user ID that is used for the authority checks is the one found in the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor of the message containing the MQSC command. This user ID must have the required authorities on the queue manager where the command is processed. For more information about the *UserIdentifier* field and how it is set, see "Message context" on page 32.

Messages containing MQSC commands are sent to the system command input queue in the following circumstances:

- The operations and control panels send MQSC commands to the system command input queue of the target queue manager. The MQSC commands correspond to the actions you choose on the panels. The *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the TSO user ID of the administrator.
- The COMMAND function of the WebSphere MQ utility program, CSQUTIL, sends the MQSC commands in the input data set to the system command input queue of the target queue manager. The COPY and EMPTY functions send

DISPLAY QUEUE and DISPLAY STGCLASS commands. The *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the job user ID.

- The MQSC commands in the CSQINPX data sets are sent to the system command input queue of the queue manager to which the channel initiator is connected. The *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the channel initiator address space user ID.

  No authority checks are performed when MQSC commands are issued from the CSQINP1 and CSQINP2 data sets. You can control who is allowed to update these data sets using RACF data set protection.
- Within a queue-sharing group, a channel initiator might send START CHANNEL commands to the system command input queue of the queue manager to which it is connected. A command is sent when an outbound channel that uses a shared transmission queue is started by triggering. The *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the channel initiator address space user ID.
- An application can send MQSC commands to a system command input queue. By default, the *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the user ID associated with the application.
- On UNIX and Windows systems, the **runmqsc** control command can be used in indirect mode to send MQSC commands to the system command input queue of a queue manager on z/OS. The *UserIdentifier* field in each message is set to the user ID of the administrator who issued the **runmqsc** command.

Access to the queue manager data sets:

WebSphere MQ administrators need authority to access the queue manager data sets. These data sets include:

- The data sets referred to by CSQINP1, CSQINP2, and CSQXLIB in the queue manager's started task procedure
- The queue manager's page sets, active log data sets, archive log data sets, and bootstrap data sets (BSDSs)
- The data sets referred to by CSQXLIB and CSQINPX in the channel initiator's started task procedure

You must protect the data sets so that no unauthorized user can start a queue manager or gain access to any queue manager data. To do this, use RACF data set protection.

Obtaining more information:

For more information about the authority you need to administer WebSphere MQ on z/OS, see the WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide.

Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects

Applications can access the following WebSphere MQ objects by issuing MQI calls:

- Queue managers
- Queues
- Processes
- Namelists
- Topics

Applications can also use PCF commands to access these WebSphere MQ objects, and to access channels and authentication information objects as well. These

objects are protected by WebSphere MQ and the user IDs associated with the applications need authority to access them.

Applications, in this context, include those written by users and vendors, and those supplied with WebSphere MQ for z/OS. The applications supplied with WebSphere MQ for z/OS include:

- The operations and control panels
- The WebSphere MQ utility program, CSQUTIL
- The dead letter queue handler utility, CSQUDLQH

Applications that use the Application Messaging Interface (AMI), WebSphere MQ classes for Java™, or WebSphere MQ classes for Java Message Service (JMS) still use the MQI indirectly.

MCAs also issue MQI calls and the user IDs associated with the MCAs need authority to access these WebSphere MQ objects. For more information about these user IDs and the authorities they require, see "Channel security" on page 37.

On z/OS, applications can also use MQSC commands to access these WebSphere MQ objects but command security and command resource security provide the authority checks in these circumstances. For more information, see "Command security and command resource security" on page 28 and "MQSC commands and the system command input queue" on page 28.

On i5/OS, a user that issues a CL command in Group 2 might require authority to access a WebSphere MQ object associated with the command. For more information, see "When authority checks are performed."

When authority checks are performed

Authority checks are performed when an application attempts to access a WebSphere MQ object that is a queue manager, queue, process, or namelist. On i5/OS, authority checks might also be performed when a user issues a CL command in Group 2 that accesses any of these WebSphere MQ objects. The checks are performed in the following circumstances:

When an application connects to a queue manager using an MQCONN or MQCONNX call

The queue manager asks the operating system for the user ID associated with the application. The queue manager then checks that the user ID is authorized to connect to it and retains the user ID for future checks.

When an application opens a WebSphere MQ object using an MQOPEN or MQPUT1 call

All authority checks are performed when an object is opened, not when it is accessed subsequently. For example, authority checks are performed when an application opens a queue, but not when the application puts messages on the queue or gets messages from the queue.

When an application opens an object, it specifies the types of operation it needs to perform on the object. For example, an application might open a queue to browse the messages on it, get messages from it, but not to put messages on it. For each type of operation the application specifies, the queue manager checks that the user ID associated with the application has the authority to perform that operation.

When an application opens a queue, the authority checks are performed against the object named in the *ObjectName* field of the object descriptor used on the MQOPEN or MQPUT1 call. If the object is an alias queue or a remote queue definition, the authority checks are performed against the object itself, not the queue to which the alias queue or the remote queue definition resolves.

If an application references a remote queue explicitly by setting the *ObjectName* and *ObjectQMgrName* fields in the object descriptor to the names of the remote queue and the remote queue manager respectively, the authority checks are performed against the transmission queue with the same name as the remote queue manager. If an application references a cluster queue explicitly by setting the *ObjectName* field in the object descriptor to the name of the cluster queue, the authority checks are performed against the cluster transmission queue, SYSTEM.CLUSTER.TRANSMIT.QUEUE.

The user ID that the queue manager uses for the authority checks is the user ID obtained from the operating system when the application connects to the queue manager.

When an application subscribes to a topic using an MQSUB call

When an application subscribes to a topic, it specifies the type of operation that it needs to perform. It will either be creating a new subscription, altering an existing subscription, or resuming an existing subscription without making any changes to it. For each type of operation, the queue manager checks that the user ID that is associated with the application has the authority to perform the operation.

When an application subscribes to a topic, the authority checks are performed against the topic objects that are found in the topic tree at, or above, the point in the topic tree at which the application subscribed. The authority checks might involve checks on more than one topic object.

The user ID that the queue manager uses for the authority checks is the user ID obtained from the operating system when the application connects to the queue manager.

The queue manager performs authority checks on subscriber queues but not on managed queues.

When an application deletes a permanent dynamic queue using an MQCLOSE call

If the object handle specified on the MQCLOSE call is not the one returned by the MQOPEN call that created the permanent dynamic queue, the queue manager checks that the user ID associated with the application that issued the MQCLOSE call is authorized to delete the queue.

When an application closes a subscription to remove it but the application did not create it, the appropriate authority is required to remove it.

When a PCF command that operates on a WebSphere MQ object is processed by the command server

This includes the case where a PCF command operates on an authentication information object.

The user ID that is used for the authority checks is the one found in the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor of the PCF command. This user ID must have the required authorities on the queue manager where the command is processed. The equivalent MQSC command encapsulated

within an Escape PCF command is treated in the same way. For more information about the *UserIdentifier* field and how it is set, see "Message context."

On i5/OS, when a user issues a CL command in Group 2 that operates on a WebSphere MQ object

This includes the case where a CL command in Group 2 operates on an authentication information object.

Unless the user is a member of the QMQMADM group or has *ALLOBJ authority, checks are performed to determine whether the user has the authority to operate on a WebSphere MQ object associated with the command. The authority required depends on the type of operation that the command performs on the object. For example, the command CHGMQMQ, Change MQM Queue, requires the authority to change the attributes of the queue specified by the command. In contrast, the command DSPMQMQ, Display MQM Queue, requires the authority to display the attributes of the queue specified by the command.

Many commands operate on more than one object. For example, to issue the command DLTMQMQ, Delete MQM Queue, the following authorities are required:

- The authority to connect to the queue manager specified by the command
- The authority to delete the queue specified by the command

Some commands operate on no object at all. In this case, the user requires only i5/OS authority to issue one of these commands. STRMQMLSR, Start MQM Listener, is an example of such a command.

Alternate user authority

When an application opens an object or subscribes to a topic, the application can supply a user ID on the MQOPEN, MQPUT1 or MQSUB call and ask the queue manager to use this user ID for authority checks instead of the one associated with the application. The application succeeds in opening the object only if both the following conditions are met:

- The user ID associated with the application has the authority to supply a different user ID for authority checks. The application is said to have *alternate user authority*.
- The user ID supplied by the application has the authority to open the object for the types of operation requested, or to subscribe to the topic.

Message context

Message context information allows the application that retrieves a message to find out about the originator of the message. The information is held in fields in the message descriptor and the fields are divided into:

identity context

These fields contain information about the user of the application that put the message on the queue.

origin context

These fields contain information about the application itself and when the message was put on the queue.

user context
These fields contain message properties that applications can use to select messages that the queue manager should deliver.

When an application puts a message on a queue, the application can ask the queue manager to generate the context information in the message. This is the default action. Alternatively, it can specify that the context fields are to contain no information. The user ID associated with an application requires no special authority to do either of these.

An application can set the identity context fields in a message, allowing the queue manager to generate the origin context, or it can set all the context fields. An application can also pass the identity context fields from a message it has retrieved to a message it is putting on a queue, or it can pass all the context fields. However, the user ID associated with an application requires authority to set or pass context information. An application specifies that it intends to set or pass context information when it opens the queue on which it is about to put messages, and its authority is checked at this time.

Here is a brief description of each of the context fields:

Identity context

UserIdentifier
The user ID associated with the application that put the message. If the queue manager sets this field, it is set to the user ID obtained from the operating system when the application connects to the queue manager.

AccountingToken
Information that can be used to charge for the work done as a result of the message.

ApplIdentityData
If the user ID associated with an application has authority to set the identity context fields, or to set all the context fields, the application can set this field to any value related to identity. If the queue manager sets this field, it is set to blank.

Origin context

PutApplType
The type of the application that put the message; a CICS® transaction, for example.

PutApplName
The name of the application that put the message.

PutDate
The date when the message was put.

PutTime
The time when the message was put.

ApplOriginData
If the user ID associated with an application has authority to set all the context fields, the application can set this field to any value related to origin. If the queue manager sets this field, it is set to blank.

User context

The following values are supported for MQINQMP or MQSETMP:

MQPD_USER _CONTEXT

The property is associated with the user context.

No special authorization is required to be able to set a property associated with the user context using the MQSETMP call.

On a V7.0 or subsequent queue manager, a property associated with the user context is saved as described for MQOO_SAVE_ALL_CONTEXT in *WebSphere MQ Using Java*. An MQPUT with MQOO_PASS_ALL_CONTEXT specified causes the property to be copied from the saved context into the new message.

MQPD_NO_CONTEXT

The property is not associated with a message context.

An unrecognized value is rejected with MQRC_PD_ERROR. The initial value of this field is MQPD_NO_CONTEXT.

For a detailed description of each of the context fields, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Reference. For more information about how to use message context, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects on i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems

On i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems, the *authorization service* provides the access control when an application issues an MQI call to access a WebSphere MQ object that is a queue manager, queue, process, topic or namelist. This includes checks for alternate user authority and the authority to set or pass context information.

As with other versions of Windows, the OAM gives members of the Administrators group the authority to access all MQ objects even when UAC is enabled on Windows Vista.

The authorization service also provides authority checks when a PCF command operates on one of these WebSphere MQ objects or an authentication information object. The equivalent MQSC command encapsulated within an Escape PCF command is treated in the same way.

On i5/OS, unless the user is a member of the QMQMADM group or has *ALLOBJ authority, the authorization service also provides authority checks when a user issues a CL command in Group 2 that operates on any of these WebSphere MQ objects or an authentication information object.

The authorization service is an *installable service*, which means that it is implemented by one or more *installable service components*. Each component is invoked using a documented interface. This enables users and vendors to provide components to augment or replace those provided by the WebSphere MQ products.

The authorization service component provided with WebSphere MQ is called the *Object Authority Manager (OAM)*. The OAM is automatically enabled for each queue manager you create.

The OAM maintains an access control list (ACL) for each WebSphere MQ object it is controlling access to. On UNIX systems, only group IDs can appear in an ACL. This means that all members of a group have the same authorities. On i5/OS and on Windows systems, both user IDs and group IDs can appear in an ACL. This means that authorities can be granted to individual users as well as to groups.

The OAM can authenticate a user and change appropriate identity context fields. You enable this by specifying a connection security parameters structure (MQCSP) on an MQCONNX call. The structure is passed to the OAM Authenticate User function (MQZ_AUTHENTICATE_USER), which sets appropriate identity context fields. In the case of an MQCONNX connection from a WebSphere MQ client, the information in the MQCSP is flowed to the queue manager to which the client is connecting over the client-connection and server-connection channel. If security exits are defined on that channel, the MQCSP is passed into each security exit and can be altered by the exit. Security exits can also create the MQCSP. For more details of the use of security exits in this context, see "Channel-exit programs", in the WebSphere MQ Intercommunication manual.

On UNIX and Windows systems, the control command **setmqaut** grants and revokes authorities and is used to maintain the ACLs. For example, the command:

```
setmqaut -m JUPITER -t queue -n MOON.EUROPA -g VOYAGER +browse +get
```

allows the members of the group VOYAGER to browse messages on the queue MOON.EUROPA that is owned by the queue manager JUPITER. It allows the members to get messages from the queue as well. To revoke these authorities subsequently, enter the following command:

```
setmqaut -m JUPITER -t queue -n MOON.EUROPA -g VOYAGER -browse -get
```

The command:

```
setmqaut -m JUPITER -t queue -n MOON.* -g VOYAGER +put
```

allows the members of the group VOYAGER to put messages on any queue whose name commences with the characters `MOON.` . MOON.* is the name of a generic profile. A *generic profile* allows you to grant authorities for a set of objects using a single **setmqaut** command. Objects whose names match the profile name do not have to exist when the **setmqaut** command is issued. Using generic profiles, therefore, allows you to grant authorities for objects that you might create in the future. For more information about the **setmqaut** command, see the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

The control command **dspmqaut** is available to display the current authorities that a user or group has for a specified object. The control command **dmpmqaut** is also available to display the current authorities associated with generic profiles. For more information about the **dspmqaut** and **dmpmqaut** commands, see the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

On i5/OS, an administrator uses the CL command GRTMQMAUT to grant authorities and the CL command RVKMQMAUT to revoke authorities. Generic profiles can be used as well. For example, the CL command:

```
GRTMQMAUT MQMNAME(JUPITER) OBJTYPE(*Q) OBJ('MOON.*') USER(VOYAGER) AUT(*PUT)
```

provides the same function as the previous example of a **setmqaut** command; it allows the members of the group VOYAGER to put messages on any queue whose name commences with the characters `MOON.` .

The CL command DSPMQMAUT displays the current authorities that user or group has for a specified object. The CL commands WRKMQMAUT and WRKMQMAUTD are also available to work with the current authorities associated with objects and generic profiles.

If you do not want any authority checks, for example, in a test environment, you can disable the OAM.

For more information about the authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects, see:

- WebSphere MQ for i5/OS System Administration Guide
- WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide, for UNIX and Windows systems

Using PCF to access OAM commands:

On i5/OS, UNIX, and Windows systems, you can use PCF commands to access OAM administration commands. The PCF commands and their equivalent OAM commands are as follows:

Table 1. PCF commands and their equivalent OAM commands

PCF command	OAM command
Inquire Authority Records	dmpmqaut
Inquire Entity Authority	dspmqaut
Set Authority Record	setmqaut
Delete Authority Record	setmqaut with -remove option

For more information on using these commands, see the WebSphere MQ Programmable Command Formats and Administration Interface book.

Authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects on z/OS

On z/OS, there are seven categories of authority check associated with calls to the MQI:

Connection security
The authority checks that are performed when an application connects to a queue manager

Queue security
The authority checks that are performed when an application opens a queue or deletes a permanent dynamic queue

Process security
The authority checks that are performed when an application opens a process object

Namelist security
The authority checks that are performed when an application opens a namelist object

Alternate user security
The authority checks that are performed when an application requests alternate user authority when opening an object

Context security
The authority checks that are performed when an application opens a queue and specifies that it intends to set or pass the context information in the messages it puts on the queue

Topic security
The authority checks that are performed when an application opens a topic

Each category of authority check is implemented in the same way that command security and command resource security are implemented. You must define certain RACF profiles and give the necessary groups and user IDs access to these profiles at the required levels. For queue security, the level of access determines the types of operation the application can perform on a queue. For context security, the level of access determines whether the application can:

- Pass all the context fields
- Pass all the context fields and set the identity context fields
- Pass and set all the context fields

Each category of authority check can be turned on or off by defining switch profiles.

All the categories, except connection security, are known collectively as *API-resource security*.

By default, when an API-resource security check is performed as a result of an MQI call from an application using a batch connection, only one user ID is checked. When a check is performed as a result of an MQI call from a CICS or IMS™ application, or from the channel initiator, two user IDs are checked.

By defining a *RESLEVEL profile*, however, you can control whether zero, one, or two users IDs are checked. The number of user IDs that are checked is determined by the user ID associated with the type of connection when an application connects to the queue manager and the access level that user ID has to the RESLEVEL profile. The user ID associated with each type of connection is:

- The user ID of the connecting task for batch connections
- The CICS address space user ID for CICS connections
- The IMS region address space user ID for IMS connections
- The channel initiator address space user ID for channel initiator connections

For more information about the authority to work with WebSphere MQ objects on z/OS, see the WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide.

Channel security

The user IDs associated with message channel agents (MCAs) need authority to access various WebSphere MQ resources.

An MCA must be able to connect to a queue manager and open the dead letter queue. If it is a sending MCA, it must be able to open the transmission queue for the channel. If it is a receiving MCA, it must be able to open destination queues and set context information in the messages it puts on those queues.

If the PUTAUT parameter is set to CTX (or ALTMCA on z/OS) in the channel definition at the receiving end of a channel, the user ID in the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor of each incoming message needs authority to open the destination queue for the message. In addition, the user ID associated with the receiving MCA needs alternate user authority to open the destination queue using the authority of a different user ID.

On an MQI channel, the user ID associated with the server connection MCA needs authority to issue MQI calls on behalf of the client application.

The user ID that is used for authority checks depends on whether the MCA is connecting to a queue manager or accessing queue manager resources after it has connected to a queue manager:

The user ID for connecting to a queue manager

On i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems, the user ID whose authority is checked when an MCA connects to a queue manager is the one under which the MCA is running. This is known as the *default user ID* of the MCA. The default user ID might be derived in various ways. Here are some examples:

- If a caller MCA is started by a channel initiator, the MCA runs under the same user ID as that of the channel initiator. This user ID might be derived in various ways. For example, if the channel initiator is started by using the WebSphere MQ Explorer, it runs under the MUSER_MQADMIN user ID. This user ID is created when you install WebSphere MQ for Windows and is a member of the mqm group.
- If a responder MCA is started by a WebSphere MQ listener, the MCA runs under the same user ID as that of the listener.
- If the communications protocol for the channel is TCP/IP and a responder MCA is started by the inet daemon, the MCA runs under the user ID obtained from the entry in the inetd.conf file that was used to start the MCA.
- If the communications protocol for the channel is SNA LU 6.2, a responder MCA might run under the user ID contained in the inbound attach request, or under the user ID specified in the transaction program (TP) definition for the MCA.

After an MCA has connected to a queue manager, it accesses certain queue manager resources as part of its initialization processing. The default user ID of the MCA is also used for the authority checks when it opens these resources. To enable the MCA to access these resources, you must ensure that the default user ID is a member of the QMQMADM group on i5/OS, the mqm group on UNIX and Windows systems, or the Administrators group on Windows systems.

On z/OS, every task in the channel initiator address space that needs to connect to the queue manager does so when the channel initiator address space is started. This includes the dispatcher tasks that run as MCAs. The channel initiator address space user ID is used to check the authority of a task to connect to the queue manager.

The user ID for subsequent authority checks

After an MCA has connected to a queue manager, the user ID whose authority is checked when the MCA accesses queue manager resources subsequently might be different from the one that was checked when the MCA connected to the queue manager. In addition, on z/OS, zero, one, or two user IDs might be checked, depending on the access level of the

channel initiator address space user ID to the RESLEVEL profile. Here are some examples of other user IDs that might be used:

- The value of the MCAUSER parameter in the channel definition
- For a channel to which the PUTAUT parameter applies, if PUTAUT is set to CTX (or, on z/OS only, ALTMCA), the user ID in the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor of each incoming message
- For a server connection MCA, the user ID that is received from a client system when a WebSphere MQ client application issues an MQCONN call

The user ID actually used is displayed on the channel status.

On z/OS, the channel initiator address space user ID needs authority to open certain system queues, such as SYSTEM.CHANNEL.INITQ, independently of the MCAs that are running in the address space.

For more information about channel security, see:

- WebSphere MQ for i5/OS System Administration Guide
- WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide, for UNIX and Windows systems
- WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide
- WebSphere MQ Clients, for MQI channels

WebSphere MQ support for SSL and TLS

WebSphere MQ supports both the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

For more information about the SSL and TLS protocols, refer to the related information.

WebSphere MQ provides the following support for SSL Version 3.0 and TLS 1.0:

i5/OS SSL support is integral to the i5/OS operating system.

Java and JMS clients
These clients use the JVM to provide SSL support.

Windows and UNIX systems
For all the UNIX and Windows systems, the SSL support is installed with WebSphere MQ.

z/OS SSL support is integral to the z/OS operating system. Note that the SSL support on z/OS is known as *System SSL*.

For information about any prerequisites for WebSphere MQ SSL support, refer to the appropriate material for the following platforms:

- "Checking optional software" in *WebSphere MQ Quick Beginnings for AIX*
- "Checking optional software - PA-RISC" or "Checking optional software - Itanium platform" in *WebSphere MQ Quick Beginnings for HP-UX*
- "SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)" in *WebSphere MQ Quick Beginnings for i5/OS*
- "Using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) with WebSphere MQ classes for JMS" or "Using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) with WebSphere MQ classes for JMS" or, for the WebSphere MQ classes for Java material, "Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) support" in *WebSphere MQ Using Java*

- "Prerequisite software for using SSL" in *WebSphere MQ Quick Beginnings for Linux*
- "Checking prerequisite hardware and software - SPARC platform" or "Checking hardware and software requirements - x86-64 platform" in *WebSphere MQ Quick Beginnings for Solaris*
- "Software requirements" in *WebSphere MQ for z/OS Concepts and Planning Guide*

This section describes the provisions in WebSphere MQ that enable you to use and control the SSL support:

- "Channel attributes"
- "Channel status attributes"
- "Queue manager attributes"
- "The authentication information object (AUTHINFO)"
- "The SSL key repository"
- "WebSphere MQ client considerations"
- "Working with WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru (IPT)"
- "Support for cryptographic hardware"

Channel attributes

WebSphere MQ SSL or TLS support includes the following parameters on the DEFINE CHANNEL MQSC command:

SSLCIPH
The CipherSpec for the channel to use. For more information about the CipherSpecs that WebSphere MQ supports, refer to the related information.

The SSLCIPH parameter is mandatory if you want your channel to use SSL.

SSLPEER
The Distinguished Name pattern that WebSphere MQ uses to decide the entities from which messages are accepted. The SSLPEER pattern filters the Distinguished Names of the entities. For more information, refer to the related information.

SSLCAUTH
Whether the SSL or TLS server requires the corresponding client to send its digital certificate for authentication. For more information about mandatory client authentication, refer to the related information.

For more information about setting these parameters with the DEFINE CHANNEL MQSC command, refer to the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

Channel status attributes

WebSphere MQ SSL or TLS support includes the following parameters on the DISPLAY CHSTATUS MQSC command:

SSLPEER
The Distinguished Name (DN) of the remote certificate.

SSLCERTI
Represents the full Distinguished Name (DN) of the issuer of the remote certificate. The "issuer" is the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the certificate.

SSLCERTU
Represents the Local UserId associated with the remote certificate. Supported on z/OS only.

SSLRKEYS
Displays the number of SSL or TLS key resets successfully performed for this channel instance. The count of SSL or TLS key resets is reset when the channel instance is ended.

SSLKEYDA
Displays the date when the last SSL or TLS secret key reset was successfully issued for this channel instance. The date of the last SSL or TLS secret key reset is reset when the channel instance is ended.

SSLKEYTI
Displays the time when the last SSL or TLS secret key reset was successfully issued for this channel instance. The time of the last SSL or TLS secret key reset is reset when the channel instance is ended.

For more information about displaying these parameters with the DISPLAY CHSTATUS MQSC command, refer to the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

Queue manager attributes

WebSphere MQ SSL or TLS support includes the following parameters on the ALTER QMGR MQSC command:

SSLKEYR
Sets a queue manager attribute, *SSLKeyRepository*, which holds the name of the SSL or TLS key repository.

SSLCRLNL
Sets a queue manager attribute, *SSLCRLNamelist*, which holds the name of a namelist of authentication information objects.

SSLCRYP
Sets a queue manager attribute, *SSLCryptoHardware*, which holds the name of the parameter string required to configure the cryptographic hardware present on the system. This parameter applies only to Windows and UNIX queue managers.

SSLTASKS
Sets a queue manager attribute, *SSLTasks*, which holds the number of server subtasks to use for processing SSL or TLS calls. If you use SSL or TLS channels you must have at least two of these tasks. This parameter applies only to z/OS queue managers.

SSLRKEYC
Sets a numeric queue manager attribute called *SSLKeyResetCount*, the total number of unencrypted bytes that are sent and received within an SSL conversation before the secret key is renegotiated. The number of bytes includes control information sent by the message channel agent.

SSLFIPS
Specifies whether only FIPS-certified algorithms are to be used if cryptography is carried out in WebSphere MQ. If cryptographic hardware is configured, the cryptographic modules used are those provided by the hardware product, and these may, or may not, be FIPS-certified to a

particular level. This depends on the hardware product in use. For more information about FIPS, see "Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)" on page 44.

For more information about setting these parameters with the ALTER QMGR MQSC command, refer to the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference, which also describes when changes to the SSL queue manager attributes become effective.

On i5/OS, you can also set the `SSLKEYR` and `SSLCRLNL` parameters with the CHGMQM command.

The authentication information object (AUTHINFO)

WebSphere MQ SSL support includes a queue manager object called an authentication information object (AUTHINFO).

An authentication information object of type CRLLDAP holds information that allows WebSphere MQ to obtain Certificate Revocation List (CRL) information from an LDAP server. For more information about CRLs and working with authentication information objects, refer to "Working with Certificate Revocation Lists and Authority Revocation Lists" on page 127.

The SSL key repository

This book uses the general term *key repository* to describe the store for digital certificates and their associated private keys. The specific store names used on the platforms that support SSL are:

i5/OS	certificate store
Windows and UNIX	key database file
z/OS	key ring

For more information, refer to "Digital certificates" on page 14 and "Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) concepts" on page 19.

A fully authenticated SSL connection requires a key repository at each end of the connection. The key repository contains:

- A number of CA certificates from various Certification Authorities that allow the queue manager or client to verify certificates it receives from its partner at the remote end of the connection. Individual certificates might be in a certificate chain.
- One or more personal certificates received from a Certification Authority. You associate a separate personal certificate with *each* queue manager or WebSphere MQ client. Personal certificates are essential on an SSL client if mutual authentication is required. If mutual authentication is not required, personal certificates are not needed on the SSL client.

The location of the key repository depends on the platform you are using:

i5/OS On i5/OS the key repository is a certificate store. The default system certificate store is located at `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/Default` in the integrated file system (IFS). On i5/OS, WebSphere MQ stores the password for the certificate store in a *password stash file*. For example, the stash file for queue manager `QM1` is `/QIBM/UserData/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/Stash.sth`.

Alternatively, you can specify that the i5/OS system certificate store is to be used instead. To do this you change the value of the queue manager's SSLKEYR attribute to *SYSTEM. This value indicates that the queue manager will use the system certificate store, and the queue manager is registered for use as an application with Digital Certificate Manager (DCM).

On i5/OS the certificate store also contains the private key for the queue manager.

For more information, see "Working with a key repository" on page 91.

Windows and UNIX

On Windows and UNIX systems the key repository is a key database file. The name of the key database file must have a file extension of `.kdb`. For example, on UNIX, the default key database file for queue manager `QM1` is `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/key.kdb`. If WebSphere MQ is installed in the default location, the equivalent path on Windows is `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\Qmgrs\QM1\ssl\key.kdb`.

On Windows and UNIX systems each key database file has an associated password stash file. This file holds encrypted passwords that allow programs to access the key database. The password stash file must be in the same directory and have the same file stem as the key database, and must end with the suffix `.sth`, for example `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/key.sth`

Note: On Windows and UNIX systems, PKCS #11 cryptographic hardware cards can contain the certificates and keys that are otherwise held in a key database file. When certificates and keys are held on PKCS #11 cards, WebSphere MQ still requires access to both a key database file and a password stash file.

On Windows and UNIX systems, the key database also contains the private key for the personal certificate associated with the queue manager or WebSphere MQ client.

z/OS Certificates are held in a key ring in RACF. Refer to "Setting up a key repository" on page 120 for more information about creating a key ring in RACF.

Other external security managers (ESMs) also use key rings for storing certificates.

On z/OS, private keys are managed by RACF.

Protecting WebSphere MQ client key repositories

The key repository for a WebSphere MQ client is a file on the client machine. Ensure that only the intended user can access the key repository file. This prevents an intruder or other unauthorized user copying the key repository file to another system, and then setting up an identical user ID on that system to impersonate the intended user.

Refreshing a key repository

You can refresh the copy of the key repository held in memory, without restarting the channel process, by using the MQSC command REFRESH SECURITY

TYPE(SSL). This enables you to use an up-to-date version of the SSL key repository when you have added a new certificate, without having to stop the channel process.

On platforms other than z/OS, the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command updates all SSL channels whether a refresh is required or not. On z/OS, if no refresh is required, REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) completes successfully and the channels are unaffected.

For more information on the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command, see the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

You can also refresh the key repository using the PCF command Refresh Security (MQCMD_REFRESH_SECURITY). The SecurityType (MQSECTYPE_SSL) parameter refreshes the copy of the key repository held in memory, allowing updates to become effective once the command has completed successfully. For more information about this command, see the WebSphere MQ Programmable Command Formats and Administration Interface book.

Resetting SSL secret keys

During an SSL handshake a *secret key* is generated to encrypt data between the SSL client and SSL server. The secret key is used in a mathematical formula that is applied to the data to transform plaintext into unreadable ciphertext, and ciphertext into plaintext.

The secret key is generated from the random text sent as part of the handshake and is used to encrypt plaintext into ciphertext. The secret key is also used in the MAC (Message Authentication Code) algorithm, which is used to determine whether a message has been altered. See “Message digests” on page 13 for more information.

If the secret key is discovered, the plaintext of a message could be deciphered from the ciphertext, or the message digest could be calculated, allowing messages to be altered without detection. Even for a complex algorithm, the plaintext can eventually be discovered by applying every possible mathematical transformation to the ciphertext. To minimize the amount of data that can be deciphered or altered if the secret key is broken, the secret key can be renegotiated periodically.

Once the secret key has been renegotiated, the previous secret key can no longer be used to decrypt data encrypted with the new secret key. The commands ALTER QMGR SSLRKEYC and DISPLAY QMGR SSLRKEYC are used to set the values used during key renegotiation. On i5/OS and Java, you can use the CHGMQM SSLRSTCNT and DSPMQM commands. For more information on these commands, see the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)

When cryptography is required on an SSL channel on Windows or UNIX, WebSphere MQ uses a cryptography package called IBM Crypto for C (ICC). On all the Windows and UNIX platforms supported by WebSphere MQ Version 7.0, the ICC software has passed the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Cryptomodule Validation Program of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, at level 140-2.

The FIPS 140-2 compliance of a WebSphere MQ SSL connection on UNIX systems and Windows is as follows:

- For all WebSphere MQ message channels (except SVRCONN and CLNTCONN channel types), the connection is FIPS-compliant if both the following conditions are met:
  - The installed GSkit ICC version has been certified FIPS 140-2 compliant on the installed operating system version and hardware architecture.
  - The queue manager's SSLFIPS attribute has been set to YES.
- For all WebSphere MQ client applications (except WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS applications in client mode), the connection uses GSkit and is FIPS-compliant if both the following conditions are met:
  - The installed GSkit ICC version has been certified FIPS 140-2 compliant on the installed operating system version and hardware architecture.
  - SSLFIPS mode has been enabled on the client as described in the related topic.
- For WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS applications using client mode, the connection uses the JRE's SSL implementation and is FIPS-compliant if both the following conditions are met:
  - The Java Runtime Environment used to run the application is FIPS-compliant on the installed operating system version and hardware architecture.
  - SSLFIPS mode has been enabled on the client as described in the related topic.

All supported AIX®, Linux®, HP-UX, Solaris and Windows platforms are FIPS 140-2 certified except as noted in the readme file included with each fix pack or refresh pack.

For SSL connections using GSkit, the component which is FIPS 140-2 certified is named *ICC*. It is the version of this component which determines GSkit FIPS compliance on any given platform. To determine the ICC version currently installed, run the gsk7ver command. Here is an example extract of the gsk7ver output relating to ICC:

```
  ICC
  ============
  @(#)CompanyName:      IBM Corporation
  @(#)LegalTrademarks:  IBM
  @(#)FileDescription:  IBM Crypto for C-language
  @(#)FileVersion:      1.4.5.0
  @(#)LegalCopyright:   Licensed Materials - Property of IBM
  @(#)                  ICC
  @(#)                  (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2002-2005
  @(#)                  All Rights Reserved. US Government Users
  @(#)                  Restricted Rights - Use, duplication or
disclosure
  @(#)                  restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract
with IBM Corp.
  @(#)ProductName:      icc_1.4 (GoldCoast Build)
  @(#)ProductVersion:   1.4.5.0
  @(#)ProductInfo:      07/03/12.23:55:21.07/03/13.15:00:28
  @(#)CMVCInfo:         icc_1.4/icc1.4.0_051026
```

The NIST certification statement for GSkit ICC 1.4.5 (included in GSkit 7.0.4.11, applicable to Websphere MQ Version 6.0.2.2 and later releases) can be found at the following link: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/1401val2007.htm#775

WebSphere MQ client considerations

WebSphere MQ provides SSL support for WebSphere MQ clients in the following:

- WebSphere MQ for AIX
- WebSphere MQ for HP-UX
- WebSphere MQ for Linux
- WebSphere MQ for Solaris
- WebSphere MQ for Windows

If you are using WebSphere MQ classes for Java or WebSphere MQ classes for JMS, refer to WebSphere MQ Using Java. The rest of this section does not apply to the Java or JMS environments.

You can specify the key repository for a WebSphere MQ client either with the MQSSLKEYR value you have defined in your WebSphere MQ client configuration file, or when your application makes an MQCONNX call. You have three options for specifying that a channel uses SSL:

- Using a channel definition table
- Using the SSL configuration options structure, MQSCO, on an MQCONNX call
- Using the Active Directory (on Windows systems)

You cannot use the MQSERVER environment variable to specify that a channel uses SSL.

You can continue to run your existing WebSphere MQ client applications without SSL, as long as SSL is not specified at the other end of the channel.

If changes are made on a client machine to the contents of the SSL Key Repository, the location of the SSL Key Repository, the Authentication Information, or the Cryptographic hardware parameters, you need to end all the SSL connections in order to reflect these changes in the client-connection channels that the application is using to connect to the queue manager. Once all of the connections have ended, restart the SSL channels. All the new SSL settings are used. These settings are analogous to those refreshed by the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command on queue manager systems.

When your WebSphere MQ client runs on a Windows or UNIX system with cryptographic hardware, you configure that hardware with the MQSSLCRYP environment variable. This variable is equivalent to the SSLCRYP parameter on the ALTER QMGR MQSC command. Refer to “Queue manager attributes” on page 41 for a description of the SSLCRYP parameter. If you use the GSK_PCS11 version of the SSLCRYP parameter, the PKCS #11 token label must be specified entirely in lower-case.

SSL secret key reset and FIPS are supported on WebSphere MQ clients. For more information, see “Resetting SSL secret keys” on page 44 and “Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)” on page 44.

Refer to the WebSphere MQ Clients book for more information about the SSL support for WebSphere MQ clients, and to “Protecting WebSphere MQ client key repositories” on page 43.

Working with WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru (IPT)

For detailed information about IPT, refer to the WebSphere MQ internet pass-thru SupportPac MS81.

When your WebSphere MQ system communicates with IPT, unless you are using SSLProxyMode in IPT, ensure that the CipherSpec used by WebSphere MQ matches the CipherSuite used by IPT:

- When IPT is acting as the SSL server and WebSphere MQ is connecting as the SSL client, the CipherSpec used by WebSphere MQ must correspond to a CipherSuite that is enabled in the relevant IPT key ring.
- When IPT is acting as the SSL client and is connecting to a WebSphere MQ SSL server, the IPT CipherSuite must match the CipherSpec defined on the receiving WebSphere MQ channel.

When you migrate from IPT to the integrated WebSphere MQ SSL support, you transfer the digital certificates from IPT Using iKeyman.

For more information about importing certificates, refer to the relevant section for your platform in Chapter 3, "Working with WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support," on page 77.

Support for cryptographic hardware

On Windows and UNIX systems you can use the SSLCRYP parameter on the ALTER QMGR MQSC command to provide cryptographic hardware configuration information to the WebSphere MQ SSL support. Refer to "Queue manager attributes" on page 41 for a description of the SSLCRYP parameter. Note however that WebSphere MQ can run SSL without cryptographic hardware. On i5/OS and z/OS, SSLCRYP is not used in cryptographic hardware configuration.

To configure cryptographic hardware for a WebSphere MQ client on Windows or UNIX, use the MQSSLCRYP value you have defined in your WebSphere MQ client configuration file, or set the CryptoHardware field of the MQSCO structure on an MQCONNX call.

The permitted values for MQSSLCRYP and the CryptoHardware field are the same as for the SSLCRYP parameter. If you use the GSK_PCS11 version of the SSLCRYP parameter, the PKCS #11 token label must be specified entirely in lower-case.

Refer to Chapter 4, "Cryptographic hardware," on page 149 for information about the cryptographic hardware that has been tested with WebSphere MQ SSL support.

Other link level security services

This chapter describes link level security services for WebSphere MQ other than those available through WebSphere MQ SSL support. It contains the following sections:

Channel exit programs

Channel exit programs are programs that are called at defined places in the processing sequence of an MCA. Users and vendors can write their own channel exit programs. Some are supplied by IBM.

There are several types of channel exit program, but only four have a role in providing link level security:

- Security exit
- Message exit
- Send exit
- Receive exit

These four types of channel exit program are illustrated in Figure 8 and are described in the following sections:

- "Security exit"
- "Message exit" on page 49
- "Send and receive exits" on page 49



Figure 8. Security, message, send, and receive exits on a message channel

Security exit

Security exits normally work in pairs; one at each end of a channel. They are called immediately after the initial data negotiation has completed on channel startup, but before any messages start to flow. The primary purpose of the security exit is to enable the MCA at each end of a channel to authenticate its partner. However, there is nothing to prevent a security exit from performing other function, even function that has nothing to do with security.

Security exits can communicate with each other by sending *security messages*. The format of a security message is not defined and is determined by the user. One possible outcome of the exchange of security messages is that one of the security exits might decide not to proceed any further. In that case, the channel is closed

and messages do not flow. If there is a security exit at only one end of a channel, the exit is still called and can elect whether to continue or to close the channel.

Security exits can be called on both message and MQI channels. The name of a security exit is specified as a parameter in the channel definition at each end of a channel.

For more information about security exits, see "Security exit" on page 58.

Message exit

Message exits at the sending and receiving ends of a channel normally work in pairs. A message exit at the sending end of a channel is called after the MCA has got a message from the transmission queue. At the receiving end of a channel, a message exit is called before the MCA puts a message on its destination queue.

A message exit has access to both the transmission queue header, MQXQH, which includes the embedded message descriptor, and the application data in a message. A message exit can modify the contents of the message and change its length. A change of length might be the result of compressing, decompressing, encrypting, or decrypting the message. It might also be the result of adding data to the message, or removing data from it.

Message exits can be used for any purpose that requires access to the whole message, rather than a portion of it, and not necessarily for security.

A message exit can decide that the message it is currently processing should not to proceed any further towards its destination. The MCA then puts the message on the dead letter queue. A message exit can also decide to close the channel.

Message exits can be called only on message channels, not on MQI channels. This is because the purpose of an MQI channel is to enable the input and output parameters of MQI calls to flow between the WebSphere MQ client application and the queue manager.

The name of a message exit is specified as a parameter in the channel definition at each end of a channel. You can also specify a list of message exits to be run in succession.

For more information about message exits, see "Message exit" on page 61.

Send and receive exits

A *send exit* at one end of a channel and a *receive exit* at the other end normally work in pairs. A send exit is called just before an MCA issues a communications send to send data over a communications connection. A receive exit is called just after an MCA has regained control following a communications receive and has received data from a communications connection. If sharing conversations is in use, over an MQI channel, a different instance of a send and receive exit is called for each conversation.

The WebSphere MQ channel protocol flows between two MCAs on a message channel contain control information as well as message data. Similarly, on an MQI channel, the flows contain control information as well as the parameters of MQI calls. Send and receive exits are called for all types of data.

Message data flows in only one direction on a message channel but, on an MQI channel, the input parameters of an MQI call flow in one direction and the output parameters flow in the other. On both message and MQI channels, control information flows in both directions. As a result, send and receive exits can be called at both ends of a channel.

The unit of data that is transmitted in a single flow between two MCAs is called a *transmission segment*. Send and receive exits have access to each transmission segment. They can modify its contents and change its length. A send exit, however, must not change the first eight bytes of a transmission segment. These eight bytes form part of the WebSphere MQ channel protocol header. There are also restrictions on how much a send exit can increase the length of a transmission segment. In particular, a send exit cannot increase its length beyond the maximum that was negotiated between the two MCAs at channel startup.

On a message channel, if a message is too large to be sent in a single transmission segment, the sending MCA splits the message and sends it in more than one transmission segment. As a consequence, a send exit is called for each transmission segment containing a portion of the message and, at the receiving end, a receive exit is called for each transmission segment. The receiving MCA reconstitutes the message from the transmission segments after they have been processed by the receive exit.

Similarly, on an MQI channel, the input or output parameters of an MQI call are sent in more than one transmission segment if they are too large. This might occur, for example, on an MQPUT, MQPUT1, or MQGET call if the application data is sufficiently large.

Taking these considerations into account, it is more appropriate to use send and receive exits for purposes in which they do not need to understand the structure of the data they are handling and can therefore treat each transmission segment as a binary object.

A send or a receive exit can decide to close a channel.

The names of a send exit and a receive exit are specified as parameters in the channel definition at each end of a channel. You can also specify a list of send exits to be run in succession. Similarly, you can specify a list of receive exits.

For more information about send and receive exits, see “Send and receive exits” on page 63.

Obtaining more information

For more information about channel exit programs, see WebSphere MQ Intercommunication.

The SSPI channel exit program

WebSphere MQ for Windows supplies a security exit, which can be used on both message and MQI channels. The security exit uses the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI), which provides the integrated security facilities of Windows platforms.

The security exit provides the following identification and authentication services:

One way authentication

This uses Windows NT® LAN Manager (NTLM) authentication support. NTLM allows servers to authenticate their clients. It does not allow a client to authenticate a server, or one server to authenticate another. NTLM was designed for a network environment in which servers are assumed to be genuine. NTLM is supported on all Windows platforms that are supported by WebSphere MQ Version 7.0.

This service is typically used on an MQI channel to enable a server queue manager to authenticate a WebSphere MQ client application. A client application is identified by the user ID associated with the process that is running.

To perform the authentication, the security exit at the client end of a channel acquires an authentication token from NTLM and sends the token in a security message to its partner at the other end of the channel. The partner security exit passes the token to NTLM, which checks that the token is authentic. If the partner security exit is not satisfied with the authenticity of the token, it instructs the MCA to close the channel.

Two way, or mutual, authentication

This uses Kerberos authentication services. The Kerberos protocol does not assume that servers in a network environment are genuine. Servers can authenticate clients and other servers, and clients can authenticate servers. Kerberos is supported on all Windows platforms that are supported by WebSphere MQ Version 7.0.

This service can be used on both message and MQI channels. On a message channel, it provides mutual authentication of the two queue managers. On an MQI channel, it enables the server queue manager and the WebSphere MQ client application to authenticate each other. A queue manager is identified by its name prefixed by the string `ibmMQSeries/`. A client application is identified by the user ID associated with the process that is running.

To perform the mutual authentication, the initiating security exit acquires an authentication token from the Kerberos security server and sends the token in a security message to its partner. The partner security exit passes the token to the Kerberos server, which checks that it is authentic. The Kerberos security server generates a second token, which the partner sends in a security message to the initiating security exit. The initiating security exit then asks the Kerberos server to check that the second token is authentic. During this exchange, if either security exit is not satisfied with the authenticity of the token sent by the other, it instructs the MCA to close the channel.

The security exit is supplied in both source and object format. You can use the source code as a starting point for writing your own channel exit programs or you can use the object module as supplied. The object module has two entry points, one for one way authentication using NTLM authentication support and the other for two way authentication using Kerberos authentication services.

For more information about how the SSPI channel exit program works, and for instructions on how to implement it, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

SNA LU 6.2 security services

Note: This section assumes that you have a basic understanding of Systems Network Architecture (SNA). Each of the books referenced in this section contains a brief introduction to the relevant concepts and terminology. If you require a more comprehensive technical introduction to SNA, see *Systems Network Architecture Technical Overview*, GC30-3073.

SNA LU 6.2 provides three security services:

- Session level cryptography
- Session level authentication
- Conversation level authentication

For session level cryptography and session level authentication, SNA uses the *Data Encryption Standard (DES)* algorithm. The DES algorithm is a block cipher algorithm, which uses a symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting data. Both the block and the key are eight bytes in length.

Session level cryptography

Session level cryptography encrypts and decrypts session data using the DES algorithm. It can therefore be used to provide a link level confidentiality service on SNA LU 6.2 channels.

Logical units (LUs) can provide mandatory (or required) data cryptography, selective data cryptography, or no data cryptography.

On a *mandatory cryptographic session*, an LU encrypts all outbound data request units and decrypts all inbound data request units.

On a *selective cryptographic session*, an LU encrypts only the data request units specified by the sending transaction program (TP). The sending LU signals that the data is encrypted by setting an indicator in the request header. By checking this indicator, the receiving LU can tell which request units to decrypt before passing them on to the receiving TP.

In an SNA network, WebSphere MQ MCAs are transaction programs. MCAs do not request encryption for any data that they send. Selective data cryptography is not an option therefore; only mandatory data cryptography or no data cryptography is possible on a session.

For information about how to implement mandatory data cryptography, see the books for your SNA subsystem. Refer to the same books for information about stronger forms of encryption that might be available for use on your platform, such as Triple DES 24-byte encryption on z/OS.

For more general information about session level cryptography, see *Systems Network Architecture LU 6.2 Reference: Peer Protocols*, SC31-6808.

Session level authentication

Session level authentication is a session level security protocol that enables two LUs to authenticate each other while they are activating a session. It is also known as *LU-LU verification*.

Because an LU is effectively the "gateway" into a system from the network, you might consider this level of authentication to be sufficient in certain circumstances. For example, if your queue manager needs to exchange messages with a remote queue manager that is running in a controlled and trusted environment, you might be prepared to trust the identities of the remaining components of the remote system after the LU has been authenticated.

Session level authentication is achieved by each LU verifying its partner's password. The password is called an *LU-LU password* because one password is established between each pair of LUs. The way that an LU-LU password is established is implementation dependent and outside the scope of SNA.

Figure 9 illustrates the flows for session level authentication.



Legend:

BIND = BIND request unit
BIND-RSP = BIND response unit
ERD = Encrypted random data
FMH-12 = Function Management Header 12
RD = Random data

Figure 9. Flows for session level authentication

The protocol for session level authentication is as follows. The numbers in the procedure correspond to the numbers in Figure 9.

1. The primary LU generates a random data value (RD1) and sends it to the secondary LU in the BIND request.
2. When the secondary LU receives the BIND request with the random data, it encrypts the data using the DES algorithm with its copy of the LU-LU password as the key. The secondary LU then generates a second random data value (RD2) and sends it, with the encrypted data (ERD1), to the primary LU in the BIND response.
3. When the primary LU receives the BIND response, it computes its own version of the encrypted data from the random data it generated originally. It does this by using the DES algorithm with its copy of the LU-LU password as the key. It then compares its version with the encrypted data that it received in the BIND response. If the two values are the same, the primary LU knows that the

secondary LU has the same password as it does and the secondary LU is authenticated. If the two values do not match, the primary LU terminates the session.

The primary LU then encrypts the random data that it received in the BIND response and sends the encrypted data (ERD2) to the secondary LU in a Function Management Header 12 (FMH-12).

4. When the secondary LU receives the FMH-12, it computes its own version of the encrypted data from the random data it generated. It then compares its version with the encrypted data that it received in the FMH-12. If the two values are the same, the primary LU is authenticated. If the two values do not match, the secondary LU terminates the session.

In an enhanced version of the protocol, which provides better protection against man in the middle attacks, the secondary LU computes a DES Message Authentication Code (MAC) from RD1, RD2, and the fully qualified name of the secondary LU, using its copy of the LU-LU password as the key. The secondary LU sends the MAC to the primary LU in the BIND response instead of ERD1.

The primary LU authenticates the secondary LU by computing its own version of the MAC, which it compares with the MAC received in the BIND response. The primary LU then computes a second MAC from RD1 and RD2, and sends the MAC to the secondary LU in the FMH-12 instead of ERD2.

The secondary LU authenticates the primary LU by computing its own version of the second MAC, which it compares with the MAC received in the FMH-12.

For information about how to configure session level authentication, see the books for your SNA subsystem. For more general information about session level authentication, see *Systems Network Architecture LU 6.2 Reference: Peer Protocols*, SC31-6808.

Conversation level authentication

When a local TP attempts to allocate a conversation with a partner TP, the local LU sends an attach request to the partner LU, asking it to attach the partner TP. Under certain circumstances, the attach request can contain security information, which the partner LU can use to authenticate the local TP. This is known as *conversation level authentication*, or *end user verification*.

The following sections describe how WebSphere MQ provides support for conversation level authentication.

Support for conversation level authentication in WebSphere MQ on i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems:

The support for conversation level authentication in WebSphere MQ for i5/OS, WebSphere MQ on UNIX systems, and WebSphere MQ for Windows is illustrated in Figure 10 on page 55. The numbers in the diagram correspond to the numbers in the description that follows.



Figure 10. WebSphere MQ support for conversation level authentication

On i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems, an MCA uses Common Programming Interface Communications (CPI-C) calls to communicate with a partner MCA across an SNA network. In the channel definition at the caller end of a channel, the value of the CONNAME parameter is a symbolic destination name, which identifies a CPI-C side information entry (1). This entry specifies:

- The name of the partner LU
- The name of the partner TP, which is a responder MCA
- The name of the mode to be used for the conversation

A side information entry can also specify the following security information:

- A security type.

  The commonly implemented security types are CM_SECURITY_NONE, CM_SECURITY_PROGRAM, and CM_SECURITY_SAME, but others are defined in the CPI-C specification.
- A user ID.
- A password.

A caller MCA prepares to allocate a conversation with a responder MCA by issuing the CPI-C call CMINIT, using the value of CONNAME as one of the parameters on the call. The CMINIT call identifies, for the benefit of the local LU, the side

information entry that the MCA intends to use for the conversation. The local LU uses the values in this entry to initialize the characteristics of the conversation (2).

The caller MCA then checks the values of the USERID and PASSWORD parameters in the channel definition (3). If USERID is set, the caller MCA issues the following CPI-C calls (4):

- CMSCST, to set the security type for the conversation to CM_SECURITY_PROGRAM.
- CMSCSU, to set the user ID for the conversation to the value of USERID.
- CMSCSP, to set the password for the conversation to the value of PASSWORD. CMSCSP is not called unless PASSWORD is set.

The security type, user ID, and password set by these calls override any values acquired previously from the side information entry.

The caller MCA then issues the CPI-C call CMALLC to allocate the conversation (5). In response to this call, the local LU sends an attach request (Function Management Header 5, or FMH-5) to the partner LU (6).

If the partner LU will accept a user ID and a password, the values of USERID and PASSWORD are included in the attach request. If the partner LU will not accept a user ID and a password, the values are not included in the attach request. The local LU discovers whether the partner LU will accept a user ID and a password as part of an exchange of information when the LUs bind to form a session.

In a later version of the attach request, a password substitute can flow between the LUs instead of a clear password. A password substitute is a DES Message Authentication Code (MAC), or an SHA-1 message digest, formed from the password. Password substitutes can be used only if both LUs support them.

When the partner LU receives an incoming attach request containing a user ID and a password, it might use the user ID and password for the purposes of identification and authentication. By referring to access control lists, the partner LU might also determine whether the user ID has the authority to allocate a conversation and attach the responder MCA.

In addition, the responder MCA might run under the user ID included in the attach request. In this case, the user ID becomes the default user ID for the responder MCA and is used for authority checks when the MCA attempts to connect to the queue manager. It might also be used for authority checks subsequently when the MCA attempts to access the queue manager's resources.

The way in which a user ID and a password in an attach request can be used for identification, authentication, and access control is implementation dependent. For information specific to your SNA subsystem, refer to the appropriate books.

If USERID is not set, the caller MCA does not call CMSCST, CMSCSU, and CMSCSP. In this case, the security information that flows in an attach request is determined solely by what is specified in the side information entry and what the partner LU will accept.

Conversation level authentication and WebSphere MQ for z/OS:

On WebSphere MQ for z/OS, MCAs do not use CPI-C. Instead, they use APPC/MVS TP Conversation Callable Services, an implementation of Advanced Program-to-Program Communication (APPC), which has some CPI-C features.

When a caller MCA allocates a conversation, a security type of SAME is specified on the call. Therefore, because an APPC/MVS LU supports persistent verification only for inbound conversations, not for outbound conversations, there are two possibilities:

- If the partner LU trusts the APPC/MVS LU and will accept an already verified user ID, the APPC/MVS LU sends an attach request containing:
  - The channel initiator address space user ID
  - A security profile name, which, if RACF is used, is the name of the current connect group of the channel initiator address space user ID
  - An already verified indicator
- If the partner LU does not trust the APPC/MVS LU and will not accept an already verified user ID, the APPC/MVS LU sends an attach request containing no security information.

On WebSphere MQ for z/OS, the USERID and PASSWORD parameters on the DEFINE CHANNEL command cannot be used for a message channel and are valid only at the client connection end of an MQI channel. Therefore, an attach request from an APPC/MVS LU never contains values specified by these parameters.

Obtaining more information:

For more information about conversation level authentication, see *Systems Network Architecture LU 6.2 Reference: Peer Protocols*, SC31-6808. For information specific to z/OS, see *z/OS MVS™ Planning: APPC/MVS Management*, SA22-7599.

For more information about CPI-C, see *Common Programming Interface Communications CPI-C Specification*, SC31-6180. For more information about APPC/MVS TP Conversation Callable Services, see *z/OS MVS Programming: Writing Transaction Programs for APPC/MVS*, SA22-7621.

Providing your own link level security

This chapter describes how you can provide your own link level security services. Writing your own channel exit programs is the main way of doing this.

Channel exit programs are introduced in “Other link level security services” on page 47. The same chapter also describes the channel exit program that is supplied with WebSphere MQ for Windows (the SSPI channel exit program). This channel exit program is supplied in source format so that you can modify the source code to suit your requirements. If neither this channel exit program, nor channel exit programs available from other vendors, meets your requirements, you can design and write your own. This chapter suggests ways in which channel exit programs can provide security services. For information about how to write a channel exit program, see WebSphere MQ Intercommunication.

This chapter contains the following sections:

Security exit

Security exits normally work in pairs; one at each end of a channel. They are called immediately after the initial data negotiation has completed on channel startup. Security exits can be used to provide the security services described in the following sections.

Identification and authentication

The primary purpose of a security exit is to enable the MCA at each end of a channel to authenticate its partner. At each end of a message channel, and at the server end of an MQI channel, an MCA typically acts on behalf of the queue manager to which it is connected. At the client end of an MQI channel, an MCA typically acts on behalf of the user of the WebSphere MQ client application. In this situation, mutual authentication actually takes place between two queue managers, or between a queue manager and the user of a WebSphere MQ client application.

The supplied security exit (the SSPI channel exit) illustrates how mutual authentication can be implemented by exchanging authentication tokens that are generated, and subsequently checked, by a trusted authentication server such as Kerberos. For more details, see "The SSPI channel exit program" on page 50.

Mutual authentication can also be implemented by using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology. Each security exit generates some random data, signs it using the private key of the queue manager or user it is representing, and sends the signed data to its partner in a security message. The partner security exit performs the authentication by checking the digital signature using the public key of the queue manager or user. Before exchanging digital signatures, the security exits might need to agree the algorithm for generating a message digest, if more than one algorithm is available for use.

When a security exit sends the signed data to its partner, it also needs to send some means of identifying the queue manager or user it is representing. This might be a Distinguished Name, or even a digital certificate. If a digital certificate is sent, the partner security exit can validate the certificate by working through the certificate chain to the root CA certificate. This provides assurance of the ownership of the public key that is used to check the digital signature.

The partner security exit can validate a digital certificate only if it has access to a key repository that contains the remaining certificates in the certificate chain. If a digital certificate for the queue manager or user is not sent, one must be available in the key repository to which the partner security exit has access. The partner security exit cannot check the digital signature unless it can find the signer's public key.

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) use PKI techniques similar to ones just described. For more information about how the Secure Sockets Layer performs authentication, see "Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) concepts" on page 19.

If a trusted authentication server or PKI support is not available, other techniques can be used. A common technique, which can be implemented in security exits, uses a symmetric key algorithm.

One of the security exits, exit A, generates a random number and sends it in a security message to its partner security exit, exit B. Exit B encrypts the number

using its copy of a key which is known only to the two security exits. Exit B sends the encrypted number to exit A in a security message with a second random number that exit B has generated. Exit A verifies that the first random number has been encrypted correctly, encrypts the second random number using its copy of the key, and sends the encrypted number to exit B in a security message. Exit B then verifies that the second random number has been encrypted correctly. During this exchange, if either security exit is not satisfied with the authenticity of other, it can instruct the MCA to close the channel.

An advantage of this technique is that no key or password is sent over the communications connection during the exchange. A disadvantage is that it does not provide a solution to the problem of how to distribute the shared key in a secure way. One solution to this problem is described in "Confidentiality" on page 61. A similar technique is used in SNA for the mutual authentication of two LUs when they bind to form a session. The technique is described in "Session level authentication" on page 52.

All the preceding techniques for mutual authentication can be adapted to provide one way authentication.

Access control

Security exits can play a role in access control.

MCAUserIdentifier:

Every instance of a channel that is current has an associated channel definition structure, MQCD. The initial values of the fields in MQCD are determined by the channel definition that is created by a WebSphere MQ administrator. In particular, the initial value of one of the fields, *MCAUserIdentifier*, is determined by the value of the MCAUSER parameter on the DEFINE CHANNEL command, or by the equivalent to MCAUSER if the channel definition is created in another way.

The MQCD structure is passed to a channel exit program when it is called by an MCA. When a security exit is called by an MCA, the security exit can change the value of *MCAUserIdentifier*, replacing any value that was specified in the channel definition.

On i5/OS, UNIX systems, and Windows systems, unless the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* is blank, the queue manager uses the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* as the user ID for authority checks when an MCA attempts to access the queue manager's resources after it has connected to the queue manager. If the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* is blank, the queue manager uses the default user ID of the MCA instead. This applies only to receiving MCAs, and assumes that the PUTAUT parameter is set to DEF in the channel definition. The queue manager always uses the default user ID of a sending MCA for authority checks, even if the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* is not blank.

On z/OS, the queue manager might use the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* for authority checks, provided it is not blank. For receiving MCAs and server connection MCAs, whether the queue manager uses the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* for authority checks depends on:

- The value of the PUTAUT parameter in the channel definition
- The RACF profile used for the checks
- The access level of the channel initiator address space user ID to the RESLEVEL profile

For sending MCAs, it depends on:

- Whether the sending MCA is a caller or a responder
- The access level of the channel initiator address space user ID to the RESLEVEL profile

The user ID that a security exit stores in *MCAUserIdentifier* can be acquired in various ways. Here are some examples:

- Provided there is no security exit at the client end of an MQI channel, a user ID associated with the WebSphere MQ client application flows from the client connection MCA to the server connection MCA when the client application issues an MQCONN call. The server connection MCA stores this user ID in the *RemoteUserIdentifier* field in the channel definition structure, MQCD. If the value of *MCAUserIdentifier* is blank at this time, the MCA stores the same user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*. If the MCA does not store the user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*, a security exit can do it subsequently by setting *MCAUserIdentifier* to the value of *RemoteUserIdentifier*.

  If the user ID that flows from the client system is entering a new security domain and is not valid on the server system, the security exit can substitute the user ID for one that is valid and store the substituted user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*.
- The user ID can be sent by the partner security exit in a security message.

  On a message channel, a security exit called by the sending MCA can send the user ID under which the sending MCA is running. A security exit called by the receiving MCA can then store the user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*. Similarly, on an MQI channel, a security exit at the client end of the channel can send the user ID associated with the WebSphere MQ client application. A security exit at the server end of the channel can then store the user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*. As in the previous example, if the user ID is not valid on the target system, the security exit can substitute the user ID for one that is valid and store the substituted user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*.

  If a digital certificate is received as part of the identification and authentication service, a security exit can map the Distinguished Name in the certificate to a user ID that is valid on the target system. It can then store the user ID in *MCAUserIdentifier*.
- If SSL is used on the channel, the partner's Distinguished Name (DN) is passed to the exit in the SSLPeerNamePtr field of the MQCD, and the DN of the issuer of that certificate is passed to the exit in the SSLRemCertIssNamePtr field of the MQCXP.

For more information about the *MCAUserIdentifier* field, the channel definition structure, MQCD, and the channel exit parameter structure MQCXP, see WebSphere MQ Intercommunication. For more information about how the *MCAUserIdentifier* field is used for authority checks on z/OS, see the WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide. For more information about the user ID that flows from a client system on an MQI channel, see WebSphere MQ Clients.

WebSphere MQ Object Authority Manager user authentication:

On WebSphere MQ client connections, security exits can be used to modify or create the MQCSP structure used in Object Authority Manager (OAM) user authentication. This is described in "Channel-exit programs", in the WebSphere MQ Intercommunication manual.

Confidentiality

Security exits can play a role in the confidentiality service by generating and distributing the symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting the data that flows on the channel. A common technique for doing this uses PKI technology.

One security exit generates a random data value, encrypts it with the public key of the queue manager or user that the partner security exit is representing, and sends the encrypted data to its partner in a security message. The partner security exit decrypts the random data value with the private key of the queue manager or user it is representing. Each security exit can now use the random data value to derive the symmetric key independently of the other by using an algorithm known to both of them. Alternatively, they can simply use the random data value as the key.

If the first security exit has not authenticated its partner by this time, the next security message sent by the partner can contain an expected value encrypted with the symmetric key. The first security exit can now authenticate its partner by checking that the partner security exit was able to encrypt the expected value correctly.

The security exits can also use this opportunity to agree the algorithm for encrypting and decrypting the data that flows on the channel, if more than one algorithm is available for use.

Message exit

A message exit can be used only on a message channel, not on an MQI channel. It has access to both the transmission queue header, MQXQH, which includes the embedded message descriptor, and the application data in a message. It can modify the contents of the message and change its length. A message exit can be used for any purpose that requires access to the whole message rather than a portion of it.

Message exits can be used to provide the security services described in the following sections.

Identification and authentication

When an application puts a message on a queue, the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor contains a user ID associated with the application. However, there is no data present that can be used to authenticate the user ID. This data can be added by a message exit at the sending end of a channel and checked by a message exit at the receiving end of the channel. The authenticating data can be an encrypted password or a digital signature, for example.

This service might be more effective if it is implemented at the application level. The basic requirement is for the user of the application that receives the message to be able to identify and authenticate the user of the application that sent the message. It is therefore natural to consider implementing this service at the application level. For more discussion about this, see “Identification and authentication” on page 73.

Access control

In a client/server environment, consider a client application that sends a message to a server application. The server application can extract the user ID from the

UserIdentifier field in the message descriptor and, provided it has alternate user authority, ask the queue manager to use this user ID for authority checks when it accesses WebSphere MQ resources on behalf of the client.

If the PUTAUT parameter is set to CTX (or ALTMCA on z/OS) in the channel definition at the receiving end of a channel, the user ID in the *UserIdentifier* field of each incoming message is used for authority checks when the MCA opens the destination queue.

In certain circumstances, when a report message is generated, it is put using the authority of the user ID in the *UserIdentifier* field of the message causing the report. In particular, confirm-on-delivery (COD) reports and expiration reports are always put with this authority.

Because of these situations, it might be necessary to substitute one user ID for another in the *UserIdentifier* field as a message enters a new security domain. This can be done by a message exit at the receiving end of the channel. Alternatively, you can ensure that the user ID in the *UserIdentifier* field of an incoming message is defined in the new security domain.

If an incoming message contains a digital certificate for the user of the application that sent the message, a message exit can validate the certificate and map the Distinguished Name in the certificate to a user ID that is valid on the receiving system. It can then set the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor to this user ID.

If it is necessary for a message exit to change the value of the *UserIdentifier* field in an incoming message, it might be appropriate for the message exit to authenticate the sender of the message at the same time. For more details, see "Identification and authentication" on page 61.

Confidentiality

A message exit at the sending end of a channel can encrypt the application data in a message and another message exit at the receiving end of the channel can decrypt the data. For performance reasons, a symmetric key algorithm is normally used for this purpose. For more information about how the symmetric key can be generated and distributed, see "Confidentiality" on page 61.

Headers in a message, such as the transmission queue header, MQXQH, which includes the embedded message descriptor, must not be encrypted by a message exit. This is because data conversion of the message headers takes place either after a message exit is called at the sending end or before a message exit is called at the receiving end. If the headers are encrypted, data conversion fails and the channel stops.

Data integrity

A message can be digitally signed by a message exit at the sending end of a channel. The digital signature can then be checked by a message exit at the receiving end of a channel to detect whether the message has been deliberately modified.

Some protection can be provided by using a message digest instead of a digital signature. A message digest might be effective against casual or indiscriminate tampering, but it does not prevent the more informed individual from changing or

replacing the message, and generating a completely new digest for it. This is particularly true if the algorithm that is used to generate the message digest is a well known one.

Non-repudiation

If incoming messages are digitally signed, a message exit at the receiving end of a channel can log sufficient evidence to enable the digital signature of a message to be checked at any time in the future. This can form the basis of a non-repudiation service with proof of origin.

Like the identification and authentication service, this service might be more effective if it is implemented at the application level. At the application level, the service can also be extended to provide proof of delivery. For more information about how this service can be implemented at the application level, see "Non-repudiation" on page 75.

Other uses of message exits

Message exits can be used for reasons other than security. For example, a message exit can be used for application data conversion, although a data conversion exit is normally more appropriate for this purpose. They can be used for compressing and decompressing the application data in messages if the communications subsystem cannot provide this function. Headers in a message must not be compressed by a message exit because it causes data conversion of the message headers to fail.

Message exits also play an important role in implementing reference messages. Reference messages allow a large object, such as a file, to be transferred from one system to another without needing to store the object in a WebSphere MQ queue at either the source or destination queue manager. For more information about reference messages, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

Send and receive exits

Send and receive exits can be used on both message and MQI channels. They are called for all types of data that flow on a channel, and for flows in both directions. Send and receive exits have access to each transmission segment. They can modify its contents and change its length.

On a message channel, if an MCA needs to split a message and send it in more than one transmission segment, a send exit is called for each transmission segment containing a portion of the message and, at the receiving end, a receive exit is called for each transmission segment. The same occurs on an MQI channel if the input or output parameters of an MQI call are too large to be sent in a single transmission segment.

On an MQI channel, byte 10 of a transmission segment identifies the MQI call, and indicates whether the transmission segment contains the input or output parameters of the call. Send and receive exits can examine this byte to determine whether the MQI call contains application data that might need to be protected.

When a send exit is called for the first time, to acquire and initialize any resources it needs, it can ask the MCA to reserve a specified amount of space in the buffer that holds a transmission segment. When it is called subsequently to process a transmission segment, it can use this space to add an encrypted key or a digital

signature, for example. The corresponding receive exit at the other end of the channel can remove the data added by the send exit, and use it to process the transmission segment.

It is recommended to use send and receive exits for purposes in which they do not need to understand the structure of the data they are handling and can therefore treat each transmission segment as a binary object.

Send and receive exits can be used to provide the security services described in the following sections.

Confidentiality

Send and receive exits can be used to encrypt and decrypt the data that flows on a channel. They are more appropriate than message exits for providing this service for the following reasons:

- On a message channel, message headers can be encrypted as well as the application data in the messages.
- Send and receive exits can be used on MQI channels as well as message channels. Parameters on MQI calls might contain sensitive application data that needs to be protected while it flows on an MQI channel. You can therefore use the same send and receive exits on both kinds of channel.

Data integrity

On a message channel, message exits are more appropriate for providing this service because a message exit has access to a whole message. On an MQI channel, parameters on MQI calls might contain application data that needs to be protected and only send and receive exits can provide this protection.

Other uses of send and receive exits

Send and receive exits can be used for reasons other than security. For example, they can be used to compress and decompress the data that flows on a channel. On message channels, they are more appropriate than message exits for this purpose because message headers can be compressed as well as the application data in the messages.

Data compression on channels is supported as an integral part of WebSphere MQ functionality. This integral support does not involve use of channel exits.

Access Manager for Business Integration

This section contains an introduction to Access Manager for Business Integration, focusing on the support it provides for the security services introduced in "Security services" on page 1. The chapter contains the following sections:

Introduction

Access Manager for Business Integration is part of WebSphere MQ Extended Security Edition, but is not supplied with the WebSphere MQ base product. Access Manager for Business Integration provides application level security services for both MQ applications and MQ client (C and JMS) applications. These security services protect WebSphere MQ messages while they are stored in queues and while they are flowing across a network. From a single point of control, an administrator can configure and maintain security services to protect WebSphere MQ resources belonging to more than one queue manager and across multiple systems.

Access Manager for Business Integration uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology to provide authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and data integrity services for messages. Access Manager for Business Integration also provides client channel authentication and authorization services to secure client connections at the channel level.

Access Manager for Business Integration has its own access control lists to control who can gain access to messages that are stored in queues. WebSphere MQ applications require no modification, recompilation, or relinking in order to implement Access Manager for Business Integration. For MQ applications, security services are invoked by Access Manager for Business Integration's API exit implementation. For applications using the MQI C and JMS client API's, security services are invoked by corresponding interceptors, which intercept calls to those APIs.

For client channels, Access Manager for Business Integration provides a security exit at the server side, which allows customers to enforce tight control of what clients are allowed to attach to production servers. Authentication using this security exit requires the presentation of a client certificate and requires the use of an SSL connection between each MQ client and server.

Access Manager for Business Integration is available on the following platforms:

- AIX
- Solaris
- Windows 2000
- Windows XP
- Windows 2003
- z/OS and OS/390®
- Linux x86
- HP/UX

Every queue manager and queue that is protected by Access Manager for Business Integration is represented in the Access Manager *protected object space*. Each queue manager and queue in the protected object space can have an associated access control list. This list specifies which application or user, represented as an OS ID, can put messages on the queue and get messages from the queue. For more information about the access control list, see "Access control" on page 66.

Each queue can also have a *protected object policy (POP)*, which specifies the *quality of protection (QoP)* that is required for the messages that are put on the queue. The quality of protection for a queue can be one of the following:

none No cryptographic protection is required for the messages in the queue. When a message is put on the queue, no Access Manager for Business Integration header is added to the message. When a message is retrieved from the queue, an Access Manager for Business Integration header is not expected. This quality of protection is appropriate, for example, when messages are being sent to, or arrive from, a queue manager whose queues are not protected by Access Manager for Business Integration.

integrity
The messages in the queue are digitally signed. For more information about this quality of protection, see "Identification and authentication" on page 67 and "Data integrity" on page 67.

privacy
The messages in the queue are encrypted and digitally signed. For more information about this quality of protection, see "Confidentiality" on page 67.

The protected object policy also specifies the audit level for the queue. For more information about the audit level, see "Non-repudiation" on page 68.

Access control

The access control list for a queue uses the following permissions:

[PDMQ]E
The application or user is allowed to enqueue, or put, messages on the queue

[PDMQ]D
The application or user is allowed to dequeue, or get, messages from the queue

[PDMQ]R
The application or user is allowed to connect to the queue manager via client channel connection

When an application attempts to open a queue, Access Manager for Business Integration inspects the access control list for the queue to check whether the user ID associated with the application has the required permissions for the operations requested. If the user ID does not have the required permissions, the MQOPEN call fails.

Access Manager for Business Integration performs these authority checks even if the quality of protection for the queue is specified as **none**. You can therefore specify a quality of protection of **none** for a queue if the only security service you require is access control.

When an application attempts to get a message from a queue, Access Manager for Business Integration checks that the sender of the message did have permission to put the message on the queue. This check is relevant for a message that has arrived from a remote queue manager and was actually put on the queue by an MCA. If the sender does not have the required permission, the MQGET call fails and the message is not delivered to the application. The message is put on the Access Manager for Business Integration error queue, or on the local dead letter queue if an error queue has not been created. This authority check is performed only if the quality of protection for the queue is specified as **integrity** or **privacy**.

When a queue manager receives a client channel connection request, the Access Manager for Business Integration security exit checks whether the initiator has permission to connect to the queue manager. The client identity is then extracted from the client certificate by WMQ SSL. If the check is successful, the client channel connection is established and the client identity is saved for use during authorization of other requests. If the check failed, the client channel connection is dropped.

Identification and authentication

When an application puts a message on a queue whose quality of protection is specified as **integrity**, Access Manager for Business Integration replaces the application data in the message with an Access Manager for Business Integration header followed by a data structure. The data structure conforms to the PKCS #7 cryptographic message syntax standard for signed data, and includes:

- The digital certificate of the sender
- The digital signature of the sender
- The original application data

When an application attempts to get the message from the queue, Access Manager for Business Integration performs the following checks:

- The digital certificate is validated by working through the certificate chain to the root CA certificate. This check provides assurance that the sender, identified by the Distinguished Name, is the genuine owner of the public key contained in the certificate.
- The digital signature is checked using the public key contained in the digital certificate. This check authenticates the sender.

If either of these checks fail, or if the message is not signed, the MQGET call fails and the message is not delivered to the application. The message is put on the Access Manager for Business Integration error queue, or on the local dead letter queue if an error queue has not been created.

Access Manager for Business Integration supports two algorithms for generating the message digest that is used to create a digital signature: MD5 and SHA-1. You can specify the message digest algorithm to be used globally for all queues in the protected object space, but you can override this global selection by specifying a different algorithm for an individual queue. If you do not specify a message digest algorithm, SHA-1 is used by default.

Data integrity

When an application attempts to get a message from a queue whose quality of protection is specified as **integrity**, the check of the digital signature (as described in "Identification and authentication") also detects whether the message has been deliberately modified since it was first put on a queue by the sending application.

Confidentiality

When an application puts a message on a queue whose quality of protection is specified as **privacy**, Access Manager for Business Integration encrypts the application data in the message using a randomly generated symmetric key. A copy of the symmetric key is encrypted with the public key of each of the intended receivers of the message. This action ensures that only an intended receiver can

decrypt the application data. The intended receivers are specified as *extended attributes* of the queue in the protected object space.

Access Manager for Business Integration replaces the application data in the message with an Access Manager for Business Integration header followed by a data structure. The data structure conforms to the PKCS #7 cryptographic message syntax standard for signed and enveloped data, and includes:

- The digital certificate of the sender
- The digital signature of the sender
- A copy of the encrypted symmetric key for each of the intended receivers
- The encrypted application data

When an application attempts to get the message from the queue, Access Manager for Business Integration decrypts the symmetric key using the private key of the actual receiver, and then decrypts the application data using the symmetric key. Access Manager for Business Integration also performs the checks for authentication and data integrity that are described in "Identification and authentication" on page 67. A quality of protection of **privacy**, therefore, implies **integrity**.

If Access Manager for Business Integration is not able to decrypt the application data for any reason, or if the authentication and data integrity checks fail, the MQGET call fails and the message is not delivered to the application. The message is put on the Access Manager for Business Integration error queue, or on the local dead letter queue if an error queue has not been created.

Access Manager for Business Integration supports five message content encryption algorithms:

STRONG
Triple DES with a 168-bit encryption key

MEDIUM
DES with a 56-bit encryption key

WEAK
RC2 with a 40-bit encryption key

AES128
AES with 128-bit encryption key

AES256
AES with 256-bit encryption key

You can specify the message content encryption algorithm to be used globally for all queues in the protected object space, but you can override the global selection by specifying a different algorithm for an individual queue. If you do not specify a message content encryption algorithm, **STRONG** is used by default.

Non-repudiation

In addition to specifying a quality of protection, the protected object policy for a queue specifies the audit level for the queue. The audit level can be one of the following:

all Access Manager for Business Integration generates an audit record for each MQOPEN, MQGET, MQPUT, MQPUT1, and MQCLOSE call on a protected queue.

none Access Manager for Business Integration generates no audit records for MQI calls.

Although these audit levels are available on all platforms, additional ones are available for use with Access Manager for Business Integration on AIX, Solaris, HP/UX, Linux Intel® and Windows 2000/2003/XP:

permit
Records only successful access to Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration–protected resources

deny Records only denied requests for access to Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration–protected resources

admin Records OPEN, CLOSE, PUT, and GET operations on protected IBM WebSphere MQ queues

error Records any unsuccessful GET operations which result in messages being sent to the error handling queue.

When an application gets a message from a queue, the audit record for the MQGET call includes the following information:

- The date and time of the MQGET call
- The name of the queue from which the message was retrieved
- The name of the queue manager that owns the queue
- Whether the MQGET call completed successfully
- The message digest algorithm that was used to create the digital signature, if the message was signed
- The Distinguished Name of the sender of the message
- The contents of the *MsgId* field in the message descriptor of the message
- The contents of the *Format* field in the message descriptor of the message

Although the audit record contains some information about the message, who sent it, and where and when it was received, other evidence that might be used to provide a non-repudiation service with proof of origin is not recorded. In particular, the audit record does not contain:

- The digital certificate of the sender
- The digital signature of the sender
- The original message

Obtaining more information

For more information about Access Manager for Business Integration, see the following:

- Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration V5.1 readme file for the latest information about installing.
- *Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration Administration Guide Version 5.1*, SC23-4831-01, for Access Manager for Business Integration on AIX, Solaris, HP-UX, Linux, Windows 2000 and Windows XP.
- *Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration - Host Edition Administration Guide Version 4.1*, SC32-1122-00, for Access Manager for Business Integration on z/OS.

Providing your own application level security

This chapter describes how you can provide your own application level security services. To help you do this, WebSphere MQ provides two exits, the API exit and the API-crossing exit.

This chapter contains the following sections:

The API exit

Note: The information in this section does not apply to WebSphere MQ for z/OS.

An *API exit* is a program module that monitors or modifies the function of MQI calls. An API exit comprises multiple *API exit functions*, each with its own entry point in the module.

There are two categories of exit function:

An exit function that is associated with an MQI call

There are two exit functions in this category for each MQI call and an additional one for an MQGET call with the MQGMO_CONVERT option. The MQCONN and MQCONNX calls share the same exit functions.

For each MQI call, one of the two exit functions is invoked before the queue manager starts to process the call and the other is invoked after the queue manager has completed processing the call. The exit function for an MQGET call with the MQGMO_CONVERT option is invoked during the MQGET call, after the message has been retrieved from the queue by the queue manager but before any data conversion takes place. This allows, for example, a message to be decrypted before data conversion.

An exit function can inspect and modify any of the parameters on an MQI call. On an MQPUT call, for example, an exit function that is invoked before the processing of the call has started can:

- Inspect and modify the contents of the application data in the message being put
- Change the length of the application data in the message
- Modify the contents of the fields in the message descriptor structure, MQMD
- Modify the contents of the fields in the put message options structure, MQPMO

An exit function that is invoked before the processing of an MQI call has started can suppress the call completely. The exit function for an MQGET call with the MQGMO_CONVERT option can suppress data conversion of the message being retrieved.

Initialization and termination exit functions

There are two exit functions in this category, the initialization exit function and the termination exit function.

The initialization exit function is invoked by the queue manager when an application connects to the queue manager. Its primary purpose is to register exit functions and their respective entry points with the queue manager and perform any initialization processing. You do not have to register all the exit functions, only those that are required for this connection. When the application disconnects from the queue manager, the registrations are removed automatically.

The initialization exit function can also be used to acquire any storage required by the exit and examine the values of any environment variables.

The termination exit function is invoked by the queue manager when an application disconnects from the queue manager. Its purpose is to release any storage used by the exit and perform any required cleanup operations.

An API exit can issue calls to the MQI but, if it does, the API exit is not invoked recursively a second time. The following exit functions, however, are not able to issue MQI calls because the correct environment is not present at the time the exit functions are invoked:

- The initialization exit function
- The exit function for an MQCONN and MQCONNX call that is invoked *before* the queue manager starts to process the call
- The exit function for the MQDISC call that is invoked *after* the queue manager has completed processing the call
- The termination exit function

An API exit can also use other APIs that might be available; for example, it can issue calls to DB2®.

An API exit can be used with a WebSphere MQ client application, but it is important to note that the exit is invoked at the *server* end of an MQI channel. See the discussion in "What application level security cannot do" on page 10.

An API exit is written using the C programming language.

To enable an API exit, you must configure it. On i5/OS, Windows, and UNIX systems, you do this by editing the WebSphere MQ configuration file, mqs.ini, and the queue manager configuration file, qm.ini, for each queue manager.

You configure an API exit by providing the following information:

- The descriptive name of the API exit.
- The name of the module and its location; for example, the full path name.
- The name of the entry point for the initialization exit function.
- The sequence in which the API exit is invoked relative to other API exits. You can configure more than one API exit for a queue manager.
- Optionally, any data to be passed to the API exit.

For more information about how to configure an API exit, see:

- WebSphere MQ for i5/OS System Administration Guide
- WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide, for UNIX and Windows systems

For information about how to write an API exit, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

The API-crossing exit

Note: The information in this section applies only to CICS applications on z/OS.

An *API-crossing exit* is a program that monitors or modifies the function of MQI calls issued by CICS applications on z/OS. The exit program is invoked by the CICS adapter and runs in the CICS address space.

The API-crossing exit is invoked for the following MQI calls only:

MQBUFMH
MQCB
MQCB_FUNCTION
MQCLOSE
MQCRTMH
MQCTL
MQDLTMH
MQGET
MQINQ
MQOPEN
MQPUT
MQPUT1
MQSET
MQSTAT
MQSUB
MQSUBRQ

For each MQI call, it is invoked once before the processing of the call has started and once after the processing of the call has been completed.

The exit program can determine the name of an MQI call and can inspect and modify any of the parameters on the call. If it is invoked before an MQI call is processed, it can suppress the call completely.

The exit program can use any of the APIs that a CICS task-related user exit can use; for example, the IMS, DB2, and CICS APIs. It can also use any of the MQI calls except MQCONN, MQCONNX, and MQDISC. However, any MQI calls issued by the exit program do not invoke the exit program a second time.

You can write an API-crossing exit in any programming language supported by WebSphere MQ for z/OS.

Before an API-crossing exit can be used, the exit program load module must be available when the CICS adapter connects to a queue manager. The load module is a CICS program that must be named CSQCAPX and reside in a library in the DFHRPL concatenation sequence. CSQCAPX must be defined in the CICS system definition file (CSD), and the program must be enabled.

An API-crossing exit can be managed using the CICS adapter control panels, CKQC. When CSQCAPX is loaded, a confirmation message is written to the adapter control panels or to the system console. The adapter control panels can also be used to enable or disable the exit program.

For more information about how to write and implement an API-crossing exit, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

The role of the API exit and the API-crossing exit in security

Note: In this section, the term *API exit* means either an API exit or an API-crossing exit.

There are many possible uses of API exits. For example, you can use them to log messages, monitor the use of queues, log failures in MQI calls, maintain audit trails for accounting purposes, or collect statistics for planning purposes.

API exits can also provide the security services described in the following sections.

Identification and authentication

At the level of an individual message, identification and authentication is a service that involves two users, the sender and the receiver of the message. The basic requirement is for the user of the application that receives the message to be able to identify and authenticate the user of the application that sent the message. Note that the requirement is for one way, not two way, authentication.

Depending on how it is implemented, the users and their applications might need to interface, or even interact, with the service. In addition, when and how the service is used might depend on where the users and their applications are located, and on the nature of the applications themselves. It is therefore natural to consider implementing the service at the application level rather than at the link level.

If you consider implementing this service at the link level, you might need to resolve issues such as the following:

- On a message channel, how do you apply the service only to those messages that require it?
- How do you enable users and their applications to interface, or interact, with the service, if this is a requirement?
- In a multi-hop situation, where a message is sent over more than one message channel on the way to its destination, where do you invoke the components of the service?

Here are some examples of how the identification and authorization service can be implemented at the application level:

- When an application puts a message on a queue, an API exit can acquire an authentication token from a trusted authentication server such as Kerberos. The API exit can add this token to the application data in the message. When the message is retrieved by the receiving application, a second API exit can ask the authentication server to authenticate the sender by checking the token.
- When an application puts a message on a queue, an API exit can append the following items to the application data in the message:
  - The digital certificate of the sender
  - The digital signature of the sender

  If different algorithms for generating a message digest are available for use, the API exit can include the name of the algorithm it has used.

  When the message is retrieved by the receiving application, a second API exit can perform the following checks:

  - The API exit can validate the digital certificate by working through the certificate chain to the root CA certificate. To do this, the API exit must have access to a key repository that contains the remaining certificates in the certificate chain. This check provide assurance that the sender, identified by the Distinguished Name, is the genuine owner of the public key contained in the certificate.
  - The API exit can check the digital signature using the public key contained in the certificate. This check authenticates the sender.

  The Distinguished Name of the sender can be sent instead of the whole digital certificate. In this case, the key repository must contain the sender's certificate so that the second API exit can find the public key of the sender. Another possibility is to send all the certificates in the certificate chain.

  Tivoli Access Manager for Business Integration uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) techniques similar to the ones just described. For more information about how Access Manager for Business Integration implements this and other application level security services, see "Access Manager for Business Integration" on page 64.
- When an application puts a message on a queue, the *UserIdentifier* field in the message descriptor contains a user ID associated with the application. The user ID can be used to identify the sender. To enable authentication, an API exit can append some data, such as an encrypted password, to the application data in the message. When the message is retrieved by the receiving application, a second API exit can authenticate the user ID by using the data that has travelled with the message.

  This technique might be considered sufficient for messages that originate in a controlled and trusted environment, and in circumstances where a trusted authentication server or PKI support is not available.

Access control

An API exit can provide access controls to supplement those provided by WebSphere MQ. In particular, an API exit can provide access control at the message level. An API exit can ensure that an application puts on a queue, or gets from a queue, only those messages that satisfy certain criteria.

Consider the following examples:

- A message contains information about an order. When an application attempts to put a message on a queue, an API exit can check that the total value of the order is less than some prescribed limit.
- Messages arrive on a destination queue from remote queue managers. When an application attempts to get a message from the queue, an API exit can check that the sender of the message is authorized to send a message to the queue.

Confidentiality

The application data in a message can be encrypted by an API exit when the message is put by the sending application and decrypted by a second API exit when the message is retrieved by the receiving application.

For performance reasons, a symmetric key algorithm is normally used for this purpose. However, at the application level, where many users might be sending messages to each other, the problem is how to ensure that only the intended receiver of a message is able to decrypt the message. One solution is to use a different symmetric key for each pair of users that send messages to each other. But this solution might be difficult and time consuming to administer, particularly

if the users belong to different organizations. A standard way of solving this problem is known as *digital enveloping* and uses PKI technology.

When an application puts a message on a queue, an API exit generates a random symmetric key and uses the key to encrypt the application data in the message. The API exit encrypts the symmetric key with the public key of the intended receiver. It then replaces the application data in the message with the encrypted application data and the encrypted symmetric key. In this way, only the intended receiver can decrypt the symmetric key and therefore the application data. If an encrypted message has more than one possible intended receiver, the API exit can encrypt a copy of the symmetric key for each intended receiver.

If different algorithms for encrypting and decrypting the application data are available for use, the API exit can include the name of the algorithm it has used.

Data integrity

A message can be digitally signed by an API exit when the message is put by the sending application. The digital signature can then be checked by a second API exit when the message is retrieved by the receiving application. This can detect whether the message has been deliberately modified.

As discussed in "Data integrity" on page 62, some protection can be provided by using a message digest instead of a digital signature.

Non-repudiation

Consider an API exit that checks the digital signature of each message that is retrieved from a queue by the receiving application. If the API exit logs sufficient evidence to enable the digital signature to be checked at any time in the future, this can form the basis of a non-repudiation service with proof of origin.

The evidence that is logged might include:

- The digital certificate of the sender
- The digital signature of the sender
- The original message

The API exit can also prepare a delivery report on behalf of the receiver of the message and send it to the reply-to queue specified in the message descriptor of the message. The delivery report might include :

- The date and time of delivery of the message
- The digital certificate of the receiver
- The digital signature of the receiver
- The original message, a subset of the original message, or some means of identifying the original message

When the delivery report is retrieved from the reply-to queue, another API exit can check the digital signature to authenticate the receiver of the original message. If the API exit also logs sufficient evidence to enable the digital signature to be checked at any time in the future, this can form the basis of a non-repudiation service with proof of delivery.

Other ways of providing your own application level security

If the API exit or API-crossing exit is not supported in your system environment, you might want to consider other ways of providing your own application level security. One way is to develop a higher level API that encapsulates the MQI. Programmers then use this API, instead of the MQI, to write WebSphere MQ applications.

The most common reasons for using a higher level API are:

- To hide the more advanced features of the MQI from programmers.
- To enforce standards in the use of the MQI.
- To add function to the MQI. This additional function can be security services.

Some vendor products use this technique to provide application level security for WebSphere MQ.

If you are planning to provide security services in this way, note the following regarding data conversion:

- If a security token, such as a digital signature, has been added to the application data in a message, any code performing data conversion must be aware of the presence of this token.
- A security token might have been derived from a binary image of the application data. Therefore, any checking of the token must be done before converting the data.
- If the application data in a message has been encrypted, it must be decrypted before data conversion.

Chapter 3. Working with WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support

The tasks that you perform when implementing the WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support for your installation can depend upon your platform as well as how you set up communications for SSL or TLS.

You can select from the following tasks:

Setting up communications for SSL or TLS

Secure communications that use the SSL or TLS cryptographic security protocols involve setting up the communication channels and managing the digital certificates that you will use for authentication.

To set up your SSL installation you must define your channels to use SSL. You must also create and manage your digital certificates. On UNIX systems, Windows systems, and on z/OS, you can perform the tests with self–signed certificates. On i5/OS, Windows systems, and on z/OS, you can work with personal certificates signed by a local CA. For full information about creating and managing certificates, see:

- "Working with SSL or TLS on i5/OS" on page 87
- "Working with SSL or TLS on UNIX and Windows systems" on page 96
- "Working with SSL or TLS on z/OS" on page 119

This chapter introduces some of the tasks involved in setting up SSL communications, and provides step-by-step guidance on completing those tasks:

- "Task 1: Using self-signed certificates" on page 78
- "Task 2: Using CA-signed certificates" on page 81
- "Task 3: Anonymous queue managers" on page 85

You might also want to test SSL client authentication, which is an optional part of the SSL protocol. During the SSL handshake the SSL client always obtains and validates a digital certificate from the SSL server. With the WebSphere MQ implementation, the SSL server always requests a certificate from the SSL client.

On UNIX, i5/OS, or Windows, the SSL client sends a certificate only if it has one labelled in the correct WebSphere MQ format:

- For a queue manager on UNIX, i5/OS, or Windows, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager changed to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`
- For a WebSphere MQ client on UNIX or Windows systems, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID changed to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.

On z/OS, the SSL client sends a certificate only if it has either of the following:

- For a queue manager on z/OS, `ibmWebSphereMQ` followed by the name of your queue manager, for example `ibmWebSphereMQQM1`
- A default certificate (which might be the ibmWebSphereMQ certificate).

Note: On UNIX, i5/OS, and Windows systems, WebSphere MQ uses the `ibmwebspheremq` prefix, and on z/OS the `ibmWebSphereMQ` prefix, on a label to avoid confusion with certificates for other products. On UNIX and Windows systems, ensure that you specify the entire certificate label in lower case.

The SSL server always validates the client certificate if one is sent. If the SSL client does not send a certificate, authentication fails only if the end of the channel acting as the SSL server is defined:

- With the SSLCAUTH parameter set to REQUIRED or
- With an SSLPEER parameter value

For more information, see "Task 3: Anonymous queue managers" on page 85.

Task 1: Using self-signed certificates

Scenario:

- You have two queue managers, QM1 and QM2, which need to communicate securely. You require mutual authentication to be carried out between QM1 and QM2.
- You have decided to test your secure communication using self-signed certificates.

On UNIX, Windows, and z/OS systems, you can create self-signed certificates for testing.

On i5/OS, you cannot create self-signed certificates. Use personal certificates signed by a local CA to test SSL on i5/OS. When testing on i5/OS, ensure that the other end of the test connection has a copy of your local CA's certificate. See "Task 2: Using CA-signed certificates" on page 81 for more information.

The steps required to complete task 1

To complete this task, follow these steps:

1. Prepare the key repository on each queue manager:

On both QM1 and QM2, ensure the key repository is correctly set up:

- On UNIX and Windows systems as described in "Setting up a key repository" on page 98
- On z/OS systems as described in "Setting up a key repository" on page 120.

2. Create a self-signed certificate for each queue manager:

On both QM1 and QM2, create a self-signed certificate:

- On UNIX and Windows systems as described in "Creating a self-signed personal certificate" on page 103
- On z/OS systems as described in "Creating a self-signed personal certificate" on page 122.

3. Add the self-signed certificate to the key repository:

This step is required only on z/OS systems. On both QM1 and QM2, add the certificate created in step 2 to the key repository that was set up in step 1, as described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124.

4. Extract a copy of each certificate:

In order to authenticate a partner's certificate when using self-signed certificates, you must send a copy to the partner system. In order to send it, you must first extract it:

- On UNIX or Windows systems as described in "Extracting the CA part of a self-signed certificate from a key repository" on page 109.
- On z/OS systems as described in "Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository" on page 125.

5. Exchange certificates:

If QM1 and QM2 are running on different systems, transfer the CA part of the QM1 certificate to the QM2 system and vice versa, for example, by ftp.

When you transfer certificates by `ftp`, you must ensure that you do so in the correct format.

Transfer the following certificate types in *binary* format:

- DER encoded binary X.509
- PKCS #7 (CA certificates)
- PKCS #12 (personal certificates)

and transfer the following certificate types in ASCII format:

- PEM (privacy-enhanced mail)
- Base64 encoded X.509

6. Add partner's certificate to the key repository:

Add the partner's certificate to the key repository:

- On UNIX and Windows systems, add the certificate as a signer certificate as described in "Adding a CA certificate (or the CA part of a self-signed certificate) into a key repository" on page 109
- On z/OS systems, connect the certificate to the key ring as described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124

7. Define sender channel:

On QM1 you need to define a sender channel to use SSL. For example:

```
DEFINE CHANNEL(QM1.TO.QM2) CHLTYPE(SDR) TRPTYPE(TCP) CONNAME(QM1.MACH.COM) XMIT(QM2)
SSLCIPH(RC4_MD5_US) DESCR('Sender channel using SSL from QM1 to QM2')
```

This example uses CipherSpec RC4_MD5. Note that the CipherSpecs at each end of the channel must be the same.

Only the SSLCIPH parameter is mandatory if you want your channel to use SSL. Refer to "Working with CipherSpecs" on page 142 for information about the permitted values for the SSLCIPH parameter.

Refer to the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference for a complete description of the DEFINE CHANNEL command, and to the WebSphere MQ Intercommunication book for general information about WebSphere MQ channels.

For a description of the i5/OS CRTMQMCHL command, which is used to define channels on i5/OS, refer to the WebSphere MQ for i5/OS System Administration Guide.

8. Define a transmission queue:

On QM1 you need to define a transmission queue for your sender channel to use:

```
DEFINE QLOCAL(QM2) USAGE(XMITQ)
```

9. Define a receiver channel:

On QM2 you need to define a receiver channel with the same name as the sender channel you defined in step 7, and using the same CipherSpec:

```
DEFINE CHANNEL(QM1.TO.QM2) CHLTYPE(RCVR) TRPTYPE(TCP) SSLCIPH(RC4_MD5_US)
SSLCAUTH(REQUIRED) DESCR('Receiver channel using SSL from QM1 to QM2')
```

10. Start the channel:

Now that you have completed all the definitions, if you have not already done so, start the channel initiator on WebSphere MQ for z/OS and, on all platforms, start a listener program on QM2. The listener program listens for incoming network requests and starts the receiver channel when it is needed. For information on how to start a listener, see the WebSphere MQ Intercommunication manual.

If the channel initiator was already running (on z/OS) or if any SSL channels have run previously, you need to issue a REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command. This ensures that all the changes made to the key repository are available.

Start the channel on QM1:

```
START CHANNEL(QM1.TO.QM2)
```

Result of task 1

The resulting configuration looks like this:



Figure 11. Configuration resulting from Task 1

In Figure 11, QM1's key repository contains QM1's certificate and QM2's CA certificate. QM2's key repository contains QM2's certificate and QM1's CA certificate.

Verifying task 1

You can issue some DISPLAY commands to verify that the task has been completed successfully. If the task was successful, the resulting output will be similar to that shown in the following examples.

From the QM1 queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     4 : dis chs(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(QM1.TO.QM2)                     CHLTYPE(SDR)
   CONNAME(9.20.25.40)                     CURRENT
   RQMNAME(QM2)
   SSLCERTI(CN=QM2,OU="WebSphere MQ Development",O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK)
   SSLPEER(CN=QM2,OU="WebSphere MQ Development",O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK)
   STATUS(RUNNING)                         SUBSTATE(MQGET)
   XMITQ(QM2)
```

From the QM2 queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     5 : dis chs(QM1.TO.QM2) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(QM2.TO.QM1)                     CHLTYPE(RCVR)
   CONNAME(9.20.35.92)                     CURRENT
   RQMNAME(QM1)
   SSLCERTI(CN=QM1,OU="WebSphere MQ Development",O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK
   SSLPEER(CN=QM1,OU="WebSphere MQ Development",O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK)
   STATUS(RUNNING)                         SUBSTATE(RECEIVE)
   XMITQ( )
```

In each case, the value of SSLPEER should match that of the DN in the partner certificate that was created in Step 2. The issuer's name matches the peer name because this is a self-signed certificate.

SSLPEER is optional. If it is specified, its value must be set so that the DN in the partner certificate (created in step 2) is allowed. For more information on the use of SSLPEER, see "WebSphere MQ rules for SSLPEER values" on page 146.

Task 2: Using CA-signed certificates

Scenario:

- You have two queue managers called QMA and QMB, which need to communicate securely. You require mutual authentication to be carried out between QMA and QMB.
- You are planning to extend this network, and therefore you have decided to use CA-signed certificates from the beginning.

The steps required to complete task 2

To complete this task, follow these steps:

1. Prepare the key repository on each queue manager:

On both QMA and QMB, ensure the key repository is correctly set up:

- On UNIX and Windows systems as described in "Setting up a key repository" on page 98.
- On z/OS systems as described in "Setting up a key repository" on page 120.
- On i5/OS systems as described in "Setting up a key repository" on page 89.

2. Request a CA-signed certificate for each queue manager:

On both QMA and QMB, create certificate requests:

- On UNIX and Windows systems, as described in "Requesting a personal certificate" on page 105.
- On i5/OS systems, as described in "Requesting a server certificate" on page 93.
- On z/OS systems, as described in "Requesting a personal certificate" on page 123.

3. Add the Certification Authority's certificate to the key repository:

On both QMA and QMB, add the CA's certificate to the queue manager's key repository:

- On UNIX and Windows systems, as described in "Adding a CA certificate (or the CA part of a self-signed certificate) into a key repository" on page 109
- On i5/OS systems, as described in "Working with SSL or TLS on i5/OS" on page 87
- On z/OS systems, as described in "Ensuring CA certificates are available to a queue manager" on page 121.

4. Add the CA-signed certificate to the key repository:

When the signed personal certificate is sent to you by the CA, add the relevant certificate to the queue manager's key repository (on both QMA and QMB):

- On UNIX and Windows systems, as described in "Receiving personal certificates into a key repository" on page 106.
- On i5/OS systems, as described in "Adding server certificates to a key repository" on page 94.
- On z/OS systems, as described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124.

5. Define sender channel and associated transmission queue:

On QMA you need to define a sender channel and the transmission is uses:

```
DEFINE CHANNEL(TO.QMB) CHLTYPE(SDR) TRPTYPE(TCP) CONNAME(QMB.MACH.COM) XMITQ(QMB)
SSLCIPH(RC2_MD5_EXPORT) DESCR('Sender channel using SSL from QMA to QMB')

DEFINE QLOCAL(QMB) USAGE(XMITQ)
```

6. Define receiver channel:

On QMB, you need to define a receiver channel:

```
DEFINE CHANNEL(TO.QMB) CHLTYPE(RCVR) TRPTYPE(TCP) SSLCIPH(RC2_MD5_EXPORT)
SSLCAUTH(REQUIRED) DESCR('Receiver channel using SSL to QMB')
```

7. Start the channel:

Now that you have completed all the definitions, if you have not already done so, start the channel initiator on WebSphere MQ for z/OS and, on all platforms, start a listener program on QMB. The listener program listens for incoming network requests and starts the receiver channel when it is needed. For information on how to start a listener, see the WebSphere MQ Intercommunication manual.

If the channel initiator was already running (on z/OS) or if any SSL channels have run previously, you need to issue a REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command. This ensures that all the changes made to the key repository are available.

Start the channel on QMA:

```
START CHANNEL(TO.QMB)
```

Result of task 2

The resulting configuration looks like this:



Figure 12. Configuration resulting from Task 2

Verifying task 2

You can issue some DISPLAY commands to verify that the task has been completed successfully. If the task was successful, the resulting output will be similar to that shown in the following examples.

From the QMA queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     4 : dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(TO.QMB)                         CHLTYPE(SDR)
   CONNAME(9.20.25.40)                     CURRENT
   RQMNAME(QMB)
   SSLCERTI("CN=WebSphere MQ CA,OU=WebSphere MQ Devt,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   SSLPEER("CN=QMB,OU=WebSphere MQ Development,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   STATUS(RUNNING)                         SUBSTATE(MQGET)
   XMITQ(QMB)
```

From the QMB queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     5 : dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(TO.QMB)                         CHLTYPE(RCVR)
   CONNAME(9.20.35.92)                     CURRENT
   RQMNAME(QMA)
   SSLCERTI("CN=WebSphere MQ CA,OU=WebSphere MQ Devt,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   SSLPEER("CN=QMA,OU=WebSphere MQ Development,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   STATUS(RUNNING)                         SUBSTATE(RECEIVE)
   XMITQ( )
```

In each case, the value of SSLPEER should match that of the Distinguished Name (DN) in the partner certificate that was created in Step 2. The issuer's name matches the subject's DN of the CA certificate that has signed the personal certificate added in Step 4.

Extensions to this task

The use of CA-signed certificates makes it easier to add extra queue managers (which will also use SSL) to your network, because it reduces the administration of certificates in your network. Table 2 compares the number of certificates that need to be installed in each queue manager's key repository to be able to communicate with all the other queue managers, when using self-signed certificates (as described in "Task 1: Using self-signed certificates" on page 78) and when using CA-signed certificates.

The administration of certificates includes the copying of these certificates from system to system as well as adding them to key repositories. Table 2 shows that, as your network grows, the number of certificates that must be copied into each queue manager's key repository increases when you use self-signed certificates. When you use CA-signed certificates however, the number of certificates remains the same, making the administration much simpler.

Table 2. Total number of certificates in each queue manager's key repository, both CA certificates and personal certificates, when using each scheme.

Number of queue managers in network	Using self-signed certificates	Using CA-signed certificates
2	2	2
3	3	2
4	4	2
5	5	2

You can extend this task by adding a third queue manager called QMC. QMC's key repository will contain its own certificate. The CA-signed certificate and appropriate channels can be defined to communicate with QMB, for example on QMC issue:

```
DEFINE CHANNEL(TO.QMB) CHLTYPE(SDR) TRPTYPE(TCP) CONNAME(QMB.MACH.COM) XMITQ(QMB)
SSLCIPH(RC2_MD5_EXPORT) DESCR('Sender channel using SSL from QMC to QMB')
```

The same CipherSpec must be used on the sender channels at QMA and QMC, if generic receiver definitions are used at queue manager QMB, because the CipherSpec must match on both ends of each channel.

Task 3: Anonymous queue managers

Scenario:

- Your two queue managers (QMA and QMB) have been set up as in "Task 2: Using CA-signed certificates" on page 81.
- You want to change QMA so that it will anonymously connect to QMB.

The steps required to complete task 3

To complete this task, follow these steps:

1. Remove QMA's personal certificate:

Remove QMA's personal certificate from its key repository. As a result, QMA will attempt to connect anonymously to QMB.

Note that on all platforms you remove the certificates from the key repository. If you do not already have a copy of a certificate and you want to restore it after testing for failure of SSL client authentication, you must save a copy of the certificate.

- On UNIX and Windows systems, remove from the SSL client's key repository the certificate labelled:
  - For a queue manager, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`, or,
  - For a WebSphere MQ client, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID folded to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.

  The procedure for removing personal certificates is described in "Deleting a personal certificate from a key repository" on page 115.
- On i5/OS, remove the certificate labelled `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`. The procedure for removing personal certificates is described in "Removing certificates" on page 95.
- On z/OS, remove from the SSL client's key repository both:
  - The certificate labelled `ibmWebSphereMQ` followed by the name of your queue manager, for example `ibmWebSphereMQQM1`
  - The default certificate (which might be the `ibmWebSphereMQ` certificate).

  The procedure for removing personal certificates is described in "Removing certificates" on page 125.

2. Refresh the SSL environment (if necessary):

On QMA, if the channel initiator was already running (on z/OS) or if any SSL channels have run previously, you need to issue a REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command. This ensures that all the changes made to the key repository are available. On QMA, enter the following command:

```
REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL)
```

3. Allow anonymous connections on the receiver:

You need to change the receiver definition on QMB to allow anonymous connections. On QMB, enter the following command:

```
ALTER CHANNEL(TO.QMB) CHLTYPE(RCVR) SSLCAUTH(OPTIONAL)
```

Result of task 3

The resulting configuration looks like this:



Figure 13. Configuration resulting from Task 3

Verifying task 3

If the sender channel was running and the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command was issued (in step 2), the channel will be restarted automatically. If the sender channel was not running, you will need to start it.

At the server end of the channel, the presence of the peer name parameter value on the channel status display indicates that a client certificate has flowed.

You can issue some DISPLAY commands to verify that the task has been completed successfully. If the task was successful, the resulting output will be similar to that shown in the following examples:

From the QMA queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     4 : dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(TO.QMB)                         CHLTYPE(SDR)
   CONNAME(9.20.25.40)                     CURRENT
   RQMNAME(QMB)
   SSLCERTI("CN=WebSphere MQ CA,OU=WebSphere MQ Devt,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   SSLPEER("CN=QMB,OU=WebSphere MQ Development,O=IBM,ST=Hampshire,C=UK")
   STATUS(RUNNING)                         SUBSTATE(MQGET)
   XMITQ(QMB)
```

From the QMB queue manager, enter the following command:

```
DISPLAY CHS(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
```

The resulting output will be similar to the following:

```
dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
     5 : dis chs(TO.QMB) SSLPEER SSLCERTI
AMQ8417: Display Channel Status details.
   CHANNEL(TO.QMB)                         CHLTYPE(RCVR)
   CONNAME(9.20.35.92)                     CURRENT
```

```
RQMNAME(QMA)                    SSLCERTI( )
SSLPEER( )                      STATUS(RUNNING)
SUBSTATE(RECEIVE)               XMITQ( )
```

On QMB, the SSLPEER field is empty, showing that QMA did not send a certificate. On QMA, the value of SSLPEER matches that of the DN in QMB's personal certificate.

Extensions to this task

This task shows the setup required to successfully connect anonymous senders.

In order to see the failure messages that are displayed when anonymous senders try to connect and the system is not set up to accept them, issue the following command on QMB:

```
ALTER CHANNEL(TO.QMB) CHLTYPE(RCVR) SSLCAUTH(REQUIRED)
```

and restart the sender on QMA.

Other failure scenarios could be tested by removing other certificates from the key repositories, and issuing

```
REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL)
```

when the changes have been made. See "Understanding authentication failures" on page 147 for information on the types of failures that might occur during an SSL handshake.

Working with SSL or TLS on i5/OS

To use the WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support for your i5/OS installation you must set up your communications to use cryptographic protocols.

This chapter describes how you set up and work with the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) on i5/OS. The operations you can perform are:

For i5/OS, the SSL support is integral to the operating system. Ensure that you have installed the prerequisites listed in WebSphere MQ for i5/OS Quick Beginnings.

On i5/OS, you manage keys and digital certificates with the Digital Certificate Manager (DCM) tool.

Digital Certificate Manager (DCM)

The Digital Certificate Manager (DCM) enables you to manage digital certificates and to use them in secure applications on the i5/OS server. With Digital Certificate Manager, you can request and process digital certificates from Certification

Authorities (CAs) or other third-parties. You can also act as a local Certification Authority to create and manage digital certificates for your users.

DCM also supports using CRLs to provide a stronger certificate and application validation process. You can use DCM to define the location where a specific Certificate Authority CRL resides on an LDAP server so that WebSphere MQ can verify that a specific certificate has not been revoked.

On i5/OS V5R1, DCM supports and can automatically detect certificates in the following formats: Base64, PKCS #7, PKCS #12 V1 and V3 (new in V5R1) and the C3 encoded standard. C3 is an IBM internal format, used when importing from, or exporting to, i5/OS systems with i5/OS V4R3. When DCM detects a PKCS #12 encoded certificate, or a PKCS #7 certificate that contains encrypted data, it automatically prompts the user to enter the password that was used to encrypt the certificate. DCM does not prompt for PKCS #7 certificates that do not contain encrypted data.

DCM provides a browser-based user interface that you can use to manage digital certificates for your applications and users. The user interface is divided into two main frames: a navigation frame and a task frame.

You use the navigation frame to select the tasks to manage certificates or the applications that use them. Some individual tasks appear directly in the main navigation frame, but most tasks in the navigation frame are organized into categories. For example, Manage Certificates is a task category that contains a variety of individual guided tasks, such as View certificate, Renew certificate, Import certificate. If an item in the navigation frame is a category that contains more than one task, an arrow appears to the left of it. The arrow indicates that when you select the category link, an expanded list of tasks displays, enabling you to choose which task to perform.

For important information about DCM, see the following IBM Redbooks®:

- *IBM i5/OS Wired Network Security: OS/400® V5R1 DCM and Cryptographic Enhancements*, SG24-6168. Specifically, see the appendices for essential information on setting up your AS/400® or i5/OS system as a local CA.
- *AS/400 Internet Security: Developing a Digital Certificate Infrastructure*, SG24-5659. Specifically, see “Chapter 5. Digital Certificate Manager for AS/400”, which explains the AS/400 DCM.

Accessing DCM

To access the DCM interface, use a web browser that can display frames and perform the following steps:

1. Go to either `http://machine.domain:2001` or `https://machine.domain:2010`, where *machine* is the name of your computer.
2. A dialog box appears, requesting a user name and a password. Type a valid user profile and password.

   Ensure your user profile has *ALLOBJ and *SECADM special authorities to enable you to create new certificate stores. If you do not have the special authorities, you can only manage your personal certificates or view the object signatures for the objects for which you are authorized. If you are authorized to use an object signing application, you can also sign objects from DCM.
3. On the AS/400 Tasks page, click **Digital Certificate Manager**. The Digital Certificate Manager page displays.

Assigning a certificate to a queue manager

In WebSphere MQ Version 7.0, you can use the traditional i5/OS digital certificate management. This means that you can specify that a queue manager uses the system certificate store, and that the queue manager is registered for use as an application with Digital Certificate Manager. To do this you change the value of the queue manager's SSLKEYR attribute to *SYSTEM.

When the SSLKEYR parameter is changed to *SYSTEM, WebSphere MQ registers the queue manager as a server application with a unique application label of QIBM_WEBSPHERE_MQ_QMGRNAME and a label with a description of Qmgrname (WMQ). The queue manager then appears as a server application in Digital Certificate Manager, and you can assign to this application any server or client certificate in the system store.

Because the queue manager is registered as an application, advanced features of DCM such as defining CA trust lists can be carried out.

If the SSLKEYR parameter is changed to a value other than *SYSTEM, WebSphere MQ deregisters the queue manager as an application with Digital Certificate Manager. If a queue manager is deleted, it is also deregistered from DCM. A user with sufficient *SECADM authority can also manually add or remove applications from DCM.

Setting up a key repository

An SSL connection requires a *key repository* at each end of the connection. Each queue manager must have access to a key repository. If you want to access the key repository using a file name and password (that is, not using the *SYSTEM option) ensure:

- the QMQM user profile has execute authority for the directory containing the key repository
- the QMQM user profile has read authority for the file containing the key repository

See "The SSL key repository" on page 42 for more information.

On i5/OS, digital certificates are stored in a certificate store that is managed with DCM. These digital certificates have labels, which associate a certificate with a queue manager. SSL uses the certificates for authentication purposes.

The queue manager certificate store name comprises a path and stem name. The default path is `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/` and the default stem name is `Default`. On i5/OS, the default certificate store, `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/Default.kdb`, is also known as `*SYSTEM`. Optionally, you can choose your own path and stem name.

"Working with a key repository" on page 91 tells you about checking and specifying the certificate store name. You can specify the certificate store name either before or after creating the certificate store.

Note: The operations you can perform with DCM might be limited by the authority of your user profile. For example, you require *ALLOBJ and *SECADM authorities to create a CA certificate.

Creating a new certificate store

You create a new certificate store only if you do not want to use the i5/OS default certificate store.

You can specify that the i5/OS system certificate store is to be used by changing the value of the queue manager's SSLKEYR attribute to *SYSTEM. This value indicates that the queue manager will use the system certificate store, and the queue manager is registered for use as an application with Digital Certificate Manager (DCM).

Use the following procedure to create a new certificate store for a queue manager:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Create New Certificate Store**. The Create New Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
3. In the task frame, select the **Other System Certificate Store** radio button. Click **Continue**. The Create a Certificate in New Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
4. Select the **No - Do not create a certificate in the certificate store** radio button. Click **Continue**. The Certificate Store Name and Password page displays in the task frame.
5. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type an IFS path and filename, for example `/QIBM/UserData/mqm/qmgrs/qm1/key.kdb`
6. Type a password in the **Password** field and type it again in the **Confirm Password** field. Click **Continue**. A window displays, containing a list of the CA certificates that are pre-installed in the certificate store. This list includes the certificate for the local CA, if you have created one. Make a note of the password (which is case sensitive) because you will need it when you stash the repository key.
7. To exit from DCM, close your browser window.

When you have created the certificate store using DCM, ensure you stash the password, as described in "Stashing the certificate store password."

Stashing the certificate store password

Note that if you have specified that the system certificate store is to be used (by changing the value of the queue manager's SSLKEYR attribute to *SYSTEM) you do not need to follow the steps in this section.

When you have created the certificate store using DCM, use the following commands to stash the password:

```
STRMQM MQMNAME('queue manager name')

CHGMQM MQMNAME('queue manager name') SSLKEYRPWD('password')
```

The password must be entered as a literal (in single quotes) exactly as you entered it in 6 of "Creating a new certificate store" (it is case sensitive).

Note: If you are not using the default system certificate store, and you do not stash the password, attempts to start SSL channels fail because they cannot obtain the password required to access the certificate store.

Working with a key repository

This section tells you how to perform the following tasks:

- "Locating the key repository for a queue manager"
- "Changing the key repository location for a queue manager"

Note: When you change either the key repository attribute, or the certificates in the key repository, check "When changes become effective."

Locating the key repository for a queue manager

Use this procedure to obtain information about the location of your queue manager's certificate store:

1. Display your queue manager's attributes, using the following command:
   ```
   DSPMQM MQMNAME('queue manager name')
   ```
2. Examine the command output for the path and stem name of the certificate store. For example: `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/Default`, where `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server` is the path and `Default` is the stem name.

Changing the key repository location for a queue manager

You can change the location of your queue manager's certificate store using any of the following methods:

- Use either the CHGMQM command or the ALTER QMGR MQSC command to set your queue manager's key repository attribute, for example:
  ```
  CHGMQM MQMNAME('qm1') SSLKEYR('/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/MyKey')

  ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR('/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/MyKey')
  ```
  The certificate store has the fully-qualified filename: `/QIBM/UserData/ICSS/Cert/Server/MyKey.kdb`

When you change the location of a queue manager's certificate store, certificates are not transferred from the old location. If the CA certificates pre-installed when you created the certificate store are insufficient, you must populate the new certificate store with certificates, as described in "Managing digital certificates" on page 94. You must also stash the password for the new location, as described in "Stashing the certificate store password" on page 90.

When changes become effective

Changes to the certificates in the certificate store and to the key repository attribute become effective:

- When a new outbound single channel process first runs an SSL channel.
- When a new inbound TCP/IP single channel process first receives a request to start an SSL channel.
- When the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command is issued to refresh the contents of the SSL key repository.
- For channels that run as threads of a process pooling process (amqrmppa), when the process pooling process is started or restarted and first runs an SSL channel. If the process pooling process has already run an SSL channel, and you want the change to become effective immediately, restart the queue manager.
- For channels that run as threads of the channel initiator, when the channel initiator is started or restarted and first runs an SSL channel. If the channel

initiator process has already run an SSL channel, and you want the change to become effective immediately, restart the queue manager.

- For channels that run as threads of a TCP/IP listener, when the listener is started or restarted and first receives a request to start an SSL channel.

Obtaining server certificates

You apply to a Certification Authority for the server certificate that is used to verify the identity of your queue manager. You can also create CA certificates for signing certificates for testing SSL on i5/OS.

This section tells you how to use DCM for:

1. "Creating CA certificates for testing"
2. "Requesting a server certificate" on page 93

Creating CA certificates for testing

The CA certificates that are provided when you install SSL are signed by the issuing CA. On i5/OS, you can generate a local Certification Authority that can sign server certificates for testing SSL communications on your system.

The instructions in this section assume that a local CA does not already exist. If a local CA does exist, go straight to "Requesting a server certificate" on page 93.

Use the following procedure in Internet Explorer to create a local CA certificate to sign certificate requests:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Create a Certificate Authority**. The Create a Certificate Authority page displays in the task frame.
3. Type a password in the **Certificate store password** field and type it again in the **Confirm password** field.
4. Type a name in the **Certificate Authority (CA) name** field, for example `SSL Test Certification Authority`.
5. Type a **Common Name** and **Organization**, and select a **Country**. For the remaining optional fields, type the values you require.
6. Type a validity period for the local CA in the **Validity period** field. The default value is 1095 days.
7. Click **Continue**. The CA is created, and DCM creates a certificate store and a CA certificate for your local CA.
8. Click **Install certificate**. The download manager dialog box displays.
9. Type the full path name for the temporary file in which you want to store the CA certificate and click **Save**.
10. When download is complete, click **Open**. The Certificate window displays
11. Click **Install certificate**. The Certificate Import Wizard displays.
12. Click **Next**.
13. Type the full path name of the temporary file in which you stored the CA certificate, or click **Browse** to find the temporary file.
14. Click **Next**.
15. Select the **Automatically select the certificate store based on the type of certificate** check box.
16. Click **Next**.

17. Click **Finish**. A confirmation window appears.
18. Click **OK**.
19. Click **OK** in the Certificate window.
20. Click **Continue**. The Certificate Authority Policy page displays in the task frame.
21. In the **allow creation of user certificates** field, select the **Yes** radio button.
22. In the **Validity period** field, type the validity period of certificates that are issued by your local CA. The default value is 365 days.
23. Click **Continue**. The Create a Certificate in New Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
24. Ensure none of the applications are selected.
25. Click **Continue** to complete the setup of the local CA.

When you make certificate requests to the local CA, as described in "Requesting a server certificate," the signed certificates can be exported and imported in PKCS #12 format into certificate stores to test SSL.

Requesting a server certificate

To apply for a server certificate, use the DCM tool as follows:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Select a Certificate Store**. The Select a Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
3. Select the **Other System Certificate Store** check box and click **Continue**. The Certificate Store and Password page displays.
4. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type the IFS path and filename you set when "Creating a new certificate store" on page 90.
5. Type a password in the **Certificate Store Password** field. Click **Continue**. The Current Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
6. In the navigation panel, click **Create Certificate**.
7. In the task frame, select the **Server or client certificate** radio button and click **Continue**. The Select a Certificate Authority (CA) page displays in the task frame.
8. If you have a local CA on your machine you choose either the local CA or a commercial CA to sign the certificate. Select the radio button for the CA you want and click **Continue**. The Create a Certificate page displays in the task frame.
9. In the **Certificate label** field, type `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`
10. Type a **Common Name** and **Organization**, and select a **Country**. For the remaining optional fields, type the values you require.
11. If you selected a commercial CA to sign your certificate, DCM creates a certificate request in PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Mail) format. Forward the request to your chosen CA.

    If you selected the local CA to sign your certificate, DCM informs you that the certificate has been created in the certificate store and can be used.

Adding server certificates to a key repository

After the CA sends you a new server certificate, you add it to the certificate store from which you generated the request. If the CA sends the certificate as part of an e-mail message, copy the certificate into a separate file.

Note:

1. You do not need to perform this procedure if the server certificate is signed by your local CA.
2. Before you import a server certificate in PKCS #12 format into DCM, you must first import the corresponding CA certificate.

Use the following procedure to receive a server certificate into the queue manager certificate store:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the **Manage Certificates** task category in the navigation panel, click **Import Certificate**. The Import Certificate page displays in the task frame.
3. Select the radio button for your certificate type and click **Continue**. Either the Import Server or Client Certificate page or the Import Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate page displays in the task frame.
4. In the **Import File** field, type the filename of the certificate you want to import and click **Continue**. DCM automatically determines the format of the file.
5. If the certificate is a **Server or client** certificate, type the password in the task frame and click **Continue**. DCM informs you that the certificate has been imported.

Managing digital certificates

This section tells you about managing the digital certificates in your certificate store.

When you make changes to the certificates in a certificate store, refer to "When changes become effective" on page 91.

Transferring certificates

This section tells you how to extract a certificate from a certificate store to allow it to be copied to another system, and how to add a certificate from another system into your certificate store.

Exporting a certificate from a key repository:

Perform the following steps on the machine from which you want to export the certificate:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Select a Certificate Store**. The Select a Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
3. Select the **Other System Certificate Store** check box and click **Continue**. The Certificate Store and Password page displays.
4. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type the IFS path and filename you set when "Creating a new certificate store" on page 90.
5. Type a password in the **Certificate Store Password** field. Click **Continue**. The Current Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.

6. In the **Manage Certificates** task category in the navigation panel, click **Export Certificate**. The Export a Certificate page displays in the task frame.
7. Select the radio button for your certificate type and click **Continue**. Either the Export Server or Client Certificate page or the Export Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate page displays in the task frame.
8. Select the certificate you want to export.
9. Select the radio button to specify whether you want to export the certificate to a file or directly into another certificate store.
10. If you selected to export a server or client certificate to a file, you provide the following information:
    - The path and file name of the location where you want to store the exported certificate.
    - For a personal certificate, the password that is used to encrypt the exported certificate and the target release. The *target release* specifies the minimum level of i5/OS to which the certificate can be exported. For CA certificates, you do not need to specify the password.

      If you selected to export a certificate directly into another certificate store, specify the target certificate store and its password. Click **Continue**.

Importing a certificate into a key repository:

Note: Before you import a personal certificate in PKCS #12 format into DCM, you must first import the corresponding CA certificate.

Perform the following steps on the machine to which you want to import the certificate:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Select a Certificate Store**. The Select a Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
3. Select the **Other System Certificate Store** check box and click **Continue**. The Certificate Store and Password page displays.
4. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type the IFS path and filename you set when "Creating a new certificate store" on page 90.
5. Type a password in the **Certificate Store Password** field. Click **Continue**. The Current Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
6. In the **Manage Certificates** task category in the navigation panel, click **Import Certificate**. The Import Certificate page displays in the task frame.
7. Select the radio button for your certificate type and click **Continue**. Either the Import Server or Client Certificate page or the Import Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate page displays in the task frame.
8. In the **Import File** field, type the filename of the certificate you want to import and click **Continue**. DCM automatically determines the format of the file.
9. If the certificate is a **Server or client** certificate, type the password in the task frame and click **Continue**. DCM informs you that the certificate has been imported.

Removing certificates

Use the following procedure to remove personal certificates:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the navigation panel, click **Select a Certificate Store**. The Select a Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.

3. Select the **Other System Certificate Store** check box and click **Continue**. The Certificate Store and Password page displays.
4. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type the IFS path and filename you set when "Creating a new certificate store" on page 90.
5. Type a password in the **Certificate Store Password** field. Click **Continue**. The Current Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
6. In the **Manage Certificates** task category in the navigation panel, click **Delete Certificate**. The Delete a Certificate page displays in the task frame.
7. Select the radio button for your certificate type and click **Continue**. The Confirm Delete a Certificate page displays in the task frame.
8. Select the certificate you want to delete. Click **Delete**.
9. Click **Yes** to confirm that you want to delete the certificate. Otherwise, click **No**. DCM informs you if it has deleted the certificate.

Configuring cryptographic hardware

Use the following procedure to configure the 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor on i5/OS:

1. Go to either `http://machine.domain:2001` or `https://machine.domain:2010`, where *machine* is the name of your computer.
2. A dialog box appears, requesting a user name and a password. Type a valid i5/OS user profile and password.

   Ensure your user profile has *ALLOBJ and *SECADM special authorities to enable you to configure the coprocessor hardware.
3. On the AS/400 Tasks page, click **4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor**.

For more information about configuring the 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor, refer to the *i5/OS Information Center* at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/html/as400/infocenter.html

Mapping DNs to user IDs

WebSphere MQ on i5/OS does not support the i5/OS function that is equivalent to the z/OS CNFs, which are described in "Working with Certificate Name Filters (CNFs)" on page 126. If you want to implement a function that maps Distinguished Names to user IDs, consider using a channel security exit.

Working with SSL or TLS on UNIX and Windows systems

To use the WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support for your UNIX or Windows system you must set up your communications to use cryptographic protocols.

This chapter applies to the following:

- WebSphere MQ for AIX
- WebSphere MQ for HP-UX
- WebSphere MQ for Linux
- WebSphere MQ for Solaris
- WebSphere MQ for Windows

For WebSphere MQ on UNIX and Windows, the SSL support is installed with WebSphere MQ.

This chapter describes how you set up and work with the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) on UNIX and Windows systems.

Before you run SSL on HP-UX, read the WebSphere MQ for HP-UX Quick Beginnings book.

Using iKeyman, iKeyCmd, and GSKCapiCmd

On UNIX and Windows systems, manage keys and digital certificates with the iKeyman GUI or from the command line using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd.

- For **UNIX** systems:
  - Use the gsk7ikm command to start the iKeyman GUI.
  - Use the gsk7cmd command to perform tasks with the iKeyCmd command line interface.
  - Use the gsk7capicmd command to perform tasks with the GSKCapiCmd command line interface. The command syntax for gsk7capicmd is the same as the syntax for gsk7cmd.

    If you need to manage SSL certificates in a way that is FIPS and Common Criteria compliant, use the gsk7capicmd command instead of the gsk7cmd or runmqckm commands.

  See the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide for a full description of the command line interfaces for the gsk7cmd and gsk7capicmd commands.

  Before you run the gsk7ikm command to start the iKeyman GUI, ensure you are working on a machine that is able to run the X Window System and that you do the following:
  - Set the DISPLAY environment variable, for example:

    ```
    export DISPLAY=mypc:0
    ```
  - Ensure that your PATH environment variable contains **/usr/bin** and **/bin**. This is also required for the gsk7cmd and gsk7capicmd commands. For example:

    ```
    export PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin
    ```
  - Set the JAVA_HOME environment variable:

AIX	`export JAVA_HOME=/usr/mqm/ssl/jre`
HP-UX	`export JAVA_HOME=/opt/mqm/ssl/jre`
Linux	`export JAVA_HOME=/opt/mqm/ssl/jre`
Solaris	`export JAVA_HOME=/opt/mqm/ssl`

    These are also required for the gsk7cmd command.
- For **Windows** systems:
  - Use the strmqikm command to start the iKeyman GUI.
  - Use the runmqckm command to perform tasks with the iKeyCmd command line interface.
  - Use the gsk7capicmd command to perform tasks with the GSKCapiCmd command line interface. The command syntax for gsk7capicmd is the same as the syntax for runmqckm.

  Before you run gsk7capicmd on Windows, set your PATH environment variable to include the GSKit binary and library directories. For example, at the command line, enter:

  ```
  set PATH=%PATH%;C:\Program Files\IBM\gsk7\bin;C:\Program Files\IBM\gsk7\lib
  ```

See the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide for more information on the strmqikm, runmqckm, and gsk7capicmd commands.

To request SSL tracing on UNIX or Windows systems, see the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

Setting up a key repository

An SSL connection requires a *key repository* at each end of the connection. Each WebSphere MQ queue manager and WebSphere MQ client must have access to a key repository. See "The SSL key repository" on page 42 for more information.

On UNIX and Windows systems, digital certificates are stored in a key database file that is managed with iKeyman, iKeyCmd, or GSKCapiCmd. These digital certificates have labels. A specific label associates a personal certificate with a queue manager or WebSphere MQ client. SSL uses that certificate for authentication purposes. On UNIX and Windows systems, WebSphere MQ uses the `ibmwebspheremq` prefix on a label to avoid confusion with certificates for other products. The prefix is followed by the name of the queue manager or WebSphere MQ client user logon ID, changed to lower case. Ensure that you specify the entire certificate label in lower case.

The key database file name comprises a path and stem name:

- On UNIX, the default path for a queue manager (set when you create the queue manager) is `/var/mqm/qmgrs/<queue_manager_name>/ssl`.

  On Windows, the default path is *`install_directory`*`\Qmgrs\<queue_manager_name>\ssl`, where *install_directory* is the directory in which WebSphere MQ is installed. For example, `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\Qmgrs\<queue_manager_name>\ssl` .

  The default stem name is `key`. Optionally, you can choose your own path and stem name, but the extension must be `.kdb`.
- For a WebSphere MQ client, there is no default path or stem name. Choose a key database file to which you can restrict access. The extension must be `.kdb`.

Note that key repositories should not be created on a file system that does not support file level locks, for example NFS version 2 on Linux.

"Working with a key repository" on page 101 tells you about checking and specifying the key database file name. You can specify the key database file name either before or after creating the key database file.

The user ID from which you run iKeyman or iKeyCmd must have write permission for the directory in which the key database file is created or updated. For a queue manager using the default SSL directory, the user ID from which you run iKeyman or iKeyCmd must be a member of the mqm group. For a WebSphere MQ client, if you run iKeyman or iKeyCmd from a user ID different from that under which the client runs, you must alter the file permissions to enable the WebSphere MQ client to access the key database file at run time. For more information, refer to "Accessing your key database file" on page 100.

Use the following procedure to create a new key database file for either a queue manager or a WebSphere MQ client:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI (using the gsk7ikm command on UNIX, or the strmqikm command on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **New**. The New window is displayed.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).

4. In the **File Name** field, type a file name. This field already contains the text `key.kdb`. If your stem name is `key`, leave this field unchanged. If you have specified a different stem name, replace `key` with your stem name but you must not change the `.kdb`.
5. In the **Location** field, type the path, for example:
   - For a queue manager: `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl` (on UNIX) or `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\qmgrs\QM1\ssl` (on Windows)
   - For a WebSphere MQ client: `/var/mqm/ssl` (on UNIX) or `C:\mqm\ssl` (on Windows)
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type a password in the **Password** field, and type it again in the **Confirm Password** field.
8. Select the **Stash the password to a file** check box.

   Note: If you do not stash the password, attempts to start SSL channels fail because they cannot obtain the password required to access the key database file.
9. Click **OK**. A window is displayed, confirming that the password is in file `key.sth` (unless you specified a different stem name).
10. Click **OK**. The Signer Certificates window is displayed, containing a list of the CA certificates that are provided with iKeyman and pre-installed in the key database.
11. Set the access permissions, as described in "Accessing your key database file" on page 100.

Use the following commands to create a new CMS key database file using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -keydb -create -db filename -pw password -type cms -expire days
    -stash
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -keydb -create -db filename -pw password -type cms -expire days
     -stash
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -keydb -create -db filename -pw password -type cms -expire days
        -stash -fips -strong
```

where:

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified file name of a CMS key database, and must have a file extension of `.kdb`.
`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-type cms`	is the type of database (for WebSphere MQ, this must be `cms`).
`-expire days`	is the expiration time in days of the database password. There is no default time for a database password: use the -expire option to set a database password expiration time explicitly.
`-stash`	tells iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd to stash the key database password to a file.
`-fips`	disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

`-strong` checks that the password entered satisfies the minimum requirements for password strength. The minimum requirements for a password are as follows:

- The password must be a minimum length of 14 characters.
- The password must contain a minimum of one lower case character, one upper case character, and one digit or special character. Special characters include the asterisk (*), the dollar sign ($), the number sign (#) and the percent sign (%). A space is classified as a special character.
- Each character can only occur a maximum of three times in a password.
- A maximum of two consecutive characters in the password can be identical.
- All characters described above are in the standard ASCII printable character set within the range from 0x20 to 0x7E inclusive.

For more information about CA certificates, refer to “Digital certificates” on page 14.

Accessing your key database file

Accessing your key database file on Windows:

On Windows, the key database file (.kdb) is created with read permission for all user IDs, so it is not necessary to change the access permissions. When you migrate your digital certificates from the certificate store on WebSphere MQ for Windows V5.3 or V5.3.1 to a GSKit key repository, the .kdb file is created as part of the certificate transfer (using AMQTCERT), and the required access permissions must already be set for this to succeed.

Accessing your key database file on UNIX:

On UNIX, the key database file must be created using iKeyman, iKeyCmd, or GSKCapiCmd. When you create your key database file using iKeyman, iKeyCmd, or GSKCapiCmd, the access permissions for the key database file are set to give access only to the user ID from which you used iKeyman, iKeyCmd, or GSKCapiCmd.

The key database file is accessed by an MCA, so ensure that the user ID under which the MCA runs has permission to read both the key database file and the password stash file. MCAs usually run under the mqm user ID, which is in the mqm group. After you have created your queue manager key database file, work with the same user ID to add read permission for the mqm group, using the UNIX `chmod` command. For example:

```
chmod g+r /var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/key.kdb

chmod g+r /var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/key.sth
```

When you set up the key database file for a WebSphere MQ client, consider working with the user ID under which you run the WebSphere MQ client. This allows you to restrict access to that single user ID. If you need to grant access to a user ID in the same group, use the UNIX `chmod` command. For example:

```
chmod g+r /var/mqm/ssl/key.kdb

chmod g+r /var/mqm/ssl/key.sth
```

Avoid giving permission to user IDs that are in different groups. For more information, refer to “Protecting WebSphere MQ client key repositories” on page 43.

Working with a key repository

This section tells you how to perform the following tasks:

- “Locating the key repository for a queue manager”
- “Changing the key repository location for a queue manager”
- “Locating the key repository for a WebSphere MQ client” on page 102
- “Specifying the key repository location for a WebSphere MQ client” on page 102

Note: When you change either the key repository attribute, or the certificates in the key database file, check “When changes become effective” on page 102.

Locating the key repository for a queue manager

Use this procedure to obtain information about the location of your queue manager’s key database file:

1. Display your queue manager’s attributes, using either of the following MQSC commands:

   ```
   DISPLAY QMGR ALL
   DISPLAY QMGR SSLKEYR
   ```

   You can also display your queue manager’s attributes using the WebSphere MQ Explorer or PCF commands.
2. Examine the command output for the path and stem name of the key database file. For example, on UNIX: `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/key`, where `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl` is the path and `key` is the stem name; on Windows: `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\qmgrs\QM1\ssl\key`, where `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\qmgrs\QM1\ssl` is the path and `key` is the stem name.

Changing the key repository location for a queue manager

You can change the location of your queue manager’s key database file by using the MQSC command ALTER QMGR to set your queue manager’s key repository attribute. For example, on UNIX:

```
ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR('/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/MyKey')
```

The key database file has the fully-qualified filename: `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl/MyKey.kdb`

On Windows:

```
ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR('C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\Qmgrs\QM1\ssl\Mykey')
```

The key database file has the fully-qualified filename: `C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\Qmgrs\QM1\ssl\Mykey.kdb`

You can also alter your queue manager’s attributes using the WebSphere MQ Explorer or PCF commands.

When you change the location of a queue manager’s key database file, certificates are not transferred from the old location. If the CA certificates pre-installed when

you create the key database file are insufficient, you must populate the new key database file with the extra CA certificates you need, as described in "Managing digital certificates" on page 107.

Locating the key repository for a WebSphere MQ client

Examine the MQSSLKEYR environment variable to obtain the location of your WebSphere MQ client's key database file. For example:

```
echo $MQSSLKEYR
```

Also check your application, because the key database file name can also be set in an MQCONNX call, as described in "Specifying the key repository location for a WebSphere MQ client." The value set in an MQCONNX call overrides the value of MQSSLKEYR.

Specifying the key repository location for a WebSphere MQ client

There is no default key repository for a WebSphere MQ client. Ensure that the key database file can be accessed only by intended users or administrators to prevent unauthorized copying to other systems.

You can specify the location of your WebSphere MQ client's key database file by:

- Setting the MQSSLKEYR environment variable. For example, on UNIX:

  ```
  export MQSSLKEYR=/var/mqm/ssl/key
  ```

  The key database file has the fully-qualified filename:

  ```
  /var/mqm/ssl/key.kdb
  ```

  On Windows:

  ```
  set MQSSLKEYR=C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\ssl\key
  ```

  The key database file has the fully-qualified filename:

  ```
  C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere MQ\ssl\key.kdb
  ```

  Note: The `.kdb` extension is a mandatory part of the filename, but is not included as part of the value of the environment variable.
- Providing the path and stem name of the key database file in the *KeyRepository* field of the MQSCO structure when an application makes an MQCONNX call. For more information about using the MQSCO structure in MQCONNX, refer to the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Reference.

When changes become effective

Changes to the certificates in the key database file and to the key repository attribute become effective:

- When a new outbound single channel process first runs an SSL channel.
- When a new inbound TCP/IP single channel process first receives a request to start an SSL channel.
- When the MQSC command REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) is issued to refresh the WMQ SSL environment.
- For channels that run as threads of a process pooling process (amqrmppa), when the process pooling process is started or restarted and first runs an SSL channel.

If the process pooling process has already run an SSL channel, and you want the change to become effective immediately, run the MQSC command REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL).

- For channels that run as threads of the channel initiator, when the channel initiator is started or restarted and first runs an SSL channel. If the channel initiator process has already run an SSL channel, and you want the change to become effective immediately, run the MQSC command REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL).
- For channels that run as threads of a TCP/IP listener, when the listener is started or restarted and first receives a request to start an SSL channel. If the listener has already run an SSL channel, and you want the change to become effective immediately, run the MQSC command REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL).

You can also refresh the WebSphere MQ SSL environment using the WebSphere MQ Explorer or PCF commands.

Obtaining personal certificates

Usually, in a production environment, you apply to a Certification Authority for the personal certificate that is used to verify the identity of your queue manager or WebSphere MQ client. You can also use self-signed personal certificates for testing SSL on your UNIX or Windows system.

This section tells you how to use iKeyman for:

1. "Creating a self-signed personal certificate"
2. "Requesting a personal certificate" on page 105

Creating a self-signed personal certificate

When you create a key database, no personal certificates are provided. However, you need a personal certificate before you can run an SSL channel. A self-signed personal certificate can be used to run SSL channels for the purposes of testing SSL communications. These certificates can be created on either a WebSphere MQ queue manager or WebSphere MQ client system.

Use the following procedure to obtain a self-signed certificate for your queue manager or WebSphere MQ client:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file in which you want to save the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. From the **Create** menu, click **New Self-Signed Certificate**. The Create New Self-Signed Certificate window displays.
9. In the **Key Label** field, type:

- For a queue manager, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`, or,
- For a WebSphere MQ client, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID folded to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.

10. Type a **Common Name** and **Organization**, and select a **Country**. For the remaining optional fields, either accept the default values, or type or select new values. Note that you can supply only one name in the **Organizational Unit** field. For more information about these fields, refer to "Distinguished Names" on page 16.
11. Click **OK**. The **Personal Certificates** list shows the label of the self-signed personal certificate you created.

Use the following commands to create a self-signed personal certificate using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -x509version version -expire days
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -x509version version -expire days
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -x509version version -expire days
        -fips -sigalg md5 | sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512
```

where:

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified file name of a CMS key database.
`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label label`	is the key label attached to the certificate.
`-dn distinguished_name`	is the X.500 distinguished name enclosed in double quotes. Note that only the CN attribute is required. You can supply multiple OU attributes.
`-size key_size`	is the key size. For iKeyCmd, the value can be 512 or 1024. For GSKCapiCmd, the value can be 512, 1024, or 2048.
`-x509version version`	is the version of X.509 certificate to create. The value can be 1, 2, or 3. The default is 3.
`-expire days`	is the expiration time in days of the certificate. The default is 365 days for a certificate.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.
`-sigalg`	The hashing algorithm used during the creation of a certificate request, a self-signed certificate, or the signing of a certificate. This hashing algorithm is used to create the signature associated with the newly created self-signed certificate. The value can be md5, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, or sha512. The default is sha1.

Requesting a personal certificate

To apply for a personal certificate, use the iKeyman tool as follows:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (UNIX) or the strmqikm command (Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file from which you want to generate the request, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. From the **Create** menu, click **New Certificate Request**. The Create New Key and Certificate Request window displays.
9. In the **Key Label** field, type:
   - For a queue manager, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager changed to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`, or
   - For a WebSphere MQ client, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID folded to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.
10. Type a **Common Name** and **Organization**, and select a **Country**. For the remaining optional fields, either accept the default values, or type or select new values. Note that you can supply only one name in the **Organizational Unit** field. For more information about these fields, refer to "Distinguished Names" on page 16.
11. In the **Enter the name of a file in which to store the certificate request** field, either accept the default `certreq.arm`, or type a new value with a full path.
12. Click **OK**. A confirmation window displays.
13. Click **OK**. The **Personal Certificate Requests** list shows the label of the new personal certificate request you created. The certificate request is stored in the file you chose in step 11.
14. Request the new personal certificate either by sending the file to a Certification Authority (CA), or by copying the file into the request form on the Web site for the CA.

Use the following commands to request a personal certificate using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -certreq -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -file filename
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -certreq -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -file filename
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -certreq -create -db filename -pw password -label label
        -dn distinguished_name -size key_size -file filename -fips
        -sigalg md5 | sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512
```

where:

`-db filename` is the fully qualified file name of a CMS key database.

`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label label`	is the key label attached to the certificate.
`-dn distinguished_name`	is the X.500 distinguished name enclosed in double quotes. Note that only the CN attribute is required. You can supply multiple OU attributes.
`-size key_size`	is the key size. If you are using iKeyCmd, the value can be 512 or 1024. If you are using GSKCapiCmd, the value can be 512, 1024, or 2048.
`-file filename`	is the filename for the certificate request.
-fips	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.
-sigalg	The hashing algorithm used during the creation of a certificate request, a self-signed certificate, or the signing of a certificate. This hashing algorithm is used to create the signature associated with the newly-created certificate request. The value can be md5, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, or sha512. The default is sha1.

If you are using cryptographic hardware, refer to "Requesting a personal certificate for your PKCS #11 hardware" on page 118.

Receiving personal certificates into a key repository

After the CA sends you a new personal certificate, you add it to the key database file from which you generated the new certificate request . If the CA sends the certificate as part of an e-mail message, copy the certificate into a separate file.

Ensure that the certificate file to be imported has write permission for the current user, and then use the following procedure for either a queue manager or a WebSphere MQ client to receive a personal certificate into the key database file:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**, and then click **OK**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file is displayed in the **File Name** field. Select the **Personal Certificates** view.
8. Click **Receive**. The Receive Certificate from a File window displays.
9. Select the **Data type** of the new personal certificate, for example **Base64–encoded ASCII data** for a file with the `.arm` extension.
10. Type the certificate file name and location for the new personal certificate, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.

11. Click **OK**. If you already have a personal certificate in your key database, a window appears, asking if you want to set the key you are adding as the default key in the database.
12. Click **Yes** or **No**. The Enter a Label window displays.
13. Click **OK**. The **Personal Certificates** field shows the label of the new personal certificate you added.

Use the following commands to add a personal certificate to a key database file using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -receive -file filename -db filename -pw password
        -format ascii
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -receive -file filename -db filename -pw password
        -format ascii
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -receive -file filename -db filename -pw password -fips
```

where:

`-file filename`	is the fully qualified file name of the file containing the personal certificate.
`-db filename`	is the fully qualified file name of a CMS key database.
`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-format ascii`	is the format of the certificate. The value can be `ascii` for Base64-encoded ASCII or `binary` for Binary DER data. The default is `ascii`.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

If you are using cryptographic hardware, refer to "Importing a personal certificate to your PKCS #11 hardware" on page 118.

Managing digital certificates

This section tells you about managing the existing digital certificates in your key database file.

When you make changes to the configuration of the certificates in the key database file, refer to "When changes become effective" on page 102.

Transferring certificates

This section tells you how to perform the following tasks:

- "Extracting a CA certificate from a key repository" on page 108
- "Extracting the CA part of a self-signed certificate from a key repository" on page 109
- "Adding a CA certificate (or the CA part of a self-signed certificate) into a key repository" on page 109

- "Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository" on page 110
- "Importing a personal certificate into a key repository" on page 111

Extracting a CA certificate from a key repository:

Perform the following steps on the machine from which you want to extract the CA certificate:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Key database content** field, select **Signer Certificates** and select the certificate you want to extract.
9. Click **Extract**. The Extract a Certificate to a File window displays.
10. Select the **Data type** of the certificate, for example **Base64-encoded ASCII data** for a file with the `.arm` extension.
11. Type the certificate file name and location where you want to store the certificate, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
12. Click **OK**. The certificate is written to the file you specified.

Use the following commands to extract a CA certificate using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -extract -db filename -pw password -label label -target filename
        -format ascii
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -extract -db filename -pw password -label label -target filename
         -format ascii
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -extract -db filename -pw password -label label
            -target filename -format ascii -fips
```

where:

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified path name of a CMS key database.
`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label label`	is the label attached to the certificate.
`-target filename`	is the name of the destination file.
`-format ascii`	is the format of the certificate. The value can be `ascii` for Base64-encoded ASCII or `binary` for Binary DER data. The default is `ascii`.

`-fips` specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

Extracting the CA part of a self-signed certificate from a key repository:

Perform the following steps on the machine from which you want to extract the CA part of a self-signed certificate:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Key database content** field, select **Personal Certificates** and select the certificate you want to extract.
9. Click **Extract certificate**. The Extract a Certificate to a File window displays.
10. Select the **Data type** of the certificate, for example **Base64-encoded ASCII data** for a file with the `.arm` extension.
11. Type the certificate file name and location where you want to store the certificate, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
12. Click **OK**. The certificate is written to the file you specified. Note that when you extract (rather than export) a certificate, only the public part of the certificate is included, so a password is not required.

Adding a CA certificate (or the CA part of a self-signed certificate) into a key repository:

If the certificate that you want to add is in a certificate chain, you must also add all the certificates that are above it in the chain. You must add the certificates in strictly descending order starting from the root, followed by the CA certificate immediately below it in the chain, and so on.

Perform the following steps on the machine on which you want to add the CA certificate:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.

7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Key database content** field, select **Signer Certificates** and select the certificate you want to add.
9. Click **Add**. The Add CA's Certificate from a File window displays.
10. Select the **Data type** of the certificate you transferred, for example **Base64-encoded ASCII data** for a file with the `.arm` extension.
11. Type the certificate file name and location where the certificate is stored, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
12. Click **OK**. The Enter a Label window displays.
13. In the Enter a Label window, type the name of the certificate.
14. Click **OK**. The certificate is added to the key database.

Use the following commands to add a CA certificate using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -add -db filename -pw password -label label -file filename
        -format ascii
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -add -db filename -pw password -label label -file filename
        -format ascii
```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -add -db filename -pw password -label label -file filename
        -format ascii -fips
```

where:

`-db` *filename*	is the fully qualified path name of the CMS key database.
`-pw` *password*	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label` *label*	is the label attached to the certificate.
`-file` *filename*	is the name of the file containing the certificate.
`-format` *ascii*	is the format of the certificate. The value can be `ascii` for Base64-encoded ASCII or `binary` for Binary DER data. The default is `ascii`.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository:

Perform the following steps on the machine from which you want to export the personal certificate:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.

6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Key database content** field, select **Personal Certificates** and select the certificate you want to export.
9. Click **Export/Import**. The Export/Import key window displays.
10. Select **Export Key**.
11. Select the **Key file type** of the certificate you want to export, for example **PKCS12**.
12. Type the file name and location to which you want to export the certificate, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
13. Click **OK**. The Password Prompt window displays. Note that when you export (rather than extract) a certificate, both the public and private parts of the certificate are included. This is why the exported file is protected by a password. When you extract a certificate, only the public part of the certificate is included, so a password is not required.
14. Type a password in the **Password** field, and type it again in the **Confirm Password** field.
15. Click **OK**. The certificate is exported to the file you specified.

Use the following commands to export a personal certificate using iKeyCmd:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -export -db filename -pw password -label label -type cms
        -target filename -target_pw password -target_type pkcs12
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -export -db filename -pw password -label label -type cms
         -target filename -target_pw password -target_type pkcs12
```

To export a personal certificate using GSKCapiCmd, use the following command:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -export -db filename -pw password -label label -type cms
        -target filename -target_pw password -target_type pkcs12
        -encryption strong | weak -fips
```

where:

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified path name of the CMS key database.
`-encryption`	is the strength of encryption used in certificate export command. The value can be strong or weak. The default is strong.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.
`-pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label label`	is the label attached to the certificate.
`-type cms`	is the type of the database.
`-target filename`	is the name of the destination file.
`-target_pw password`	is the password for encrypting the certificate.
`-target_type pkcs12`	is the type of the certificate.

Importing a personal certificate into a key repository:

Before importing a personal certificate in PKCS #12 format into the key database file, you must first add the full valid chain of issuing CA certificates to the key database file (see "Adding a CA certificate (or the CA part of a self-signed certificate) into a key repository" on page 109).

PKCS #12 files should be considered temporary and deleted after use.

Perform the following steps on the machine to which you want to import the personal certificate:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window displays.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Key database content** field, select **Personal Certificates**.
9. Click **Export/Import**. The Export/Import key window is displayed.
10. Select **Import Key**.
11. Select the **Key file type** of the certificate you want to import, for example **PKCS12**.
12. Type the certificate file name and location where the certificate is stored, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
13. Click **OK**. The Password Prompt window displays.
14. In the **Password** field, type the password used when the certificate was exported.
15. Click **OK**. The Select from Key Label List window is displayed.
16. From the list of certificate labels displayed, select the ones that you want to import. Ensure that you include any CA (signer) certificates that might be necessary to form a full chain for any personal certificates you are importing. You do not need to include any that are already in the target key database.
17. Click **OK**. The Change Labels window is displayed. This window allows the labels of certificates being imported to be changed if, for example, a certificate with the same label already exists in the target key database. Changing certificate labels has no effect on certificate chain validation. This can be used to change the personal certificate label to that required by WebSphere MQ in order to associate the certificate with the particular queue manager or client (`ibmwebspheremqqm1` for example).
18. To change a label, select the required label from the **Select a label to change:** list. The label is copied into the **Enter a new label:** entry field. Replace the label text with that of the new label and click **Apply**.
19. The text in the **Enter a new label:** entry field is copied back into the **Select a label to change:** field, replacing the originally selected label and so relabelling the corresponding certificate.
20. When you have changed all the labels that needed to be changed, click **OK**. The Change Labels window closes, and the original IBM Key Management window reappears with the **Personal Certificates** and **Signer Certificates** fields updated with the correctly labeled certificates.

21. The certificate is imported to the target key database.

To import a personal certificate using iKeyCmd, use the following commands:

- On UNIX:

```
gsk7cmd -cert -import -file filename -pw password -type pkcs12 -target filename
-target_pw password -target_type cms -label label
```

- On Windows:

```
runmqckm -cert -import -file filename -pw password -type pkcs12 -target filename
-target_pw password -target_type cms -label label
```

To import a personal certificate using GSKCapiCmd, use the following command:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -import -file filename -pw password  -type pkcs12 -target filename
-target_pw password -target_type cms -label label -fips
```

where:

`-file filename`	is the fully qualified file name of the file containing the PKCS #12 certificate.
`-pw password`	is the password for the PKCS #12 certificate.
`-type pkcs12`	is the type of the file.
`-target filename`	is the name of the destination CMS key database.
`-target_pw password`	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-target_type cms`	is the type of the database specified by -target
`-label label`	is the label of the certificate to import from the source key database.
`-new_label label`	is the label that the certificate will be assigned in the target database. If you omit -new_label option, the default is to use the same as the -label option.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

iKeyCmd does not provide a command to change certificate labels directly. Use the following steps to change a certificate label:

1. Export the certificate to a PKCS #12 file using the -cert -export command. Specify the existing certificate label for the -label option.
2. Remove the existing copy of the certificate from the original key database using the -cert -delete command.
3. Import the certificate from the PKCS #12 file using the -cert -import command. Specify the old label for the -label option and the required new label for the -new_label option. The certificate will be imported back into the key database with the required label.

Importing from a Microsoft .pfx file:

This section describes how to import from a Microsoft® .pfx file using iKeyman. You cannot use GSKCapiCmd to import a .pfx file.

A .pfx file can contain two certificates relating to the same key. One is a personal or site certificate (containing both a public and private key). The other is a CA (signer) certificate (containing only a public key). These certificates cannot coexist

in the same CMS key database file, so only one of them can be imported. Also, the "friendly name" or label is attached to only the signer certificate.

The personal certificate is identified by a system generated Unique User Identifier (UUID). This section shows the import of a personal certificate from a pfx file while labeling it with the friendly name previously assigned to the CA (signer) certificate. The issuing CA (signer) certificates should already be added to the target key database. Note that PKCS#12 files should be considered temporary and deleted after use.

Follow these steps to import a personal certificate from a source pfx key database:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows). The IBM Key Management window is displayed.
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window is displayed.
3. Select a key database type of **PKCS12**.
4. **You are recommended to take a backup of the pfx database before performing this step.** Select the pfx key database that you want to import. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window is displayed.
5. Enter the key database password and click **OK**. The IBM Key Management window is displayed. The title bar shows the name of the selected pfx key database file, indicating that the file is open and ready.
6. Select **Signer Certificates** from the list. The "friendly name" of the required certificate is displayed as a label in the Signer Certificates panel.
7. Select the label entry and click **Delete** to remove the signer certificate. The Confirm window is displayed.
8. Click **Yes**. The selected label is no longer displayed in the Signer Certificates panel.
9. Repeat steps 6, 7, and 8 for all the signer certificates.
10. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window is displayed.
11. Select the target key CMS database which the pfx file is being imported into. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window is displayed.
12. Enter the key database password and click **OK**. The IBM Key Management window is displayed. The title bar shows the name of the selected key database file, indicating that the file is open and ready.
13. Select **Personal Certificates** from the list.
14. Click **Import** to import keys from the pfx key database. The Import Key window is displayed.
    - Click **Export/Import key**. The Export/Import key window is displayed.
    - Select **Import** from Choose Action Type
15. Select the PKCS12 file.
16. Enter the name of the pfx file as used in Step 4. Click **OK**. The Password Prompt window is displayed.
17. Specify the same password that you specified when you deleted the signer certificate. Click **OK**.
18. The Change Labels window is displayed (as there should be only a single certificate available for import). The label of the certificate should be a UUID which has a format `xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx`.

19. To change the label select the UUID from the **Select a label to change:** panel. The label will be replicated into the **Enter a new label:** field. Replace the label text with that of the friendly name that was deleted in Step 7 and click **Apply**. The friendly name must be in the form `ibmwebspheremq`, followed by the queue manager name or the WebSphere MQ client user logon ID in lower case.
20. The text in the **Enter a new label:** field is replicated back into the **Select a label to change:** panel, replacing the originally selected label and so relabelling the personal certificate with the required friendly name.
21. Click **OK**. The Change Labels window is now removed and the original IBM Key Management window reappears with the Personal Certificates and Signer Certificates panels updated with the correctly labeled personal certificate.
22. The pfx personal certificate is now imported to the (target) database.

It is not possible to change a certificate label using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd.

Importing from a PKCS #7 file:

The iKeyman and iKeyCmd tools do not support PKCS #7 (.p7b) files. Use the GSKCapiCmd tool to import certificates from a PKCS #7 file.

Use the following command to add a CA certificate from a PKCS #7 file:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -add -db filename -pw password -type cms -file filename
-label label
```

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified file name of the CMS key database.
`-pw password`	is the password for the key database.
`-type cms`	is the type of the key database.
`-file filename`	is the name of the PKCS #7 file.
`-label label`	is the label that the certificate is assigned in the target database. The first certificate takes the label given. All other certificates, if present, are labelled with their subject name.

Use the following command to import a personal certificate from a PKCS #7 file:

```
gsk7capicmd -cert -import -db filename -pw password -type pkcs7 -target filename
-target_pw password -target_type cms -label label -new_label label
```

`-db filename`	is the fully qualified file name of the file containing the PKCS #7 certificate.
`-pw password`	is the password for the PKCS #7 certificate.
`-type pkcs7`	is the type of the file.
`-target filename`	is the name of the destination key database.
`-target_pw password`	is the password for the destination key database.
`-target_type cms`	is the type of the database specified by -target
`-label label`	is the label of the certificate that is to be imported.
`-new_label label`	is the label that the certificate will be assigned in the target database. If you omit the -new_label option, the default is to use the same as the -label option.

Deleting a personal certificate from a key repository

Use the following procedure to remove personal certificates:

1. Start the iKeyman GUI using either the gsk7ikm command (on UNIX) or the strmqikm command (on Windows).
2. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
3. Click **Key database type** and select **CMS** (Certificate Management System).
4. Click **Browse** to navigate to the directory that contains the key database files.
5. Select the key database file to which you want to add the certificate, for example `key.kdb`.
6. Click **Open**. The Password Prompt window is displayed.
7. Type the password you set when you created the key database and click **OK**. The name of your key database file displays in the **File Name** field.
8. In the **Personal Certificates** list, select the certificate you want to delete.
9. If you do not already have a copy of the certificate and you want to save it, click **Export/Import** and export it (see "Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository" on page 110).
10. With the certificate selected, click **Delete**. The Confirm window displays.
11. Click **Yes**. The **Personal Certificates** field no longer shows the label of the certificate you deleted.

Use the following commands to delete a personal certificate using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd:

- On UNIX:

  ```
  gsk7cmd -cert -delete -db filename -pw password -label label
  ```

- On Windows:

  ```
  runmqckm -cert -delete -db filename -pw password -label label
  ```

- Using GSKCapiCmd:

  ```
  gsk7capicmd -cert -delete -db filename -pw password -label label -fips
  ```

where:

`-db` *filename*	is the fully qualified file name of a CMS key database.
`-pw` *password*	is the password for the CMS key database.
`-label` *label*	is the label attached to the personal certificate.
`-fips`	specifies that the command is run in FIPS mode. This mode disables the use of the BSafe cryptographic library. Only the ICC component is used and this component must be successfully initialized in FIPS mode. When in FIPS mode, the ICC component uses algorithms that have been FIPS 140-2 validated. If the ICC component does not initialize in FIPS mode, the gsk7capicmd command fails.

Configuring for cryptographic hardware

You can configure cryptographic hardware for a queue manager on UNIX or Windows using either of the following methods:

- Use the ALTER QMGR MQSC command with the SSLCRYP parameter, as described in the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.
- Use WebSphere MQ Explorer to configure the cryptographic hardware on your UNIX or Windows system. For more information, refer to the online help.

You can configure cryptographic hardware for a WebSphere MQ client on UNIX or Windows using either of the following methods:

- Set the MQSSLCRYP environment variable. The permitted values for MQSSLCRYP are the same as for the SSLCRYP parameter, as described in the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference. If you use the GSK_PCS11 version of the SSLCRYP parameter, the PKCS #11 token label must be specified entirely in lower-case.
- Set the *CryptoHardware* field of the SSL configuration options structure, MQSCO, on an MQCONNX call. For more information, see the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

If you have configured cryptographic hardware which uses the PKCS #11 interface using any of these methods, you must store the personal certificate for use on your channels in the key database file for the cryptographic token you have configured. This is described in "Managing certificates on PKCS #11 hardware."

Managing certificates on PKCS #11 hardware

This section tells you about managing digital certificates on cryptographic hardware that supports the PKCS #11 interface. Note that you still need a key database file, even when you store all your certificates on your cryptographic hardware.

Perform the following steps to work with your cryptographic hardware:

1. On UNIX, login as the root user. On Windows, login as Administrator or a member of the MQM group.
2. Execute the gsk7ikm command to start the iKeyman GUI.
3. From the **Key Database File** menu, click **Open**. The Open window displays.
4. Click **Key database type** and select **Cryptographic token**.
5. In the **File Name** field, type the name of the module for managing your cryptographic hardware, for example `PKCS11_API.so`
6. In the **Location** field, type the path, for example `/usr/lib/pksc11` (on UNIX). On Windows, you can type the library name, for example `cryptoki`.
7. Click **OK**. The Open Cryptographic Token window displays.
8. In the **Cryptographic Token Password** field, type the password that you set when you configured the cryptographic hardware.
9. If your cryptographic hardware has the capacity to hold the signer certificates required to receive or import a personal certificate, clear both secondary key database check boxes and continue from step 17 on page 118.

   If you require a secondary CMS key database to hold the signer certificates, select either the **Open existing secondary key database file** check box or the **Create new secondary key database file** check box.
10. In the **File Name** field, type a file name. This field already contains the text `key.kdb`. If your stem name is `key`, leave this field unchanged. If you have specified a different stem name, replace `key` with your stem name but you must not change the `.kdb`
11. In the **Location** field, type the path, for example:
    - For a queue manager: `/var/mqm/qmgrs/QM1/ssl`
    - For a WebSphere MQ client: `/var/mqm/ssl`
12. Click **OK**. The Password Prompt window displays.
13. If you selected the **Open existing secondary key database file** check box in step 9, type a password in the **Password** field, and continue from step 17 on page 118.

14. If you selected the **Create new secondary key database file** check box in step 9 on page 117, type a password in the **Password** field, and type it again in the **Confirm Password** field.
15. Select the **Stash the password to a file** check box. Note that if you do not stash the password, attempts to start SSL channels fail because they cannot obtain the password required to access the key database file.
16. Click **OK**. A window displays, confirming that the password is in file `key.sth` (unless you specified a different stem name).
17. Click **OK**. The Key database content frame displays.

Requesting a personal certificate for your PKCS #11 hardware:

Use the following procedure for either a queue manager or a WebSphere MQ client to request a personal certificate for your cryptographic hardware:

1. Perform the steps to work with your cryptographic hardware.
2. From the **Create** menu, click **New Certificate Request**. The Create New Key and Certificate Request window displays.
3. In the **Key Label** field, type:
   - For a queue manager, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`, or
   - For a WebSphere MQ client, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID folded to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.
4. Type a **Common Name** and **Organization**, and select a **Country**. For the remaining optional fields, either accept the default values, or type or select new values. Note that you can supply only one name in the **Organizational Unit** field. For more information about these fields, refer to "Distinguished Names" on page 16.
5. In the **Enter the name of a file in which to store the certificate request** field, either accept the default `certreq.arm`, or type a new value with a full path.
6. Click **OK**. A confirmation window displays.
7. Click **OK**. The **Personal Certificate Requests** list shows the label of the new personal certificate request you created. The certificate request is stored in the file you chose in step 5.
8. Request the new personal certificate either by sending the file to a Certification Authority (CA), or by copying the file into the request form on the Web site for the CA.

Importing a personal certificate to your PKCS #11 hardware:

Use the following procedure for either a queue manager or a WebSphere MQ client to import a personal certificate to your cryptographic hardware:

1. Perform the steps to work with your cryptographic hardware.
2. Click **Receive**. The Receive Certificate from a File window displays.
3. Select the **Data type** of the new personal certificate, for example **Base64–encoded ASCII data** for a file with the `.arm` extension.
4. Type the certificate file name and location for the new personal certificate, or click **Browse** to select the name and location.
5. Click **OK**. If you already have a personal certificate in your key database, a window appears, asking if you want to set the key you are adding as the default key in the database.
6. Click **Yes** or **No**. The Enter a Label window displays.

7. Type a label, for example the label you used when you requested the personal certificate. Note that the label must be in the correct WebSphere MQ format:
   - For a queue manager, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by the name of your queue manager folded to lower case. For example, for `QM1`, `ibmwebspheremqqm1`, or,
   - For a WebSphere MQ client, `ibmwebspheremq` followed by your logon user ID folded to lower case, for example `ibmwebspheremqmyuserid`.
8. Click **OK**. The **Personal Certificates** list shows the label of the new personal certificate you added. This label is formed by adding the cryptographic token label before the label you supplied.

Mapping DNs to user IDs

UNIX systems do not have a function equivalent to the z/OS CNFs, which are described in "Working with Certificate Name Filters (CNFs)" on page 126. If you want to implement a function that maps Distinguished Names to user IDs, consider using a channel security exit.

Migrating SSL security certificates in WebSphere MQ for Windows

In WebSphere MQ for Windows Version 5.3, support for WebSphere MQ SSL is provided using Microsoft SSL. In WebSphere MQ for Windows Version 7.0, support for WebSphere MQ SSL is provided using Global Security Kit (GSKit) SSL. This means that WebSphere MQ for Windows supports only SSL in which certificates are stored in a GSKit key database. Therefore, if you migrate from WebSphere MQ for Windows Version 5.3 to Version 7.0, you need to migrate your certificates from the Microsoft Certificate Store to a GSKit key repository. The amqtcert (Transfer Certificates) command helps to do this (see WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide for more information on using this command). The chain checker application, which is used to verify all the required certificates are there before migrating certificates from the WebSphere MQ for Windows V5.3 store to the GSKit store, is available in WebSphere MQ V5.3 Fix Pack 10 (CSD10) or later.

Migration of security certificates from WebSphere MQ Version 5.3 to Version 7.0 is described fully in WebSphere MQ Migration Information.

Working with SSL or TLS on z/OS

To use the WebSphere MQ TLS and SSL support for your z/OS installation you must set up your communications to use cryptographic protocols.

The operations you can perform are:

Each section includes examples of performing each task using RACF. You can perform similar tasks using the other external security managers.

On z/OS, you must also set the number of server subtasks that each queue manager uses for processing SSL calls, as described in "Setting the SSLTASKS parameter."

z/OS SSL support is integral to the operating system, and is known as *System SSL*. System SSL is part of the Cryptographic Services Base element of z/OS. The Cryptographic Services Base members are installed in the *pdsname*.SIEALNKE partitioned data set (PDS). When you install System SSL, ensure that you choose the appropriate options to provide the CipherSpecs that you require.

Setting the SSLTASKS parameter

To use SSL channels, ensure that there are at least two server subtasks by setting the SSLTASKS parameter, using the ALTER QMGR command. For example:

```
ALTER QMGR SSLTASKS(5)
```

To avoid problems with storage allocation, do not set the SSLTASKS parameter to a value greater than 50.

For more information about the ALTER QMGR MQSC command, refer to the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

Setting up a key repository

An SSL connection requires a *key repository* at each end of the connection. Each queue manager must have access to a key repository. Use the SSLKEYR parameter on the ALTER QMGR command to associate a key repository with a queue manager. See "The SSL key repository" on page 42 for more information.

On z/OS, digital certificates are stored in a *key ring* that is managed by your External Security Manager (ESM) . These digital certificates have labels, which associate the certificate with a queue manager. SSL uses these certificates for authentication purposes. All the examples that follow use RACF commands. Equivalent commands exist for other ESM programs.

On z/OS, WebSphere MQ uses the `ibmWebSphereMQ` prefix on a label to avoid confusion with certificates for other products. The prefix is followed by the name of the queue manager.

The key repository name for a queue manager is the name of a key ring in your RACF database. You can specify the key ring name either before or after creating the key ring.

Use the following procedure to create a new key ring for a queue manager:

1. Ensure that you have the appropriate authority to issue the RACDCERT command (see the *SecureWay Security Server RACF Command Language Reference* for more details).
2. Issue the following command:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(userid1) ADDRING(ring-name)
   ```

   where:

   - *userid1* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space, or the user ID that is going to own the key ring (if the key ring is shared).

- *ring-name* is the name you want to give to your key ring. The length of this name can be up to 237 characters. This name is case-sensitive. Specify *ring-name* in upper case to avoid problems.

Ensuring CA certificates are available to a queue manager

After you have created your key ring, you need to connect any relevant CA certificates to it. For example, to connect a CA certificate for `My CA` to your key ring, use the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid1)
CONNECT(CERTAUTH LABEL('My CA') RING(ring-name) USAGE(CERTAUTH))
```

where *userid1* is either the channel initiator user ID or the owner of a shared key ring.

For more information about CA certificates, refer to "Digital certificates" on page 14.

Working with a key repository

This section tells you how to perform the following tasks:

- "Locating the key repository for a queue manager"
- "Specifying the key repository location for a queue manager"

Note: When you change either the key repository attribute, or the certificates in the key ring, check "When changes become effective" on page 122.

Locating the key repository for a queue manager

Use the following procedure to obtain information about the location of your queue manager's key ring:

1. Display your queue manager's attributes, using either of the following MQSC commands:

   ```
   DISPLAY QMGR ALL
   DISPLAY QMGR SSLKEYR
   ```

2. Examine the command output for the location of the key ring.

Specifying the key repository location for a queue manager

To specify the location of your queue manager's key ring, use the ALTER QMGR MQSC command to set your queue manager's key repository attribute. For example:

```
ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR(CSQ1RING)
```

if the key ring is owned by the channel initiator address space, or:

```
ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR(userid1/CSQ1RING)
```

if it is a shared key ring, where *userid1* is the user ID that owns the key ring.

Ensuring the CHINIT has the correct read access:

Ensuring the CHINIT has access to read the key repository

Ensure your CHINIT userid has read access to the IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING profile in the FACILITY class by using the following command:

```
PERMIT IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING CLASS(FACILITY) ID(userid) ACCESS(READ)
```

where *userid* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space.

Ensuring CHINIT has read access to the appropriate CSF* profiles

Ensure your CHINIT userid has read access to the appropriate CSF* profiles in the CSFSERV class by using the following command:

```
PERMIT csf-resource CLASS(CSFSERV) ID(userid) ACCESS(READ)
```

where *csf-resource* is the name of the CSF* profile and *userid* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space.

Repeat this command for each of the following CSF* profile names:

- CSFPKD
- CSFPKE
- CSFPKI
- CSFDSG
- CSFDSV
- CSFKEYS

When changes become effective

Changes to the certificates in the key ring and to the key repository attribute become effective:

- When the channel initiator is started or restarted, or
- When the REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(SSL) command is issued to refresh the contents of the SSL key repository.

Obtaining personal certificates

You apply to a Certification Authority (CA) for the personal certificate that is used to verify the identity of your queue manager. You can also create self-signed certificates for testing SSL on your z/OS system.

This section tells you how to use RACF for:

1. "Creating a self-signed personal certificate"
2. "Requesting a personal certificate" on page 123
3. "Creating a RACF signed personal certificate" on page 123

Creating a self-signed personal certificate

Use the following procedure to create a self-signed personal certificate:

1. Generate a certificate and a public and private key pair using the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid2) GENCERT
SUBJECTSDN(CN('common-name')
           T('title')
           OU('organizational-unit')
           O('organization')
           L('locality')
           SP('state-or-province')
           C('country'))
WITHLABEL('label-name')
```

2. Connect the certificate to your key ring using the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid1)
CONNECT(ID(userid2) LABEL('label-name') RING(ring-name) USAGE(PERSONAL))
```

where:

- *userid1* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space or owner of the shared key ring.
- *userid2* is the user ID associated with the certificate.
- *ring-name* is the name you gave the key ring in "Setting up a key repository" on page 120.
- *label-name* must be in the correct WebSphere MQ format for a queue manager: `ibmWebSphereMQ` followed by the name of your queue manager, for example, `ibmWebSphereMQCSQ1`.

Note that *userid1* and *userid2* can be the same ID.

Requesting a personal certificate

To apply for a personal certificate, use RACF as follows:

1. Create a self-signed personal certificate, as in "Creating a self-signed personal certificate" on page 122. This certificate provides the request with the attribute values for the Distinguished Name.
2. Create a PKCS #10 Base64-encoded certificate request written to a data set, using the following command:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(userid2) GENREQ(LABEL('label-name')) DSN(output-data-set-name)
   ```

   where *label-name* is the label used when creating the self-signed certificate, and *userid2* is the user ID associated with the certificate.
3. Send the data set to a Certification Authority (CA) to request a new personal certificate.
4. When the signed certificate is returned to you by the Certification Authority, you need to add the certificate back into the RACF database, using the original label, as described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124.

Creating a RACF signed personal certificate

RACF can function as a Certification Authority and issue its own CA certificate. This section uses the term *signer certificate* to denote a CA certificate issued by RACF.

The private key for the signer certificate must be in the RACF database before you carry out the following procedure:

1. Use the following command to generate a personal certificate signed by RACF, using the signer certificate contained in your RACF database:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(userid2) GENCERT
   SUBJECTSDN(CN('common-name')
              T('title')
              OU('organizational-unit')
              O('organization')
              L('locality')
              SP('state-or-province')
              C('country'))
   WITHLABEL('label-name')
   SIGNWITH(CERTAUTH LABEL('signer-label'))
   ```

2. Connect the certificate to your key ring using the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid1)
CONNECT(ID(userid2) LABEL('label-name') RING(ring-name) USAGE(PERSONAL))
```

where:

- *userid1* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space or owner of the shared key ring.
- *userid2* is the user ID associated with the certificate.
- *ring-name* is the name you gave the key ring in "Setting up a key repository" on page 120.
- *label-name* must be in the correct WebSphere MQ format for a queue manager: `ibmWebSphereMQ` followed by the name of your queue manager, for example, `ibmWebSphereMQCSQ1`.
- *signer-label* is the label of your own signer certificate.

Note that *userid1* and *userid2* can be the same ID.

Adding personal certificates to a key repository

After the Certification Authority sends you a new personal certificate, add it to the key ring using the following procedure:

1. Add the certificate to the RACF database using the following command:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(userid2) ADD(input-data-set-name) WITHLABEL('label-name')
   ```

2. Connect the certificate to your key ring using the following command:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(userid1)
   CONNECT(ID(userid2) LABEL('label-name') RING(ring-name) USAGE(PERSONAL))
   ```

where:

- *userid1* is the user ID of the channel initiator address space or owner of the shared key ring.
- *userid2* is the user ID associated with the certificate.
- *ring-name* is the name you gave the key ring in "Setting up a key repository" on page 120.
- *input-data-set-name* is the name of the data set containing the CA signed certificate. The data set must be cataloged and must not be a PDS or a member of a PDS. The record format (RECFM) expected by RACDCERT is VB. RACDCERT dynamically allocates and opens the data set, and reads the certificate from it as binary data.
- *label-name* is the label name that was used when you created the original request. It must be in the correct WebSphere MQ format for a queue manager: `ibmWebSphereMQ` followed by the name of your queue manager, for example, `ibmWebSphereMQCSQ1`.

Managing digital certificates

This section tells you about managing the digital certificates in your key ring.

When you make changes to the certificates in a key ring, refer to "When changes become effective" on page 122.

This section contains the following procedures:

- "Transferring certificates" on page 125
- "Removing certificates" on page 125

Transferring certificates

This section describes how to extract a certificate from a key ring to allow it to be copied to another system, and how to import a certificate from another system into a key ring.

Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository:

On the system from which you want to extract the certificate, use the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid2) EXPORT(LABEL('label-name'))
DSN(output-data-set-name) FORMAT(CERTB64)
```

where:

- *userid2* is the user ID under which the certificate was added to the key ring.
- *label-name* is the label of the certificate you want to extract.
- *output-data-set-name* is the data set into which the certificate is placed.
- CERTB64 is a DER encoded X.509 certificate that is in Base64 format. You can choose an alternative format, for example:

  CERTDER
  DER encoded X.509 certificate in binary format

  PKCS12B64
  PKCS #12 certificate in Base64 format

  PKCS12DER
  PKCS #12 certificate in binary format

  Note that **PKCS12DER** is supported only on OS/390 V2.10 and z/OS V1.1 and subsequent releases.

Importing a personal certificate into a key repository:

To import the extracted certificate into a different key ring, follow the procedure described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124.

Removing certificates

This section describes two methods of removing a certificate:

- "Deleting a personal certificate from a key repository"
- "Renaming a personal certificate in a key repository"

Deleting a personal certificate from a key repository:

Before deleting a personal certificate, you might want to save a copy of it. To copy your personal certificate to a data set before deleting it, follow the procedure in "Exporting a personal certificate from a key repository." Then use the following command to delete your personal certificate:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid2) DELETE(LABEL('label-name'))
```

where:

- *userid2* is the user ID under which the certificate was added to the key ring.
- *label-name* is the name of the certificate you want to delete.

Renaming a personal certificate in a key repository:

If you do not want a certificate with a specific label to be found, but do not want to delete it, you can rename it temporarily using the following command:

```
RACDCERT ID(userid2) LABEL('label-name') NEWLABEL('new-label-name')
```

where:

- *userid2* is the user ID under which the certificate was added to the key ring.
- *label-name* is the name of the certificate you want to rename.
- *new-label-name* is the new name of the certificate.

This can be useful when testing SSL client authentication.

Working with Certificate Name Filters (CNFs)

When an entity at one end of an SSL channel receives a certificate from a remote connection, the entity asks RACF if there is a user ID associated with that certificate. The entity uses that user ID as the channel user ID. If there is no user ID associated with the certificate, the entity uses the user ID under which the channel initiator is running. For more information about which user ID is used, refer to the WebSphere MQ for z/OS System Setup Guide.

There are two ways to associate a user ID with a certificate:

- Install that certificate into the RACF database under the user ID with which you wish to associate it, as described in "Adding personal certificates to a key repository" on page 124.
- Use a Certificate Name Filter (CNF) to map the Distinguished Name of the subject or issuer of the certificate to the user ID, as described in "Setting up a CNF."

Setting up a CNF

Perform the following steps to set up a CNF. Refer to the *SecureWay® Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide* for more information about the commands you use to manipulate CNFs.

1. Enable CNF functions. You require update authority on the class DIGTNMAP to do this:

   ```
   SETROPTS CLASSACT(DIGTNMAP) RACLIST(DIGTNMAP)
   ```

2. Define the CNF. For example:

   ```
   RACDCERT ID(USER1) MAP WITHLABEL('filter1') TRUST
   SDNFILTER('O=IBM.C=UK') IDNFILTER('O=ExampleCA.L=Internet')
   ```

   where `USER1` is the user ID to be used when:

   - The DN of the subject has an Organization of `IBM` and a Country of `UK`.
   - The DN of the issuer has an Organization of `ExampleCA` and a Locality of `Internet`.

3. Refresh the CNF mappings:

   ```
   SETROPTS RACLIST(DIGTNMAP) REFRESH
   ```

Note:

1. If the actual certificate is stored in the RACF database, the user ID under which it is installed is used in preference to the user ID associated with any CNF. If the certificate is not stored in the RACF database, the user ID associated with the most specific matching CNF is used. Matches of the subject DN are considered more specific than matches of the issuer DN.

2. Changes to CNFs do not apply until you refresh the CNF mappings.
3. A DN matches the DN filter in a CNF only if the DN filter is identical to the *least significant portion* of the DN. The least significant portion of the DN comprises the attributes that are usually listed at the right-most end of the DN, but which appear at the beginning of the certificate.

   For example, consider the SDNFILTER `'O=IBM.C=UK'`. A subject DN of `'CN=QM1.O=IBM.C=UK'` matches that filter, but a subject DN of `'CN=QM1.O=IBM.L=Hursley.C=UK'` does not match that filter.

   Note that the least significant portion of some certificates can contain fields that do not match the DN filter. Consider excluding these certificates by specifying a DN pattern in the SSLPEER pattern on the DEFINE CHANNEL command.
4. If the most specific matching CNF is defined to RACF as NOTRUST, the entity uses the user ID under which the channel initiator is running.
5. RACF uses the `'.'` character as a separator. WebSphere MQ uses either a comma or a semicolon.

You can define CNFs to ensure that the entity never sets the channel user ID to the default, which is the user ID under which the channel initiator is running. For each CA certificate in the key ring associated with the entity, define a CNF with an IDNFILTER that exactly matches the subject DN of that CA certificate. This ensures that all certificates that the entity might use match at least one of these CNFs. This is because all such certificates must either be connected to the key ring associated with the entity, or must be issued by a CA for which a certificate is connected to the key ring associated with the entity.

Working with Certificate Revocation Lists and Authority Revocation Lists

During the SSL handshake, the communicating partners authenticate each other with digital certificates. Authentication can include a check that the certificate received can still be trusted. Certification Authorities (CAs) revoke certificates for various reasons, including:

- The owner has moved to a different organization
- The private key is no longer secret

CAs publish revoked personal certificates in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). CA certificates that have been revoked are published in an Authority Revocation List (ARL).

For more information about Certification Authorities, refer to “Digital certificates” on page 14.

WebSphere MQ SSL support implements CRL and ARL checking using LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) servers. This chapter tells you about:

- “Setting up LDAP servers” on page 128
- “Accessing CRLs and ARLs” on page 129
- “Manipulating authentication information objects with PCF commands” on page 133
- “Keeping CRLs and ARLs up to date” on page 133
- “Certificate validation and trust policy design on UNIX and Windows systems” on page 133

For more information about LDAP, refer to the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Guide.

The WebSphere MQ CRL and ARL support on each platform is as follows:

- On i5/OS, the CRL and ARL support complies with PKIX X.509 V2 CRL profile recommendations.
- On Windows and UNIX systems, the CRL and ARL support complies with PKIX X.509 V2 CRL profile recommendations.
- On z/OS, System SSL supports CRLs and ARLs stored in LDAP servers by the Tivoli Public Key Infrastructure product.

Setting up LDAP servers

Configure the LDAP Directory Information Tree (DIT) structure to use the hierarchy corresponding to the Distinguished Names of the CAs that issue the certificates and CRLs. You can set up the DIT structure with a file that uses the LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF). You can also use LDIF files to update a directory.

LDIF files are ASCII text files that contain the information required to define objects within an LDAP directory. LDIF files contain one or more entries, each of which comprises a Distinguished Name, at least one object class definition and, optionally, multiple attribute definitions.

The `certificateRevocationList;binary` attribute contains a list, in binary form, of revoked user certificates. The `authorityRevocationList;binary` attribute contains a binary list of CA certificates that have been revoked. For use with WebSphere MQ SSL, the binary data for these attributes must conform to DER (Definite Encoding Rules) format. For more information about LDIF files, refer to the documentation provided with your LDAP server.

Figure 14 shows a sample LDIF file that you might create as input to your LDAP server to load the CRLs and ARLs issued by CA1, which is an imaginary Certification Authority with the Distinguished Name "CN=CA1, OU=Test, O=IBM, C=GB", set up by the Test organization within IBM.

```
dn: o=IBM, c=GB
o: IBM
objectclass: top
objectclass: organization

dn: ou=Test, o=IBM, c=GB
ou: Test
objectclass: organizationalUnit

dn: cn=CA1, ou=Test, o=IBM, c=GB
cn: CA1
objectclass: cRLDistributionPoint
objectclass: certificationAuthority
authorityRevocationList;binary:: (DER format data)
certificateRevocationList;binary:: (DER format data)
caCertificate;binary:: (DER format data)
```

Figure 14. Sample LDIF for a Certification Authority. This might vary from implementation to implementation.

Figure 15 on page 129 shows the DIT structure that your LDAP server creates when you load the sample LDIF file shown in Figure 14 together with a similar file

for CA2, an imaginary Certification Authority set up by the PKI organization, also within IBM.



Figure 15. Example of an LDAP Directory Information Tree structure

Note that both CRLs and ARLs are checked by WebSphere MQ.

Note: Ensure that the access control list for your LDAP server allows authorized users to read, search, and compare the entries that hold the CRLs and ARLs. WebSphere MQ accesses the LDAP server using the LDAPUSER and LDAPPWD properties of the AUTHINFO object.

Configuring and updating LDAP servers

Use the following procedure to configure or update your LDAP server:

1. Obtain the CRLs and ARLs in DER format from your Certification Authority, or Authorities.
2. Using a text editor or the tool provided with your LDAP server, create one or more LDIF files that contain the Distinguished Name of the CA and the required object class definitions. Copy the DER format data into the LDIF file as the values of either the `certificateRevocationList;binary` attribute for CRLs, the `authorityRevocationList;binary` attribute for ARLs , or both.
3. Start your LDAP server.
4. Add the entries from the LDIF file or files you created at step 2.

Accessing CRLs and ARLs

This section describes:

- "Accessing CRLs and ARLs with a queue manager" on page 130
- "Accessing CRLs and ARLs with a WebSphere MQ client" on page 132
- "Accessing CRLs and ARLs using WebSphere MQ Explorer" on page 131
- "Accessing CRLs and ARLs with WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS" on page 132

Note that in this section, information about Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) also applies to Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs).

On the following platforms, WebSphere MQ maintains a cache of CRLs and ARLs that have been accessed in the preceding 12 hours:

- i5/OS from V5R2M0 onwards
- UNIX systems
- Windows systems
- z/OS systems

When the queue manager or WebSphere MQ client receives a certificate, it checks the CRL to confirm that the certificate is still valid. WebSphere MQ first checks in the cache, if there is a cache. If the CRL is not in the cache, WebSphere MQ interrogates the LDAP CRL server locations in the order they appear in the namelist of authentication information objects specified by the *SSLCRLNamelist* attribute, until WebSphere MQ finds an available CRL. If the namelist is not specified, or is specified with a blank value, CRLs are not checked.

Accessing CRLs and ARLs with a queue manager

Note that in this section, information about Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) also applies to Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs).

You tell the queue manager how to access CRLs by supplying the queue manager with authentication information objects, each of which holds the address of an LDAP CRL server. The authentication information objects are held in a namelist, which is specified in the *SSLCRLNamelist* queue manager attribute.

In the following example, MQSC is used to specify the parameters:

1. Define authentication information objects using the DEFINE AUTHINFO MQSC command, with the AUTHTYPE parameter set to CRLLDAP. On i5/OS, you can also use the CRTMQMAUTI CL command.

   WebSphere MQ supports only the value CRLLDAP for the AUTHTYPE parameter, which indicates that CRLs are accessed on LDAP servers. Each authentication information object with type CRLLDAP that you create holds the address of an LDAP server. When you have more than one authentication information object, the LDAP servers to which they point *must* contain identical information. This provides continuity of service if one or more LDAP servers fail.

   Additionally, on z/OS only, all LDAP servers must be accessed using the same user ID and password. The user ID and password used are those specified in the first AUTHINFO object in the namelist.
2. Using the DEFINE NAMELIST MQSC command, define a namelist for the names of your authentication information objects. On z/OS, ensure that the NLTYPE namelist attribute is set to AUTHINFO.
3. Using the ALTER QMGR MQSC command, supply the namelist to the queue manager. For example:

   ```
   ALTER QMGR SSLCRLNL(sslcrlnlname)
   ```

   where `sslcrlnlname` is your namelist of authentication information objects.

   This command sets a queue manager attribute called *SSLCRLNamelist*. The queue manager's initial value for this attribute is blank.

On i5/OS, you can specify authentication information objects, but the queue manager uses neither authentication information objects nor a namelist of authentication information objects. Only WebSphere MQ clients that use a client connection table generated by an i5/OS queue manager use the authentication information specified for that i5/OS queue manager. The *SSLCRLNamelist* queue manager attribute on i5/OS determines what authentication information such clients use. See "Accessing CRLs and ARLs on i5/OS" on page 131 for information about telling an i5/OS queue manager how to access CRLs.

You can add up to 10 connections to alternative LDAP servers to the namelist, to ensure continuity of service if one or more LDAP servers fail. Note that the LDAP servers *must* contain identical information.

Accessing CRLs and ARLs on i5/OS:

Note that in this section, information about Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) also applies to Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs).

Use the following procedure to set up a CRL location for a specific certificate on i5/OS:

1. Access the DCM interface, as described in "Accessing DCM" on page 88.
2. In the **Manage CRL locations** task category in the navigation panel, click **Add CRL location**. The Manage CRL Locations page displays in the task frame.
3. In the **CRL Location Name** field, type a CRL location name, for example `LDAP Server #1`
4. In the **LDAP Server** field, type the LDAP server name.
5. In the **Use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)** field, select **Yes** if you want to connect to the LDAP server using SSL. Otherwise, select **No**.
6. In the **Port Number** field, type a port number for the LDAP server, for example `389`.
7. If your LDAP server does not allow anonymous users to query the directory, type a login distinguished name for the server in the **login distinguished name** field.
8. Click **OK**. DCM informs you that it has created the CRL location.
9. In the navigation panel, click **Select a Certificate Store**. The Select a Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
10. Select the **Other System Certificate Store** check box and click **Continue**. The Certificate Store and Password page displays.
11. In the **Certificate store path and filename** field, type the IFS path and filename you set when "Creating a new certificate store" on page 90.
12. Type a password in the **Certificate Store Password** field. Click **Continue**. The Current Certificate Store page displays in the task frame.
13. In the **Manage Certificates** task category in the navigation panel, click **Update CRL location assignment**. The CRL Location Assignment page displays in the task frame.
14. Select the radio button for the CA certificate to which you want to assign the CRL location. Click **Update CRL Location Assignment**. The Update CRL Location Assignment page displays in the task frame.
15. Select the radio button for the CRL location which you want to assign to the certificate. Click **Update Assignment**. DCM informs you that it has updated the assignment.

Note that DCM allows you to assign a different LDAP server by Certification Authority.

Accessing CRLs and ARLs using WebSphere MQ Explorer:

Note that in this section, information about Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) also applies to Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs).

You can use WebSphere MQ Explorer to tell a queue manager how to access CRLs.

Use the following procedure to set up an LDAP connection to a CRL:

1. Ensure that you have started your queue manager.

2. In WebSphere MQ Explorer, expand the **Advanced** folder of your queue manager.
3. Right-click the **Authentication Information** folder and click **New -> Authentication Information**. In the property sheet that opens:
   a. On the first page **Create Authentication Information**, enter a name for the CRL(LDAP) object.
   b. On the **General** page of **Change Properties**, select the connection type. Optionally you can enter a description.
   c. Select the **CRL(LDAP)** page of **Change Properties**.
   d. Enter the LDAP server name as either the network name or the IP address.
   e. If the server requires login details, provide a user ID and if necessary a password.
   f. Click **OK**.
4. Right-click the **Namelists** folder and click **New -> Namelist**. In the property sheet that opens:
   a. Type a name for the namelist.
   b. Add the name of the CRL(LDAP) object (from step 3a) to the list.
   c. Click **OK**.
5. Right-click the queue manager, select **Properties**, and select the **SSL** page:
   a. Select the **Check certificates received by this queue manager against Certification Revocation Lists** check box.
   b. Type the name of the namelist (from step 4a) in the **CRL Namelist** field.

Accessing CRLs and ARLs with a WebSphere MQ client

Note that in this section, information about Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) also applies to Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs).

You have three options for specifying the LDAP servers that hold CRLs for checking by a WebSphere MQ client:

- Using a channel definition table
- Using the SSL configuration options structure, MQSCO, on an MQCONNX call
- Using the Active Directory (on Windows systems with Active Directory support)

For more information, refer to the WebSphere MQ Clients book, the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Reference, and the **setmqcrl** command in the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

You can include up to 10 connections to alternative LDAP servers to ensure continuity of service if one or more LDAP servers fail. Note that the LDAP servers *must* contain identical information.

You cannot access LDAP CRLs from a WebSphere MQ client channel running on Linux (zSeries® platform).

Accessing CRLs and ARLs with WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS

Refer to WebSphere MQ Using Java for information about working with CRLs and ARLs with WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS

Checking CRLs and ARLs

After you have configured your LDAP CRL server, check that it is set up correctly. First, try using a certificate that is not revoked on the channel, and check that the channel starts correctly. Then use a certificate that is revoked, and check that the channel fails to start.

Manipulating authentication information objects with PCF commands

You can manipulate authentication information objects with the following Programmable Command Format commands:

- Create Authentication Information
- Copy Authentication Information
- Change Authentication Information
- Delete Authentication Information
- Inquire Authentication Information
- Inquire Authentication Information Names

For a complete description of these commands, refer to the WebSphere MQ Programmable Command Formats and Administration Interface book.

Keeping CRLs and ARLs up to date

Obtain updated CRLs from the Certification Authorities frequently. Consider doing this on your LDAP servers every 12 hours.

Use the procedure described in "Configuring and updating LDAP servers" on page 129 to include the new CRLs.

Certificate validation and trust policy design on UNIX and Windows systems

The information in this section applies to the following:

- WebSphere MQ for UNIX systems V7.0 and later
- WebSphere MQ for Windows systems V7.0 and later

This section details the supported certificate validation trust policy for WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems. The information is organized first by specification standard (PKIX), then by policy topic: certificate, CRL, and path validation.

Some definitions of terms used in this section:

certificate policy
: Determines which fields in a certificate are understood and processed.

CRL policy
: Determines which fields in a certificate revocation list are understood and processed.

path validation policy
Determines how the certificate and CRL policy types interact with each other to determine if a certificate chain (a trust point ″RootCA″ to an end-entry ″EE″) is valid.

The basic and standard policies are described as separate entities because this reflects the implementation within WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems. That is, there are two separate validation classes. To validate a certificate to standard (RFC 3280) policy, an implementation first needs to validate with the basic policy and then follow this with standard policy validation.

Note: WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems apply both the basic policy validation and the standard policy (RFC 3280) validation in that order.

Basic certificate policy

The supported fields for this policy are:
- OuterSigAlgID
- Signature
- Version
- SerialNumber
- InnerSigAlgID
- Issuer
- Validity
- SubjectName
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo
- IssuerUniqueID
- SubjectUniqueID

The supported extensions for this policy are:
- AuthorityKeyID
- SubjectKeyID
- IssuerAltName
- SubjectAltName
- KeyUsage
- BasicConstraints
- PrivateKeyUsage
- CRLDistributionPoints
  - DistributionPoint
    - DistributionPointName (X.500 Name and LDAP Format URI only)
    - NameRelativeToCRLIssuer (not supported)
    - Reasons (ignored)
    - CRLIssuer fields (not supported)

Basic CRL policy
- OuterSigAlgID
- Signature
- Version
- InnerSigAlgID

- Issuer
- ThisUpdate
- NextUpdate
- RevokedCertificate
  - UserCertificate
  - RevocationDate

There are no supported CRLEntry extensions. See step 7 of "Basic path validation policy" for further information.

The supported CRL extensions for this policy are:
- AuthorityKeyID
- IssuerAltName
- CRLNumber
- IssuingDistributionPoint
  - DistributionPoint
  - DistributionPointName
    - FullName (X.500 Name and LDAP Format URI only)
    - NameRelativeToCRLIssuer (not supported)
- Reasons (ignored)
- CRLIssuer
- OnlyContainsUserCerts (not supported)
- OnlyContainsCACerts (not supported)
- OnlySomeReasons (not supported)
- IndirectCRL[1] (rejected)

Basic path validation policy

The validation of a chain is performed in the following manner (but not necessarily in the following order):

1. Ensure that the name of the certificate's issuer is equal to the subject name in the previous certificate, and that there is not an empty issuer name in this certificate or the previous certificate subject name. If no previous certificate exists in the path and this is the first certificate in the chain, ensure that the issuer and subject name are identical and that the trust status is set for the certificate[2].

   Note: WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems will fail path validation in situations where the previous certificate in a path has the same subject name as the current certificate.
2. Ensure that the signature algorithm used to actually sign the certificate matches the signature algorithm indicated within the certificate, by ensuring

1. IndirectCRL extensions will result in CRL validation failing. IndirectCRL extensions must not be used because they cause identified certificates to not be rejected.

2. Trust status is an administrative setting in the key database file. You can access and alter the trust status of a particular signer certificate in iKeyman. Select the required certificate from the signer list and click the **View/Edit...** button. The **Set the certificate as a trusted root** check box on the resulting panel indicates the trust status. You can also set Trust status using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd with the -trust flag on the **-cert -modify** command. For further information about this command, see Chapter 18, "Managing keys and certificates" in the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

that the issuer signature algorithm identifier in the certificate matches the algorithm identifier in the signature data.

3. Ensure that the certificate was signed by the issuer, using the subject public key from the previous certificate in the path to verify the signature on the certificate. If no previous certificate exists and this is the first certificate, use the subject public key of the certificate to verify the signature on it.
4. Ensure that the certificate is a known X509 version, unique IDs are not present for version 1 certificates, and extensions are not present for version 1 and version 2 certificates.
5. Ensure that the certificate has not expired, or not been activated yet, and that its validity period is good[3].
6. Ensure that there are no unknown critical extensions or any duplicate extensions.
7. Ensure that the certificate has not been revoked. The CRLDistributionPoints extension is checked for a list of X.500 distinguished name GENERALNAME_directoryname and URI GENERALNAME_uniformResourceID.

   Only LDAP format URIs are supported. If the extension is not present, the name of the certificate's issuer is used. A CRL database (LDAP) is then queried for CRLs. If the certificate is not the last certificate, or if the last certificate has the basic constraint extension with the ″isCA″ flag turned on, the database is queried for ARLs and CRLs instead. If CRL checking is enabled, and no CRL database can be queried, the certificate is treated as revoked. Currently, the X500 directory name form and the LDAP URI form are the only supported name forms used to look up CRLs and ARLs[4]

   Note: RelativeDistinguishedNames are not supported.
8. If the issuerAltName extension is marked critical, ensure that the name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:
   - rfc822
   - DNS
   - directory
   - URI
   - IPAddress(v4/v6)
9. If the subjectAltName extension is marked critical, ensure that the name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:
   - rfc822
   - DNS
   - directory
   - URI
   - IPAddress(v4/v6)
10. If the KeyUsage extension is critical on a non-EE certificate, ensure that the keyCertSign flag is on, and ensure that if the BasicConstraints extension is present, that the ″isCA″ flag is true.

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3. There are no checks to ensure the subject's validity is within bounds of the issuer's validity. This is not required, and Verisign certificates have been shown to not pass such a check.
4. When retrieved from the database, ARLs are evaluated in exactly the same way as CRLs. Many CAs do not issue ARLs at all. However, WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems will look for ARLs and CRLs if checking a CA certificate for revocation status.

11. If the BasicConstraints extension is not present the certificate is only valid as an EE certificate. If the BasicConstraints extension is present, the following checks are made:
    - If the "isCA" flag is false, ensure the certificate is the last certificate in the chain and that the pathLength field is not present.
    - If the "isCA" flag is true and the certificate is NOT the last certificate in the chain, ensure that the number of certificates until the last certificate in the chain is not greater than the pathLength field.
12. The AuthorityKeyID extension is not used for path validation, but is used when building the certificate chain.
13. The SubjectKeyID extension is not used for path validation, but is used when building the certificate chain.
14. The PrivateKeyUsagePeriod extension is ignored by the validation engine, because it cannot determine when the CA actually signed the certificate. The extension is always non-critical and therefore can be safely ignored.

The validation of a CRL is also performed to ensure that the CRL itself is valid, and is performed in the following manner (but not necessarily the following order):

1. Ensure that the signature algorithm used to actually sign the CRL matches the signature algorithm indicated within the CRL, by ensuring that the issuer signature algorithm identifier in the CRL matches the algorithm identifier in the signature data.
2. Ensure that the CRL was signed by the issuer of certificate in question, verifying that the CRL has been signed with key of the certificate issuer.
3. Ensure that the CRL has not expired[5], or not been activated yet, and that its validity period is good.
4. Ensure that if the version field is present, it is version 2. Otherwise the CRL is version 1 and must not have any extensions. However, WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems only verify that no critical extensions are present.
5. Ensure that the certificate in question is on the revokedCertificates field list and that the revocation date is not in the future.
6. Ensure that there are no duplicate extensions.
7. If unknown critical extensions, including critical entry extensions, are detected in the CRL, this will cause identified certificates to be treated as revoked[6] (provided the CRL passes all other checks).

---

5. If no current CRLs are found, WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems will attempt to use out of date CRLs to determine the revocation status of a Certificate. It is not clearly specified in RFC 3280 what action to take in the event of no current CRLs. WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems attempt to use out of date CRLs so that security will not be adversely reduced.

6. ITU X.509 and RFC 3280 are in conflict in this case because the RFC mandates that CRLs with unknown critical extensions must fail validation. However, ITU X.509 requires that identified certificates must still be treated as revoked provided the CRL passes all other checks. WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems adopt the ITU X.509 guidance so that security will not be adversely reduced.

   A potential scenario exists where the CA who issues a CRL might set an unknown critical extension to indicate that even though all other validation checks are successful, a certificate which is identified should not be considered revoked and thus not rejected by the application. In this scenario, following X.509, WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems will function in a fail-secure mode of operation. That is, they might reject certificates that the CA did not intend to be rejected and therefore might deny service to some valid users. A fail-insecure mode ignores a CRL because it has an unknown critical extension and therefore certificates that the CA intended to be revoked are still accepted. The administrator of the system should then query this behavior with the issuing CA.

8. If the authorityKeyID extension in the CRL and the subjectKeyID in the CA certificate are present and if the keyIdentifier field is present within the authorityKeyID of the CRL, match it with the CACertificate's subjectKeyID.
9. If the issuerAltName extension is marked critical, ensure that the name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:
   - rfc822
   - DNS
   - directory
   - URI
   - IPAddress(v4/v6)
10. If the issuingDistributionPoint extension is present in the CRL process as follows:
    - If the issuingDistributionPoint specifies an InDirectCRL then fail the CRL validation.
    - If the issuingDistributionPoint indicates that a CRLDistributionPoint is present but no DistributionPointName is found, fail the CRL validation
    - If the issuingDistributionPoint indicates that a CRLDistributionPoint is present and specifies a DistributionPointName ensure that it is a GeneralName or LDAP format URI that matches the name given by the certificate's CRLDistributionPoint or the certificate's issuer's name. If the DistributionPointName is not a GeneralName then the CRL validation will fail.

      Note: RelativeDistinguishedNames are not supported and will fail CRL validation if encountered.

Standard policy (RFC-3280)

The supported fields for the standard policy are the same as the basic policy fields. These fields are listed in "Basic certificate policy" on page 134.

The supported extensions for the standard policy are:

- the basic policy supported extensions as listed in "Basic certificate policy" on page 134.
- NameConstraints
- CertificatePolicies
  - PolicyInformation
    - PolicyIdentifier
    - PolicyQualifiers (not supported)
- PolicyMappings
- PolicyConstraints

Standard CRL policy

The standard CRL policy is the same as the basic CRL policy, which is detailed in "Basic CRL policy" on page 134.

Standard path validation policy

- A certification path of length n, where the trust point or root certificate is certificate #1, and the EE is n.
- A set of initial policy identifiers (each comprising a sequence of policy element identifiers), that identifies one or more certificate policies, any one of which is

acceptable for the purposes of certification path processing, or the special value ″any-policy″. Currently this is always set to ″any-policy″.

Note: WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems only support policy identifiers that are created by WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems.

- Acceptable policy set: a set of certificate policy identifiers comprising the policy or policies recognized by the public key user, together with policies deemed equivalent through policy mapping. The initial value of the acceptable policy set is the special value ″any-policy″.
- Constrained subtrees: a set of root names defining a set of subtrees within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in the certification path can fall. The initial value is ″unbounded″.
- Excluded subtrees: a set of root names defining a set of subtrees within which no subject name in subsequent certificates in the certification path can fall. The initial value is ″empty″.
- Explicit policy: an integer which indicates if an explicit policy identifier is required. The integer indicates the first certificate in the path where this requirement is imposed. When set, this variable can be decreased, but can not be increased. (That is, if a certificate in the path requires explicit policy identifiers, a later certificate can not remove this requirement.) The initial value is n+1.
- Policy mapping: an integer which indicates if policy mapping is permitted. The integer indicates the last certificate on which policy mapping may be applied. When set, this variable can be decreased, but can not be increased. (That is, if a certificate in the path specifies policy mapping is not permitted, it can not be overridden by a later certificate.) The initial value is n+1.

The validation of a chain is performed in the following manner (but not necessarily the following order):

1. The information in the following paragraph is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

   Ensure that the name of the certificate’s issuer is equal to the subject name in the previous certificate, and that there is not an empty issuer name in this certificate or the previous certificate subject name. If no previous certificate exists in the path and this is the first certificate in the chain, ensure that the issuer and subject name are identical and that the trust status is set for the certificate[7].

   If the certificate does not have a subject name, the subjectAltName extension must be present and critical.
2. The information in the following paragraph is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

   Ensure that the signature algorithm used to actually sign the certificate matches the signature algorithm indicated within the certificate, by ensuring that the issuer signature algorithm identifier in the certificate matches the algorithm identifier in the signature data.

   If both the certificate’s issuersUniqueID and the issuer’s subjectUniqueID are present, ensure they match.
3.

7. Trust status is an administrative setting in the key database file. You can access and alter the trust status of a particular signer certificate in iKeyman. Select the required certificate from the signer list and click the **View/Edit...** button. The **Set the certificate as a trusted root** check box on the resulting panel indicates the trust status. You can also set Trust status using iKeyCmd or GSKCapiCmd with the -trust flag on the **-cert -modify** command. For further information about this command, see Chapter 18, ″Managing keys and certificates″ in the WebSphere MQ System Administration Guide.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

Ensure that the certificate was signed by the issuer, using the subject public key from the previous certificate in the path to verify the signature on the certificate. If no previous certificate exists and this is the first certificate, use the subject public key of the certificate to verify the signature on it.

4.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

Ensure that the certificate is a known X509 version, unique IDs are not present for version 1 certificates and extensions are not present for version 1 and version 2 certificates.

5.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

Ensure that the certificate has not expired, or not been activated yet, and that its validity period is good[8]

6.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

Ensure that there are no unknown critical extensions, nor any duplicate extensions.

7.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

Ensure that the certificate has not been revoked. The CRLDistributionPoints extension is checked for a list of X500 distinguished names. If the extension is not present, the name of the certificate’s issuer is used. A CRL database (LDAP) is then queried for CRLs. If the certificate is not the last certificate, or if the last certificate has the basic constraint extension with the ″isCA″ flag turned on, the database is queried for ARLs and CRLs instead. If CRL checking is enabled, and no CRL database can be queried, the certificate is treated as revoked. Currently, the X500 directory name form is the only supported name form used to look up CRLs and ARLs[9].

8.

The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in “Basic path validation policy” on page 135:

If the subjectAltName extension is marked critical, ensure that the name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:

- rfc822
- DNS
- directory
- URI
- IPAddress(v4/v6)

---

8. There are no checks to ensure the subject’s validity is within bounds of the issuer’s validity. This is not required, and Verisign certificates have been shown to not pass such a check.

9. When retrieved from the database, ARLs are evaluated in exactly the same way as CRLs. Many CAs do not issue ARLs at all. However, WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems will look for ARLs and CRLs if checking a CA certificate for revocation status.

9. Ensure that the subject name and subjectAltName extension (critical or noncritical) is consistent with the constrained and excluded subtrees state variables.[10].
10. If the EmailAddress OID is present in the subject name field as an IA5 string, and there is no subjectAltName extension, the EmailAddress must be consistent with the constrained and excluded subtrees state variable.
11. Ensure that policy information is consistent with the initial policy set[11]:
    a. If the explicit policy state variable is less than or equal to the current certificate's numerical sequence value, a policy identifier in the certificate shall be in the initial policy set.
    b. If the policy mapping variable is less than or equal to the current certificate's numerical sequence value, the policy identifier can not be mapped.
12. Ensure that policy information is consistent with the acceptable policy set:
    a. If the certificate policies extension is marked critical[12], the intersection of the policies extension and the acceptable policy set is non-null.
    b. The acceptable policy set is assigned the resulting intersection as its new value.
13. Ensure that the intersection of the acceptable policy set and the initial policy set is non-null.
14. The following is performed for all certificates except the last one:
    a. If the issuerAltName extension is marked critical, ensure that the name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:
       - rfc822
       - DNS
       - directory
       - URI
       - IPAddress(v4/v6)
    b. If the BasicConstraints extension is present, ensure that the ″isCA″ flag is true[13]. If the pathLength field is present, ensure the number of certificates until the last certificate is not greater than the pathLength field.
    c. If the KeyUsage extension is critical on not the last certificate, ensure that the keyCertSign flag is on, and ensure that if the BasicConstraints extension is present, that the ″isCA″ flag is true[14].
    d. If a policy constraints extension is included in the certificate, modify the explicit policy and policy mapping state variables as follows:
    e. If the policyMappings extension is present (see 12(b)), ensure that it is not critical, and if policy mapping is allowed, these mappings are used to map between this certificate's policies and its signee's policies.

---

10. WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems only support nameConstraint Extensions that are created by WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems
11. WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems only support Policy Extensions that are created by WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems.
12. This is maintained as a legacy requirement from RFC2459 (6.1 (e)(1))
13. "isCA" is always checked to ensure it is true to be as part of the chain building itself, however this specific test is still made.
14. This check is in fact redundant because of step (b), but the check is still made.

f. f. If the nameConstraints extension is present[15], ensure that it is critical, and that the permitted and excluded subtrees adhere to the following before updating the chain's subtree's state in accordance with the algorithm described in RFC 3280 section 6.1.4 part (g):

1) The minimum field is set to zero.
2) The maximum field is not present.
3) The base field name forms are recognized. The following general name forms are currently recognized:
   - rfc822
   - DNS
   - directory
   - URI
   - IPAddress(v4/v6)

15. The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in "Basic path validation policy" on page 135:

    The AuthorityKeyID extension is not used for path validation, but is used when building the certificate chain.

16. The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in "Basic path validation policy" on page 135:

    The SubjectKeyID extension is not used for path validation, but is used when building the certificate chain.

17. The following information is consistent with the basic path validation policy described in "Basic path validation policy" on page 135:

    The PrivateKeyUsagePeriod extension is ignored by the validation engine, because it cannot determine when the CA actually signed the certificate. The extension is always non-critical and therefore can be safely ignored.

Working with CipherSpecs

The CipherSpec identifies the combination of encryption algorithm and hash function used by an SSL or TLS connection. A CipherSpec forms part of a CipherSuite, which identifies the key exchange and authentication mechanism as well as the encryption and hash function algorithms.

Note that WebSphere MQ supports both SSL and TLS CipherSpecs.

WebSphere MQ supports only the RSA key exchange and authentication algorithms. The size of the key used during the SSL handshake can depend on the digital certificate you use, but some of the CipherSpecs supported by WebSphere MQ include a specification of the handshake key size. Note that larger handshake key sizes provide stronger authentication. With smaller key sizes, the handshake is faster.

For more information, refer to "CipherSuites and CipherSpecs" on page 22 and "An overview of the SSL handshake" on page 19.

15. WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems only support nameConstraint Extensions that are created by WebSphere MQ for UNIX and Windows systems.

Specifying CipherSpecs

Specify the CipherSpec by using the SSLCIPH parameter in either the DEFINE CHANNEL MQSC command or the ALTER CHANNEL MQSC command.

You can choose from the CipherSpecs listed in Table 3:

Table 3. CipherSpecs that can be used with WebSphere MQ SSL and TLS support

CipherSpec name	Protocol used	Hash algorithm	Encryption algorithm	Encryption bits	FIPS on Windows and UNIX platforms [1]
NULL_MD5	SSL	MD5	None	0	No
NULL_SHA	SSL	SHA-1	None	0	No
RC4_MD5_EXPORT	SSL	MD5	RC4	40	No
RC4_MD5_US	SSL	MD5	RC4	128	No
RC4_SHA_US	SSL	SHA-1	RC4	128	No
RC2_MD5_EXPORT	SSL	MD5	RC2	40	No
DES_SHA_EXPORT	SSL	SHA-1	DES	56	No
RC4_56_SHA_EXPORT1024 **Note:** 1. Not available for z/OS or i5/OS 2. Specifies a 1024–bit handshake key size	SSL	SHA-1	RC4	56	No
DES_SHA_EXPORT1024 **Note:** 1. Not available for z/OS or i5/OS 2. Specifies a 1024–bit handshake key size	SSL	SHA-1	DES	56	No
TRIPLE_DES_SHA_US	SSL	SHA-1	3DES	168	No
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS	SHA-1	AES	128	Yes
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS	SHA-1	AES	256	Yes
AES_SHA_US **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	SSL	SHA-1	AES	128	No
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA **Note:** Not available for z/OS	TLS	SHA-1	DES	56	No[2]
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA **Note:** Not available for z/OS	TLS	SHA-1	3DES	168	Yes
FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA **Note:** Available only on Windows and UNIX platforms	SSL	SHA-1	DES	56	No[3]
FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA **Note:** Available only on Windows and UNIX platforms	SSL	SHA-1	3DES	168	Yes
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	TLS	MD5	None	0	No
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	TLS	SHA-1	None	0	No
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_40_MD5 **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	TLS	MD5	RC2	40	No
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	TLS	MD5	RC4	40	No

Table 3. CipherSpecs that can be used with WebSphere MQ SSL and TLS support (continued)

CipherSpec name	Protocol used	Hash algorithm	Encryption algorithm	Encryption bits	FIPS on Windows and UNIX platforms [1]
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 **Note:** Available on i5/OS only	TLS	MD5	RC4	128	No

Note:

1. Is the CipherSpec FIPS-certified on a FIPS-certified platform? See "Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)" on page 44 for an explanation of FIPS.
2. This CipherSpec was FIPS 140-2 certified prior to 19th May 2007.
3. This CipherSpec was FIPS 140-2 certified prior to 19th May 2007. The name FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA is historical and reflects the fact that this CipherSpec was previously FIPS-compliant.

Note: On i5/OS V5R3, installation of AC3 is a prerequisite for the use of SSL, but installation of AC3 is not a prerequisite on i5/OS releases later than V5R3.

When you request a personal certificate, you specify a key size for the public and private key pair. The key size that is used during the SSL handshake can depend on the size stored in the certificate and on the CipherSpec:

- On UNIX systems, Windows systems, and z/OS, when a CipherSpec name includes `_EXPORT`, the maximum handshake key size is 512 bits. If either of the certificates exchanged during the SSL handshake has a key size greater than 512 bits, a temporary 512-bit key is generated for use during the handshake.
- On UNIX and Windows systems, when a CipherSpec name includes `_EXPORT1024`, the handshake key size is 1024 bits.
- Otherwise the handshake key size is the size stored in the certificate.

Obtaining information about CipherSpecs using WebSphere MQ Explorer

Use the following procedure to obtain information about the CipherSpecs in Table 3 on page 143:

1. Open **WebSphere MQ Explorer** and expand the **Queue Managers** folder.
2. Ensure that you have started your queue manager.
3. Select the queue manager you want to work with and click **Advanced –> Channels**.
4. Right–click the channel you want to work with and select **Properties**.
5. Select the **SSL** property page.
6. Select from the list the CipherSpec you want to work with. A description appears in the window below the list.

Alternatives for specifying CipherSpecs

Note: This section does not apply to UNIX or Windows systems, because the CipherSpecs are provided with the WebSphere MQ product, so new CipherSpecs do not become available after shipment.

For those platforms where the operating system provides the SSL support, your system might support new CipherSpecs that are not included in Table 3 on page 143. You can specify a new CipherSpec with the SSLCIPH parameter, but the value

you supply depends on your platform. In all cases the specification *must* correspond to an SSL CipherSpec that is both valid and supported by the version of SSL your system is running.

i5/OS A two-character string representing a hexadecimal value.

For more information about the permitted values, refer to the appropriate information center (search on *cipher_spec*):

- For V5R3, the *iSeries® Information Center* at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/iseries/v5r3/index.jsp
- For V5R4, the *i5/OS Information Center* at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/iseries/v5r4/index.jsp

You can use either the CHGMQMCHL or the CRTMQMCHL command to specify the value, for example:

```
CRTMQMCHL CHLNAME('channnel name') SSLCIPH('hexadecimal value')
```

You can also use the ALTER QMGR MQSC command to set the `SSLCIPH` parameter.

z/OS A two-character string representing a hexadecimal value. The hexadecimal codes correspond to the SSL protocol values defined at http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ssl-toc.html

For more information, refer to the description of gsk_environment_open() in the API reference chapter of *z/OS System SSL Programming*, SC24-5901, where there is a list of all the supported SSL V3.0 and TLS V1.0 cipher specifications in the form of 2-digit hexadecimal codes.

Considerations for WebSphere MQ clusters:

With WebSphere MQ clusters you should try to use the CipherSpec names in Table 3 on page 143. If you use an alternative specification, be aware that the specification might not be valid on other platforms. For more information, refer to the WebSphere MQ Queue Manager Clusters book.

Specifying a CipherSpec for a WebSphere MQ client

You have three options for specifying a CipherSpec for a WebSphere MQ client:

- Using a channel definition table
- Using the SSL configuration options structure, MQSCO, on an MQCONNX call
- Using the Active Directory (on Windows systems with Active Directory support)

For more information, refer to the WebSphere MQ Clients book and the WebSphere MQ Application Programming Reference.

Specifying a CipherSuite with WebSphere MQ classes for Java and WebSphere MQ classes for JMS

For information about specifying a CipherSuite with WebSphere MQ classes for Java, refer to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) support

For information about specifying a CipherSuite with WebSphere MQ classes for JMS, refer to Using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) with WebSphere MQ classes for JMS

Understanding CipherSpec mismatches

A CipherSpec identifies the combination of the encryption algorithm and hash function. Both ends of a WebSphere MQ SSL channel must use the same CipherSpec, although they can specify that CipherSpec in a different manner. Mismatches can be detected at two stages:

During the SSL handshake
The SSL handshake fails when the CipherSpec specified by the SSL client is unacceptable to the SSL support at the SSL server end of the connection. A CipherSpec failure during the SSL handshake arises when the SSL client proposes a CipherSpec that is not supported by the SSL provision on the SSL server. For example, when an SSL client running on AIX proposes the `TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA` CipherSpec to an SSL server running on i5/OS.

During channel startup
Channel startup fails when there is a mismatch between the CipherSpec defined for the responding end of the channel and the CipherSpec defined for the calling end of channel. Channel startup also fails when only one end of the channel defines a CipherSpec.

Refer to "Specifying CipherSpecs" on page 143 for more information.

Note: If Global Server Certificates are used, a mismatch can be detected during channel startup even if the CipherSpecs specified on both channel definitions match.

Global Server Certificates are a special type of certificate which require that a minimum level of encryption is established on all the communications links with which they are used. If the CipherSpec requested by the WebSphere MQ channel configuration does not meet this requirement, the CipherSpec is renegotiated during the SSL handshake. This is detected as a failure during WebSphere MQ channel startup as the CipherSpec no longer matches the one specified on the channel.

In this case, change the CipherSpec at both sides of the channel to one which meets the requirements of the Global Server Certificate. To establish whether a certificate that has been issued to you is a Global Server Certificate, contact the certificate authority which issued that certificate.

SSL servers do not detect mismatches when an SSL client channel on UNIX or Windows specifies the `DES_SHA_EXPORT1024` CipherSpec, and the corresponding SSL server channel on UNIX or Windows is using the `DES_SHA_EXPORT` CipherSpec. In this case, the channel runs normally.

WebSphere MQ rules for SSLPEER values

This chapter tells you about the rules you use when specifying SSLPEER values and which WebSphere MQ uses for matching Distinguished Names in digital certificates. For a full description of Distinguished Names, refer to "Distinguished Names" on page 16.

When SSLPEER values are compared with DNs, the rules for specifying and matching attribute values are:

1. You can use either a comma or a semicolon as a separator.

2. Spaces before or after the separator are ignored. For example:
   `CN=John Smith, O=IBM ,OU=Test , C=GB`
3. The values of attribute types `CN`, `T`, `O`, `OU`, `L`, `ST`, `SP`, `S`, `C` are text strings that usually include only the following:
   - Upper and lower case alphabetic characters `A` through `Z` and `a` through `z`
   - Numeric characters `0` through `9`
   - The space character
   - Characters `, . ; ' " ( ) / -`

   To avoid conversion problems between different platforms, do not use other characters in an attribute value. Note that the attribute types, for example `CN`, must be in upper case.
4. Strings containing the same alphabetical characters match irrespective of case.
5. Spaces are not allowed between the attribute type and the `=` character.
6. Optionally, you can enclose attribute values in double quotes, for example `CN="John Smith"`. The quotes are discarded when matching values.
7. Spaces at either end of the string are ignored unless the string is enclosed in double quotes.
8. The comma and semicolon attribute separator characters are considered to be part of the string when enclosed in double quotes.
9. The names of attribute types, for example `CN` or `OU`, are considered to be part of the string when enclosed in double quotes.
10. Any of the attribute types `ST`, `SP`, and `S` can be used for the State or Province name.
11. Any attribute value can have an asterisk (`*`) as a pattern-matching character at the beginning, the end, or in both places. The asterisk character substitutes for any number of characters at the beginning or end of the string to be matched. This enables your SSLPEER value specification to match a range of Distinguished Names. For example, `OU=IBM*` matches every Organizational Unit beginning with IBM, such as IBM Corporation.

    Note that the asterisk character can also be a valid character in a Distinguished Name. To obtain an exact match with an asterisk at the beginning or end of the string, the backslash escape character (\) must precede the asterisk: `\*`. Asterisks in the middle of the string are considered to be part of the string and do not require the backslash escape character.
12. When multiple OU attributes are specified, all must exist and be in descending hierarchical order. For an example of this, see the information on the DEFINE CHANNEL command in "Chapter 2. The MQSC commands" in the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference.

Understanding authentication failures

This chapter explains some common reasons for authentication failures during the SSL handshake:

A certificate has been found in a Certificate Revocation List or Authority Revocation List

You have the option to check certificates against the revocation lists published by the Certification Authorities.

A Certification Authority can revoke a certificate that is no longer trusted by publishing it in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or Authority

Revocation List (ARL). For more information, refer to "Working with Certificate Revocation Lists and Authority Revocation Lists" on page 127.

A certificate has expired or is not yet active
Each digital certificate has a date from which it is valid and a date after which it is no longer valid, so an attempt to authenticate with a certificate that is outside its lifetime fails.

A certificate is corrupted
If the information in a digital certificate is incomplete or damaged, authentication fails.

A certificate is not supported
If the certificate is in a format that is not supported, authentication fails, even if the certificate is still within its lifetime.

The SSL client does not have a certificate
The SSL server always validates the client certificate if one is sent. If the SSL client does not send a certificate, authentication fails if the end of the channel acting as the SSL server is defined:

- With the SSLCAUTH parameter set to REQUIRED or
- With an SSLPEER parameter value

There is no matching CA root certificate or the certificate chain is incomplete
Each digital certificate is issued by a Certification Authority (CA), which also provides a root certificate that contains the public key for the CA. Root certificates are signed by the issuing CA itself. If the key repository on the computer that is performing the authentication does not contain a valid root certificate for the CA that issued the incoming user certificate, authentication fails.

Authentication often involves a chain of trusted certificates. The digital signature on a user certificate is verified with the public key from the certificate for the issuing CA. If that CA certificate is a root certificate, the verification process is complete. If that CA certificate was issued by an intermediate CA, the digital signature on the intermediate CA certificate must itself be verified. This process continues along a chain of CA certificates until a root certificate is reached. In such cases, all certificates in the chain must be verified correctly. If the key repository on the computer that is performing the authentication does not contain a valid root certificate for the CA that issued the incoming root certificate, authentication fails. For more information, refer to "How certificate chains work" on page 17.

For more information about the terms used in this chapter, refer to:

- "Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) concepts" on page 19
- "Digital certificates" on page 14

Chapter 4. Cryptographic hardware

Note:

1. Symmetric cipher operations (see below for a definition of this term) are only supported on cards where this is explicitly stated.
2. On i5/OS and z/OS, the operating system provides the cryptographic hardware support.
3. On 64-bit enabled UNIX platforms, testing was carried out using GSKit in 32-bit mode

On i5/OS, when you use DCM to create or renew certificates, you can choose to store the key directly in the coprocessor or to use the coprocessor master key to encrypt the private key and store it in a special key store file.

On z/OS, when you use RACF to create certificates, you can choose to store the key using ICSF (Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility) to obtain improved performance and more secure key storage.

On UNIX and Windows systems, WebSphere MQ currently provides support for the following cryptographic hardware:

IBM 4758-002

Interface: PKCS #11

Platforms:

- i5/OS V5R3

IBM e-business Cryptographic Accelerator (#4960)

Interface: PKCS #11

Platforms:

- Linux (zSeries)

IBM PCICA

Interface: PKCS #11

Platforms:

- Linux (zSeries)

nCipher nForce 300

Interface: PKCS #11

Platforms:

- HP11i

If SSL cryptographic hardware symmetric cipher operations are enabled within WebSphere MQ, the cryptography used on an SSL channel will be provided by nCipher. This card is currently supported for symmetric cipher operations using Triple DES encryption.

nCipher netHSM 300, 800 and 1600

Interface: PKCS#11

Platforms:

- AIX V5.3

On all platforms, cryptographic hardware is used at the SSL handshaking stage and at secret key reset.

On UNIX and Windows systems, WebSphere MQ support is also provided for SSL cryptographic hardware symmetric cipher operations. When using SSL cryptographic hardware symmetric cipher operations, data sent across an SSL or TLS connection is encrypted/decrypted by the cryptographic hardware product.

On the queue manager, this is switched on by setting the SSLCryptoHardware queue manager attribute appropriately (see the WebSphere MQ Script (MQSC) Command Reference and WebSphere MQ Programmable Command Formats and Administration Interface books). On the WMQ client, equivalent variables are provided (see the WebSphere MQ Clients book). The default setting is off.

If this attribute is switched on, WebSphere MQ attempts to use symmetric cipher operations whether the cryptographic hardware product supports them for the encryption algorithm specified in the current CipherSpec or not. If the cryptographic hardware product does not provide this support, WebSphere MQ performs the encryption and decryption of data itself, and no error is reported. If the cryptographic hardware product supports symmetric cipher operations for the encryption algorithm specified in the current CipherSpec, this function is activated and the cryptographic hardware product performs the encryption and decryption of the data sent.

In a situation of low CPU usage it is generally quicker to perform the encryption/decryption in software, rather than copying the data on to the card, encrypting/decrypting it, and copying it back to the SSL protocol software. Hardware symmetric cipher operations become more useful when the CPU usage is high.

On z/OS with cryptographic hardware, support is provided for symmetric cipher operations. This means that the user's data is encrypted and decrypted by the hardware if the hardware has this capability for the CipherSpec chosen, and is configured to support data encryption and decryption.

On i5/OS, cryptographic hardware is not used for encryption and decryption of the user's data, even if the hardware has the capability of performing such encryption for the encryption algorithm specified in the current CipherSpec.

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Index

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

T

U

V

W

X

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