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The Enduring Value of zSeries

Strategic Directions for z/OS, zVM and Linux for zSeries

From a Security Perspective

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**New York RACF
Users Group**

What is Security from a customer view?

- **Policy**
- **Corporate Directive**
- **Regulatory Compliance (e.g. HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley)**
- **Technology (e.g. RACF, ACF2, Tivoli Access Manager)**
- **Infrastructure (e.g. Tivoli, Vanguard, Consul, Beta)**
- **Components (e.g. firewalls)**
- **Preventative (e.g. anti-virus, intrusion defense)**
- **Business workflow (e.g. Analytics, audit)**
- **Physical (e.g. Badge Access, Biometrics)**
- **Multi-media (e.g. Video cameras, voice analysis)**
- **Executive Position (e.g. CISO, CPO)**
- **Skill specialty (e.g. CISSP)**
- **Department (e.g. Info Assurance, IT Security)**

- **Typically, it's not → a Solution**
 - **Leverage Security to make solutions better**


 - **But there are new “offerings” evolving that look like solutions**
 - **e.g. DB2 Entity Analytics Solution**

- **Redundant**
- **Bureaucratic**
- **Too Sensitive**
- **Expensive**
- **Unresponsive**
- **Big Brother**

Service Systems & Databases


A large bank – their key components

End User – Hosted Client



Service Systems & Databases


Do they Scale Out?



- Authentication
- Alert processing
- Firewalls
- Virtual Private Networks
- Network Bandwidth
- Encryption of data
- Audit Records/Reports
- Provisioning Users/Work
- Disaster Recovery plans
- Storage Management
- Data Transformations
- Application Deployment

Service Systems & Databases

Do they Scale Up?




Mgt

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Service Systems & Databases


Or Both?

End User – Hosted Client



**Service Systems
& Databases**

Compare Costs




Compare:

- ✓ Scale
- ✓ Resilience
- ✓ Speed
- ✓ Operations
- ✓ Control Points
- ✓ Complexity
- ✓ Batch
- ✓ Security
- ✓ Compliance/Audit
- ✓ Environmentals
- ✓ People
- ✗ Proof of concept


✗ Don't base the production decision on the proof of concept of one part

Integration of Applications and Data

NY Route 9



NYS Thruway



Compare:

- ✓ Scale
- ✓ Resilience
- ✓ Speed
- ✓ Operations
- ✓ Complexity
- ✓ Environmentals

**zSeries
Benchmark**


Loser ?

With zLinux (Saw Mill Parkway)

- Marshall Parameters
- Cross network hardware
- Establish security mapping
- Longer response time
- Additional capacity and operations
- Provide data conversion
- Distributed commit scope
- Multiple points of failure
- Fewer points of failure
- Security intrusion possibilities

- Intra-process memory calls
- Internal communications
- Inherit security credentials
- Less end to end pathlength
- Workload managed and balanced
- Leverage existing data format
- RRS managed 2 phased commit
- Fewest points of failure
- Less opportunity for intrusion

We need to break down the political barriers





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
Tivoli and RACF Integration
Enabling Websphere production & development
Simplifying enterprise administration
Improving Corporate Governance

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
Distributed Security Evolution



•These TAM/TIM servers could be on a bladecenter as well

Application Deployment and Migration Experiences

Application Migration



~~WAS V4~~ → WAS V4


WAS V5 → ~~WAS V5~~
 Without Direction, your Enterprise will suffer.

WAS V6 → ~~WAS V6~~
 Give them a target. OpenEdition
 Reduce POC costs Unix Sys Serv


USS → z/OS
 Portability of programming and operations is important
 Unicode, threads

<http://www.ibm.com/university/zseries>

Operations Migration



~~TAM~~
 TFIM
~~DB2 V7~~
 DB2 V8
 RACF
 RACF
 DB2 V7
 DB2 V8



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Tying it all Together




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Why does Infrastructure simplification matter? HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley



- ### Typical Business Workflow
- Do you audit all places with Personally Identifiable Information?
 - Is the process automated?
 - Data is easy to replicate
 - policies are not.
 - Reducing the copies will reduce compliance efforts and increase resiliency
 - Leverage a file server to delete copies and reduce data movement
 - Application data proximity
 - Move the applications back to the data source, where practical
 - Plus can use WebSphere SOA access facilities, where practical

zSeries: The Data Vault



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DB2 Entity Analytic Solutions Overview

Answering the Question “Who is Who?”
and “Who Knows Who?” to resolve Financial
Sanctions and Terrorist Financing Issues

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DB2 Identity Resolution Determines “Who is Who?”

DB2 Identity Resolution software helps organizations recognize the single identity who is using multiple identities. So not just “Matching” but beyond “Matching” to finding individuals who are hiding and fraudulent.



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


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DB2 Entity Analytics Operational Risk Customer Scenario



How might you quantify value of security?

- **Take all your SMF records on z/OS**
 - Determine number of I/O's done on the system for a month
 - Count the number of Access failures
 - Remove duplicate failures
 - Create list of unique databases/files with failed attempts
 - Failure to Success ratio is probably: .0000xxx
- **Recognize that a successful attempt to access that data may have been to:**
 - Corrupt the data (e.g. destroy or modify)
 - Publish personally identifiable data (spam, embarrass, threaten)
 - Identity theft (steal)
- **Determine costs to recover from a problem**
 - Time, business disruption, lost business, people, backup/archive....
- **Project similar costs for each subsequent copy of the data within the enterprise**
 - Are similar policies in place with each additional instance to protect?