

# **DB2 for z/OS Security: New Ways to Protect Your Assets**

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## Agenda

- Trusted context and roles
- Granular Administrative Authorities
- Row and column level access controls
- External Security Enhancements
- Audit - Audit policies
- Audit - Temporal tables
- Summary



COMPLIANCE IS A  
CONTINUOUS PROCESS

## DB2 9: Trusted context and Role

- Better access control from application servers.
- Allows connections to be established as today. Application attributes are verified before associating it with a trusted context such as the application id and where the request originated
- Supports identity propagation allowing authenticated non z/OS distributed IDs to flow to DB2 to be included in audit logs
- Allows a unique set of privileges by use of a Role to be associated with an application, preventing the misuse of privileges when not accessing through the application
- Provides flexibility by removing object dependency from users
- Addresses administrator challenges

## Trusted Context

- **Trusted context** establishes trust between DB2 and an external entity such as
  - RRSAF (Resource Recovery Services Attachment Facility)
  - DSN Command Processor
  - Application Server
- Once established, a **trusted connection** provides the ability to
  - Efficiently switch user with optional authentication
  - Acquire special set of privileges using a Role
  - Acquire special RACF Security Label authority
- Manage trusted context using **SQL CREATE / ALTER / DROP TRUSTED CONTEXT**

## Database Role

- Database entity with one or more privileges
- Established only through a trusted connection
- User assigned only one role in a trusted connection
- Can optionally be the OWNER of DB2 objects
- Manage role using SQL CREATE / DROP ROLE

```
CREATE ROLE ADMINROLE;
```

```
DB2 native authorization - ROLE keyword for GRANTEE:  
GRANT SYSADM TO ROLE ADMINROLE;
```

```
RACF exit authorization - CRITERIA(SQLROLE) keyword:  
PERMIT DSNADM SUBSYS.SYSADM ID(ADMINA)  
      WHEN (CRITERIA (SQLROLE (ADMINROLE) ) )
```

## Trusted context - Local

- Trusted context can be local or remote
- Local trusted context is based upon
  - System Authid
    - User ID associated with the connection
  - JOBNAME
    - Job or started task name associated with the connection

**Example: Assign a role DBAROLE to any job named ADMINJOB that connects using auth ID SALLY**

```
CREATE ROLE DBAROLE;
```

```
CREATE TRUSTED CONTEXT DBACONTEXT  
  BASED UPON CONNECTION USING SYSTEM AUTHID SALLY  
  ATTRIBUTES JOBNAME ('ADMINJOB')  
  DEFAULT ROLE DBAROLE  
  ENABLE;
```

## Trusted Context - Remote

- Remote trusted context is based upon
  - System Authid
    - User ID associated with the connection
  - ADDRESS
    - Client's IP address, domain name or SERVAUTH security zone name of the connection
  - ENCRYPTION
    - Connection encryption level (NONE | LOW | HIGH)

**Example: Assign a role TELLER to a connection established from IP address 9.10.10.120 and the auth ID SRVRID01.**

```
CREATE ROLE TELLER;
```

```
CREATE TRUSTED CONTEXT TELLERCONTEXT
  BASED UPON CONNECTION USING SYSTEM AUTHID SRVRID01
  ATTRIBUTES ADDRESS('9.10.10.120')
  DEFAULT ROLE TELLER
  ENABLE;
```



## Trusted Context Auth ID Switching

- Allows trusted connection to be used by different users
- Optional authentication requirement
- Specific ROLE and RACF Security Label can be assigned to the user

**Example: Assign a role TELLER to a connection established from IP address 9.10.10.120 and the auth ID SRVRID01. Allow MARY and JOHN to use the connection.**

```
CREATE TRUSTED CONTEXT TELLERCONTEXT
  BASED UPON CONNECTION USING SYSTEM AUTHID SRVRID01
  ATTRIBUTES ADDRESS('9.10.10.120')
  DEFAULT ROLE TELLER
  WITH USE FOR MARY, JOHN
  ENABLE;
```

# Trusted Context Auth ID Switch options

- Switch user options:
  - Authorization name
  - EXTERNAL SECURITY PROFILE Profile-name
    - DB2 primary authorization id or one of their groups has to be permitted to use the specified profile.
  - PUBLIC
- Distributed Identity
  - Exploits RACF distributed identity mapping capability
  - RACF RACMAP command is used to associate a distributed ID to a DB2 RACF user ID.

**Example: Map distributed user ID, APPUSR01 to RACF ID, RACFID1 using Registry name, USERREGISTRY01.**

```

SETROPTS CLASSACT(IDIDMAP) RACLIST(IDIDMAP)
RACMAP ID(RACFID1) MAP -
  USERDIDFILTER(NAME('APPUSR01')) -
  REGISTRY(NAME('USERREGISTRY01'))
SETR RACLIST(IDIDMAP) REFRESH
  
```

# Trusted Context RACF support


- When DB2's native authorization mechanisms are used, RACF is completely uninvolved in the access control decision
- When RACF is used to control access to DB2 objects access is permitted using the CRITERIA keyword on the PERMIT command:

```
PERMIT DSNADM DSND.SYSADM ID(MARKN) WHEN (CRITERIA (SQLROLE (SysProg) )
PERMIT DSNADM DSND.SYSADM ID(*)          WHEN (CRITERIA (SQLROLE (SysProg) ) )
```

– Warning: The SQLROLE value is a mixed case value!

- “SysProg” ^= “SYSPROG” ^= “sysprog” !

# Trusted connections provide more effective controls and accurate audit trail for remote access



- The application server's user ID and password are used to establish the trusted connection
- The user is switched in the trusted connection and client user ID is propagated to the server and checked for database access
- RACF **distributed identities** allows to map client user ID to RACF user ID
  - End user identity not used for privilege checking, but contained in both RACF and DB2 audit logs
- Certificate authentication eliminates the exposure to RACF IDs and passwords on distributed platforms




## New improved security features provide more effective controls and accurate audit trail for remote access

- Support **client certificate authentication** in z/OS V1R10
  - AT-TLS secure handshake accomplishes identification and authentication for client certificates
  - DB2 client driver presents its certificate as identification and its *proof-of-possession* as authentication
  - DB2 server can retrieve the user ID associated with the client certificate in SAF for the AT-TLS policy rule configuration:  
HandshakeRole = ServerWithClientAuth, ClientAuthType = SAFCheck
  - RACF certificate name filtering (RACDCERT MAP command) can map many certificates with one RACF userid
- Support password phrases in z/OS V1R10
  - A RACF password phrase is a character string made up of mixed-case letters, numbers, special characters, and is between 9 to 100 characters long
  - Can be used instead of a traditional 8-character password

# DB2 10: New Granular System Authorities

## Prior to DB2 10

- ❖ **SYSADM**
- ❖ **DBADM**
- ❖ **DBCTRL**
- ❖ **DBMAINT**
- ❖ **SYSCTRL**
- ❖ **PACKADM**
- ❖ **SYSOPR**



## Granular Authorities in DB2 10

- ❖ **System DBADM**
- ❖ **ACCESSCTRL**
- ❖ **DATAACCESS**
- ❖ **SECADM**
- ❖ **SQLADM**
- ❖ **EXPLAIN**

**System DBADM:** Allows management of objects

**DATAACCESS:** Access to data in all user tables

**ACCESSCTRL:** Controls access to data

**SECADM:** Performs security related tasks

**SQLADM:** Allows monitoring and tuning without access to data



## DB2 10: Install Security Parameters

- **Prevents SYSADM and SYSCTRL from granting or revoking privileges**
  - Install parameter, **SEPARATE\_SECURITY**
  - Install **SECADM** authority manages subsystem security
  - SYSADM and SYSCTRL can no longer implicitly grant or revoke privileges
  - Install SYSADM authority not impacted
- **Control cascading effect of revokes**
  - Install parameter, **REVOKE\_DEP\_PRIVILEGES**
  - **INCLUDING / NOT INCLUDING DEPENDENT PRIVILEGES** clause can be specified on SQL REVOKE statements

# RACF Support for the New Administrative Authorities

- RACF Access Control Module has been modified to honor the setting of SEPARATE\_SECURITY
- New DB2 System Privilege Checks

<b>DB2 Authority</b>	<b>Resource</b>	<b>Class</b>
SECADM	<subsystem>.SECADM	DSNADM
System DBADM	<subsystem>.SYSDBADM	DSNADM
DATAACCESS	<subsystem>.DATAACCESS	DSNADM
ACCESSCTRL	<subsystem>.ACCESSCTRL	DSNADM
SQLADM	<subsystem>.SQLADM	MDSNSM
EXPLAIN	<subsystem>.EXPLAIN	MDSNSM



# DB2 10: Row and Column Access Controls

## New table controls to protect against unplanned SQL access

- Define additional data controls at the row and column level
  - Security policies are defined using SQL
  - Separate security logic from application logic
- Security policies based on real time session attributes
  - Protects against SQL injection attacks
  - Determines how column values are returned
  - Determines which rows are returned
- No need to remember various view or application names
  - No need to manage many views; no view updates or audit issues
- All access via SQL including privileged users, adhoc query tools, report generation tools is protected
- Policies can be added, modified, or removed to meet current company rules without change to applications

# Table controls to protect SQL access to individual row level

- Establish a row policy for a table
  - Filter rows out of answer set
  - Policy can use session information, e.g. the SQL ID is in what group or user is using what role, to control which row is returned in result set
  - Applicable to SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, & MERGE
  - Defined as a row permission:

***CREATE PERMISSION policy-name ON table-name  
FOR ROWS WHERE search-condition  
ENFORCED FOR ALL ACCESS ENABLE;***

## Table controls to protect SQL access to individual column level

- Establish a column policy for a table
  - Mask column values in answer set
  - Policy can use session information, e.g. the SQL ID is in what group or user is using what role, to control what masked value is returned in result set
  - Applicable to the output of outermost subselect
  - Defined as column masks :

***CREATE MASK mask-name ON table-name  
FOR COLUMN column-name RETURN CASE-expression  
ENABLE;***

# Define table policies based on who or how the table is being accessed

- SESSION\_USER - Primary authorization ID of the process
- CURRENT SQLID - SQL authorization ID of the process
- VERIFY\_GROUP\_FOR\_USER function
  - Get the authorization IDs for the value in SESSION\_USER
  - Returns 1 if any of those authorization IDs is in the argument list

```
WHERE
  VERIFY_GROUP_FOR_USER (SESSION_USER, 'MGR', 'PAYROLL') = 1
```

- VERIFY\_ROLE\_FOR\_USER function
  - Get the role for the value in SESSION\_USER
  - Return 1 if the role is in the argument list

```
WHERE
  VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER (SESSION_USER, 'MGR', 'PAYROLL') = 1
```

## Managing row and column access controls

- When activated row and column access controls:
  - All row permissions are connected with ‘OR’ to filter out rows
  - All column masks are applied to mask output
  - All access to the table is prevented if no user-defined row permissions
  
- When deactivated row and column access controls:
  - Opens all access to the table

```
ALTER TABLE table-name
  ACTIVATE ROW      ACCESS CONTROL
  ACTIVATE COLUMN  ACCESS CONTROL;
```


```
ALTER TABLE table-name
  DEACTIVATE ROW    ACCESS CONTROL
  DEACTIVATE COLUMN ACCESS CONTROL;
```

## DB2 11: External Security (DSNX@XAC) consistency with DB2 Security – Owner Authorization

- Support OWNER privileges for authorization
  - Allows owner to be checked for authorization on BIND and REBIND commands
  - Supports dynamic SQL authorization using DYNAMICRULES behavior
    - Package owner
    - ID that executes the package
    - ID that defined the routine
    - ID that invokes the routine
  - Allows automatic rebind (AUTOBIND)
  - Owner can be a RACF ID, GROUP or ROLE. DB2 provides owner ACEE to RACF
  - Similar behavior between DB2 native and RACF exit authorization
  - New installation parameter, AUTHEXIT\_CHECK is used to govern owner authorization

# DB2 11: External Security (DSNX@XAC) Enhancements

## Sync RACF Permission Changes to DB2 Cache



## RACF ENF Signals Heard by DB2

- RACF Event Notifications (ENF)
  - Notifications generated by RACF when a profile is changed
- DB2 11 listens for:
  - ENF 62: RACF options refreshed
    - SETROPTS RACLIST REFRESH
  - ENF 71: User permissions changed
    - ALTUSER REVOKE, CONNECT REVOKE, DELUSER, DELGROUP, REMOVE
  - ENF 79: User permissions to access resource changed
    - PERMIT..DELETE, ACCESS(NONE), RESET, WHEN(CRITERIA(SQLROLE...))
    - RALTER.. UACC(NONE), DELMEM; RDELETE
    - On receipt of ENF 79, DB2 stores the changes and refreshes cache entries only when ENF 62 is heard
    - Requirement: RACF class descriptor table must have SIGNAL = YES
      - Enabled for IBM supplied RACF resource classes for DB2
- New installation parameter, `AUTHEXIT_CACHEREFRESH` is used to govern cache refresh
- Cache refresh considerations link:
  - [http://www-01.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSEPEK\\_11.0.0/com.ibm.db2z11.doc.seca/src/tpc/db2z\\_engsignalprocessing.dita](http://www-01.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSEPEK_11.0.0/com.ibm.db2z11.doc.seca/src/tpc/db2z_engsignalprocessing.dita)



## DB2 V11 – RACF exit enhancements

- Support new Global Variables privileges

DB2 Privilege	Resource	Class
READ	<subsystem>.schema-name.variable-name	MDSNGV
WRITE	<subsystem>. schema-name.variable-name	MDSNGV

- Provide RACLISTed classes at DB2 start in the new XAPLCLST field
- Remove RC8 and reason code 17 on AUTOBIND for UDFs

## Auditing in DB2

- Who is privileged to access what data?
  - Most of the catalog tables describe the DB2 objects, such as tables, views, table spaces, packages, and plans
  - If using DB2 native authorization, several other tables (every table with the character string "AUTH" in its name) hold records of every granted privilege or authority.
- Who accessed what data?
  - You can find answers by using the audit trace, another important audit trail for DB2

## Audit Trace Records

- DB2 uses SMF and/or GTF and/or monitor program for trace data
- Trace types
  - -Accounting -Audit -Monitor -Performance -Statistics
- Audit - Selective tracing with 11 classes of information
  - Access denials
  - Authorization changes
  - Changes to the structure of data (such as dropping a table)
  - Changes to data values (such as updating or inserting records)
  - Reading of data values (such as select)
  - Changes in authorization IDs
  - Utilities changes
  - Trusted context information
  - Audit Administrative Authorities

**-START TRACE (AUDIT) CLASS (4,6) DEST (GTF) LOCATION (\*)**

## DB2 10: Audit Policies

- New Audit policy allows you to comply without the need of external collectors. Managed in the DB2 catalog.
- Auditor can define an audit policy to audit any access to specific tables for specific programs during day
  - Audit policy does not require AUDIT clause to be specified using DDL
  - Audit policy generate records for all SQL read and update access
  - Audit policy includes additional records identifying the specific SQL statements
  - Audit policy provides wildcarding of based on table names
- Auditor can define an audit policy to identify any unusual use of a privileged authority
  - Records each use of an administrative authority
  - Audit records written only when authority is used for access



## How to exploit Audit policies

- Security administrator using the new SECADM authority maintains DB2 audit policies in a new catalog table
  - **SYSIBM.SYSAUDITPOLICIES**
- Audit policies enabled using **–STA TRACE** command
- Audit policies disabled using **–STO TRACE** command
- Up to 8 audit policies can be specified to auto start or auto start as secure during DB2 start up
- Only user with SECADM authority can stop a secure audit policy trace
- Supports 8 categories
  - CHECKING, VALIDATE, OBJMAINT, EXECUTE
  - CONTEXT, SECMAINT, SYSADMIN, DBADMIN

## Example: Dynamic auditing of tables

- Audit all the tables that start with 'PAY' in EMPLOYEE schema
- Does not require AUDIT clause to be specified during table definition

```
INSERT INTO SYSIBM.SYSAUDITPOLICIES (AUDITPOLICYNAME, OBJECTSCHEMA,  
OBJECTNAME, OBJECTTYPE, EXECUTE)  
VALUES ('TABADT1','EMPLOYEE','"PAY%"','T','A');  
  
-STA TRACE (AUDIT) DEST (GTF) AUDTPLCY(TABADT1);
```

## Example – Audit privileged authority

- Audit successful execution of all actions using installation SYSADM authority and system DBADM authority

```
INSERT INTO SYSIBM.SYSAUDITPOLICIES  
  (AUDITPOLICYNAME, SYSADMIN, DBADMIN)  
VALUES ('AUDITADMIN','I','B');  
  
-STA TRACE (AUDIT) DEST (GTF) AUDTPLCY(AUDITADMIN);
```

## DB2 10: Temporal table

DB2 can now manage different versions of your data

- Temporal table allows DB2 to automatically maintain different versions of your data
- Two types of time sequences of table rows are supported through the introduction of database defined time periods
  - **SYSTEM\_TIME** is used to support data “versioning” which archives old rows into a history table
  - **BUSINESS\_TIME** is a period that represents when a row is valid to the user or application
  - **BITEMPORAL** table combines SYSTEM\_TIME period and BUSINESS\_TIME period



## Defining system period on an existing table

- System versioning is implemented by altering an existing or creating a table with two timestamps, a history table, and defining the versioning relationship between tables

```
CREATE TABLE POLICY_INFO
(POLICY_ID CHAR(10) NOT NULL,
COVERAGE INT NOT NULL,
SYS_START TIMESTAMP(12) NOT NULL GENERATED ALWAYS AS ROW BEGIN,
SYS_END TIMESTAMP(12) NOT NULL GENERATED ALWAYS AS ROW END,
CREATE_ID TIMESTAMP(12) GENERATED ALWAYS AS TRANSACTION START ID,
PERIOD SYSTEM_TIME(SYS_START,SYS_END));
```

```
CREATE TABLE HIST_POLICY_INFO
(POLICY_ID CHAR(10) NOT NULL,
COVERAGE INT NOT NULL,
SYS_START TIMESTAMP(12) NOT NULL,
SYS_END TIMESTAMP(12) NOT NULL,
CREATE_ID TIMESTAMP(12));
```

## Defining system period on an existing table

- After the base and history tables are appropriately defined:
  - ALTER TABLE table-name **ADD VERSIONING** is specified on the base table that is to be versioned
- Auditor can query historical data through SQL
  - DB2 rewrites the user's query to include data from the history table

```
ALTER TABLE POLICY_INFO
ADD VERSIONING USE HISTORY TABLE HIST_POLICY_INFO;
```

## DB2 11: Audit change data

- DB2 V10 system versioning feature provided an auditing solution to track **WHEN** the data is modified.
- DB2 V11 (APARs PM99683/PI15298/PI15666) provides support to track
  - **WHO** modified the data
  - **WHAT** action caused the data modification
  - Supported on SQL **CREATE** and **ALTER TABLE** statements using new **GENERATED ALWAYS AS** clause

## Audit change data – WHO modified data

- **Special registers** can be specified using **GENERATED ALWAYS AS** clause to audit WHO modified data
  - CURRENT CLIENT\_ACCTNG VARCHAR(255)
  - CURRENT CLIENT\_APPLNAME VARCHAR(255)
  - CURRENT CLIENT\_CORR\_TOKEN VARCHAR(255)
  - CURRENT CLIENT\_USERID VARCHAR(255)
  - CURRENT CLIENT\_WRKSTNNAME VARCHAR(255)
  - CURRENT SERVER CHAR(16)
  - CURRENT SQLID VARCHAR(8)
  - SESSION\_USER or USER VARCHAR(128)

Example using SESSION\_USER special register:

```
CREATE TABLE Bank_Account
(Account_Num INT NOT NULL,
Balance INT,
USER_ID VARCHAR(128) GENERATED ALWAYS AS (SESSION_USER);
```

## Audit change data – WHO modified data

- **Session Variables** can be specified using **GENERATED ALWAYS AS** clause to audit the process that modified data
  - SYSIBM.PACKAGE\_NAME VARCHAR(128)
  - SYSIBM.PACKAGE\_SCHEMA VARCHAR(128)
  - SYSIBM.PACKAGE\_VERSION VARCHAR(122)

Example using Session Variables:

```
CREATE TABLE Bank_Account
(Account_Num INT NOT NULL,
Balance INT,
Package_Name VARCHAR(128) GENERATED ALWAYS AS (SYSIBM.PACKAGE_NAME));
```

## Audit change data – WHAT action caused data change

- New **DATA CHANGE OPERATION** keyword can be specified using **GENERATED ALWAYS** clause to audit the action that caused data modification
  - DB2 generates one of the following values:
    - I – Insert operation
    - U – Update operation
    - D – Delete operation

Example for DATA CHANGE OPERATION:

```
CREATE TABLE Bank_Account
(Account_Num INT NOT NULL,
Balance INT,
USER_ID VARCHAR(128) GENERATED ALWAYS AS (SESSION_USER),
OPERATION CHAR(1) GENERATED ALWAYS AS (DATA CHANGE OPERATION));
```

## Summary

- Trusted connections provide better user accountability and improved compliance.
- Granular administrative authorities help reduce data exposure for administrators
- Row and column access table controls to safe guard your data
- Access Control Authorization Exit enhancements provide consistent security model and improved RACF integration
- Auditing features using audit policies provide better auditing capabilities
- Temporal data to comply with regulations to maintain historical data



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