

Welcome my name is Tom Wasik. I am the chief product owner for JES2 here at IBM. Today I want to talk to you about an enhancement that IBM has made to the product called JES2 SPOOL encryption. As this name implies, this function allows you to encrypt data that you write to your spool data set. But it's much more than just encryption. This enhancement changes the way that data is stored on the SPOOL. This enables other functions to be implemented such as compression. Compression will help you reduce the amount of data that you write to SPOOL saving you not only space, but also improving performance by reducing the number of I/Os. In this presentation I'll go into how to set up SPOOL encryption if this is what you need, and also will talk about compression and how to set up compression on your system.

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


JES2 has been doing SPOOL for 50+ years. In all that time, the way data was stored on spool has not significantly changed. The most exciting thing that was done was blank truncation. Until now.

Pervasive encryption has come to JES data sets on SPOOL. This makes the data customers stored on SPOOL unreadable to anyone that does not have access to the appropriate encryption key. You use your security product to controls access to the keys and identifies what data to encrypt and what keys to used. This can be applied to each application SYSOUT or instream data sets securing data at rest on your SPOOL volume.

In addition, if you are running z15 hardware, JES2 will compress the data before encrypting it. This reduces the amount of data being encrypted and thus improves the performance. Depending on the nature of the data the savings can be significant. Standard character data is often compressed to less than 20% of its original size. This saves not only on the overhead of encryption, but overall overhead of reading and writing data to SPOOL, not to mention space savings storing the data. And for SYSOUT data set, you can get the savings of compression without doing encryption.


This was all done transparently. There are no changes needed to any application that writes or read data from SPOOL. In fact, the only way you can tell that a data set is compressed or encrypted is to check out the data set statistics in a product like SDSF.



Data breaches are becoming more and more of a problem in today's world. That's one of the reasons why z/OS developed pervasive encryption. It secures data without the need to alter the applications that create or use the data.

Up until now, pervasive encryption did not apply to data that applications wrote to SPOOL even though that data can contain sensitive information, whether it be instream data or SYSOUT. SPOOL encryption extends pervasive encryption to these SPOOL data sets. With it, you can encrypt data at rest while it's sitting on your SPOOL. Like pervasive encryption, it this takes advantage of the processing power of the z14 processor to perform the encryption.

SPOOL encryption truly is an extension of pervasive encryption. It uses the same paradigms that were used to encrypt DF/SMS datasets. This allows you to have a consistent scheme for managing access to key labels across not only DF/SMS data sets but also your data on SPOOL. By controlling who can access the key label you can control who can read (decrypt) the data. This can be done separately from who can manage the data sets.



SPOOL encryption provides the ability to protect individual JES2 data sets on SPOOL with different key labels and thus different encryption key. These are the same encryption key labels used by data set encryption to protect DF/SMS data sets. Access to the keys is controlled by the security product using the CSFKEYS class (as is done for data set encryption). Conditional access can be accomplished using WHEN(CRITERIA(SMS(DSENCRYPTION))).


JES2 keeps track of the key labels in its internal control blocks associated with each data set. When the data set is read JES2 uses the saved key label to decrypt the data set. Applications that want to access a data set must have access to the key label in order to decrypt the data set. Other than this additional access requirement, applications do not need to change if SPOOL encryption is active.

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Key labels must be defined in the ICSF cryptographic key data set (CKDS) in order to be used by SPOOL encryption. The actual keys are associated with the key label. Key labels can be up to 64 characters in length. The key label must be associated with an AES 256 bit keys and should be protected by the security product using the CSFKEYS class.

As with any encryption scheme the loss of a key or access to a key will prevent access to the data the key encrypts. Because of this, a robust key label management system must be used to ensure consistent access to the data. It is worth noting that data stored by JES2 differs from data stored using pervasive encryption in that JES2 data is generally short lived, days perhaps week versus years or more for regular datasets. Because of this JES2 does not have a scheme for rekeying existing SPOOL datasets.



To encrypt data on the jazz two spool you must associate the key label with the data set. There are two ways to do this. The first method uses the KEYLABEL field in the JES segment of a JESJOBS profile to assign a key label. The format of the JESJOBS profile is:

ENCRYPT.nodename.userid.jobname.dsname

Where the fields in the name are:


- *nodename* NJE node name of the current JES2 JESPlex
- *userid* Owning userid of the job. If this is an instream data set during INPUT phase processing, the USER= from the JOB card is used if specified, otherwise the submitting userid is used
- *jobname* Current job name (TSO user, started task name) associated with the job
- *dsname* The one to eight character DSNAME=dsn specified on the DD JCL statement defining the data set

The UACC and access list of this JESJOBS profile are not used.

The second method to assign a key label is to use the DSKEYLBL= keyword on the DD *, DATA or SYSOUT JCL statement, specify DSKEYLBL on the TSO ALLOC command, or as a text unit on DYNALLOC. This DSKEYLBL specification will override what was specified via the JESJOBS profile. However, to specify DSKEYLBL, a FACILITY class profile must pass.

The profile is either JES.ENCRYPT.OWNER or JES.ENCRYPT.SUBMITTER depending on when the data set being encrypted. The check is for READ access to a non-generic profile. For instream data set during INPUT phase, the JES.ENCRYPT.SUBMITTER profile is used. For all other cases (including instream data set in PROCs and INCLUDEs), the JES.ENCRYPT.OWNER profile is checked.

NJE SYSOUT receivers will perform a JESJOBS profile look up to determine if each the data set received should be encrypted. NJE job receivers will do the same checks that were done for normal batch jobs.




In addition to the security checks to access the key label in the CSFKEYS class applications wanting to create or access encrypted data sets must also have access to the ICSF services to do so . In particular, the CSNBKRR2 service access is controlled by the CSFKRR2 entity in the CSFSERV class. Note that if ICSF is configured with CHECKAUTH(NO) then the CSFSERV check is not done.

When JES2 is accessing SPOOL data sets for encryption or decryption it does not check access to the CSFKEYS class. This includes:

- NJE or SPOOL offload job transmitters
- SYSOUT transmitters
- SYSOUT receivers
- Local (non-FSS) printers and punches
- RJE printers and punches

Since SYSOUT receivers use JESJOBS profiles to assign key labels to incoming data sets without checking the CSDKEYS class, it is possible that the owner of the SYSOUT data set may not have access to the key label needed to decrypt the data.



This is an example of JCL that illustrates assigning key labels to various datasets.


The SYSPRINT DD is explicitly assigned the key label ALPHA using DSKEYLBL=. Since this is a SYSOUT dataset the owning userid IBMUSER must have READ access to the FACILITY class profile JES.ENCRYPT.OWNER.

The J0B0UT DD is assigned the key label OUTPUT by the JESJOBS ENCRYPT profile listed.

Finally, the SYSIN DD is explicitly assigned the key label OUTPUT using DSKEYLBL=. Since this is an instream data set processed during INPUT phase, the submitting userid must have READ access to the FACILITY class profile JES.ENCRYPT.SUBMITTER.



In addition to encryption JES2 also supports data set compression for SPOOL data set. Compression takes advantage of the integrated accelerator for zEDC compression on the z15 processor. Using this feature to compress spool data significantly reduces the size of the data, allowing you to store more data on the same spool volumes using less I/O to both write and later read the data, and less CPU to perform the I/Os. The integrated accelerator for zEDC is an included feature on the z15 processor. There is no additional licensing fees to use this feature.



To set up compression all that is needed is to set the COMPRESS=YES keyword on the corresponding OUTCLASS statement. If a data set is being encrypted JES2 will always attempt to compress the data set before encryption. Compression can be requested for any SYSOUT data set even if it is not being encrypted, however instream datasets will only be compressed if they are being encrypted.

CPU costs in testing done in house did not significantly change when using compression. In general, what was seen is a slight single digit percent increase in CPU with compression and encryption active. However the number of I/Os that occurred was significantly reduced.

Compression ratios vary greatly depending upon the data being compressed. Data that is already compressed will have a lower compression ratio than normal character data. In testing we found that character data would compress to less than 20% of its original size. Some of the best benefits from an overall performance standpoint we're seeing with long LRECL data sets such as CPDS data sets.

Compression ratios can be found in the JDS display in SDSF and are available in the extended status SSI.



The spool encryption and compression functions of jazz two I designed to protect application data. JES2 system datasets, JESJCLIN, JESMSGLG, JESJCL, JESYSMSG, \$INTTEXT, \$JOURNAL, \$SWABLKS, and EVENTLOG) are currently not eligible for either function. Additionally system jobs, SYSLOG, Remote messages, EDS notify messages, and \$TRCLOG are not eligible for these functions.

One final note, JES2 supports a method of writing SYSOUT called PUT update. This allows an application to write a record to a SYSOUT data set And later point to that record an updated it. Unfortunately if the data is compressed changing the data could change the compressed record size. This updated size may no longer fit in the space allotted for the original record (a requirement for PUT update). Because of this put update is not allowed for compressed records. A generic tracker entry will be created if they put update is detected on your system. If compression or encryption is requested for these datasets the GET update will fail.




The SPOOL encryption function was activated with APAR OA57466 which shipped against z/OS 2.4. Both spool encryption and compression required that records written to SPOOL are in a new enhanced format. The APAR ships with the advanced format not active by default. Before activating the new data format all members must have completed their migration to z/OS 2.4. Once this function is activated, pre z/OS 2.4 members will not be allowed to join the MAS. The command to activate advanced format is \$T SPOOLDEF,ADVANCED_FORMAT=ENABLED.

Advanced format can be disabled by using the command \$T SPOOLDEF,ADVANCED_FORMAT=DISABLE. Disabling advanced format does not affect existing data sets on SPOOL. It only prevents the encryption and compression of new datasets while the function is disabled. Even if advanced format is disabled pre-z/OS 2.4 members are still not allowed to join the JESPlex.

ADVANCED_FORMAT= can be abbreviated ADVF=. To display the current setting, use the \$D SPOOLDEF command.




JES2 does not create SMF records for SPOOL data sets. The only logging that compression or encryption are in use is in is in the SMF 26 record created when a job is purged. This record has been updated with a new section that contains a count of the number of datasets for the job that were compressed and the number that were encrypted. In addition it has accumulated byte counts for compressed datasets, with the bytes prior to compression and after compression. The other way to see if an individual data set has been compressed or encrypted is to use products like SDSF. The SSI used by SDSF to obtain data set information has new fields indicating a data set is encrypted with the key label and an indicator the data set was compressed with the pre and post compression byte counts.



So let's summarize enabling SPOOL encryption on your system. The first step is to migrate all members of the JESPlex to Z OS 2.4 and ensure all needed service is installed (OA57466 and any later APARs) on each system. Once you know that you will not need to fall back to an earlier release you can activate advanced format using the \$T SPOOLDEF,ADVANCED_FORMAT=ENABLED command. Remember enabling advanced format has no effect if there


are no RACF profiles for encryption set up. At this point consider developing or extending the existing key label management scheme for SPOOL encryption. Asg part of developing the key label scheme you need to identify what user IDs will be doing encryption and decryption and ensure that those user IDs have access to the appropriate profiles in the CSFKEYS and CSFSERVE classes. At this point you need to decide what data sets you want to encrypt. You will probably want use JESJOBs profiles to assign keys to the data set you want to encrypt. However before doing this you may want to test using the JCL DSKEYLBL= on the DD cards to ensure that all your authorizations were set up correctly. Once you have completed testing with DSKEYLBL you can start defining the appropriate JESJOBS profiles.

The easiest way to verify the data sets you wanted to be encrypted were indeed encrypted is to use the SDSF JDS panel 2 display the encryption state and key label used for the data set. Long term you can use SMF 26 to track that jobs that should have encrypted data sets indeed are using encryption




Now for something completely different, lets talk NJE. NJE sits on top of the various networking protocols (TCP/IP, SNA, BSC) and sends jobs and SYSOUT between nodes. Security in NJE is based on data that is passed in the NJE headers associated with data object. These contain information about where the object came from, the user, group, and SECLABEL associated with the object at the origin node. But the bottom line is that the assumption is the only way something can get onto an NJE network is a properly authenticated NJE node put it there.

Note we are talking NJE which is a layer on top of a protocol like TCP/IP. Typically, NJE is the domain of the JES guys and they deal with the concepts. The network guy deal with the actual connections that NJE uses. I say this since many of the concepts and terms of NJE also exist in the networking world (like SUBNETs) but have a very different meaning and usage.




One of the things NJE does is something called store and forward. Sending something from NODEA to NODEX can involve sending it to intermediate nodes on the way to the destination. The data is received and stored on the intermediate node until it can be sent to the next node. Think of it this way, if you are taking a subway to a destination, there may be stations you pass through, but if you are lucky, you can take the one train to your destination. However, if you are not luck you may have to transfer to another train or perhaps even to a bus to get to your destination. NJE is like this. Store and forward is like having to transferring trains. Due to the infrastructure it may be necessary, but it leaves you exposed to the outside world (OK, in my world, the subway car is safety and standing in a station is unsafe. Not a perfect analogy).




So one day you look at your NJE cloud and notice an unexpected red node sitting out there. And it has the same name as another node in your network. This is an imposter. Perhaps a pen tester? Perhaps something worse? He got in through a node that did not set up strong sign on security for signing on NJE nodes. Perhaps it is that VM guy that says he does not need security because they are a test environment. But they do hook into your NJE network. But what is this imposter node? Someone with a mainframe? Perhaps running on mainframe emulator on a PC? Or something simpler. Ever GOOGLE "NJE python"? There are python programs to do NJE. They can run on any PC that is in your TCP/IP network. They could run in python on your mainframe.


But what harm can this imposter do?



So here is a job that the imposter on the red NODED sends to NODEC. It claims to come from the SYSADMIN user on NODEX and is going to NODEA. The job runs some RACF commands in TSO batch. It could have easily done other things (FTP?). But the question is, can NODEA detect that this job is not really from NODEX? In general, NO it cannot. The rules of NJE store and forward do not allow this. So the real question is, does NODEA trust jobs from NODEX?



There are some things that can help the situation. The one that can be of the most help is routing based security. This is using information about how an object got to the destination node. There are a number of checks that can be made but the most obvious is to look at the node that gave me the object. The easiest way to think of it is to make connection directly to any node you want to trust. And then use the DIRECT=YES keywords to define the nodes (NODEA defines NODEX as DIRECT=YES and NODEX defines NODEA as DIRECT=YES). This tells JES2 not to use store and forward to get objects to the other node. If store and forward is not used, then any object claiming to be from NODEX that arrives via another node is unexpected and the object is marked dubious. Dubious jobs are not trusted.




In NJE we have a concept of SUBNETs. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE NETWORK GUYS THINKS OF WHEN YOU SAY SUBNET. These are NJE subnet.

A subnet is a collection of nodes that have 2 properties that are of interest

- If a node is not the local SUBNET, then if path determination can reach one node in a subnet, then it can reach all nodes in the subnet through that node.
- When discovering the path to a node, a path out of a subnet can never be used to return into the subnet. What that means is that an object on a node inside a subnet, that is destined for another node inside the subnet, can never be sent outside the subnet to get to its destination.

A node can only be in at most one subnet.

It is the last property that is interesting to this discussion (what originates in a subnet that is destined for a node in the subnet, never leaves the subnet). And we care about that for the local subnet (ie the subnet the local node is in, if any).




These are the cases that trigger a job to be marked dubious. When a job arriving is marked dubious, the following message is issued:

\$HASP541 Routing for job named jobname received on device (adjnode)

from userid at node is inconsistent with information in the NJE header

- Header indicates inconsistency detected on store and forward node
- Job indicates it originates from local node
- Job arrived from unknown origin node
- Job indicates it originates from within the local subnet but arrived from outside the local subnet
- Job from direct node arrived via store and forward
- Job from adjacent node specifies to execute on that adjacent node
- Node name in SAF token does not match NJE job header




The following options control this processing:

VFYPATH= on the NODE statement associated with an arriving job's origin node affects how that job is processed. A setting of YES can only be specified for the local node and nodes defined as DIRECT=YES. When set to YES, a job will be marked dubious if:

- For a NODE that also specifies DIRECT=YES, the job arrives from some other adjacent node (jobs must arrive from the directly connected node).
- For the NODE statement for the local node, the job claims to originate at the local node and indicates it will execute on the local node.
- For the NODE statement for the local node, the job claims to originate at the local node and indicates it will execute on a directly connected node.

VERIFY_SUBNET= (or VFYSUBNET=) on the NJEDEF statement will mark as dubious jobs that claim to be from a node within the local subnet and indicate they will execute on a node within the local subnet, but arrived from an adjacent node that is outside the local subnet. The local subnet is the SUBNET= value specified on the NODE statement for the local node.

PRECHECK= on the NJEDEF statement controls whether or not jobs that are marked dubious will be pre-validated to ensure they are allowed to run without depending on the settings in the NODES class (as if the NODES class profile specifies READ). This is an extra call to the security product before the normal verification of the job.



An JES NJE security health check ensures that trusted nodes are configured using best practices. There is one instance of the health check per active JES subsystem. The name of the check reflects the subsystem it is running against. If it is the primary subsystem, the name is JES_NJE_SECURITY. If it is a secondary subsystem the subsystem name is added to the check name (so JES_NJE_SECURITY_JESA). The output of the check is a list of the trusted nodes and any problems with how they are defined. The check results in medium and high severity exceptions.

To perform its functions, the check must know what nodes are considered trusted. This information is only known by the security product. An interface was defined that allows the check to pass a list of nodes into the security product and get back a list of which of those nodes are trusted. This list is returned by the exec and used to perform configuration testing. RACF shipped an exec to perform this function.

The check is set to run every 6 hours (3 if there is a problem detected).


There are 3 sections to this health check:

- Trusted nodes checks (including a list of trusted nodes)
- Local node check
- · Non-trusted nodes that can be or are connected

Each section returns a list of nodes and the exceptions found, followed by a list of exception messages based on what exceptions are found.



IBM has some questions about how you are using or are planning to use pervasive encryption. Please take a minute to answer a few simple questions. Your responses are greatly appreciated



Thank you for your time and attention. If you have any questions, please feel free to email me.

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