

# Best Practices

## IBM Data Server Security

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Last updated: October 2010

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## Introduction

Securing data requires a holistic and layered approach that considers the broad range of threats. This is commonly referred to as defense in depth, and requires a “security by design” approach, which espouses security as part of the core design of database environments, the supporting infrastructures and business practices around these environments. Multiple layers of security work together to provide the three ultimate objectives of security, commonly known as the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

IBM understands these data security threats, and designs security features directly into its DB2® and Informix® families of data servers. Both data server families are designed with a wide range of security and auditing capabilities to help protect even the most critical data.

### *Security threats and countermeasures roadmap*

To simplify the task of implementing effective data server security, we have created this white paper as a roadmap to assist in rolling out security mechanisms in your own enterprise. This roadmap is based on multiple customer inquiries about how they can ensure that they are protected against the common data security threats, and some uncommon threats. This paper covers the most common data threats along with proposed countermeasures to help address the threats.

The countermeasures reflect current best practices as recommended by the security teams for each data server, and use IBM Information Management products and features that are all available now. The countermeasures include the following actions:

- Using authentication and authorization methods that adhere to the principle of “least privilege” — only permit users to do what they really need to do, and minimize overlap<sup>1</sup>
- Setting proper privileges and access control (such as LBAC) on sensitive data
- Auditing user access, particularly to sensitive data and actions by the DBA
- Revoking the data access authority from the DBA if they have no business need to access data
- Limiting access given to PUBLIC
- Remembering to protect staging tables and MQTs
- Using trusted contexts in multi-tier environments
- Encrypting data and backup files at the operating system level

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<sup>1</sup> DB2 9.7 introduced a set of new authorities to help you adhere to this security principle. For example, the EXPLAIN authority allows users to perform an explain operation on an SQL statement without the privileges to access objects referenced in that SQL statement.

- Using SSL to transmit data securely on the network
- Using operating-system controls to prevent operating-system administrators from gaining too much access

This paper focuses on the database tier and underlying data-level security. The first section, “Assessing Your Security Needs” discusses how to determine what security your system requires. The sections “Threats” and “Recommended Countermeasures” describe the usual threats to security and their proposed countermeasures, respectively. “Product Overviews” provides an introduction to each of the recommended security-enhancing products. References to important additional information on the secure configuration and operation of IBM Data Server products are listed in the “More Information” section at the end of this document.

### *Security outside the database*

To completely secure your environment you must also address other aspects of security besides the database system itself, which are not covered by this paper:

- **Physical security:** Implement effective badge access to control who can physically access the machine or machines hosting the data server.
- **Host security:** Secure the operating system, use virus and malware protection, implement Web browser security, monitor and log activities of privileged system users, and other host security techniques.
- **Network security:** Use firewalls, virtual private networks (VPNs), secure routers, intrusion detection systems, detecting network sniffers, and other network security techniques.
- **Application security:** Secure applications running on your system. For example, one well-known threat is SQL injection, whereby a poorly developed application can be forced to run unintended SQL statements. This vulnerability only exists in dynamic SQL applications that do not validate any user input that is used in the construction of dynamic SQL statements.
- **Identity management:** Use reliable systems and methods for identifying and authenticating enterprise users effectively.
- **Business controls:** Implement rules, processes and practices to govern access to assets and the use and management of data.

## Assessing your security needs

At a minimum, rolling out an effective data security plan should always include the following seven steps:

1. **Data classification:** Understand and classify your data. Which parts of the data are most important, and which are less so? What is the value of the data to the organization? What is the cost if the data is compromised?
2. **User classification:** Determine who is allowed to access the data. What is the minimum level of authorities/privileges that employees need to do their jobs? How long does each employee need to have this level of authority/privilege? At this stage, the two security principles of least privilege and separation of duties are vital.
3. **Threat identification:** Understand the threats you are facing. The threats that you know about must be enumerated and categorized in a logical fashion. Decide which threats apply to your environment and which ones (if any) do not. Do your best to anticipate, and be prepared for, unforeseen threats.
4. **Counter measures and preventative measures:** Implement effective measures to address every threat deemed important in your environment. It makes little sense to buy a titanium front door to secure your house when the side door is made of wood. In most cases, addressing threats involves multiple layers—remember defense in depth. Lastly, these solutions should also be easy to deploy and manage; otherwise, no one will use them, or worse, people will think the solutions are applied properly when in fact they are not.
5. **Testing:** Test and validate that your security mechanisms are in place and working properly. In many ways, this can be the hardest part; not only should your system be secure but there must be a way to continuously validate that it is so. This testing must be performed in various ways—including both vulnerability (to detect any current vulnerabilities) and penetration testing (to test the effectiveness of applied countermeasures and the impact of a breach).
6. **Auditing:** Audit and monitor your system to provide a historical trail of data access and to detect any attempts to improperly access the data. Otherwise, as happens all too frequently, no one is able to detect when a breach has occurred or something has gone wrong. For example, you should audit access to any data classified as sensitive from the data classification step. You might also want to audit the actions of certain users, groups, or roles, as identified the user classification step. Your audit policy is driven by business controls and any corporate audit policy that may already exist. Effective data security is an ongoing process, and auditing is the key feedback method in this process.
7. **Maintenance:** Keep everything maintained and secure. Effective security is not a point in time exercise. Everything should be kept up to date as new threats are identified, new users are added, and your data environment changes as

inevitably it will. Security maintenance should be integrated in your standard operational practices and people should be tasked with keeping it up to date as an important part of their core everyday responsibilities.

## Threats

You should know what type of threats you are up against. Data server security threats can be divided into four broad categories: data threats, configuration threats, audit threats, and executable threats.

**Data threats:** Threats against data are mechanisms whereby data can be accessed by users or processes that are not authorized to access such data. This is by far the largest category of threats, and is usually the first that comes to mind. These threats can be aimed directly at the tables in the database, or through more indirect means, such as by looking at the log files or directly at the table space files on the operating system.

**Configuration threats:** Threats against configuration are mechanisms whereby the database or database manager configuration files can be tampered with. Because they control critical aspects of your data server—such as how and where authentication is performed—it is critical that the database configuration files are protected as securely as the data itself.

**Audit Threats:** Threats against the audit facility are mechanisms whereby the audit configuration, audit logs, or archive logs can be tampered with. In many cases, audit records are the only way to determine what has happened in the past and the only form of evidence to detect misuse; it is critical that they be able to withstand tampering.

**Executable Threats:** Threats against executables are mechanisms whereby database manager executable files can be tampered with. This includes executable spoofing, denial-of-service attacks and Trojan horse attacks.

In the following sections, each threat is uniquely identified by a three-part name: the category followed by a unique number, and one word identifying the threat. This always takes the form:

```
<category>.#.<threat short name>
```

For example, the threat **Data.6.OSAdminAccess** is threat #6 in the “Data” category and is referenced by the short name “OSAdminAccess”.



**Data Threats**

Threat	Threat Description	Explanation
Data.1.Connection	Exploiting poor database connection authentication and authorization	<p>An unauthorized user can exploit poor authentication practices on the database to connect to the database.</p> <p>The most common examples of these practices include requiring no server-side credentials to authenticate users when connecting (for example, using the CLIENT-side authentication), or by granting the CONNECT privilege to the group PUBLIC.</p>
Data.2.BaseTables	Exploiting poor authorization controls on base tables	<p>An unauthorized user can exploit poor authorization practices in the database to access data in the base tables and system catalog tables.</p> <p>For example, leaving the group PUBLIC with access to the system catalog tables allows any user to access all their information.</p>
Data.3.OtherTables	Exploiting poor authorization controls on replicated tables, Materialized Query Tables (MQTs), staging tables, exception tables, and relational OLAP cubes	<p>An unauthorized user can exploit poor authorization practices on the database to access data on other important non-base tables.</p> <p>These non-base tables include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SQL replicated tables</li> <li>MQTs</li> <li>Exception tables</li> <li>Staging tables</li> <li>Relational OLAP cubes</li> <li>Clone tables</li> </ul>
Data.4.CommonUser ID	Loss of identity of connected users in N-tier architectures due to common user ID	Application servers often use a common user ID to connect to the database that works on behalf of all its applications. This is also referred to as connection pooling. This common

		<p>user ID weakens user accountability and the ability to properly audit database access.</p> <p>This also leads to over-granting of privileges to this common user ID, effectively bypassing most database privilege checking.</p>
Data.5.DBAAccess	Abusing database administrator privileges	<p>By default, DBAs have access to any table in their database. A privileged database administrator—or those who acquire database administrator authority in an unauthorized fashion—can abuse that privilege by reading or modifying data that they should not be seeing.</p> <p>This is a critical component of “insider abuse”.</p>
Data.6.OSAdminAccess	Abusing operating system administrator privileges	<p>Both a user with OS administrator privileges and the instance owner of the database have direct file system access to OS files where table data resides.</p> <p>They can abuse that privilege by directly reading or copying the contents of these files via the file system and bypass access controls placed inside the database.</p> <p>This is a critical component of “insider abuse”.</p>
Data.7.InTransit	Sniffing data in transit on the network	<p>Data, user IDs, and passwords traveling in clear text over a network can be viewed by network sniffers.</p>
Data.8.Backups	Exploiting poor security on backups and archives	<p>Many times unauthorized access to data occurs once the data has left the protection of a running data server environment.</p> <p>If left unprotected, data can be accessed directly from backup and archive images, whether left onsite or put offsite for disaster recovery (DR) purposes.</p>
Data.9.TxnLogs	Exploiting poor security on transaction logs	<p>Transaction logs contain valuable data that can be exploited—such as inserted data values. Because transaction logs are files on the file system, they can be accessed directly by the OS</p>

		<p>administrator on the production system.</p> <p>Also, if transaction logs are mirrored or replicated, these copies can also be exploited by a privileged user as well.</p>
Data.10.ArchiveLogs	Exploiting poor security on archived transaction logs	<p>Archived transaction logs contain valuable data that can be exploited—such as inserted data values. Once transaction logs are archived for recovery purposes, they usually leave the protection of the production system and are put on other servers or devices. Privileged users on those archive servers or devices can abuse their privileges and access data within these archived transaction logs.</p>
Data.11.Diagnostics	Exploiting poor security on trace files, dump files, and output of monitoring and diagnostic tools	<p>Many diagnostic logs, monitoring output, and dump files contain valuable information that can be exploited by attackers.</p> <p>For example, data in the diagnostic logs and trace files can contain data values and are logged in clear text. Also, unloading of the direct raw page images from tables directly to disk can easily be done using tools such as <b>db2dart</b> or <b>IDS onunload</b>. This dumped data provides an indirect means to view data in the data server.</p>
Data.12.Extract	Exploiting extracted data that has been moved from its secure home	<p>Data is commonly extracted from the production environment into an export file or another database, usually for distribution or test purposes. Once it is extracted, it leaves the security of the data server environment and is often left exposed to unauthorized access. This is also true for load input files that are waiting to be loaded into a data server.</p> <p>This threat can be split into different cases according to the ultimate goal of the extraction:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Test:</b> When the data is being used in test environments, the data must have the same properties as production data but can safely be masked or changed to preserve sensitive data such as credit card</li> </ol>

		<p>numbers or social security numbers.</p> <p>2. <b>Distribution:</b> When the data is being extracted for distribution to another location, the data must be left identical to that in production. This includes data extracted by Extract, Transform, and Load (ETL) processing and those for replicated tables. One scenario for distribution is management of copies.</p>
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**Configuration Threats**

Threat	Threat Description	Notes
Config.1.Files	Exploiting poor security on database configuration files	If the DBMS configuration files are insecure, an intruder can modify the way the system behaves and make it reveal information that should not be revealed.
Config.2.DBCreate	Exploiting lack of authorization controls on who can create databases	Creating a database in a database management system is a privileged operation that is controlled by the instance configuration. Only trusted users should be authorized to create a database within an instance.
Config.3.DBEnvironment	Exploiting poor configuration of the database environment	Poor configuration includes poor database configuration parameter settings, database manager configuration parameter settings, database administration server settings, not running with the latest fix pack and others.

**Audit Threats**

Threat	Threat Description	Notes
Audit.1.Config	Exploiting poor security on audit configuration files	<p>Unauthorized personnel should not be able to alter the auditing behavior on the system. This is a common way for attackers to hide their tracks <i>before</i> performing an unauthorized breach.</p> <p>Unauthorized personnel should not be able to</p>

		modify the audit configuration files.
Audit.2.Logs	Exploiting poor security on audit log files	Audit logs contain valuable data that can be exploited—both from the perspective of modifying past auditing results and of understanding data server access patterns for would-be attackers. This is a common way for attackers to hide their tracks <i>after</i> performing an unauthorized breach. Unauthorized personnel should not be able to alter or view the audit records or archived audit records.

***Executable Threats***

Threat	Threat Description	Notes
Executable.1.Files	Maliciously modifying data server executable files	<p>Data server executable files can be maliciously modified, for example by adding an identically named version containing a Trojan horse, or can be removed to perform a denial-of-service attack.</p> <p>Also executables and libraries used by stored procedures and UDFs can also similarly be maliciously modified.</p> <p>Only the user entrusted with installing the software should be able to modify the executables used by the data server.</p>
Executable.2.Dirs <sup>2</sup>	Exploiting poor security on directories containing executables or data	If the directories containing the executables or the data files are not secure, then attackers could modify directory paths to mount a denial-of-service attack on the database system.

<sup>2</sup> This threat is not applicable on z/OS systems

## Recommended countermeasures

Effectively protecting your database from the threats outlined in “Threats” demands effective organizational processes and controls as well as technical components. Your protection plan must include both aspects.

The tables below document the technical components of the recommended countermeasures to help address each of the threats. The recommended countermeasure is presented followed by the features and solutions needed to implement the recommended countermeasure using the latest product version as outlined in “Product overviews”.

The “Products recommended” columns in the tables that follow use the following abbreviations for product names:

Linux®, UNIX®, and Windows® platforms:

Products	Abbreviation
DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows	DB2
Informix Dynamic Server	IDS
IBM Database Encryption Expert	IBM DEE
IBM Optim Test Database Management	IBM Optim TDM
IBM Optim Archive	IBM Optim Archive

z/OS® platform:

Products	Abbreviation
DB2 for z/OS	DB2
IBM Audit Management Expert for z/OS	IBM AME
IBM Optim Test Database Management	IBM Optim TDM
IBM Optim Archive	IBM Optim Archive
z/OS Security Server (Resource Access Control Facility, RACF®, or equivalent)	z/OS RACF
IBM Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Database tool	z/OS Encryption
z/OS Communication Server Application Transparent Transport Layer Security	z/OS AT-TLS
IBM System Storage® TS1120 Tape Drive	z/OS Tape Drive
IBM System Storage DS8700 Disk	z/OS Disk Encryption

*Data Threats*

Threat	Threat Description	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Data.1.Connection	Exploiting poor database connection authentication and authorization	Use authentication and authorization practices that follow the principle of least privilege. For authentication, you should not use client authentication, as it is not secure. Use SERVER, LDAP, or Kerberos authentication.	DB2 or IDS
Data.2.BaseTables	Exploiting poor authorization controls on base tables	<p>ALL OBJECTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set proper database privileges and access controls based on data sensitivity classification and principle of least privilege.</li> <li>• REVOKE all privileges from those who do not absolutely need them.</li> <li>• Assign privileges to roles and not directly to specific users.</li> <li>• Have sensitive objects owned by roles and limit all access of these roles to users connecting from trusted contexts.</li> <li>• When creating new database objects, ensure that access is never granted to PUBLIC.</li> </ul> <p>BASE or SYSTEM CATALOG TABLES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Audit all access to important tables</li> <li>• When possible, make sure that access to the system catalogs is not granted to</li> </ul>	<p>DB2 or IDS</p> <p>IBM AME (z/OS only)</p> <p>z/OS RACF</p>

		<p>PUBLIC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The use of Label-Based Access Control (LBAC) or z/OS MLS on sensitive tables is recommended in government and other highly sensitive and regulated environments. For more information, see the “Recommendations on when to use LBAC” section of this document.</li> </ul>	
Data.3.OtherTables	Exploiting poor authorization controls on replicated tables, Materialized Query Tables (MQTs), staging tables, exception tables, and relational OLAP cubes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Violation, exception, and staging tables should be fully protected against unauthorized access, just as the corresponding base tables are.</li> <li>MQTs serve as a results set cache for improving query performance (via MQT routing). As such, MQTs should be regarded as internal tables, and users should not be given direct access to them.</li> <li>If direct access to the MQT is required, turn on fine-grained auditing of all SQL access to the MQT.</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS
Data.4.CommonUserID	Loss of identity of connected users in N-tier architectures due to common user ID	Use the Trusted Context feature in any N-tier environment. Trusted contexts allow the middle-tier to assert the identity of the end user accessing the database. The end user's database identity and database privileges are then used for any database requests by that end user. Because the user identity is preserved, you can use audit to track user access and actions.	DB2



<p>Data.5.DBAAccess</p>	<p>Abusing database administrator privileges</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Monitor:</b> Audit all actions requiring DBA authority.</li> <li>• <b>Restrict access to DBA Authority:</b> Assign DBA authority only through a role and control access to this role using trusted contexts. This restricts access to only trusted connections originating from trusted hosts.</li> </ul> <p><b>Prevent DBA from accessing data:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revoke DATAACCESS and ACCESSCTRL from the DBA</li> <li>• Protect the data with LBAC or z/OS MLS features</li> </ul>	<p>DB2 or IDS</p> <p>IBM AME (z/OS only)</p>
<p>Data.6.OSAdminAccess</p>	<p>Abusing operating system administrator privileges</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent the data from being copied or read directly from the file system by using disk encryption is needed on non z/OS platforms. AES encryption is recommended. z/OS RACF protection protects the data from being copied or read directly from the file system.</li> <li>• Prevent sensitive files, such as the table space files, from being modified directly by the OS administrator. This requires <b>extended OS access control</b> functionality, such as that provided by IBM DEE</li> </ul>	<p>IBM DEE</p> <p>z/OS Encryption</p> <p>z/OS RACF</p>

		and z/OS RACF.	
Data.7.InTransit	Sniffing data in transit on the network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encrypt the data before it is transferred on the wire.</li> <li>• In most cases, the recommendation is to use SSL encryption <sup>3</sup> when possible.</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS z/OS AT-TLS
Data.8.Backups	Exploiting poor security on backups and archives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encrypt all backup images and archive images on any media type (disk, tape, etc.).</li> <li>• Restoration of the backup image must require controlled access to the encryption key and must be audited.</li> </ul>	IBM DEE IBM Optim Archive z/OS Tape Drive
Data.9.TxnLogs	Exploiting poor security on transaction logs	Prevent files from being modified directly by the OS administrator or any other user using extended OS access control.	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Data.10.ArchiveLogs	Exploiting poor security on archived transaction logs	Prevent the logs from being copied or read directly from the file system by using disk encryption.	IBM DEE z/OS Tape Drive
Data.11.Diagnostics	Exploiting poor security trace files, dump files, and output of monitoring and diagnostic tools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent files from being modified directly by the OS administrator or any other user using extended OS access control.</li> <li>• Audit any direct file system access to these files.</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Data.12.Extract	Exploiting extracted data that has been moved from its secure home	Countermeasure depends on the reason the data is being extracted:  1. <b>Test:</b> Use the data privacy capabilities of Optim Test Data Manage to automatically mask	IBM Optim TDM IBM DEE z/OS RACF

<sup>3</sup> Turning on network encryption will cause any third-party data sniffing application to no longer function.

		<p>out all sensitive information from the data during extraction to your test environment.</p> <p>2. <b>Distribution:</b> Prevent extract file from being read or modified by using disk encryption. On z/OS z/OS RACF protection protects the files from being read or modified. Audit all access to the extract file.</p> <p>Make sure that you remember to audit the extraction of data, such as during export.</p>	
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### *Recommendations on when to use label-based access control*

The following guidelines help determine when you should use label-based access control (LBAC) to protect your data.

Use row-level LBAC for:

- Government applications that manage classified information
- Other applications, where all of the following apply:
  - Data classification is known
  - Data classification can be represented by one or more LBAC security label components
  - Authorization rules can be mapped to the security label components

Use column-level LBAC for:

- Protecting sensitive columns from table owners and DBAs
- Tables that contain data which you want to protect from access by the table owner or the DBA. To protect this data, follow these steps:
  1. Assign a security label to all columns in the table.
  2. Assign that security label to a role.
  3. Assign that role to all users who need access to the table. Only users who are members of that role are able to access data in that table.

## Configuration Threats

Threat	Threat Description	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Config.1.Files	Exploiting poor security on database configuration files	Prevent files from being modified directly by the OS administrator or any other user using extended OS access control.	DB2 or IDS IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Config.2.DBCreate	Exploiting lack of authorization controls on who can create databases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revoke this privilege except for authorized DBA.</li> <li>• Audit all attempts to create databases.</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS
Config.3.DBEnvironment	Exploiting poor configuration of the database environment	Consider following the recommendations in <b>Security Configuration Benchmark For DB2 8, 9 &amp; 9.5 for Linux, Unix and Windows</b> from the Center for Internet Security (CIS) to properly configure DB2 LUW. A copy can be obtained from: <a href="http://www.cisecurity.org">www.cisecurity.org</a>	DB2 for LUW

## Audit Threats

Threat	Threat Description	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Audit.1.Config	Exploiting poor security on audit configuration files	Prevent files from being modified directly by the OS administrator or any other user using extended OS access control.	DB2 or IDS IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Audit.2.Logs	Exploiting poor security on audit log files	<p>Use a secure centralized audit repository such as IBM AME (z/OS only)</p> <p>Use extended OS access control to prevent files from being modified directly on file system by the OS administrator or any other user.</p> <p>Encrypt the audit logs records on disk.</p>	DB2 or IDS IBM AME (z/OS only) IBM DEE

*Executable Threats*

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Threat Description</b>	<b>Countermeasure</b>	<b>Products Recommended</b>
Executable.1.Files	Maliciously modifying data server executable files	Use executable security feature, such as the “operational controls” functionality in IBM DEE, to prevent executable modification.	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Executable.2.Dirs	Exploiting poor security on directories containing executables or data	Use extended OS access control to prevent directories from being modified by unauthorized users.	IBM DEE z/OS RACF

## Product overviews

### *IBM DB2 Version 9.7 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows*

The DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows security capabilities can be divided into four broad areas:

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Encryption
- Auditing.

**Authentication** is the first security capability encountered when a user attempts to use the DB2 database system. The user must be identified and authenticated before they are allowed to use any of the DB2 services. The DB2 database system relies on a security plug-in architecture for authentication. The security plug-in determines where authentication takes place, which is generally the operating system but it can also be Kerberos or an LDAP server.

**Authorization** is the next security capability encountered. The authenticated user must be authorized to perform the action they are attempting. Authorization can be coarse-grained (for example, at a table) or fine-grained (for example, views). For a given operation, the DB2 database system checks whether or not the user's permissions are sufficient to allow them to carry out that operation. Users can acquire permissions either directly or indirectly through membership in roles and groups.

Packages provide an elegant model to give users access to database objects without having to give them actual privileges on those objects, especially for packages that contain static SQL. To run a package, a user requires only EXECUTE privilege on that package. The static SQL in the package executes under the authorization ID of the package owner. Authorization for the static SQL in the package is checked once when the package is created, and the package owner must be authorized to execute all the static SQL in that package. For dynamic SQL in the package, the authorization checking depends on the settings of the DYNAMICRULES bind option. The authorization checking can be based on either the package owner authorization ID or on the authorization ID that is executing the package.

While dynamic SQL provides some flexibility for applications to dynamically construct the SQL, it also opens the door for SQL injections. A poorly developed application, for example one that does not validate user input, can be forced to execute unintended SQL. There are at least two options a customer can take to handle the SQL injection problem. First, by using IBM pureQuery, a DBA can guard against SQL injection by restricting access to only captured SQL. If the target database is DB2, the captured SQL can be

bound into packages for static execution to improve security. Second, by using an application scanning tool such as IBM Rational AppScan, a DBA can detect and then eliminate potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through SQL injection attacks.

Label-based access control (LBAC) was enhanced so that security administrators can assign security labels and exemptions to roles and groups. DB2 Version 9.7 also provides a new security capability that helps address the security concerns that arise from the use of a single user ID to access the database in three-tier environments. This capability is referred to as trusted contexts. Trusted contexts also allow security administrators to gain more control over when a privilege or an authority becomes available to a user. For example, a security administrator can use trusted contexts to make sure that a database administrator (DBA) can exercise their role only when they are connecting to the database from a specific IP address.

**Encryption** can be employed to keep information confidential when it is transmitted between a DB2 server and a DB2 client or when it is stored on disk. For data transmission confidentiality, the DB2 database system provides two options: the native DATA\_ENCRYPT capability and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). For data storage, there are also two options: the native encryption and decryption column functions and the IBM Database Encryption Expert. It is highly recommended to use IBM Database Encryption Expert as this provides additional security features, improved performance, and most importantly requires no application-level changes.

Lastly, the **audit facility** can be turned on to track user actions. For example, the security administrator can consult the audit trail to find out what actions a particular user executed in a given timeframe. The audit facility has been substantially improved to provide finer granularity and to reduce the auditing performance overhead.

### *IBM DB2 Version 9.1 for z/OS*

Like DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows, the DB2 for z/OS security capabilities can be divided into four broad areas:

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Encryption
- Auditing.

Because for many years z/OS has been designed to run multiple applications simultaneously on the same server, these capabilities are mature, proven technologies.

**Authentication** is the first security capability encountered when a user attempts to use the DB2 for z/OS product. The user must be identified and authenticated before allowed to use any of the DB2 for z/OS services. DB2 for z/OS uses the z/OS Security Server (RACF or equivalent) for authentication and authorization to access any DB2 subsystem.

**Authorization** is the next security control encountered. When an application gains access to a subsystem, the user has been authenticated and access to DB2 for z/OS is checked using RACF. DB2 for z/OS then controls access to data through the use of identifiers associated with the authenticated user. A set of one or more DB2 for z/OS identifiers, called authorization IDs, represent the user on every process that connects to or signs on to DB2 for z/OS. These IDs make up the SQL ID. The SQL ID and role, if running in a trusted context, are used for authorization checking within the DB2 database system.

Access to DB2 for z/OS requires the use of packages. Packages are required to execute SQL statements. Packages have an owner ID or role associated with them. The owner might be different from the SQL ID or role executing the package. To execute any SQL statements bound in a package, the SQL ID or role associated with the package must have the execute privilege on the package. The package owner is used for privilege checking for any static SQL statements in the package. When executing a dynamic SQL statement, the SQL ID or role must be authorized to perform the action against the DB2 database system, not the owner. This allows DB2 for z/OS to perform as much authorization checking when the package is created and not every time it is used. Also this approach eliminates the need to authorize all users to all objects used in a package.

You can take advantage of mandatory access control in the DB2 database system to protect table data based on the security labels of the rows. When a user accesses a row or a field in the row with an SQL statement, DB2 for z/OS calls RACF to verify that the user is allowed to perform the type of access that is required for the SQL statement. The access is allowed only if the user has the requested access right to all of the rows containing fields that are accessed as part of the SQL statement. For all fields that the SQL statement accesses, DB2 for z/OS checks the security label of the row containing the field and denies access when the user security label does not dominate the security label of any one of the rows containing the fields.

A powerful security enhancement in DB2 9 for z/OS is the introduction of trusted contexts, a feature that supplies the ability to establish a connection as trusted when connecting from a certain location or job. Having established a trusted connection, it provides the possibility of switching to other user IDs, thus giving the opportunity of taking on the identity of the user associated with the SQL statement. In addition, it is possible to assign a role to a user of a trusted context. The role can be granted privileges and can therefore represent a role within the organization in the sense that it can hold the sum of privileges needed to perform a certain job, application, or role. These two constructs together supply security enhancements for various different scenarios ranging from any three-tier layered application, such as SAP, to the daily duties of a DBA maintaining the DB2 for z/OS subsystem.

**Encryption** can be employed to help protect the confidentiality of information when it is transmitted between a DB2 for z/OS subsystem and a DB2 for z/OS client or when it is stored on disk. For data transmission confidentiality, DB2 for z/OS provides two options: native data stream encryption supported in the database protocols and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) supported in the network layer. The native data stream encryption uses DES to provide a level of performance over SSL. For SSL, DB2 for z/OS exploits z/OS Communications Server's Application Transparent Transport Layer Support (AT-TLS).



This facilitates the use of SSL encryption of data during data transmission between DB2 for z/OS systems on behalf of DB2 for z/OS.

For data-at-rest encryption, there are also two options: IBM System Storage DS8700

Disk Encryption or database encryption methods either the encryption and decryption column functions provided by the DB2 for z/OS or the IBM Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Databases tool used to encrypt a table. Both the column functions and encryption tool have limited or restricted usage that needs to be reviewed before deploying these encryption techniques. It is recommended to utilize IBM System Storage Disk Encryption which includes a robust and sophisticated key management in order to meet your long term encryption requirements.

To satisfy Payment Card Industry (PCI) security standards encryption requirements when disk encryption is used (rather than table or column-level encryption), logical access must be managed independently of native operating system access control. z/OS RACF protection and self encrypting disks provide this level of encryption. This solution encrypts the data at rest with no performance degradation or no impact to your applications.

When offloading backups and archive logs, the tape units offer encryption built-in to the drive to protect the archive tape. All exploit System z™ Crypto hardware features designed to provide better performance and industry level security built-in to z/OS.

The **audit facility** integrated into z/OS can be turned on to track user actions in the DB2 database system. Auditors can collect log and trace data in an audit repository, and then view, analyze, and generate comprehensive reports on the data using the IBM DB2 Audit Management Expert for z/OS. You can selectively filter SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE activity by user or by object, and export these filters for use on another DB2 subsystem.

### *IBM Informix Dynamic Server, Version 11*

Similar to the DB2 database system, the security capabilities of Informix Dynamic Server, Version 11 (IDS) can be split into the four broad areas:

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Encryption
- Auditing

Before a user is permitted to connect to an IDS database, the system **authenticates** them. You can configure the way that IDS authenticates users. The primary authentication mechanism is based on the operating system identity of the user. However, you can

configure IDS to use PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) to authenticate users using other systems such as LDAP.

Once authenticated, a user is still denied access unless they are also **authorized** to perform the intended action. This includes permission to access a particular database, as well as separate controls for each object in the database.

IDS also supports mandatory access control through LBAC. This LBAC implementation is similar to the version for DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows. You can apply labels to columns and rows, and grant labels to users, and the system determines whether the user is permitted to see or modify the data.

IDS supports **encryption** in a number of ways. For the Informix client applications using the SQLI protocol, you can configure the communications between the client and server so that all communications between them are encrypted using the ENCCSM module, or you can encrypt the password using the SPWDSCSM. If you are using DRDA clients, you can configure them to use SSL. To enhance the secrecy of data in the database, you can use column-level encryption to encrypt particular values. Alternatively, you can use IBM Database Encryption Expert to help secure the disks on which your data is stored. Depending on the backup system you use, you can encrypt the backup data.

The **auditing facilities** in IDS permit you to track who did what to the data in the system and when they did it. You can control which users and which actions are audited.

### *IBM Database Encryption Expert, Version 1.1.1*


The IBM Database Encryption Expert, Version 1.1.1 (IBM Database Encryption Expert) is a data access control tool that combines file encryption with host-level access controls and operational controls. It provides the means, through centrally managed policy, to control the “who, what, when, where, and how” data is accessed on the files on the operating system. These controls can be applied to the database applications, database containers, and other elements in the operating environment.

IBM Database Encryption Expert is a two-component solution composed of one or more software security servers and data security agents. This architecture provides separation of duties so the database administrator does not have the same data security privileges as the Database Encryption Expert administrator. The security server acts as the centralized point of administration for encryption key, data security policy, and audit log collection.

IBM Database Encryption Expert currently has two agents:

- **Online data protection agent** (EE FS Agent in the diagram) provides encryption services and access controls for data in online storage accessed by file systems.
- **Secure backup agent** (EE DB2 Backup Agent in the diagram) provides encryption services for data being backed up to offline storage—both disk and tape.

Figure 1 shows the architecture of the IBM Database Encryption Expert when it is installed and used with a DB2 database system.



**Figure 1 IBM Database Encryption Expert Architecture**

An important distinction between IBM Database Encryption Expert and other solutions that offer encryption is how the encryption is performed. IBM Database Encryption Expert leaves the file metadata in clear text (unencrypted) while encrypting the file contents. This technique provides an additional level of file access control in addition to what the file system offers—access without viewability. Effectively, an application can be granted access to a file for the purposes of management without decrypting its contents. Privileged superusers can continue to manage their environments and access the file but be restricted from having clear-text access to the file content. This capability helps mitigate risks from internal malicious activity targeted at private or confidential data.

### ***IBM Database Encryption Expert security policy overview***

Security policies are at the core of IBM Database Encryption Expert.

They control the following aspects of data security:

- Who and what can access data
- When data can be accessed
- Where data can be accessed from
- How data is accessed


Policies also control the use of encryption keys and what events are logged (for example, all file accesses and policy violations). These data security policies allow organizations to translate business rules into data access control and protection policies.

The policy engine is managed through a browser interface hosted from the security server. From one security server, the policies for many database servers and Database Encryption Expert agents can be managed. Geographical proximity is not a restriction as long as there is IP connectivity between the IBM Database Encryption Expert agents that reside on a DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows database server and the security server. It is possible (in fact, it is a best practice) to cluster the security servers for high availability and failover.

### *IBM Optim*

IBM Optim software is a single, scalable, interoperable information lifecycle management solution providing a central point to deploy policies to extract, store, port, and protect application data from creation through to deletion.

Figure 2 below illustrates at a high level the functionality of the IBM Optim enterprise data management software.



**Figure 2 IBM Optim software functionality**

IBM Optim can provide the following core functionality:

**Test data management:** IBM Optim assists in application deployment by streamlining the way you create and manage test environments. Subset and migrate data to build realistic and right-sized test databases. It helps to reduce the expense and effort of maintaining multiple database clones.

**Data privacy:** Protecting your sensitive data does not stop at your production system. This data is commonly replicated in multiple test environments across your organization,

as well as in extract files and staging tables. IBM Optim provides automatic data transformation capabilities to mask personal information and de-identify confidential information to help protect privacy. You can then use the transformed data safely for application testing, which helps you address compliance requirements and maintain client loyalty.

**Archive:** IBM Optim provides proven database archiving capabilities, empowering organizations to segregate historical from current data, and helping to store it securely and cost-effectively while maintaining universal access to the data, thus allowing your production databases to serve your business applications at higher performance levels.

### *IBM DB2 Audit Management Expert 1.1 for z/OS*

IBM DB2 Audit Management Expert 1.1 for z/OS is a tool that gives auditors, security administrators, and database administrators the capabilities they need to deliver accurate, timely data and reports for use in auditing activities. It collects the audit records generated from the DB2 audit facility for your DB2 data servers in one audit repository, and allows the auditor to easily view, analyze, and generate reports from these audit records.

From this one centralized tool, auditors can:

- Selectively audit all inserts, updates, deletes, and reads in DB2 databases using automatic processes.
- View all reported activity on specific DB2 objects.
- Generate meaningful reports on the data collected in the audit repository.

IBM DB2 Audit Management Expert separates the roles of auditor and DBA, freeing up the valuable DBA resources used to support auditing requests today. Auditors are not required to be privileged users on the systems they are auditing so database security is preserved. Where a significant auditing exposure is suspected, DB2 Audit Management Expert allows an authorized auditor to investigate the exposure by reviewing what data has been changed in the system. This enables auditors to do database auditing work without DBA involvement. And in a similar fashion, DBAs and security administrators can use the tool to ensure that their system is audit-ready.

With the benefit of an easy-to-use graphical user interface, auditors can customize data collection capabilities, defining filter policies based on any combination of DB2 objects, DB2 user IDs, applications connecting to the DB2 database system, and time of collection.

DB2 Audit Management Expert also provides a reporting interface that facilitates common auditing tasks such as determining who updated a particular object in a certain timeframe, or monitoring unauthorized access for specific systems or objects. Robust reporting options enable auditors to view and report on data from several perspectives.

Lastly, a separate user-friendly administration interface enables DB2 Audit Management Expert administrators to easily define DB2 Audit Management Expert entities such as

collection criteria, users, and groups. The interface simplifies administrative tasks with easy-to-use wizards to guide the administrator through each task.

### ***z/OS Security Server: Resource Access Control Facility***

The Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) software is a component of z/OS System Authorization Facility (SAF), used to protect all resources on z/OS including your network and communications. SAF is the high-level infrastructure that allows you to plug into any commercially available security product.

RACF has evolved over more than 30 years to provide protection for various resources, features, facilities, programs, and commands on the z/OS platform. The RACF concept is simple: it keeps a record of all the resources that it protects in the RACF database. It can, for example, set permissions for file patterns even for files that do not yet exist. Those permissions are then used should the file (or other object) be created at a later time. In other words, RACF establishes security policies rather than just permission records. The RACF initially identifies and authenticates users by user ID and password when they log on to the system. When a user tries to access a resource, RACF checks its database and, based on the information that it finds in the database, it either allows or denies the access request.

### ***z/OS Communications Server: Application Transparent Transport Layer Security***


The Transport Layer Security software, or TLS, is the latest evolution of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology. With it, you can encrypt and protect your most important e-commerce transactions and other data transmissions as they cross the network. Implementing and taking advantage of this highly secure approach used to require extensive programming changes to applications within the mainframe environment. With the availability of Application Transparent Transport Layer Security (AT-TLS), you can now deploy TLS encryption helping to avoid the time and expense of re-coding your applications.

AT-TLS support is policy driven and is managed by a Policy Agent or PAGENT. Socket applications continue to send and receive clear text over the socket, but data sent over the network is protected by system SSL. Support is provided for applications that require awareness of AT-TLS for status or to control the negotiation of security.

## Summary

To comprehensively secure your environment you must address all aspects of security, not just the database system itself. As described in the section “Security outside the database”, this includes securing the network, your host computer, and any applications you are running, plus controlling physical access and implementing business controls.

Figure 3 illustrates data security and its accompanying threats as part of the broader enterprise security picture.



**Figure 3 Data security model and security threats**

Threats to data security can be divided into four broad categories: data threats, configuration threats, audit threats and executable threats. The following tables summarize for each of these categories the threats and their countermeasures for your database system:



Data threats:

Threat	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Data.1.Connection	Use authentication and authorization best practices following the principle of least privilege	DB2 or IDS
Data.2.BaseTables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Classify data and set privileges based on the principle of least privilege</li> <li>Assign privileges via roles and not directly to the users</li> <li>Ensure sensitive objects owned by roles</li> <li>Limit all access of these roles to users connecting via trusted contexts</li> <li>Audit all access to important tables</li> <li>Do not grant access to PUBLIC</li> <li>Use LBAC or MLS on sensitive tables in classified government environments</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS IBM AME z/OS RACF
Data.3.OtherTables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protect violation, exception and staging tables the same as base tables</li> <li>Do not grant direct access to MQTs</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS
Data.4.CommonUserID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use the Trusted Context feature in any N-tier environment</li> </ul>	DB2
Data.5.DBAAccess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Monitor:</b> Audit all actions requiring DBA authority</li> <li><b>Restrict access to DBA Authority:</b> Make DBA authority available only via a role and control access to this role using trusted context</li> <li><b>Prevent DBA from accessing data:</b> Protect the data with LBAC or MLS</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS IBM AME
Data.6.OSAdminAccess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encrypt data at rest (AES recommended)</li> <li>Use extended operating system access control</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS Encryption z/OS RACF
Data.7.InTransit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encrypt data in motion (SSL recommended)</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS z/OS AT-TLS
Data.8.Backups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encrypt all backup images and archive images on any media type</li> <li>Implement access control and full auditing for any attempt to access the backup encryption keys</li> </ul>	IBM DEE IBM Optim Archive z/OS Tape Drive
Data.9.TxnLogs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use extended operating system access control</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Data.10.ArchiveLogs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encrypt data at rest (AES recommended)</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS Tape Drive
Data.11.Diagnostics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use extended operating system access control</li> <li>Audit any access to these files</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Data.12.Extract	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Test:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use Optim TDM's data privacy capabilities to mask out all sensitive information</li> </ul> </li> <li><b>Distribution:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encrypt data at rest (AES recommended)</li> <li>Audit all access to the extract file</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	IBM Optim TDM IBM DEE z/OS Encryption



**Configuration threats:**

Threat	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Config.1.Files	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use extended operating system access control</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Config.2.DBCreate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revoke this privilege except for authorized DBA</li> <li>Audit all create database attempts</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS

**Audit threats:**

Threat	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Audit.1.Config	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use extended operating system access control</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Audit.2.Logs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use a secure centralized audit repository</li> <li>Encrypt data at rest (AES recommended)</li> </ul>	DB2 or IDS IBM AME IBM DEE

**Executable threats:**

Threat	Countermeasure	Products Recommended
Executable.1.Files	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use executable security, such as the “operational controls”</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS RACF
Executable.2.Dirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use extended operating system access control on directories</li> </ul>	IBM DEE z/OS RACF

## Further reading

- DB2 Best Practices <http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/db2/bestpractices/>
- DB2 for Linux, UNIX, and Windows Security

[1] DB2 Information Center

<http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/db2luw/v9r7/index.jsp>

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<http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks.nsf/RedpieceAbstracts/sg247555.html?Open>

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