

Powerful and secure infrastructures with WebSphere Application Server for z/OS

WebSphere V5 and J2EE 1.3: Security Overview



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(thanks to my residents)



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Agenda

- Introduction, terminology and overview
- J2EE security concepts
- New in J2EE 1.3 and WebSphere Application Server V5
 - Increased flexibility
 - Improved interoperability
 - Java 2 security
 - JAAS

Terminology

- Basic security terminology
 - Identification
 - Examples: userId, distinguished name
 - Authentication
 - How do we know you're really Adam?
 - Authorization
 - OK Adam, you may freely eat of every tree in the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat.
 - Confidentiality
 - Protection of messages and other data from observation by unauthorized entities
 - Integrity
 - Assurance that a message has not been altered in transmission
 - Non-repudiation
 - The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me fruit from the tree, and I ate--blame her!




Security API's reference

- CertPath 1.0 from J2EE V1.4
- Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) 1.2.1
- Java Authentication and Authorization Services (JAAS) 1.0
- Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) 1.0.2
- Public Key Cryptography Standards 1.0
- SOAP-Sec 1.0
- XML Digital Signature 0.9.0
- Common Secure Interoperability Version 2 (CSlv2)

Some Java terminology


- Subject an abstraction for a user or caller
 - ironically, the subject is an object
 - may contain one or more principals
- The principal is a user in a particular context--one principal at a time may be active on the thread
- A credential is what the security mechanism returned after the user authenticated



J2EE Security Model

- Declarative
 - Specified outside the program code - in the deployment descriptor
 - Controls how authentication is performed and who is authorized to which resources
 - Roles, run-as, res-auth
 - Java 2 security
- Programmatic
 - Program code performs authentication and/or authorization
 - JAAS


The monsters still with us



- Within the J2EE server, security identities can be set/changed but the ACEE stays equal to the RACF userid of the J2EE application servant region.
- ACEE can **no longer** be changed via "Sync to OS Thread" option



Roles




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Roles

- Roles are defined in the deployment descriptor
 - Web components (URL / method)
 - EJB components
- RACF
 - profile in classes GEJBROLE
 - or EJBROLE control use of the role
 - The APPLDATA field in the profile specifies a RACF userid to be associated with the role when RunAs(role)
 - Although the classes names are GEJBROLE/EJBROLE, the profiles protect all resources, not just only EJBs
- Customer User Registry
 - Roles defined in authorization bindings



Roles



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Run-as RunAS are two monsters with many heads

- RunAs sets the principal
- used to run this method and for downstream propagation
 - Caller (the default)
 - Run this method with the identity of the user who instantiated me
 - Server (EJB Container only)
 - Run this method with the identity of the server on which I was instantiated
 - Role
 - Run this method with the RACF ID associated with this roles RACF EJBROLE/GEJBROLE profile



Identity propagation

- run-as
 - run-as
 - Included in J2EE 1.3 (EJB 2.0, Servlet 2.3) specification
 - Defaults to caller
 - Can be specified as a role-name
 - Found in Web application or EJB deployment descriptor
 - Applies to component and all its methods
- runAs
 - IBM WebSphere extension to the programming model
 - Introduced in V4, supported in V5
 - Applies to EJB only
 - Defaults to caller
 - Can be specified as Server or a role-name
 - Found in IBM extension to EJB deployment descriptor
 - Can be applied separately to each method


RunAS role 2 user mapping

- Local OS
- Role name is mapped to RACF ID via the APPLDATA property in the EJBROLE/GEJBROLE profile
 - **APPLDATA (EVA)**
- Custom Registry
- or to an CUR Identity within the bindings file
 - **ibm-application-bnd.xmi:**

```
<runAsMap xmi:id="RunAsMap_1">
  <runAsBindings xmi:id="RunAsBinding_1">
    <authData xmi:type="commonbnd:BasicAuthData"
      xmi:id="BasicAuthData_1" userId="EVA" password="HOLGER"/>
    <securityRole href="META-INF/application.xml#SecurityRole_6"/>
  </runAsBindings>
</runAsMap>
```



RunAs separate objects




Identity propagation: same object

EJBROLE: Leader
APPLDATA("TOM")*

Jack's Roles:
ImportantGuy
Leader
Boss

Tom's Roles:
Leader
Presenter



*Shows SAF implementation. Mapping can also be performed in deployment descriptor

Within the same object
RunAs does not change the
propagated Java principal.




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RunAs stack

RunAs "stack"



caller identity is important for:

- methodPermissions
- isCallerInRole(x)
- getCallerPrincipal()

RunAs Identity is important for:

- downstream authorizations
- outbound identity
- syncToOSThread when enabled




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Res-auth



Container: container supplies userid (and password if required) from execution environment or configuration settings

Application/Servlet: application must specify userid and password



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Summary of J2EE security concepts

- People often work in various roles
- Application developer defines roles required for use
- Application assembler defines what identity should be used when running (RunAs)
- Application assembler can map application roles to organizational roles using role references
- Security administrator defines roles as profiles in the RACF EJBROLE class
- Permits users & groups to EJBROLE profiles
- Security can be container based (declarative) or application based (programmatic)



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New in security for V5

- J2EE 1.3 compliant
- Role based Authorization Enhancements for J2EE 1.3
- Java 2 Security
 - Policy based access to System resources
- JAAS programming model support
 - Provides means for restricting running code based on authenticated user
- Support for CSiv2 security protocol (conformance level 0)
 - Provides Interoperability between different vendor's application servers
 - SAS (for WAS Distributed) and z/SAS (for WAS z/OS) protocol supported for backward compatibility (4.0.x and before)
- JAAS, Java 2 Security and CSiv2 required by J2EE 1.3 CTS
- WebSphere Security Administration
 - Role Based Authorization for Administrative tasks
 - Role Based Authorization for Naming
 - All Security configuration handled by admin console Security Center
 - No longer necessary to edit SAS properties files, and other security files
- Consistency and commonality between WebSphere on Distributed platforms and z/OS platform




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WebSphere Security: The big picture




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
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z/OS Implementation



V5 Authc/Authz & delegation options



Connector security

Connectors		ThreadIdentity	ThreadSecurity
IMS Connector local configuration		ALLOWED	Not Supported
IMS Connector remote configuration		NOTALLOWED	Not Supported
CTG CICSECIConnector local configuration		ALLOWED	Not Supported
CTG CICSECIConnector remote configuration		NOTALLOWED	Not Supported
IMS JDBC Connector		REQUIRED	True
RRA DB2 390 Local JDBC Provider		ALLOWED	True
Container-managed alias specified?			
NO		YES	
Connector Allows or Requires Thread Identity?		Connector Requires Thread Identity?	
NO	YES	NO	YES
Connector Requires OS Thread Security?		Connector Requires OS Thread Security?	
Processing is dependent on connector: • may throw exception • may default to connector user/pswd custom properties	NO	YES	NO
	Server Sync-To-Thread enabled?		YES
	NO	YES	NO
	YES	YES	YES
Use RunAs user identity associated with current thread		Use specified alias	
Use Server identity		Use RunAs user identity associated with current thread	
Use RunAs user identity associated with current thread		Use Server identity	
		Use RunAs user identity associated with current thread	



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It finally talks to others!

- Two suites of function available
 - zSAS
 - Compatible with z/OS and OS/390 V4 and V5 servers
 - Compatible with WebSphere AE V4 clients (basic authentication over SSL)
 - Compatible with WebSphere AE V4 servers (server-wide configured userid/password only)
 - CS1v2
 - Compatible with all WebSphere V5 servers
 - Provides support for asserted identity
- These are available concurrently




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"Authentication mechanisms"

- SSO
 - SWAM
 - No security token created
 - LTPA
 - Security token created by WebSphere using configured keys
 - ICSF
 - Security token created by ICSF using keys from SAF keyring
- Interoperability/migration




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Java 2 Security

- Generally code based vs. Subject- Based Authorization
- Access Control
 - Policy
 - defines permissions
 - grant to code based on the location and signer(s)
 - Dynamic, multi-level
 - Cell, Server, Application, Connector
- Each class belongs to one Protection Domain
 - Protection Domain
 - Code Source
 - Location (URL)
 - Signers
 - Permissions
- Filters prevent abuse by applications



Why?

Servant identity must have permission to all OS resources required by application

Java 2 Security allows for differentiation among applications




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
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Policy files




Security Manager/Access Controller



JAAS

- Container (declarative) and application (programmatic) security
- Multiple login configurations
 - Each having one or more modules
 - Required
 - Requisite
 - Sufficient
 - Optional
 - Default is WSLLogin
- Replaces SSOAuthenticator
 - Deprecated, but still supported
- Introduces Subject-based permissions
 - Class x can open file y when running under Subject with principal z.




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doAS() makes JAAS login useful

- Establishes new subject on the thread
 - Java Subject won't survive a **doPrivileged()** call
 - No way to call an EJB using the new subject
 - WebSphere **WSSubject** invented to overcome this deficiency




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
JAAS Components



doAs() vs. run-As

	run-as	doAs()
type	declarative	programmatic
scope	method (runAs) or component (run-as)	run() method
values	caller (default) role server (runAs only)	any Subject (or WSSubject)
propagated?	Yes	WSSubject only

Admin security



Role Based
LOCAL OS only