

IBM System z

## z/VSE Security Concepts and Update

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## Security requirements

#### **§** Security requirements are increasing in today's world

- Data security
- Data integrity
- Keep long-term data audit-save

#### **§** The number of attacks increase daily

- Industrial spying
- Security exploits, Denial-of-Service attacks
- Spam, Phishing, ...

## § Not paying attention to security requirements can be very expensive

- Your data is the heart of your company
- Loosing your customer data is a disaster
- You can loose customers

#### **§** IT Security gets more and more important

- You need to consider the whole IT Environment not only single systems










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## Security in a heterogeneous environment





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## Why secure VSE ?

§ Prevent unauthorized access to VSE and data




- Keep secret data secret
- Data modification by unauthorized users
- § Prevent users from damaging the VSE system (maybe by accident)
  - Deletion of members or entries
  - Submission of jobs






## VSE Security Components





## VSE Security Components



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## Basic Security Manager – New with z/VSE 3.1.1

- User Groups
  - Users can be grouped into groups
  - Permissions can be given on groups or individual users
- Description field for all profiles (20 characters)
- New admin functions
  - BSTADMIN (console or batch)
  - Interactive Interface Dialogs
- New resource classes
  - TCICSTRN Transactions (as on VSE/ESA 2.7)
    - MCICSPPT Application programs
    - FCICSFCT - Files
    - JCICSJCT Journals

  - ACICSPCT
  - APPL
  - FACILITY
- SCICSTST Temporary storage queues
- DCICISDCT Transient data queues
  - Transactions (CICS START)
    - Applications
  - Miscellaneous resources







## Basic Security Manager – New with z/VSE 4.1

#### **§** Audit-Logging and Reporting

- All access attempts to protected resources can be logged
  - Allowed access as well as disallowed access
- Possible attacks can be detected
  - E.g. multiple logon attempts with invalid password
- You can comprehend who did when access which resource
- Analysis can be done using a reporting tool
  - Summary report
  - Detailed report of all access attempts
- Uses the CICS DMF Tool
  - Creates SMF records containing logging information







## Audit-Logging and Reporting - New with z/VSE 4.1

- § To activate logging for a specific resource, you need to specify the AUDIT option (BSTADMIN) on the resource profile
  - AUDIT(audit-level)
    - ALL
      - Specifies that all authorized accesses and detected unauthorized access attempts should be logged.
    - FAILURES
      - Specifies that all detected unauthorized access attempts should be logged (the Default).
    - SUCCESS
      - Specifies that all access attempts that were authorized should be logged.
    - NONE
      - Specifies that no logging should be done.
- § Note: You should use the auditing function with care. It will increase the BSM and DMF processing and might negatively affect the performance of your z/VSE system!





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## Audit-Logging and Reporting - New with z/VSE 4.1

		stration concerns
		*Job/User
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95.076	12:26:06	SYSA
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95.076	12:26:12	HUGO
		HUGO MAYER
05.076	12:26:17	HUGO
		HUGO MAYER
95.076	12:26:17	HUG0
		HUGO MAYER
5.076	12:26:18	HUGO
		HUGO MAYER
95.076	12:26:29	SYSA
		AUGUST WONG
95.076	12:26:30	SYSA
		AUGUST WONG
95.076	12:26:33	SYSA
		AUGUST WONG

05.081 09:35:32

ş	BSM Report - Listing of Process Records
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	8 Job=(CICSICCF) - User verification: Sucessful termination Auth=(None),Reason=(None)
	1 Job=(CICSICCF) - User verification: Invalid password
	Auth=(None),Reason=(User ve rification failure)
30	0 Job=(CICSICCF) - User verification: Sucessful initiation / logon Auth=(None),Reason=(None)
	1 Job=(CICSICCF) - Resource access: Insufficient authority
	Auth=(Normal),Reason=(Audit options)
	Resource=CESN, Intent=Read, Allowed=None, Resource_class=TCICSTRN, GenProf=CES
	8 Job=(CICSICCF) - User verification: Sucessful termination Auth=(None),Reason=(None)
	0 Job=(PAUSEBG ) - User verification: Sucessful initiation / logon Auth=(None),Reason=(None)
	Auth=(Administrator), Reason=(Administrator)
	Resource=MYAPPL.MYPRINT, Intent=Read, Allowed=Read, Resource class=FACILITY
	8 Job=(PAUSEBG ) - User verification: Sucessful termination
	Auth=(None),Reason=(None)

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## Audit-Logging and Reporting - New with z/VSE 4.1

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## **CICS TS Security**

#### **§** Sign on Security

- Logon only possible for authorized users
- Permissions for applications and resources based on user-id

#### § Resource Security

- CICS Resources (e.g. files, applications, ...) can be protected
- Permissions can be assigned very granularly
- § Definition within single resource definition (e.g. file FILEA and FILEB)
  - Within DEFINE FILE: RESSEC(YES)
  - With BSTADMIN Resource Profiles for Resource Class FCICSFCT:
    - ADD FCICSFCT FILEA UACC(NONE)
    - ADD FCICSFCT FILEB UACC(NONE)
    - PERMIT FCICSFCT FILEA(GROUP1) ACCESS(UPDATE)
    - PERMIT FCICSFCT FILEB(GROUP1) ACCESS(READ





## **Batch Security**

#### **§** Only entitled users are allowed to execute jobs


- § Jobs run under the specified user id
  - Protects from disallowed access and/or modification of data
  - The job inherits the permissions from the user it is running under
- § ID statement or \* \$\$ JOB specifies user id and password for a job
  - Subsystems (LIBR, VSAM, ...) uses this user id to verify access permissions
  - Requites SYS SEC=YES in IPL Procedure

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## Security in a heterogeneous environment





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## Why secure remote access ?

#### **§** Today most computers are part of a network

- Distributed processes require exchange of data between these systems
- Data transfer must be secure and reliable
- Other systems require access to VSE data and applications
- Even in a company's internal network, that is treated as relatively secure, you will find viruses and worms
- The most dangerous attacks are those from inside the company (e.g. frustrated employees)

#### **§** Prevent unauthorized access to VSE and data

- Requires to authenticate the user (logon)
- Secure communication for confidential data
- **§** Using FTP you can access productions data
  - E.g. VSAM, POWER Lists





## **TCP/IP Security**

#### § In general TCP/IP uses its own user id definitions

- DEFINE USER, ID=user, PASSWORD=pwd
- Readable in initialization member (IPINITxx.L)
- Duplicate user definitions
- § Security Exit available from IBM to check the user ids and resource access via Security Manager
  - Checks user id during logon
  - Checks resource access permissions


#### **§** The most attacks are today coming through TCP/IP

- It is important to focus on this area



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## **TCP/IP Security Exit**




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## **Customer Data Protection Requirements**

- § Regulatory requirements driving need for greater data security, integrity, retention/auditability, and privacy
- § Severe business impacts caused by loss or theft of data including financial liability, reputation damage, legal/compliance risk
- § Increasing need to share data securely with business partners and maintain backups at remote locations
- § Need to reduce complexity and improve processes around enterprise encryption management
- § Need ability to cost effectively encrypt large quantities of tape data




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## Cryptography - what can it do for you?

#### **§** Keeping secrets

- Alice wants to send Bob confidential information,
- Charly should not be able to read it.
- **§** Proving identity



- Bob receives a message from Alice. How he can be sure that it is really from Alice?
- **§** Verifying information
  - Bob receives a message from Alice. How he can be sure that the content has not been modified?
- **§** Encryption of data transmitted over TCP/IP connections
  - SSL, HTTPS
  - SecureFTP
- **§** Encryption of data stored on disk or tape
  - Encryption of backups or archives
  - Signing of data
  - Exchange of encrypted and/or signed data with customers or business partners





## **SecureFTP**

#### § The FTP protocol provides a easy and straight forward protocol for transferring files between systems on different platforms

- Many installations rely on it to efficiently transmit critical files that can contain vital information such as
  - customer names
  - credit card account numbers
  - social security numbers
  - corporate secrets
  - other sensitive information
- FTP protocol transmits data without any authentication, privacy or integrity
- SecureFTP provides user authentication, privacy and integrity by using RSA digitally signed certificates, DES, 3DES and AES encryption and SHA-1 secure hash functions
  - SecureFTP is integrated into TCP/IP for VSE with z/VSE V4.1 or as separate product



## Hardware Crypto Support on System z and VSE

	z/VSE 4.1	z/VSE 3.1	VSE/ESA 2.7	VSE/ESA 2.6
PCICA	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
CEX2C	Yes	Yes	-	-
CPACF	Yes	Yes	-	-
CEX2A	Yes	Yes	-	-
PCIXCC	Yes	-	-	-

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PCICA	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
PCIXCC	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	-
CEX2C	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
CPACF	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
CEX2A	-	-	-	-	-	Yes

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CEX2C = Crypto Express2 in coprocessor mode

CEX2A = Crypto Express2 in accelerator mode

See: http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/security/cryptography.html



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## **VSE Hardware Configuration**

- **§** VSE hardware configuration not necessary for crypto hardware
  - No IOCDS definition in VSE
  - No device type
  - No ADD statement
  - You may have to define the devices in the HMC (LPAR) or z/VM directory
- § Use of crypto hardware is transparent to end users and even TCP/IP applications
  - But use of crypto hardware can be disabled via TCP/IP SOCKOPT phase

```
FB 0095 1J023I FOUND A CRYPTO EXPRESS2 CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 0
FB 0095 1J023I FOUND A CRYPTO EXPRESS2 CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 1
FB 0095 1J014I FOUND A PCICA CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 6
FB 0095 1J005I HARDWARE CRYPTO ENVIRONMENT INITIALIZED SUCCESSFULLY.
FB 0095 1J006I USING CRYPTO DOMAIN 0
FB 0095 1J022I CPU CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSIST FEATURE AVAILABLE.
```



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## Crypto HW exploitation in VSE

#### **§** Pluggable crypto cards are used for RSA acceleration only

- RSA decrypt/encrypt for SSL session initiation
- RSA encrypt for signing of certificates (CIALCREQ)

#### § CPACF

- Acceleration of symmetric algorithms: DES, TDES, AES-128 (z9 only), SHA-1
- Used at
  - SSL/SFTP data transfer
  - CIAL functions in TCP/IP

#### **§** Usage is transparent for TCP/IP applications

- If Crypto HW is available, it will be used. If not available, the SW implementation (as part of TCP/IP) will be used
- Crypto operations are faster by factors when using hardware acceleration





## **IBM Tape Encryption – TS1120**

- § The IBM System Storage TS1120 Tape Drive has been enhanced to provide drive based data encryption
  - A new, separate IBM Encryption Key Manager component for the Java Platform (Encryption Key Manager) program is also being introduced




- supports the generation and communication of encryption keys for the tape drives across the enterprise.
- § The announcement contains a Statement of Direction concerning z/VSE support:
  - z/VSE V3.1 support of the TS1120 Tape Drive with encryption is planned for first half 2007. It is also IBM's intent to support z/VSE V4.1 (when made available) using Systems Managed Encryption with the TS1120. z/VSE support will require the Encryption Key Manager component running on another operating system other than z/VSE using an out-of-band connection.
- **§** For more information, please see the hardware announcement letter
  - ENUS106-655

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


## **IBM Tape Encryption – TS1120**





## **IBM Tape Encryption – TS1120**



- § The Data-Key can be encrypted using 2 different public keys (KEK = Key Encrypting Keys), to be able to send the tape to 2 different receivers
- § More info can be found in the *z*/VSE 4.1 Administration manual (VSE Homepage)



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## Other ways to encrypt your backups or tapes

## § Can be done using VTAPE

- Create a backup on a remote virtual tape
- Store the tape image on an encrypted medium
  - Encrypted file system or directory (e.g. EcryptFS on Linux)
  - Use encryption tools (e.g. TrueCrypt or OpenPGP)
  - Use Tivoli Storage Manager to store the backup data


## **§** Encrypt data in applications

- Use CryptoVSE API to encrypt the data
  - Uses Hardware Crypto Support if available



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Thank you for listening

# Thank You !

## Catch the WAVV

WAVV Conference Green Bay, Wisconsin May 18-22, 2007 Regency Suites Hotel



Register now: http://www.wavv.org

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