



IBM System z Technical University



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z/VSE Security Exploitation with Crypto Hardware

zDS02

Ingo Franzki, IBM



Authorized

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Security requirements

§ Security requirements are increasing in today's world

- Data security
- Data integrity
- Keep long-term data audit-save

§ The number of attacks increase daily

- Industrial spying
- Security exploits, Denial-of-Service attacks
- Spam, Phishing, ...

§ Not paying attention to security requirements can be very expensive

- Your data is the heart of your company
- Loosing your customer data is a disaster
- You can loose customers

§ IT Security gets more and more important

- You need to consider the whole IT Environment not only single systems



BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Q&A: Child benefit records lost - Mozilla Firefox

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Last Updated: Thursday, 22 November 2007, 16:30 GMT

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Q&A: Child benefit records lost

How worried should people be by the loss of discs containing child benefit recipients' personal details?

What has happened?

HM Revenue and Customs has lost computer discs containing the entire child benefit records, including the personal details of 25 million people - covering 7.25 million families overall. The two discs contain the names, addresses, dates of birth and bank account details of people who received child benefit. They also include National Insurance numbers.

How were the discs lost?

They were sent via internal mail from HMRC in Washington, in the North East of England, to the National Audit Office in London on 18 October, by a junior official, and never arrived. That broke data protection laws and is the reason Revenue and Customs chairman Paul Gray resigned.

BENEFIT RECORDS LOST

Queries answered
BBC personal finance reporter Jennifer Clarke answers your questions on the crisis

KEY STORIES

- › Six more data discs 'are missing'
- › Disc search moves to courier firm
- › Private data 'also given to firm'
- › E-mails reveal data warning
- › Government challenges claims
- › Cameron calls for ID cards halt
- › Threat of fraud 'looms for years'
- › Brown orders data spot checks
- › Brown apologises for records loss
- › UK's families put on fraud alert
- › Government letter: full text

SKETCH

Done



BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Q&A: Child benefit records lost - Mozilla Firefox

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What is the government saying?

Prime Minister Gordon Brown told MPs: "I profoundly regret and apologise for the inconvenience and worries that have been caused to millions of families who receive child benefits. When mistakes happen in enforcing procedures, we have a duty to do everything we can to protect the public." He denied the data was lost because of "systemic" failures at the HMRC saying it had been due to procedures not being followed. He ordered security checks on all government departments to ensure data is properly protected.

What is being done to find the discs?

The Metropolitan Police, National Audit Office, Revenue and Customs staff and courier firm TNT have all been searching for the discs.

How worried should people be?

The details on the lost discs would be sought after by fraudsters. Mr Darling says the information was password protected, but that was not good enough. He said there was no suggestion that anything untoward had happened as a result of the discs' loss to date. Experts say such data should normally be sent in encrypted form.

▸ **Analysis: How worried should we be?**

SKETCH



'Profound regret'
How Brown dealt with data crisis in weekly Commons grilling

FEATURES AND BACKGROUND

- Q&A: Child benefit records lost
- Taking cover from ID theft
- Point-by-point: Darling statement
- The dealers in data
- Life inside the beleaguered HMRC
- Timeline: Benefits records loss
- Revenue's previous data failings

HAVE YOUR SAY

- Your reaction to lost records
- 'Our data was put at risk'

WATCH/LISTEN

- ▶ **WATCH** Brown's apology
- ▶ **WATCH** Alistair Darling

RELATED INTERNET LINKS

- HMRC
- Treasury committee

The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

TOP UK POLITICS STORIES


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Cryptography and data encryption

Main areas of cryptography:

§ Encryption of data transmitted over network connections

- SSL, HTTPS
- SecureFTP




§ Encryption of data stored on disk or tape

- Encryption of backups or archives
- Exchange of encrypted and/or signed data with customers or business partners
- TS1120 Encrypting Tape Drive
- Encryption Facility for z/VSE




Keeping Secrets




Alice encrypts the message with a secret code that only she and Bob knows

Verifying Information



Alice generates a "hash" from the message using a secret code and attaches it to the message. Bob also generates the hash from the received message and compares it.

Proving Identity





Alice "signs" the message by attaching a secret phrase that only she and Bob knows

Secret Key Cryptography - continued

Alice



Bob





Alice encrypts the message with the secret key and sends it to Bob. Bob decrypts the message with the secret key.

Public Key Cryptography - Encrypting



Alice



Bob



Bob's public key



Bob's private key




Alice encrypts the message using Bobs public key and sends it to Bob. Bob decrypts it using his private key. Since only Bob knows his private key, only he can read the message.

Public Key Cryptography - Signing



Alice



Bob



Alice's private key



Alice's public key

Alice encrypts the message using her private key and sends it to Bob. Bob decrypts it using Alice's public key. The message is "signed" by Alice since it can only be decrypted using **her** public key.

Combined Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography



Alice




Bob




secret key





Bob's public key



Bob's private key




secret key



secret key

Key Management

- Key exchange is not trivial:
 - ▶ Is the public key really from the right person?



Bob publishes his public key, but Charly intercepts this and instead sends his public key to Alice.

Key & Certificate Management

Cryptography uses **Keys** and **Certificates**

§ Key Management is not trivial

- Key must often be kept secure for a very long time
- You must be able to associate the encrypted data with the corresponding key(s)
- Encrypted data and the corresponding key(s) must be strictly separated

§ Keyman/VSE

- Creation of RSA keys and digital certificates
- Upload of keys and certificates to VSE
- Creation of PKCS#12 keyring files (use with Java-based connector or import into a Web browser)
- Download from VSE Homepage

<http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zvse/downloads/#vkeyman>




Where are keys and certificates stored on VSE ?

§ Keys and certificates are stored on a VSE Library

- Usually in CRYPTO.KEYRING
- This library should be secured using the VSE security mechanisms (access protection)

§ Member types:

- .PRVK – Public/Private Key
- .ROOT – Root Certificate
- .CERT – Server Certificate
- .CCERT – Client Certificate
- BSSDCUID.MAPPING – Contains the User to Certificate mapping information



Certificates

§ A certificate contains the following items

- The subject (name of the person)
- The subject's public key
- Period of validity
- The issuer
- Issuers signature

§ The issuer "signs" the certificate by encrypting a hash of the certificate content with his private key

§ Everyone can check the sign by decrypting it with the issuers public key

§ For **production purposes**, certificates are usually issued by a well known and trusted **Certificate Authorities (CA)**

- For example Thawte, VeriSign, etc.

§ For **in-house use (Intranet)**, you can have your own **Company-wide Certificate Authority**

- Certificates are trusted inside your company, but not outside

§ For **test purposes** you can use **self-signed Certificates (you are your own Certificate Authority)**

- Nobody trusts these Certificates (except you)



Secure Socket Layer – Encrypted data transfer over a network

§ **SSL provides a communication channel with message integrity, authentication, and confidentiality**

§ **SSL is a widely used protocol**

- Secure HTTP (HTTPS) is used very often in the Internet

§ **SSL uses a TCP connection to transfer encrypted messages**


- Uses asymmetric cryptography for **session initiating**
- Uses symmetric cryptography for **data encryption**

§ **As the name implies, SSL is a layer on top of TCP**

§ **Cipher suites defines the algorithms used:**

- For key exchange
- For encryption
- For hash algorithm

SSL_**RSA**_WITH_**DES**_CBC_**SHA**




HTTP	App
TCP	
IP	

HTTP	App
SSL	
TCP	
IP	

SecureFTP

§ The FTP protocol provides a easy and straight forward protocol for transferring files between systems on different platforms

- Many installations rely on it to efficiently transmit critical files that can contain vital information such as customer names, credit card account numbers, social security numbers, corporate secrets and other sensitive information
- FTP protocol transmits data without any authentication, privacy or integrity



§ SecureFTP provides user authentication, privacy and integrity by using RSA digitally signed certificates, DES encryption and SHA-1 secure hash functions

- SecureFTP is integrated into TCP/IP for VSE with z/VSE V4.1 or later (at no additional charge) or offered as separately priced product by CSI

§ How to setup Secure FTP with VSE:

ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/eserver/zseries/zos/vse/pdf3/How_to_setup_SecureFTP_with_VSE.pdf

Hardware Crypto Support on System z and VSE

by release

	z/VSE 4.2	z/VSE 4.1	z/VSE 3.1	VSE/ESA 2.7	VSE/ESA 2.6
PCICA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
CEX2C	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-
CPACF	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-
CEX2A	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-
PCIXCC	Yes	Yes	-	-	-

	prior z800	z800	z900	z890	z990	z9	z10	z196
PCICA	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
PCIXCC	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
CEX2C	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CPACF	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CEX2A	-	-	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes

by server



CEX2C = Crypto Express2/3 in coprocessor mode

CEX2A = Crypto Express2/3 in accelerator mode

See: <http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/security/cryptography.html>



VSE Hardware Configuration

§ VSE hardware configuration not necessary for crypto hardware

- No IOCDS definition in VSE
- No device type
- No ADD statement
- You may have to define the devices in the HMC (LPAR) or z/VM directory



§ Use of crypto hardware is transparent to end users and TCP/IP applications

- But use of crypto hardware can be disabled via TCP/IP SOCKOPT phase

§ How to setup cryptographic hardware for VSE:

- <http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zvse/documentation/security.html#howto>



```
FB 0095 1J023I FOUND A CRYPTO EXPRESS2 CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 0
FB 0095 1J023I FOUND A CRYPTO EXPRESS2 CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 1
FB 0095 1J014I FOUND A PCICA CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 6
FB 0095 1J014I FOUND A PCICA CARD AT DEVICE INDEX 7
FB 0095 1J005I HARDWARE CRYPTO ENVIRONMENT INITIALIZED SUCCESSFULLY.
FB 0095 1J006I USING CRYPTO DOMAIN 0
FB 0095 1J022I CPU CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSIST FEATURE AVAILABLE.
```

IBM Tape Encryption – TS1120 & TS1130

- § The IBM System Storage TS1120/TS1130 Tape Drive has been enhanced to provide **drive based data encryption**
- § A key management component supports the **generation and communication of encryption keys** for the tape drives across the enterprise.
- § Support is available for z/VSE:
 - z/VSE V4.2: GA
 - z/VSE V4.1: [DY46682](#) (UD53141 and UD53142)
 - z/VM: [VM64062](#) (UM32012)
 - DITTO: [PK44172](#) - *With this APAR, DITTO/ESA for VSE supports tape encryption interactively and via standard VSE JCL in BATCH mode*
- § Considerations when encrypting tapes:
 - A tape can either contain encrypted data or unencrypted data
 - If you encrypt the first file on the tape, all subsequent files will also be encrypted using the same key
 - Important for multi file tapes
 - If you send an encrypted tape to a business partner, the other side will also require a TS1120 or TS1130 to be able to read the tape



IBM Tape Encryption – TS1120 & TS1130



```

// JOB ENCRYPT
// ASSGN SYS005,480,03
// KEKL UNIT=480,KEKL1='MYKEKL1',KEM1=L,KEKL2='MYKEKL2',KEM2=L
// EXEC LIBR
  BACKUP LIB=PRD2 TAPE=SYS005
/*
/ &
    
```

encryption mode
(03=write)


key label1
(name of the 1. KEK-key in EKM)

encoding mechanism
(L=Label, H=Hash)



Encryption Facility for z/VSE

- § Secure business and customer data
- § Address regulatory requirements
- § Protect data from loss and inadvertent or deliberate compromise
- § Enable sharing of sensitive information across platforms with partners, vendors, and customers
- § Enable **decrypting and encrypting of data** to be exchanged between z/VSE and non-z/VSE platforms



- § The Encryption Facility for z/VSE is packaged as an **optional, priced feature** of VSE Central Functions V8.1 (5686-CF8-40).
- § The **Encryption Facility for z/VSE V1.1** uses System z data format
- § The **Encryption Facility for z/VSE V1.2** uses the standard **OpenPGP** data format
 - PGP stands for „Pretty Good Privacy“, invented by Phil Zimmermann in 1991
 - Open Standard, described in RFCs 2440 and 4880
 - Compatible with Encryption Facility for z/OS V1.2 and many other OpenPGP implementations

Encryption Facility for z/VSE

Differences between Encryption Facility V1.1 and V1.2 OpenPGP:

	EF for z/VSE V1.1	EF for z/VSE V1.2 OpenPGP
Encrypted data format	System z format	OpenPGP format
Compatibility with	EF for z/OS V.1.1, EF for z/OS Java client	Any OpenPGP implementations, like GnuPG, EF for z/OS V1.2 OpenPGP
Symmetric Algorithms	TDES and AES-128	DES, TDES, AES-128, 192, 256
Hash algorithms	SHA1	MD5, SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512
Compression	System z provided compression (hardware accelerated)	ZIP, ZLIB based compression (software)
RSA key lengths	512, 1024, 2048	1024, 2048
Data integrity	None	MDC
Public key format	x.509 certificates	PGP certificates
Signatures	None	RSA signatures

Encryption Facility for z/VSE - Customer value

§ No special tape hardware requirements (e.g. TS1120)

- But exploits IBM crypto hardware (crypto cards and CPACF)

§ Host-based utility, no additional client/server workstations

§ Easy to use

- No special setup necessary for password-based encryption

§ Supports all VSE data formats: single files and complete tape backups (LIBR, IDCAMS, POWER, etc.)

§ Supports even proprietary vendor backup formats

§ Encrypted datasets and tapes can easily be exchanged between business partners even on non z platforms

- Password-based
- Public-key based



Other ways to encrypt your backups or tapes

Encrypt your backup data using VTAPE

- § Create a backup on a remote virtual tape
- § Store the tape image on an encrypted medium
 - Encrypted file system or directory (e.g. EcryptFS on Linux)
 - Use encryption tools (e.g. TrueCrypt)
 - Use Tivoli Storage Manager to store the backup data



Encrypt data in applications

- § Use CryptoVSE API to encrypt the data
 - Uses Hardware Crypto Support if available

New technical articles on VSE homepage

<http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zvse/documentation/security.html#howto>

How to setup hardware crypto with VSE

-  [How to setup SSL with the VSE Script Connector](#) (PDF, 900KB)
Updated: January 2010
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup WebSphere MQ for z/VSE V3.0 and WebSphere MQ for Windows V7.0 with secured connections using SSL](#) (PDF, 3.0MB)
Updated: March 2009
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to use Encryption Facility for z/VSE](#) (PDF, 380KB)
Updated: June 2010
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup SSL with CICS Web Support](#) (PDF, 1.5MB)
Updated: May 2009
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup Secure Telnet with VSE](#) (PDF, 1.7MB)
Updated: January 2010
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup Secure FTP with VSE](#) (PDF, 1.2MB)
Updated: August 2009
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup SSL with VSE](#) (PDF, 810KB)
New: August 2009
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM
-  [How to setup cryptographic hardware for VSE](#) (PDF, 1.4MB)
Updated: December 2008
Joerg Schmidbauer, IBM

New Redbook: Security on IBM z/VSE - SG24-7691


Available since October 20, 2009

<http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpieces/abstracts/sg247691.html>

Explains security concepts as well as step by step setup

It covers:

- § Basic Security Manager
- § LDAP Authentication
- § Cryptography & SSL
- § TCP/IP Security
- § SecureFTP & Secure telnet
- § CICS Web Support Security
- § Connector Security
- § Security APIs



Related Documentation

§ **New RedBook: Security on IBM z/VSE - SG24-7691**

- <http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redpieces/abstracts/sg247691.html>

§ **IBM System z cryptography for highly secure transactions**

- <http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/security/cryptography.html>

§ **z/VSE Security Homepage**

- <http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zvse/documentation/security.html>

§ **IBM Manuals**

- z/VSE Planning
- z/VSE Administration
- OS/390 Security Server External Security Interface (RACROUTE) Macro Reference (GC28-1922)
- OS/390 Security Server (RACF) Data Areas (SY27-2640)
- z/VSE e-business Connectors, User's Guide
- CICS Enhancements Guide, GC34-5763



Questions ?

