

# z/OS LDAP

MYTHS, TRUTHS AND PRACTICAL USE CASES

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# Agenda

- Myths
- Truths
- Practical Use Cases





# Myths

# z/OS LDAP is a Single Sign On Solution - FALSE

SSO Definition -

Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication scheme that allows a user to log in with a single ID and password to any of several related, yet independent, software systems. It is often accomplished by using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and stored LDAP databases on (directory) servers.[1] A simple version of single sign-on can be achieved over IP networks using cookies but only if the sites share a common DNS parent domain.[2]

For clarity, a distinction should be made between Directory Server Authentication and single sign-on: Directory Server Authentication refers to systems requiring authentication for each application but using the same credentials from a directory server, whereas single sign-on refers to systems where a single authentication provides access to multiple applications by passing the <u>authentication token seamlessly to configured</u> <u>applications.</u>

David's Definition - Sign on once, and identity token passed there after so user does not sign in again.

zOS LDAP can be used to enable RACF user IDs to be used in SSO solution but it is not a SSO Solution

zOS has many entry points - There is no one SSO solution for zOS

Examples - Session managers for TN3270 with the use of passtickets

- WAS, CICS, DB2 Network Authorization Services enablement of Kerberos
- WAS with SAML enabled by ISAM or IBM Cloud Identify Verify


RACF provides definitions of users, groups, classes, and **\*general resources**, and access control for resources. The LDAP server can provide LDAP access to this information stored in RACF. Using SDBM, the RACF database backend of the LDAP server, you can accomplish the following tasks:

• Add, modify, and delete RACF users, groups, and general resources. Data set resources are not supported.

- Add, modify, and delete user connections to groups.
- Add and remove users and groups in general resource access lists.
- Modify SETROPTS options that affect classes (for example, RACLIST).
- Retrieve RACF information for users, groups, connections, general resources, and class options.
- Retrieve RACF user password and password phrase envelopes.

\*To see resources you must enable in ds.config with this variable enableresources {on | off}

Note All RACF Defined Resources will be seen active and not active



LDAP Browser\Editor v2.8.2 - [Idap://192.168.48.122/cn=tec2racf,o=ibm, c=us]

<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>L</u> DIF <u>H</u> elp		
<b>9 % % &amp;  1</b> % <b>1 1 1 1</b>		
	Attribute Value objectclass TOP objectclass RACFPROFILETYPE profiletype CSFKEYS	
<ul> <li>profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER10.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019</li> <li>profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER11.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018</li> <li>profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER11.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019</li> <li>profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER12.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018</li> </ul>		
Ready. 50 entries returned.		U

LDAP Browser\Editor v2.8.2 - [Idap://192.168.48.122/cn=tec2racf,o=ibm, c=us]

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#### profiletype=CSEKEYS

File Edit View LDIF Help

	. 4	Astullauta	Value
P  profiletype=CSFKEYS		Attribute	Value 0
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSERXX.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racfupdateaccesscount racfresourceaudit	0 FAILURES(READ)
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSERXX.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		objectclass	TOP
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER01.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		objectclass	RACFRESOURCE
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER01.NONVSAMDATA.V1.MAR242020		objectclass	EXTENSIBLEOBJECT
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER02.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		profilename	AES.PE.LABUSERXX.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER02.NONVSAMDATA.V1.OCT222019		racfcontrolaccesscount	0
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER03.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racfauthorizationdate	12/12/18
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER03.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racfaccesscontrol	ID(EKMFSGRP) ACCESS(READ) COUNT(0)
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER04.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racfaccesscontrol	ID(USERXX) ACCESS(READ) WHEN(CRITERIA(SMS('DSENCRYPTION
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER04.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122019		racflastchangedate	12/12/18
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER04.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racfuacc	NONE
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER05.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racficsfsymcpacfwrap racfalteraccesscount	YES 0
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER05.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122019		racfreadaccesscount	0
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER05.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racficsfsymexportable	BYANY
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER06.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racfowner	RACFID=PERES,PROFILETYPE=GROUP,CN=TEC2RACF,O=IBM,C:
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER06.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racflevel	0
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER07.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racflastreferencedate	12/12/18
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER07.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racficsfsymcpacfret	YES
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER08.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018		racficsfasymusage	SECUREEXPORT
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER08.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019		racficsfasymusage	HANDSHAKE
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER09.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER09.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER10.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER10.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER11.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER11.NONVSAMDATA.V1.FEB122019			
profilename=AES.PE.LABUSER12.NONVSAMDATA.V1.DEC122018	-		
	<b>F</b>	•	

# z/OS LDAP has only one type of back end - FALSE

#### Backends

### TDBM

The LDAP server provides a backend to store directory information in a Db2 database. TDBM is a general purpose backend that can store any type of directory information.

#### SDBM

The LDAP server can provide remote LDAP access to the user, group, connection, and general resource profile information stored in RACF. It also supports setting RACF options that affect classes. When creating change log records for changes to RACF data, SDBM is required.

#### LDBM

The LDAP server provides a file-based backend to store directory information in a z/OS UNIX System Services file system. LDBM is a general-purpose backend that can store any type of directory information.

#### CDBM

The LDAP server provides the CDBM backend to store configuration information, for example, for advanced replication and password policy. CDBM is file-based, storing its directory information in a UNIX System Services file system.

#### GDBM

- The LDAP server can provide a change log containing information about changes to:
- RACF users, groups, user-group connections, and general resource profiles.
- TDBM, LDBM, and CDBM entries.
- LDAP server schema entry.



### **Overview of LDAP**

# What is LDAP?

- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a global directory model
- Originally developed as front-end of X.500 (DAP)
- The LDAP protocol runs over TCP
- Global directory model is based on entries

Each entry identified by its DN (distinguished name)


- Often uses cn (common name), ou (organization unit), o (organization)
- Each entry is a collection of attributes

Each attribute has a type and values


Attributes are grouped into object classes

Determine mandatory and optional attributes for an entry


DN: cn=ken,ou=LDAP,o=IBM,c=US



# LDAP Server on z/OS



# LDAP for z/OS Parallel Sysplex Support



### **LDAP** Authentication

# Authentication with an LDAP Server


### LDAP is a stateful protocol

- Session starts when client "binds" to server
- Session can be unauthenticated (anonymous bind)
- Authentication is performed during bind
  - Check password or certificate
  - Determine groups to which user belongs (for authorization checking)


### LDAP supports different authentication protocols

- Simple bind: Distinguished Name and password
  - Session can optionally be protected with SSL
  - Passwords can be stored in LDAP directory, optionally one-way (MD5, SHA-1, crypt) or two-way (TDES) encrypted, or stored in RACF
- Certificate bind: X.509 digital certificate over SSL
  - Distinguished name in certificate must conform with distinguished name of person authenticating
- Kerberos bind: Kerberos principal sends ticket for LDAP server
  - Attribute: ibm-kn = principal @ realm
- CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5 binds: DN/userid and password
  - Client hashes password using MD5 encryption


# LDAP Authentication with SDBM (RACF)



# LDAP TDBM Authentication



# **LDAP Native Authentication**



# z/OS LDAP Server Native Authentication

### • Disadvantage of Authentication in RACF:

- SDBM backend required
- Nonstandard Distinguished Name (racfid, profiletype)
- Fixed schema: only RACF information is available, cannot add attributes to contain additional information

### Native Authentication uses TDBM backend

- Standard Distinguished Name (e.g. cn, ou, o)
- Any schema supported by LDAP V3 for person entry can be used
  - Any information supported by the schema can be retrieved
  - Use TDBM groups and group membership in ACLs
- Authentication (password verification) performed by RACF
  - Password for entry is in security server (not in TDBM)
  - No need for administration or synchronization of multiple password registries
  - RACF authentication triggered by attribute ibm-nativeld in TDBM entry
- Can limit native authentication to specific TDBM subtrees or entries some entries use RACF, others have passwords in entry

## Accessing RACF via LDAP


# SDBM Support of RACF

### Use LDAP to add, modify, delete, display RACF users, groups, and usergroup connection - remote admin

**Equivalent to RACF commands:** ADDUSER, ALTUSER, DELUSER, LISTUSER, ADDGROUP, ALTGROUP, DELGROUP, LISTGRP, CONNECT, REMOVE

### **SDBM directory structure**

\*\* With enableresource on



example DN: racfid=kmorgan,profiletype=user,cn=myRacf

### Hard coded schema definitions

Limited search capabilities - predefined by SDBM

### All data accessed via RACF

No RACF Data in LDAP

Authorization controled by RACF, based on bound userid

# Changing the RACF Password

### Idapmodify can be used to change RACF password

Via SDBM:

```
    dn: racfid=G12345,profiletype=user,cn=myRACF
changetype: modify
replace: racfPassword
racfPassword: new_password
    Via TDBM with native authentication

            dn: cn=jayb,ou=LDAP,o=ibm,c=us
```

```
changetype: modify
delete: userPassword
userPassword: old_password
-
add: userPassword
userPassword: new password
```

- Note: replace: userPassword cannot be used not supported
- LDAP SDBM or native authentication bind can be used to change a password (even if expired)

Specify old\_password/ new\_password

### **Access Control in TDBM**

# **Access Control Checking**


26

Does subject have the right to perform the requested operation on an object?

"subject" - the "bound" LDAP client identity: DN of requestor + DNs of groups to which requestor belongs

"object" - the entries or the attributes of the entries involved in the operation

"rights" - the access required to perform the requested operation (add/delete entry, read/write/search/compare attribute)



# **Access Control Implementation**

**TDBM uses an Access Control List (ACL) to control access to an entry** Specifies DNs of bound users and groups that can access the entry

Can control access to individual attributes or to classes of attributes (normal, sensitive, critical, restricted and system)

Attribute's access class defined in the schema

Use LDAP modify operation to set ACL and search operation to display ACL info

### examples:

aclentry: cn=Jayb,o=Your Company:normal:rwsc:sensitive:rsc aclentry: racfid=morgankg,profiletype=user,cn=myRacf:object:ad aclentry: group:cn=mgrs,o=Your Company:at:userpassword:rwsc aclentry:group:racfid=g1,profiletype=group,cn=myRacf:normal:rwsc

Can propagate an entry's ACL to the subtree below it

# Special aclEntry "pseudo-DNs"

#### cn=anybody

Applies when no other specific ACL value applies

#### cn=authenticated

Applies when the requestor has authenticated to the directory but no other specific ACL value applies

Meant to allow more access than cn=anybody ACL value


#### cn=this

Applies when the requestor has authenticated with the same DN as the entry being accessed Used to grant individuals access to their own entry

### **Example:**

aclentry: cn=anybody:normal:rsc aclentry: cn=authenticated:normal:rsc:sensitive:rs aclentry: cn=this:normal:rscw:sensitive:rscw:critical:rsc **The Big Picture** 

# User Information and Authentication in LDAP



New Function in z/OS V2R4 LDAP

### Overview

- Problem Statement / Need Addressed
  - SDBM backend uses R\_admin callable service to issue the RACF search command, and is subject to the R\_admin 4096-line output limitation.
  - SDBM backend search results can be incomplete if the RACF database contains over 4096 user/group/general resource profiles.
  - SDBM backend only supports a few search filters and the search capability is limited.
- Solution
  - The R\_admin extract next profile function can be used to iteratively retrieve the rest of the profiles not returned from the RACF search command.
  - The SDBM extended search is introduced to support all the LDAP-compliant search filters.
- Benefit / Value
  - Search capability enhancement simplifies RACF profile management and makes the SDBM search behavior more similar to that of other backends.

### Usage & Invocation - SDBM extended search

- Enhanced search capability
  - Complete search result, no 4096-line limitation
  - Common LDAP search filter support
- Performance consideration
  - Basic mode supports limited search filters, with performance equivalent to the traditional SDBM search that disables the extended search (Off mode)
  - Advanced mode has performance impact because common LDAP search filter support requires loading complete profiles from RACF

SDBM Extended Search						
	Search Capability					
Mode	4096-Line Limitation Search Filter Sup		Search Result			
Off	Yes	Limited	Profile entry DN or complete profile entry *			
Basic	No	Limited	Profile entry DN or complete profile entry *			
Advanced	No	All	Complete profile entry			

Davids-MacBook-Pro-10:~ davidrossi\$ Idapsearch -h 192.168.48.122 -D racfid=dzrossi,profiletype=user, cn=tec2racf,o=ibm,c=us -w password -b profiletype=user,cn=tec2racf,o=ibm,c=us "objectclass=\*" -

#### extendedSearch off


# USER05, USER, tec2racf, ibm, us dn: racfid=USER05,profiletype=USER,cn=tec2racf,o=ibm,c=us

#### extendedSearch advanced

# USER05, USER, tec2racf, ibm, us dn: racfid=USER05,profiletype=USER,cn=tec2racf,o=ibm,c=us racfid: USER05 racfauthorizationdate: 01/09/19 racfowner: RACFID=PEUSER, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=TEC2RACF, 0=IBM, C=US racfpasswordinterval: 90 racfpasswordchangedate: 03/24/20 racfprogrammername: PELAB USER05 racfdefaultgroup: RACFID=PEUSER.PROFILETYPE=GROUP,CN=TEC2RACF,0=IBM,C=US racflastaccess: 03/24/20/14:28:09 racflogondays: SUNDAY racflogondays: MONDAY racflogondays: TUESDAY racflogondays: WEDNESDAY racflogondays: THURSDAY racflogondays: FRIDAY racflogondays: SATURDAY racflogontime: ANYTIME racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=PEUSER.PROFILETYPE=GROUP.CN=TEC2RACF,0=IBM,C=US racfhavepasswordenvelope: NO racfhavepassphraseenvelope: NO racfmfapwfallback: NOPWFALLBACK racfattributes: PASSWORD safaccountnumber: D999 safdefaultcommand: : IA== safholdclass: H safiobclass: A safdefaultloginproc: IKJACCNT saflogonsize: 1048000 safmessageclass: H safmaximumregionsize: 0 safdefaultsysoutclass: 0 safuserdata: 0000 objectclass: TOP objectclass: RACFBASECOMMON objectclass: RACFUSER objectclass: SAFTSOSEGMENT

## **DS CONFIG**

#### Setup made easy with DSCONFIG



Samples in /usr/lpp/ldap/etc

IBM Tivoli Directory Server Administration and Use for z/OS - chapter 4

https://www-01.ibm.com/servers/resourcelink/svc00100.nsf/pages/zOSV2R4sc236788/\$file/glpa200\_v2r4.pdf

### Setup made easy with ds config

1) Create or add to existing .profile export STEPLIB=SYS1.SIEALNKE:ÇSTEPLIB export PATH=/usr/lpp/ldap/sbin:\$PATH export NLSPATH=/usr/lpp/ldap/1ib/nls/msg/%L/%N:\$NLSPATH exoort LANG=En US.IBM-1047

2) Copy over ds.profile from /usr/lpp/ldap/etc to your working directory. Edit ds.profile

3) Run ds utility – dsconfig –I ds.profile This will create the following jobs.

GLD.CNFOUT

APF DSCONFIG DSENVVAR GLDSRV PRGMCTRL PROG00 RACF

IBM Tivoli Directory Server Administration and Use for z/OS - chapter 4

https://www-01.ibm.com/servers/resourcelink/svc00100.nsf/pages/zOSV2R4sc236788/\$file/glpa200\_v2r4.pdf



# **Practical Use Cases**




# Distributed Identity Management



# Data Privacy Passports (DPP)

- The data is protected at the point of extraction and is enforced at the point of consumption
- Move data from IBM Z to distributed as Trusted Data Objects – Start with SQL data sources on IBM Z
- Passport Controller deployed in an SSC LPAR
- Policy for enforcement can be changed dynamically to revoke to entitle users to data
- Create a single protected table to provide multiple views of data

## Runs on IBM z15



### Data Privacy Passports – External Identity Management

Access Management is about Users, Groups and Connects

RACF id RACF password RACF group RACF connect

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Idapsearch -h 129.40.130.17 -D racfid=usrda,profiletype=user,cn=RACF,o=IBM,c=in -w datapass -b racfid=usrda,profiletype=user,cn=RACF,o=IBM,c=in "objectclass=\*" racfconnectgroupname

```
# extended LDIF
     # LDAPv3
     # base <racfid=usrda,profiletype=user,cn=RACF,o=IBM,c=in> with scope subtree
     # filter: objectclass=*
     # requesting: racfconnectgroupname
     # USRDA, USER, RACF, ibm, in
     dn: racfid=USRDA,profiletype=USER,cn=RACF,o=ibm,c=in
     racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=DPPDA, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=RACF, 0=IBM, C=IN
     racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=OMK1, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=RACF, O=IBM, C=IN
     racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=OMK2, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=RACF, O=IBM, C=IN
     racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=SMK1, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=RACF, O=IBM, C=IN
     racfconnectgroupname: RACFID=SMK2, PROFILETYPE=GROUP, CN=RACF, O=IBM, C=IN
     # search result
     search: 2
     result: 0 Success
     # numResponses: 2
     # numEntries: 1
IBM Security
```



# **User Behavior Analytics**

E IBM QRadar shboard Offenses Log Activity Netwo	rk Activity Assets Reports	Risks Vulnerabi	itles Admin Z.Audit User-Analytics Pulse			System Time: 8:39 A
ashboard			Search for User	Q,	Next Refresh: 00:40 C	Reset Layout 🔅 🖧 葦 🕐
fonitored Users 7.8K	High Risk User O 0% of monitored to		Users Discovered from Events 87	Users Imported 7.7K	• U • M	ve Analytics BA Rules lachine Learning
Status of Machine Learning Models	5	\$	Recent Offenses		System Score (Last Day)	
Authentication Activity		• • •	Offense # 81 User: SIRC	updated about 23 hours ago	1.4K	
Suspicious Activity		-	Description: UACC Set To Read On A Data S	et Profile containing Change_UACC		
Data Downloaded			Event Count: 2 Flow Count: 0	Magnitude: 3/10	E 800	
Activity Distribution		<b>~</b>	Offense # 71 User: PPETERS	updated 12 days ago	e 400	
Defined Peer Group		<b>~</b>	Description: UACC Set To Read On A Data S Authority Was Granted containing Change_U		400 400 Average	
Learned Peer Group			Event Count: 6 Flow Count: 0	Magnitude: 4/10	8:30 AM 12:00 PM 6:00 PM	M 130 MM
Monitored Users			Offense # 70 User: WASADM	updated 16 days ago		·
	Recent risk Risk sco	re ↓	Description: UACC Set To Read On A Data S	et Profile containing Change_UACC	Risk Category Breakdown (Last He	
U070003		2.1	Event Count: 4 Flow Count: 0	Magnitude: 3/10		<ul> <li>User Privilege</li> <li>UBA Machine Learning</li> </ul>
USS TEAM U040016			Offense # 69 User: CSTLSEC	updated about a month ago		
USS TEAM	10 1	7.13	Description: System Authority Was Granted of	containing Grant_Privilege_System		
U050030 USS TEAM	0 1	5.68 📑	Event Count: 2 Flow Count: 0	Magnitude: 3/10		
C2PSUSER	0 12	2.19	Offense # 68 User: PPETERS	updated 2 months ago		
<b>U040009</b> USS TEAM	0 12		Description: System Authority Was Granted p Data Set Profile containing Change_UACC	preceded by UACC Set To Read On A		

User Import > Edit			×
LDAP server configurat	LDAP server configuration		
2 Other import settings	Enter the LDAP server information to retrieve user data. Before going to the next step, click Test Connection.		
Ĭ	Protocol LDAP Server Host * ① Port *	Attribute	Samples
3 Summary	ldap:// ~ 9.12.20.114 2389	dn	racfid=\$IZUSVR,profiletype=USER,sysple more
	Username (Bind DN)		
	racfid=dzrossi,profiletype=user,sysplex=plex1	racfattributes	PROTECTED more
	Password	racfauthorizationdate	02/14/17 more
		racfconnectgroupname	RACFID=CFZUSRGP,PROFILETYPE=GR
	<ul> <li>Advanced Settings</li> </ul>	racfdefaultgroup	RACFID=ZOSMF\$90,PROFILETYPE=GR more
	Base DN ()	racfhavepassphraseenvelope	NO
	profiletype=user,sysplex=plex1		
	Filter ①	racfhavepasswordenvelope	NO
	objectclass=*	racfid	\$IZUSVR more
	Certificate ①	racfinstallationdata	2019 HUANG XIAO CHEN ZOSMF
		racflastaccess	07/04/18/22:25:56
	Paged results	racflogondays	SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESD
	Test Connection Number of attributes: 20	racflogontime	ANYTIME

#### ≡ IBM QRadar

Dashboard

#### Peers in Group membership : RACFID=POKTSO,PROFILETYPE=GROUP,SYSPLEX=PLEX1



Q

Dashboard > User Det

Offenses Log Activity Netw

Filter users...

DZROSSI	-			
Job title: DAVE ROSSI Department: 2017 DAVE ROSSI ( Group membership: RACFID=POKTS)		Recent risk	Risk score ↓	
Overall Risk Score Risk O \> O \> O Advanced Actions -	DODARO1 LISA DODARO	0	• 0.07	<b>E</b> 1
Recent Offenses No recent Sense Offense	DZROSSI DAVE ROSSI	0	• 0.07	Ē
	PPETERS8 PHIL PETERS	0	• 0.07	<b>=</b> 1
	TSO8CHAR FRED LATES	0	• 0	<b>E</b>
	BARTOE2 RYAN BARTOE	0	• 0	
	FATZ PETER FATZINGER	0	• O	

### Other Uses cases



# THANK YOU

#### FOLLOW US ON:

- ibm.com/security
- securityintelligence.com
- xforce.ibmcloud.com
- *ibmsecurity*
- youtube/user/ibmsecuritysolutions

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