Note
Before using this document, be sure to read the information in "Notices" on page 187.

Edition notice
This edition applies to libica version 3.2 for openCryptoki version 3.7 and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions.

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Summary of changes

This revision reflects changes to the Development stream for libica version 3.2.

You can find the open source version of libica at:

https://github.com/opencryptoki/libica/releases

Updates for libica version 3.2

Edition SC34-2602-09

This publication for libica version 3.2 also includes the changes for libica version 3.1.

- The libica library introduces a new family of SHA3/SHAKE hash functions, which exploit the SHA3 support offered by CPACF on the new z14 processor. The SHAKE functions are part of the SHA3 family of hash algorithms. The name SHAKE combines the term Secure Hash Algorithm with the KECCAK family name of cryptographic hash functions.
  - In Chapter 7, “Examples,” on page 113, you find a new program sample for one of the new algorithms.
  - The IBM® z14 machine introduces a new CPACF instruction (KMA) to implement the AES Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM). As of IBM z14, this KMA instruction is transparently used by existing AES-GCM APIs. Additionally, new AES-GCM APIs have been added to fully exploit the new KMA instruction. These new APIs are available also on systems that do not support the KMA instruction.
  - The utilities icainfo andicastats now show new output lines that provide information about availability and usage of the new AES-GCM and SHA-3/SHAKE functions.
  - Due to their reduced security strength, it is no longer recommended to use the available DES functions and the SHA1 hashing algorithm. For compatibility reasons, they are still available in libica, but are moved into a separate topic: “Deprecated functions” on page 75.

Updates for libica version 3.0

Edition SC34-2602-08

- The libica library is now enabled for FIPS 140-2 certification and therefore can run in the so-called FIPS mode. When running in FIPS mode, only cryptographic algorithms approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) can be used. FIPS mode can be disabled at compile time.
- The icainfo output now indicates whether libica has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state.
- In Chapter 7, “Examples,” on page 113, you find three updated samples and two new AES samples, while all DES samples have been deleted.
- The following deprecated libica APIs are no longer available with libica version 3.0:
Updates for libica version 2.6

Edition SC34-2602-07

- A new deterministic random bit generator (DRBG), which is compliant to the NIST SP800-90A specifications, has been added to libica.
- The information about libica version 2.6 presented in this document is valid for all libica versions 2.6.x, because the changes in version 2.6 later than 2.6.0 are not relevant for user documentation.
About this document

This document describes how to install and use version 3.2 of the Library for IBM Cryptographic Architecture (libica).

libica is a library of cryptographic functions used to write cryptographic applications on Linux on Z and LinuxONE, both with and without cryptographic hardware.

You can find the latest version of this document on the developerWorks® website at:

www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html

and on the IBM Knowledge Center at:


How this document is organized

The information is divided into topics that describe installing, configuring and using libica together with descriptions of the functions and example programs.

Chapter 1, “General information about libica,” on page 1 has general information about the current libica version.

Chapter 2, “Installing and using libica version 3.2,” on page 5 contains installation and set up instructions, and coexistence information for the current libica version.

Chapter 3, “Application programming interfaces,” on page 9 describes the libica APIs.

Chapter 4, “Accessing libica functions through the PKCS #11 API (openCryptoki),” on page 89 describes how the cryptographic functions provided by libica can be accessed using the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

Chapter 5, “libica constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes,” on page 103 lists the defines, typedefs, structs, and return codes for libica.

Chapter 6, “libica tools,” on page 109 contains tools to investigate the capabilities of your cryptographic hardware and how these capabilities are used by applications that use libica.

Chapter 7, “Examples,” on page 113 is a set of programming examples that use the libica APIs.

Who should read this document

This document is intended for C programmers who want to access IBM Z hardware support for cryptographic methods.

In particular, this publication addresses programmers who write hardware-specific plug-ins for cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL and openCryptoki.
Distribution independence

This publication does not provide information that is specific to a particular Linux distribution.

The tools it describes are distribution independent.

Other publications for Linux on Z and LinuxONE

You can find publications for Linux on Z and LinuxONE on IBM Knowledge Center and on developerWorks.

These publications are available on IBM Knowledge Center at

- Device Drivers, Features, and Commands (distribution-specific editions)
- Using the Dump Tools (distribution-specific editions)
- Running Docker Containers on IBM Z, SC34-2781
- KVM Virtual Server Quick Start, SC34-2753
- KVM Virtual Server Management, SC34-2752
- KVM Virtual Server Management Tools, SC34-2763
- Device Drivers, Features, and Commands for Linux as a KVM Guest (distribution-specific editions)
- Installing SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 as a KVM Guest, SC34-2755
- How to use FC-attached SCSI devices with Linux on Systems, SC33-8413
- libica Programmer’s Reference, SC34-2602
- Exploiting Enterprise PKCS #11 using openCryptoki, SC34-2713
- Secure Key Solution with the Common Cryptographic Architecture Application Programmer’s Guide, SC33-8294
- Linux on Systems Troubleshooting, SC34-2612
- Kernel Messages, SC34-2599
- How to use Execute-in-Place Technology with Linux on z/VM®, SC34-2594
- How to Improve Performance with PAV, SC33-8414
- How to Set up a Terminal Server Environment on z/VM, SC34-2596

You can also find these publications on developerWorks at

For versions of documents that have been adapted to a particular distribution, see
one of the following web pages:

- www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_ubuntu.html
Chapter 1. General information about libica

The libica library provides hardware support (and software fallbacks if the hardware is not available) for cryptographic functions.

The cryptographic adapters are used for asymmetric encryption and decryption. The CPACF instructions are used for symmetric encryption and decryption, pseudo random number generation, message authentication, and secure hashing. For some of these functions, if the hardware is not available or failed, libica uses the low-level cryptographic functions of OpenSSL, if available.

This product includes software that is developed by the OpenSSL Project for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org). This product includes cryptographic software that is written by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

The libica library is part of the openCryptoki project in GitHub. It is primarily used by OpenSSL through the IBM OpenSSL CA engine or by openCryptoki through the ICA token. A higher level of security can be achieved by using it through the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

The libica library is optimized to work on IBM Z hardware.

IBM reserves the right to change or modify this API at any time. However, an effort is made to keep the API compatible with later versions within a major release.

You can use the icastats utility to obtain statistics about cryptographic processes. The icainfo command shows whether libica is using cryptographic hardware or software fallback for each specific libica function. See "icastats - Show use of libica functions" on page 110 and icainfo - Show available libica functions’ on page 109 for more information.

libica is an open source project and can be found at: https://github.com/opencryptoki/libica/releases

In the extracted source package, you also find test cases for all APIs in directory /src/tests/.

IBM Z cryptographic hardware support

The information in this topic presents the different types of cryptographic hardware support that may be available on IBM Z mainframes, depending on the machine model.

Supported IBM CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF):

Ciphers:
- DES, TDES, AES128, AES192, and AES256 with the following modes of operation: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR, CMAC, GCM, and XTS.

Hashes:
- SHA-1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256, and GHASH.
Random:
   PRNG

Cryptographic coprocessors:

Accelerator: RSA (CRT, MOD-EXPO) with supported key sizes in the range 57 - 4096 bit.

CCA Coprocessor: RSA (CRT, MOD-EXPO) with supported key sizes in the range 57 - 4096 bit, and RNG.

Check the prerequisites: cryptographic adapter and device driver

To exploit hardware support of asymmetric cryptographic operations, you need a loaded device driver and an installed IBM cryptographic adapter.

Loading the Linux zcrypt device driver

You also need an installed Linux kernel that includes the zcrypt device driver.

To check, enter the command:

```
$ lszcrypt
card06: CEX5A
```

If the following error message is displayed, load the zcrypt device driver main module:

```
error - cryptographic device driver zcrypt is not loaded!
```

The zcrypt device driver is no longer monolithic as in older distributions where the module was called z90crypt. The device driver is now loaded as separate modules, where the main module is called `ap`. There is, however, an alias name z90crypt that links to the `ap` main module.

To load the device driver `ap` main module, use the following command:

```
modprobe ap
```

See your Linux distribution documentation for how to load the module persistently.

Checking the cryptographic adapter availability

Check whether you have plugged in and enabled your IBM cryptographic adapter and validate your model and type configuration (accelerator or coprocessor). Use the `lszcrypt` command to retrieve basic status information.

To check, enter the command:

```
$ lszcrypt
card06: CEX5A
```

Use the `chzcrypt` command to enable (online state) or disable (offline state) the IBM crypto adapter:
$ chzcrypt -e 0x06  // set card06 online
$ chzcrypt -d 0x06  // set card06 offline

Use one of the following commands to display more detailed information about the adapters, for example, to see if the adapters are online:

```
lszcrypt -V
lszcrypt -VV
lszcrypt -VVV
```

For more information about the IBM crypto adapter with Linux on z Systems®, see Device Drivers, Features, and Commands, SC33-8411 available at [www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html](http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html)
Chapter 2. Installing and using libica version 3.2

View the contained subtopics for information about where to obtain the libica version 3.2 library, and how to install it.

Installing libica version 3.2 from the distribution packages

To make use of the described libica hardware support for cryptographic functions, it is necessary to install the libica version 3.2 package. Obtain the libica version 3.2 package from your distribution provider as soon as available (RPM or DEB) for package manager installation.

Procedure

The libica library is available as an RPM or DEB package named libica3-<version> within your distribution package. Mainly there are two packages, a library package and a development package. Ubuntu and recent SUSE Linux Enterprise Server distributions separated the icastats and icainfo commands into the libica-utils package. See your Linux distribution documentation for how to install an RPM or DEB package. To check whether the libica library is installed, issue:

for Redhat and SUSE:

```
# rpm -qa | grep -i libica
```

for Ubuntu:

```
# dpkg -l | grep -i libica
```

Installing libica version 3.2 from the source package

If you prefer, you can install libica from the source package manually.

Procedure

1. Download the latest libica version 3.2 sources from the GitHub libica website: https://github.com/opencryptoki/libica/releases

2. Extract the tar archive. There should be a new directory named libica-3.x.x.

3. Change to that directory and execute the following scripts and commands:

```
$ ./bootstrap
$ ./configure
$ make
$ make install
```

where:

**bootstrap**
Initial setup, basic configurations

**configure**
Check configurations and build the makefile.
You can use the option --enable-testcases when running the 
`configure` command to enable the build environment to automatically 
compile the test-suite:
```
configure --enable-testcases
```
You can use the option --enable-fips when running the `configure` 
command to enable the build environment to compile with FIPS mode:
```
configure --enable-fips
```

```
make  Compile and link
make install  Install the libraries
```

---

**Using libica**

The function prototypes are provided in this header file: `include/ica_api.h`.

Applications using these functions must link to libica and libcrypto. The libcrypto 
library is available from the OpenSSL package. You must have OpenSSL in order to 
runt programs using the current libica version.

---

**Using libica in FIPS mode**

Starting with libica version 3.0, the library is enabled for FIPS 140-2 certification 
and therefore can run in the so-called FIPS mode. When running in FIPS mode, 
only cryptographic algorithms approved by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) can be used.

The NIST defines so called Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). One 
of their publications, the FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements For Cryptographic 
Modules defines a standard for cryptography-based security systems (crypto 
modules) used by US Federal organizations to protect sensitive data. FIPS 140-2 
certifications are done under the **Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)**.

The FIPS 140-2 standard specifies four levels of security. Each level corresponds to 
a set of requirements wherein a higher level is a strict superset of the lower levels. 
Software crypto modules can maximally reach a level 1 certification. In order to 
make the libica FIPS 140-2 level 1 conformant, the library has been extended by the 
following features:

- **When running in FIPS mode**, only NIST approved crypto algorithms can be 
  used and various self-tests are conducted. Approved crypto algorithms are listed 
  in [Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips-140-2/annex-a). However, it is 
  possible to disable this feature at compile time. Non-approved algorithms (like 
  for example, DES and PRNG) are disabled when running in FIPS mode.

  For information on how to enable or disable the FIPS mode, see [Enabling libica 
  for FIPS mode](#) on page 7.

  - The software fallbacks and RSA key generation of libica is currently provided 
    by OpenSSL. When running in FIPS mode, libica tries to load OpenSSL in FIPS 
    mode. If the available OpenSSL build does not support this, libica consequently 
    disables its fallbacks and RSA key generation. If loading OpenSSL in FIPS mode 
    is successful, it allows only for the generation of RSA keys with FIPS approved 
    parameters (moduli, exponents).
  - Various self-tests required by FIPS 140-2 are implemented. If a self-test fails, 
    libica enters an error state (FIPS error state) and does not perform any 
    cryptographic operations. In this case, an error message is written to the `syslog`.

---
The DRBG error state was changed to trigger the FIPS error state. In this case an error message is written to the syslog.

New interfaces were added to enable the consuming application to trigger the self-tests on demand and to query the status (see “FIPS mode functions” on page 74). The status indicates, which self-tests were passed or failed and whether libica is running in FIPS mode.

The `icainfo` output now indicates whether libica has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state. Algorithms that are not FIPS approved are marked as blocked when running in FIPS mode. All algorithms are marked as blocked when libica is in an error state.

For detailed information about the FIPS 140-2 standard, see FIPS PUB 140-2

**FIPS mode dependencies**

Read about the dependencies on software and hardware that exist if you want to run libica in FIPS mode.

**Dependencies on Open Source software (OpenSSL)**

At startup, the library reads the kernel FIPS flag from the proc filesystem (see “Enabling the Linux kernel for FIPS mode”). If the flag is found to be 1, then the libica DRBG must be used for random number generation, because the libica PRNG is disabled with FIPS built. DRBG in turn has two options to obtain its seed material:

- Either from the `/dev/hwrng` device which is available via the CCA coprocessor adapter.
- If no `/dev/hwrng` device is available, the kernel prng module must be loaded to make the `/dev/prandom` device available for seed obtaining. This is, because the kernel prng like the libica DRBG is also FIPS compliant.

**Dependencies on hardware**

The pseudo random number generator (PRNG) provided by libica is disabled with FIPS built. So only the DRBG can be used for the generation of random data. However, the DRBG needs at least MSA 2 to work. This means that FIPS mode cannot be used if no MSA 2 (introduced with z10™) or higher is available.

---

**Enabling libica for FIPS mode**

To use libica in FIPS mode, the library itself and also the Linux kernel need to be enabled. That is, the FIPS-enabled libica library can run in FIPS mode when the kernel FIPS flag is set.

**Enabling the Linux kernel for FIPS mode**

A prerequisite for actually running the the FIPS-enabled libica in FIPS mode is to set the FIPS flag in the used Linux kernel configured for FIPS.

For all distributions, you need to enable the kernel FIPS mode at runtime by setting the kernel FIPS flag. To set this flag in `/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled`, boot or reboot with the kernel parameter `fips=1`. 

---

Chapter 2. Installing and using libica version 3.2 7
For more information about setting and checking the kernel FIPS flag, refer to *Device Drivers, Features, and Commands*, SC33-8411. Or, for more distribution-specific information, refer to the publications provided by the specific distributor.

**Enabling libica for FIPS mode**

If you are using libica from a distribution, ensure that FIPS mode is supported, because a distribution may provide libica packages (RPM or DEB) both with or without FIPS support.

If you want to install libica version 3.2 from the source package, as described in “Installing libica version 3.2 from the source package” on page 5, then refer to the INSTALL file for information on how to install, configure, and build the libica library. You can then enable the FIPS mode at compile time by running the configure script with the `enable-fips` option:

```
./configure --enable-fips
```
Chapter 3. Application programming interfaces

View a list of application programming interfaces (APIs) for the functions of libica version 3.2. All functions are included in include/ica_api.h.

Table 1. libica APIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open and close adapter functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open adapter handle</td>
<td>“ica_open_adapter” on page 14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13®, z13s™, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close adapter handle</td>
<td>“ica_close_adapter” on page 14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure hash operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-1 algorithm (deprecated)</td>
<td>“ica_sha1” on page 86</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-224 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha224” on page 15</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-256 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha256” on page 16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-384 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha384” on page 17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-512 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha512” on page 18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA3-224 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha3_224” on page 19</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA3-256 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha3_256” on page 20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA3-384 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha3_384” on page 21</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA3-512 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha3_512” on page 22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHAKE-128 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_shake_128” on page 23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHAKE-256 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_shake_256” on page 24</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random number generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate a pseudo random number</td>
<td>“ica_random_number_generate” on page 27</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. libica APIs (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - instantiate</td>
<td>&quot;ica_drbg_instantiate&quot; on page 27</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - reseed</td>
<td>&quot;ica_drbg_reseed&quot; on page 28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - generate</td>
<td>&quot;ica_drbg_generate&quot; on page 29</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - uninstantiate</td>
<td>&quot;ica_drbg_uninstantiate&quot; on page 30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - health_test</td>
<td>&quot;ica_drbg_health_test&quot; on page 30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RSA key generation functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate RSA keys in modulus/exponent format</td>
<td>&quot;ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo&quot; on page 31</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SW only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate RSA keys in CRT format</td>
<td>&quot;ica_rsa_key_generate_crt&quot; on page 32</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SW only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RSA encryption and decryption operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSA encryption and decryption operation using a key in modulus/exponent format</td>
<td>&quot;ica_rsa_mod_expo&quot; on page 33</td>
<td>Depends on supp. key size of Crypto Expr feature</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Key length max. 4K bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA encryption and decryption operation using a key in Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT) format</td>
<td>&quot;ica_rsa_crt&quot; on page 34</td>
<td>Depends on supp. key size of Crypto Expr feature</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Key length max. 4K bits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AES functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cbc&quot; on page 36</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CBC-Cipher text stealing mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cbc_cs&quot; on page 37</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_ccm&quot; on page 38</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>libica API name</td>
<td>Key length in bits</td>
<td>Supported on</td>
<td>CPACF function</td>
<td>SW fallback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cfb&quot; on page 40</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cmac&quot; on page 41</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode, process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cmac_intermediate&quot; on page 42</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode, process last chunk</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_cmac_last&quot; on page 43</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_ctr&quot; on page 44</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_ctrlist&quot; on page 45</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Electronic Code Book mode</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_ecb&quot; on page 47</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for single operations</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm&quot; on page 47</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - initialize</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_initialize&quot; on page 49</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - intermediate</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_intermediate&quot; on page 50</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - last</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_last&quot; on page 52</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - pointer to new GCM context</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_new&quot; on page 54</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - deallocate new GCM context</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_free&quot; on page 54</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - initialize new GCM context</td>
<td>&quot;ica_aes_gcm_kma_init&quot; on page 54</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. libica APIs (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - perform encryption or decryption with authentication</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_kma_update” on page 55</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - get authentication tag</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_kma_get_tag” on page 57</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for KMA exploitation - verify authentication tag</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_kma_verify_tag” on page 58</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ofb” on page 59</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with XEX-based Tweaked Code Book mode (TCB) with CipherText Stealing (CTS)</td>
<td>“ica_aes_xts” on page 60</td>
<td>128, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TDES/3DES functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cbc” on page 62</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CBC-Cipher text Stealing mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cbc_cs” on page 63</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cfb” on page 64</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac” on page 65</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac_intermediate” on page 66</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode process last chunk</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac_last” on page 67</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Counter mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ctr” on page 68</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ctrlist” on page 69</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. libica APIs (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Electronic Code Book mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ecb” on page 70</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ofb” on page 71</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information retrieval functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return version information for libica</td>
<td>“ica_get_version” on page 73</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return a list of crypto mechanisms supported by libica</td>
<td>“ica_get_functionlist” on page 73</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIPS mode functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queries and returns a FIPS status and whether libica is running in FIPS mode.</td>
<td>“ica_fips_status” on page 74</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triggers the implemented self-tests when running in FIPS mode.</td>
<td>“ica_fips_powerup_tests” on page 75</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DES functions (deprecated)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cbc” on page 76</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CBC-Cipher text stealing mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cbc_cs” on page 76</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cfb” on page 78</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac” on page 79</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac_intermediate” on page 80</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode process last chunk</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac_last” on page 81</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Counter mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ctr” on page 82</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>“ica_des_ctrlist” on page 83</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Electronic Code Book mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ecb” on page 84</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z196, z114, zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. libica APIs (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ofb” on page 85</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, zBC12, z13, z13s, z14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Open and close adapter functions

These functions open or close the crypto adapter. It is recommended to open the crypto adapter before using any of the libica crypto functions, and to close it after the last usage of the libica crypto functions. However, in this version of the libica only the RSA-related functions ica_rsa_modexpo and ica_rsa_crt require a valid adapter handle as input. A pointer to the value DRIVER_NOT_LOADED indicates an invalid adapter handle. The parameter ica_adapter_handle_t is a redefine of int.

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

ica_open_adapter

Purpose

Opens an adapter.

Format

unsigned int ica_open_adapter(ica_adapter_handle_t *adapter_handle);

Parameters

ica_adapter_handle_t *adapter_handle

Pointer to the file descriptor for the adapter or to DRIVER_NOT_LOADED if opening the crypto adapter failed.

Opening an adapter succeeds if a cryptographic device is accessible for reading and writing. By default, cryptographic access must be available with the /dev/z90crypt path name for the adapter open request to succeed. If the environment variable LIBICA_CRYPT_DEVICE is set to a valid path name of an accessible cryptographic device, accessing the device with that path name takes precedence over the default path names.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_close_adapter

Purpose

Closes an adapter.

Comments

This API closes a device handle.

Format

unsigned int ica_close_adapter(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle);
**Parameters**

```
ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle
```

Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

**Return codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For return codes indicating exceptions, see [“Return codes” on page 107](#).

---

**Secure hash operations**

These functions are included in: `include/ica_api.h`.

These functions perform secure hash on input data using the chosen algorithm of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, or SHAKE-256.

SHA context structures contain information about how much of the actual work was already performed. Also, it contains the part of the hash that is already produced. For the user, it is only interesting in cases where the message is not hashed at once, because the context is needed for further operations.

### ica_sha224

**Purpose**

Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHA-224 algorithm.

**Format**

```
unsigned int ica_sha224(unsigned int message_part,
                         unsigned int input_length,
                         unsigned char *input_data,
                         sha256_context_t *sha256_context,
                         unsigned char *output_data);
```

**Required hardware support**

KIMD-SHA-256 and KLMD-SHA-256

**Parameters**

```
unsigned int message_part
```

The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

- `SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY` 
  - A single hash operation
- `SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST` 
  - The first part
- `SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE` 
  - The middle part
- `SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL` 
  - The last part

```
unsigned int input_length
```

Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-224 algorithm.
unsigned char *input_data
   Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha256_context_t *sha256_context
   Pointer to the SHA-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha224 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha224. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

   Note: Due to the algorithm used by SHA-224, a SHA-256 context must be used.

unsigned char *output_data
   Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA224_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
   0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_sha256
   Purpose

   Performs a secure hash on the input data using the SHA-256 algorithm.

   Format
   unsigned int ica_sha256(unsigned int message_part,
                            unsigned int input_length,
                            unsigned char *input_data,
                            sha256_context_t *sha256_context,
                            unsigned char *output_data);

   Required hardware support

   KIMD-SHA-256 and KLMD-SHA-256

   Parameters

   unsigned int message_part
      The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

      SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
         A single hash operation

      SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
         The first part

      SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
         The middle part

      SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
         The last part
unsigned int input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-256 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha256_context_t *sha256_context
Pointer to the SHA-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha256 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha256. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA256_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_sha384
Purpose
Performs a secure hash on the input data using the SHA-384 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha384(unsigned int message_part,
uint64_t input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha512_context_t *sha512_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA-512 and KLMD-SHA-512

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
A single hash operation
SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
The first part
SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
The middle part
SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
The last part
uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-384 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha512_context_t *sha512_context
Pointer to the SHA-512 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha384 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha384. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

Note: SHA-384 also uses a SHA-512 context

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA384_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_sha512
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA-512 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha512(unsigned int message_part,
   uint64_t input_length,
   unsigned char *input_data,
   sha512_context_t *sha512_context,
   unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA-512 and KLMD-SHA-512

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
   SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
      A single hash operation
   SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
      The first part
   SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
      The middle part
   SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
      The last part
uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-512 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha512_context_t *sha512_context
Pointer to the SHA-512 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha512 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha512. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA512_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_sha3_224
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA3-224 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha3_224(unsigned int message_part,
unsigned int input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha3_224_context_t *sha3_224_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA3-224 and KLMD-SHA3-224

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
- SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
  a single hash operation.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
  the first part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
  the middle part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
  the last part.
unsigned int input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA3-224 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be NULL. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha3_224_context_t *sha3_224_context
Pointer to the SHA3-224 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha3_224 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha3_224. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. This pointer must always be available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a length of SHA3_224_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107

ica_sha3_256
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA3-256 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha3_256(unsigned int message_part,
unsigned int input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha3_256_context_t *sha3_256_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA3-256 and KLMD-SHA3-256

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
a single hash operation.

SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
the first part.

SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
the middle part.

SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
the last part.
unsigned int input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA3-256 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha3_256_context_t *sha3_256_context
Pointer to the SHA3-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha3_256 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha3_256. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. This pointer must always be available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a length of SHA3_256_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_sha3_384
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA3-384 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha3_384(unsigned int message_part,
uint64_t input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha3_384_context_t *sha3_384_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA3-384 and KLMD-SHA3-384

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
- SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
  a single hash operation.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
  the first part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
  the middle part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
  the last part.
uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA3-384 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha3_384_context_t *sha3_384_context
Pointer to the SHA3-384 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha3_384 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha3_384. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. This pointer must be available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a length of SHA3_384_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_sha3_512
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA3-512 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha3_512(unsigned int message_part,
uint64_t input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha3_512_context_t *sha3_512_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA3-512 and KLMD-SHA3-512

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
a single hash operation.

SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
the first part.

SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
the middle part.

SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
the last part.
uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA3-512 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even
in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha3_512_context_t *sha3_512_context
Pointer to the SHA3-512 context structure used to store intermediate values
needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part
SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must
contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha3_512 for message
part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message
part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned
value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha3_512. Therefore, the application
must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. This pointer must be
available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a length of
SHA3_512_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_shake_128

Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHAKE-128
algorithm. Unlike other hash functions, the SHAKE algorithm has no fixed output
length. This means that you can choose any output length which is a multiple of 8
bits (1 byte).

Format
unsigned int ica_shake_128(unsigned int message_part,
    uint64_t input_length,
    unsigned char *input_data,
    shake_128_context_t *shake_128_context,
    unsigned char *output_data, unsigned int output_length);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHAKE-128 and KLMD-SHAKE-128

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following
values:

SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
a single hash operation.

SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
the first part.

SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
the middle part.
SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
the last part.

uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHAKE-128
algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even
in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

shake_128_context_t *shake_128_context
Pointer to the SHAKE-128 context structure used to store intermediate values
needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part
SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must
contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_shake_128 for message
part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message
part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned
value can be used for a chained call of ica_shake_128. Therefore, the
application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained
calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. Done. This pointer
must be available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a
length as specified in parameter output_length. Make sure that the buffer is at
least this size.

unsigned int output_length
The resulting length of the hashed data. The output length must not be zero
and must be 1 byte or more for all message parts.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_shake_256
Purpose
Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHAKE-256
algorithm. Unlike other hash functions, the SHAKE algorithm has no fixed output
length. This means that you can choose any output length which is a multiple of 8
bits (1 byte).

Format
unsigned int ica_shake_256(unsigned int message_part,
 uint64_t input_length,
 unsigned char *input_data,
 shake_256_context_t *shake_256_context,
 unsigned char *output_data, unsigned int output_length);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHAKE-256 and KLMD-SHAKE-256
Parameters

unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
- SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
  a single hash operation.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
  the first part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
  the middle part.
- SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
  the last part.

uint64_t input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHAKE-256 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

shake_256_context_t *shake_256_context
Pointer to the SHAKE-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_shake_256 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_shake_256. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. This pointer must be available and must not be NULL. The resulting output data has a length as returned in parameter output_length. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

unsigned int output_length
The resulting length of the hashed data. The output length must not be zero and must be 1 byte or more for all message parts.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

Pseudo random number generation functions

lica provides two methods of random number (random bit) generation:
- a conventional random number generator ("ica_random_number_generate" on page 27).
- a NIST SP800-90A compliant deterministic random bit generator. This generator is implemented by a combination of five separate functional APIs and is hereafter referred to as ica_drbg to denote the complete generator as a whole.
Conventional ica_random_number_generate function

libica initialization tries to seed the CPACF random generator. To get the seed, device /dev/hwrng is opened. Device /dev/hwrng provides true random data from crypto adapters over the crypto device driver (main module name is ap, with an alias name z90crypt, which is linking to ap). If that fails, the initialization mechanism uses device /dev/urandom. Within the initialization, a byte counter s390_byte_count is set to 0. If the CPACF pseudo random generator is available, after 4096 bytes of the pseudo random number are generated, the random number generator is seeded again. If the CPACF pseudo random generator is not available, random numbers are read from /dev/urandom.

Since libica version 2.6, this API internally invokes the NIST compliant ica_drbg functionality. The original code of this API is only processed if no MSA5, or at least no MSA2 support is available, which is the prerequisite of the ica_drbg API (see “NIST compliant ica_drbg functions”).

NIST compliant ica_drbg functions

The following APIs make up the complete ica_drbg functionality:

- "ica_drbg_instantiate" on page 27
- "ica_drbg_reseed" on page 28
- "ica_drbg_generate" on page 29
- "ica_drbg_uninstantiate" on page 30
- "ica_drbg_health_test" on page 30

The IBM zEnterprise® EC12 (zEC12) machines introduced an updated version 5 of the message security assist (MSA). If available, the ica_drbg function exploits this updated MSA5 version that provides full hardware support for random number generation based on SHA512 in accordance with NIST SP800-90A.

Note: If no MSA5 version is available, the ica_drbg software fallback exploits at least MSA2 support, which includes SHA512. This fallback also produces NIST SP800-90A compliant random numbers, however, without the mentioned high performance MSA5 hardware support. If no MSA2 or higher support is available, the ica_drbg mechanism cannot return any pseudorandom bytes to the requesting application. In such cases, you must use the ica_random_number_generate function.

The implementation is designed to be thread-safe such that different threads can share the same ica_drbg instantiation.

The ica_drbg functionality uses certain definitions and supports the following DRBG mechanisms as shown in Table 2.

```c
typedef struct ica_drbg_mech ica_drbg_mech_t;
extern ica_drbg_mech_t *const ICA_DRBG_SHA512;
```

**Table 2. Supported DRBG mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRBG mechanism</th>
<th>supported security strengths (in bits)</th>
<th>max. byte length of pers/add parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRBG_SHA512</td>
<td>112, 128, 196, 256</td>
<td>256 / 256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following information list satisfies the NIST SP800-90A documentation requirements:
• Entropy input is read from /dev/hwrng. If /dev/hwrng is not available, the entropy input is read from /dev/prandom.

• ica drbg provides the ica drbg health test interface for validation and health testing. This function together with test parameters can be found in libica/src/include/s390_drbg.h. Nonce and entropy input can be injected via these parameters for the purpose of known answer testing.

• No further support functions other than health testing are supported.

• The only DRBG mechanism currently implemented is Hash_DRBG using SHA-512.

• ica drbg supports 112, 128, 196, and 256 bits of security.

• ica drbg supports prediction resistance.

• The generate function is tested every $2^{64} - 1$ calls. This interval size is chosen, because CPACF hardware failures should not happen frequently.

• The integrity of the health test can be determined by inspecting the checksum/hash of the package before install.

ica_random_number_generate

Purpose

This function generates a pseudo random number. Parameter *output_data is a pointer to a buffer of byte length output_length. output_length number of bytes of pseudo random data is placed in the buffer pointed to by output_data.

Format

unsigned int ica_random_number_generate(unsigned int output_length,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support

KMC-PRNG

Parameters

unsigned int output_length
Length in bytes of the output_data buffer, and the length of the generated pseudo random number.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to receive the generated pseudo random number.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_drbg_instantiate

Purpose

This function instantiates a NIST SP800-90A compliant deterministic random bit generator.

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Format

int ica_drbg_instantiate(ica_drbg_t **sh,
    int sec,
    bool pr,
    ica_drbg_mech_t *mech,
    const unsigned char *pers,
    size_t pers_len);

Parameters

ica_drbg_t **sh
State handle pointer. The (invalid) state handle is set to identify the new DRBG instantiation and thus becomes valid.

int sec
Requested security strength in bits of the new DRBG instantiation. The security strength is set to the lowest value supported by its DRBG mechanism that is greater than or equal to your selected sec value (see Table 2 on page 26). For example, if you request security strength 160 for your instance, it is actually set to 196.

bool pr
Prediction resistance flag. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance may be required by the consuming application during one or more requests for pseudo random bytes.

ica_drbg_mech_t *mech
Pointer to the mechanism type selected for the new DRBG instantiation. The new instantiation is then of this mechanism type. For available mechanisms, see Table 2 on page 26.

const unsigned char *pers
Pointer to a personalization string. This is optional input that provides personalization information. The personalization string should be unique for all instantiations of the same mechanism type. NULL indicates that no personalization string is used (not recommended).

size_t pers_len
Length in bytes of the string referenced by *pers.

Return codes

0 Success
ENOTSUP Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.
EPERM Failed to obtain a valid timestamp from clock.
ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL Health test failed, see "ica_drbg_health_test" on page 30.
ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL Entropy source failed.

ica_drbg_reseed

Purpose

This function reseeds a NIST SP800-90A compliant DRBG instantiation from ica_drbg_instantiate.
Format
int ica_drbg_reseed(ica_drbg_t *sh,
    bool pr,
    const unsigned char *add,
    size_t add_len);

Parameters
ica_drbg_t *sh
    State handle pointer. Identifies the DRBG instantiation to be reseeded.
bool pr
    Prediction resistance request. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is required.
const unsigned char *add
    Pointer to additional optional input. NULL indicates that no additional input is used.
size_t add_len
    Length in bytes of parameter add.

Return codes
0    Success
ENOTSUP
    Prediction resistance is not supported.
ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL
    Health test failed, see "ica_drbg_health_test" on page 30.
ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL
    Entropy source failed.

ica_drbg_generate
Purpose
This function requests pseudorandom bytes from an ica_drbg instantiation created by the ica_drbg_instantiate function.

Format
int ica_drbg_generate(ica_drbg_t *sh,
    int sec,
    bool pr,
    const unsigned char *add,
    size_t add_len,
    unsigned char *prnd,
    size_t prnd_len);

Parameters
ica_drbg_t *sh
    State handle pointer. Identifies the DRBG instantiation from which pseudorandom bytes are requested.
int sec
    Requested security strength: Minimum bits of security that the generated pseudorandom bytes shall offer.
bool pr
    Prediction resistance request. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is required.
const unsigned char *add
    Pointer to additional optional input. NULL indicates that no additional input is used.

size_t add_len
    Length in bytes of parameter add.

unsigned char *prnd
    Pointer to the generated pseudo random bytes.

size_t prnd_len
    Length in bytes of parameter prnd, which corresponds to the number of generated pseudo random bytes.

Return codes
0    Success
ENOTSUP
    Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.
EPERM
    Reseed required.
ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL
    Health test failed, see “ica_drbg_health_test.”
ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL
    Entropy source failed.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_drbg_uninstantiate
Purpose
This function destroys an existing ica_drbg instance.

Format
int ica_drbg_uninstantiate(ica_drbg_t **sh);

Parameters
ica_drbg_t **sh
    State handle pointer. The corresponding DRBG instantiation is destroyed and the state handle is set to NULL (invalid).

Return codes
0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_drbg_health_test
Purpose
This function runs a health test for the complete ica_drbg function mechanism.

Format
int ica_drbg_health_test(void *func,
    int sec,
    bool pr,
    ica_drbg_mech_t *mech);
Parameters

`void *func`
Pointer indicating which function should be tested. Options are:
- `ica_drbg_instantiate`
- `ica_drbg_reseed`
- `ica_drbg_generate`

The `ica_drbg_instantiate` function is tested whenever other functions are tested.

`int sec`
Security strength. Argument for the call to the function denoted by parameter `func`.

`bool pr`
Prediction resistance. Argument for the call to the function denoted by parameter `func`.

`ica_drbg_mech_t *mech`
Pointer to the mechanism to be tested.

Return codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL</td>
<td>Health test failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENOTSUP</td>
<td>Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL</td>
<td>Entropy source failed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

RSA key generation functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions generate an RSA public/private key pair. They are performed using software through OpenSSL. Hardware is not used.

`ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo`

Purpose

Generates RSA keys in modulus/exponent format.

Comments

For specific information about some of these parameters, see the considerations in “Data structures” on page 104.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
                        unsigned int modulus_bit_length,
                        ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *public_key,
                        ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *private_key);
```
Parameters

\texttt{ica_adapter_handle_t adapter\_handle}

Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

\texttt{unsigned int modulus\_bit\_length}

Length in bits of the modulus part of the key. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:

\[ \text{key}\_\text{length} = \frac{\text{modulus\_bits} + 7}{8} \]

\texttt{ica_rsa_key_mod\_expo\_t *public\_key}

Pointer to where the generated public key is to be placed. If the exponent element in the public key is not set, it is randomly generated. A poorly chosen exponent could result in the program looping endlessly. Common public exponents are 3 and 65537.

\texttt{ica_rsa_key_mod\_expo\_t *private\_key}

Pointer to where the generated private key in modulus/exponent format is to be placed. The length of both the private and public keys should be set in bytes. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:

\[ \text{key}\_\text{length} = \frac{\text{modulus\_bits} + 7}{8} \]

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

\texttt{ica_rsa_key\_generate\_crt}

Purpose

Generates RSA keys in Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT) format.

Comments

For specific information about some of these parameters, see the considerations in “Data structures” on page 104.

With libica version 2.5, this function has been extended to allow RSA key generation for any granularity in the range 57 - 4096 bits.

Format

\begin{verbatim}
unsigned int ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
            unsigned int modulus_bit_length,
            ica_rsa_key_modexpo_t *public_key,
            ica_rsa_key_crt_t *private_key);
\end{verbatim}

Parameters

\texttt{ica_adapter_handle_t adapter\_handle}

Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

\texttt{unsigned int modulus\_bit\_length}

Length in bits of the modulus part of the key. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:

\[ \text{key}\_\text{length} = \frac{\text{modulus\_bits} + 7}{8} \]

\texttt{ica_rsa_key_mod\_expo\_t *public\_key}

Pointer to where the generated public key is to be placed. If the exponent
element in the public key is not set, it is randomly generated. A poorly chosen exponent can result in the program looping endlessly. Common public exponents are 3 and 65537.

ica_rsa_key_crt_t *private_key
Pointer to where the generated private key in CRT format is to be placed. Length of both private and public keys should be set in bytes. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation

\[ \text{key_length} = \frac{(\text{modulus_bits} + 7)}{8} \]

Return codes
0       Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes” on page 107.

ica_rsa_crt_key_check
Purpose

Analyzes an RSA CRT key and check if the components are conform with the IBM cryptographic architecture. If necessary the key is converted to a conform format that can be used for IBM cryptographic hardware acceleration.

Checks if the RSA key credentials in CRT format are presented in privileged form, respectively whether prime \( p \) is greater than prime \( q \) (\( p > q \)) In case of \( p < q \), key credentials \( p \) and \( q \) as well as \( dp \) and \( dq \) are swapped and \( qInverse \) is recalculated.

Format

\[
\text{unsigned int ica_rsa_crt_key_check(ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key);}
\]

Parameters

ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key
Pointer to the key to be used in CRT format.

Return codes
0       All key credentials are in the correct format.
1       Key credentials were recalculated.
ENOMEM  Memory allocation fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes” on page 107.

RSA encrypt and decrypt operations

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform a modulus/exponent operation using an RSA key whose type is either ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t or ica_rsa_key_crt_t. They exploit the available cryptographic accelerators and CCA coprocessors.

ica_rsa_mod_expo
Purpose

Performs an RSA encryption or decryption operation using a key in modulus/exponent format.
Comments

Make sure that your message is padded before using this function.

Format

unsigned int ica_rsa_mod_exp(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
    unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_rsa_key_mod_exp_t *rsa_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support

Cryptographic accelerators or CCA coprocessors.

Parameters

ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle
    Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

unsigned char *input_data
    Pointer to the input data to be encrypted or decrypted. This data must be in
    big endian format. Make sure that the input data is not longer than the bit
    length of the key. The byte length for the input data and the key must be the
    same. Right align the input data inside the data block.

ica_rsa_key_mod_exp_t *rsa_key
    Pointer to the key to be used, in modulus/exponent format.

unsigned char *output_data
    Pointer to the location where the output results are to be placed. This buffer
    has to be at least the same size as input_data and therefore at least the same
    size as the size of the modulus.

Return codes

0      Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes” on page 107.

ica_rsa_crt

Purpose

Performs an RSA encryption or decryption operation using a key in CRT format.

Comments

Make sure that your message is padded before using this function.

Format

unsigned int ica_rsa_crt(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
    unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support

Cryptographic accelerators or CCA coprocessors.
Parameters

ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle
    Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

unsigned char *input_data
    Pointer to the input data to be encrypted or decrypted. This data must be in big endian format. Make sure that the input data is not longer than the bit length of the key. The byte length for the input data and the key must be the same. Right align the input data inside the data block.

ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key
    Pointer to the key to be used, in CRT format.

unsigned char *output_data
    Pointer to the location where the output results are to be placed. This buffer must be as large as the input_data, and as large as the length of the modulus specified in rsa_key.

Return codes

0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

AES functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform encryption and decryption or computation or verification of message authentication codes using an AES key. Supported key lengths are 16, 24 or 32 bytes for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. The cipher block size for AES is 16 bytes.

To securely apply AES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input.

As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation, have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decryption according to a mode of operation also compute an output vector. The output vector can be used as the initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

When decrypting a cipher text, the mode of operation, the key, the initialization vector (if applicable), and for ica_aes_cfb, the lcfb value used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that transformed the plain text into cipher text.

AES API functions exploiting the KMA instruction

libica version 3.2 offers an enhanced API for the AES cipher in GCM block cipher mode. It consists of six API functions that exploit the cipher message with authentication (KMA) instruction. This KMA instruction is part of the message-security-assist extension 8 (MSA 8) and runs on the CPACF starting with z14 processors.
GCM API functions provided by libica earlier than version 3.2 also use the new KMA instruction on z14 processors. However, the enhanced GCM APIs offer advantages concerning usability and performance. Therefore, consider to use these APIs instead of the existing ones in all of your applicable applications.

You find the descriptions of the enhanced GCM APIs in the following topics:
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_new” on page 54
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_free” on page 54
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_init” on page 54
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_update” on page 55
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_get_tag” on page 57
- “ica_aes_gcm_kma_verify_tag” on page 58

ica_aes_cbc
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
                        unsigned char *out_data,
                        unsigned long data_length,
                        const unsigned char *key,
                        unsigned int key_length,
                        unsigned char *iv,
                        unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMC-AES-128, KMC-AES-192, or KMC-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 for AES).

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in
bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_aes_cbc or ica_aes_cbc_cs call with the same key.

unsigned int direction
  0  Use the decrypt function.
  1  Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
  0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_cbc_cs
Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2, and the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A on Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode.

ica_aes_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted or decrypted by chained calls to ica_aes_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the last call to ica_aes_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_aes_cbc_cs call, provided that the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (greater than 16 bytes for AES).

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned int key_length,
   unsigned char *iv,
   unsigned int direction,
   unsigned int variant);

Required hardware support

KMC-AES-128, KMC-AES-192 or KMC-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES).
const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for
    AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the
    definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes.
    This vector is overwritten during the function. For variant equal to 1 or variant
    equal to 2, the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a
    chained ica_aes_cbc or ica_aes_cbc_cs call with the same key, if data_length is a
    multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int direction
    0   Use the decrypt function.
    1   Use the encrypt function.

unsigned int variant
    1   Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication
        800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two
        blocks in order.
    2   Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication
        800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two
        blocks if data_length is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a
        multiple of 16 bytes for AES).
    3   Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication
        800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the
        last two blocks.

Return codes
0       Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_ccm
    Purpose

Encrypt and authenticate or decrypt data and check authenticity of data with an
AES key using Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
(CCM) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38C. Formatting and
counter functions are implemented according to NIST 800-38C Appendix A.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_ccm(unsigned char *payload,
    unsigned long payload_length,
    unsigned char *ciphertext_n_mac,
    unsigned int mac_length,
    const unsigned char *assoc_data,
    unsigned long assoc_data_length,
    const unsigned char *nonce,
    unsigned int nonce_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned int direction);
Required hardware support
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256
KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192, or KMAC-AES-256

Parameters

unsigned char *payload
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to payload_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the payload buffer must be readable and contain a payload message of size payload_length to be encrypted. If direction is equal to 0, the payload buffer must be writable. If the authentication verification succeeds, the decrypted message in the most significant payload_length bytes of ciphertext_n_mac is written to this buffer. Otherwise, the contents of this buffer is undefined.

unsigned long payload_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. This value can be 0 unless assoc_data_length is equal to 0.

unsigned char *ciphertext_n_mac
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to payload_length plus mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and the encrypted message from payload followed by the message authentication code for the nonce, the payload, and associated data are written to that buffer. If direction is equal to 0, then the buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of length payload_length followed by a message authentication code of length mac_length.

unsigned int mac_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code. Valid values are: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 16.

const unsigned char *assoc_data
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to assoc_data_length bytes. The associated data in the most significant assoc_data_length bytes is subject to the authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

unsigned long assoc_data_length
Length of the associated data in assoc_data. This value can be 0 unless payload_length is equal to 0.

const unsigned char *nonce
Pointer to readable buffer of size greater than or equal to nonce_length bytes, which contains a nonce (number used once) of size nonce_length bytes.

unsigned int nonce_length
Length of the nonce in bytes. Valid values are greater than 6 and less than 14.

const unsigned char *key
Specifies a pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.
Return codes
0  Success
EFAULT
   If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication
code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_cfb
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as
described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned int key_length,
   unsigned char *iv,
   unsigned int lcfb,
   unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMF-AES-128, KMF-AES-192, or KMF-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
   Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
   Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
   the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
   Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for
   AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the
definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
   Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in
   bytes (16 bytes for AES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The
   result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained
   ica_aes_cfb call with the same key, if the data_length in the preceding call is a
   multiple of lcfb.
unsigned int lcfb
Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES).

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_cmac
Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_aes_cmac can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
    unsigned long message_length,
    unsigned char *mac,
    unsigned int mac_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192 or KMAC-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to this buffer. If direction is equal to 0, this buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac in bytes, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). It is recommended to use values greater than or equal to 8.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.
unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions:
AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code.
1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_cmac_intermediate

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_aes_cmac_intermediate and ica_aes_cmac_last can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using CMAC is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_aes_cmac_intermediate is used to process all but the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by ica_aes_cmac_intermediate must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 bytes for AES).

Note that ica_aes_cmac_intermediate has no direction argument. This function can be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message,
unsigned long message_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned char *iv);

Required hardware support
KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192, or KMAC-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message, to be authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message part in message. This value must be a multiple of the cipher block size.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.
unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions:
AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (16 bytes for AES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of zeros. For processing the n-th message part, this parameter must be the resulting iv value of the ica_aes_cmac_intermediate function applied to the (n-1)-th message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to ica_aes_cmac_intermediate or to ica_aes_cmac_last with the same key.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_cmac_last

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_aes_cmac_last can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message, or of the final part of a message for which all preceding parts were processed with ica_aes_cmac_intermediate.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message,
    unsigned long message_length,
    unsigned char *mac,
    unsigned int mac_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192 or KMAC-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message or the final part of a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If
*direction* is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code that is verified against the message in *message*.

**unsigned int mac_length**
Length in bytes of the message authentication code *mac* in bytes, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). It is recommended to use values greater than or equal to 8.

**const unsigned char *key**
Pointer to a valid AES key.

**unsigned int key_length**
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

**unsigned char *iv**
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If *iv* is NULL, *message* is assumed to be the complete message to be processed. Otherwise, *message* is the final part of a composite message to be processed, and *iv* contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts with chained calls to *ica_aes_cmac_intermediate* (the value returned in *iv* of the *ica_aes_cmac_intermediate* call applied to the penultimate message part).

**unsigned int direction**
0 Verify message authentication code.
1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

**Return codes**
0 Success
EFAULT
If *direction* is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

**ica_aes_ctr**

**Purpose**
Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of cipher block size (16 bytes for AES) is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block, subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment function used in *ica_aes_ctr* is an arithmetic increment without carry on the *M* least significant bytes in the counter where *M* is a parameter to *ica_aes_ctr*.

**Format**
unsigned int ica_aes_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data,  
unsigned char *out_data,  
unsigned long data_length,  
const unsigned char *key,  
unsigned int key_length,  
unsigned char *ctr,  
unsigned int ctr_width,  
unsigned int direction);
Required hardware support

KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
   Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
   Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
   Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *ctr
   Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block in bytes. ctr contains an initialization value for a counter function, and it is replaced by a new value. That new value can be used as an initialization value for a counter function in a chained ica_aes_ctr call with the same key, if the data_length used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int ctr_width
   A number M between 1 and the cipher block size. The value is used by the counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing without carry the least significant M bytes of the counter value.

unsigned int direction
   0 Use the decrypt function.
   1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_ctrlist

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of the same size as the cipher block in bytes is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_aes_ctrlist function assumes that a list n of precomputed counter values is provided, where n is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message size divided by the cipher block size. This function optimally uses IBM Z hardware
support for non-standard counter functions.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_ctrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned int key_length,
   const unsigned char *ctrlist,
   unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMCTR-DEAKMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

  Calls to `ica_aes_ctrlist` with the same key can be chained if:
  - With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the `data_length` used is a multiple of the cipher block size.
  - The `ctrlist` argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that follows the counters used in the preceding call.

- **const unsigned char *key**
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- **unsigned int key_length**
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

- **const unsigned char *ctrlist**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that is both of a size greater than or equal to `data_length`, and a multiple of the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). `ctrlist` should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

- **unsigned int direction**
  - 0 Use the decrypt function.
  - 1 Use the encrypt function.

**Return codes**

- 0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.
ica_aes_ecb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
             unsigned char *output,
             unsigned int data_length,
             const unsigned char *key,
             unsigned int key_length,
             unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256

Parameters

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`. `data_length` must be a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 for AES).

- **const unsigned char *key**
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- **unsigned int key_length**
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

- **unsigned int direction**
  0 Use the decrypt function.
  1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm

Purpose

Encrypt data and authenticate data or decrypt data and check authenticity of data with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D. If no message needs to be encrypted or decrypted and only authentication or authentication checks are requested, then this method implements the GMAC mode.
Format

unsigned int ica_aes_gcm(unsigned char *plaintext,
unsigned long plaintext_length,
unsigned char *ciphertext,
const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned int iv_length,
const unsigned char *aad,
unsigned long aad_length,
unsigned char *tag,
unsigned int tag_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192 or KM-AES-256
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256
are used transparently for better performance.

Parameters

unsigned char *plaintext
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes. If
direction is equal to 1, the plaintext buffer must be readable and contain a
payload message of size plaintext_length to be encrypted. If direction is equal to
0, the plaintext buffer must be writable and if the authentication verification
succeeds, the decrypted message in the most significant plaintext_length bytes
of ciphertext is written to the buffer. Otherwise, the contents of the buffer are
undefined.

unsigned long plaintext_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. This value can be
0 unless aad_length is equal to 0. The value must be greater than or equal to 0
and less than (2**36) - 32.

unsigned char *ciphertext
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes. If
direction is equal to 1, then this buffer must be writable and the encrypted
message from plaintext is written to that buffer. If direction is equal to 0, then
this buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of length
plaintext_length.

const unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to iv_length bytes,
which contains an initialization vector of size iv_length.

unsigned int iv_length
Length in bytes of the initialization vector in iv. The value must be greater
than 0 and less than 2**61. A length of 12 is recommended.

const unsigned char *aad
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to aad_length bytes.
The additional authenticated data in the most significant aad_length bytes is
subject to the message authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

unsigned int aad_length
Length in bytes of the additional authenticated data in aad. The value must be
greater than or equal to 0 and less than 2**61.
unsigned char *tag
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to tag_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, this buffer must be writable, and a message authentication code for the additional authenticated data in aad and the plain text in plaintext of size tag_length bytes is written to this buffer. If direction is equal to 0, this buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the additional authenticated data in aad and the decrypted cipher text from ciphertext.

unsigned int tag_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code tag. Valid values are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
1 Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm_initialize
Purpose
Start and initialize a new session of AES-GCM for stream cipher requests.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_initialize(const unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key,
    unsigned char *key_length,
    unsigned char *icb,
    unsigned char *ucb,
    unsigned char *subkey,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192 or KM-AES-256
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.
Parameters

unsigned char *iv
  Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to iv_length bytes, that contains an initialization vector of size iv_length.

unsigned int iv_length
  Length in bytes of the initialization vector in iv. It must be greater than 0 and less than 2^61. A length of 12 is recommended.

unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *icb
  Pointer to the initial counter block, which is a writable buffer of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). This buffer is filled by ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_last() for the final tag computation.

unsigned char *ucb
  Pointer to the usage counter block, which is a writable buffer of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). This buffer is filled by ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and updated (increased) during the intermediate update operations.

unsigned char *subkey
  Pointer to the subkey block, which is a writable buffer (subkey block) of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). This buffer is filled by ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last().

unsigned int direction
  0  Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
  1  Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes

0  Success
EIO  If the operation fails.
EFAULT
  If direction equals 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm_intermediate

Purpose

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D. ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last() can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using GCM is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() is used to process all data chunks. Be aware that all chunks, with the possible exception of the last one, must be a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). The last data chunk might be any size. In any cases the ica_aes_gcm_last() must be called at the end to calculate the final authentication tag.
Format

unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_intermediate(unsigned char *plaintext,
    unsigned long plaintext_length,
    unsigned char *ciphertext,
    unsigned char *ucb,
    unsigned char *aad,
    unsigned long aad_length,
    unsigned char *tag,
    unsigned int tag_length,
    unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *subkey,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256
are used transparently for better performance.

Parameters

unsigned char *plaintext
    Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes.
    If direction equals 1, the plaintext buffer must be readable and contain a
    payload message of size plaintext_length that is encrypted. If direction
    equals 0 the plaintext buffer must be writable.
    If the authentication verification succeeds, the decrypted message in the most
    significant plaintext_length bytes of ciphertext is written to the buffer.
    Otherwise the contents of the buffer is undefined.

unsigned long plaintext_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. It must be equal
    or greater than 0 and less than (2**36)-32. With the exception of the call
    followed by a call to ica_aes_gcm_last(), the value must be a multiple of
    AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Only in the call followed by ica_aes_gcm_last(), the value does
    not have to be a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Padding is done automatically.

unsigned char *ciphertext
    Pointer to a buffer of a size which is a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE and which
    is greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes.
    If direction equals 1, then the buffer must be writable and the encrypted
    message from plaintext is written to that buffer. If direction equals 0, then
    the buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of a length which is
    equal to the least multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE that is greater than or equal to
    plaintext_length.

unsigned char *ucb
    Pointer to the usage counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created
during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is updated (increased) during the
intermediate update operations. The length of this counter block is
AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). It is assumed that with the call to
ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() the contents of the usage counter block was
returned in the ucb parameter of a preceding call to ica_aes_gcm_init() or
ica_aes_gcm_intermediate().

unsigned char *aad
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to aad_length bytes.
The additional authenticated data in the most significant `aad_length` bytes is subject to the authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

**unsigned long aad_length**
Length in bytes of the additional authenticated data in `aad`. It must be equal to or greater than 0 and less than `2**61`, and the following constraints must apply:
- If the `aad_length` is not a multiple of `AES_BLOCK_SIZE` or 0, then in all subsequent calls to `ica_aes_gcm_intermediate()` that belong to the same AES GCM computation, the `aad_length` must be 0 which implies that only the last `aad` chunk can have a length that is not a multiple of `AES_BLOCK_SIZE`.
- If in a preceding call to `ica_aes_gcm_intermediate()` belonging to the same AES GCM computation, the `plaintext_length` was greater than 0, then `aad_length` must be 0, which implies that plaintext or ciphertext can only be supplied when all additional authenticated data is supplied.

**unsigned char *tag**
Contains the temporary hash/tag value. It is an input/output parameter and must be 16 byte long.

**unsigned int tag_length**
This parameter is currently not used.

**unsigned char *key**
Pointer to a valid AES key.

**unsigned int key_length**
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

**unsigned char *subkey**
Pointer to a writable buffer, generated in `ica_aes_gcm_initialize()` and used in `ica_aes_gcm_intermediate()` and `ica_aes_gcm_last()`. The length of this buffer is `AES_BLOCK_SIZE` (16 bytes).

**unsigned int direction**
0 Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
1 Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

**Return codes**
0 Success
EIO If the operation fails.
EFAULT If `direction` is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

**ica_aes_gcm_last**

**Purpose**
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D. `ica_aes_gcm_last()` must be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a message for which all preceding parts were processed with `ica_aes_gcm_intermediate()`.
Format

unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_last(unsigned char *icb,
    unsigned long aad_length,
    unsigned long ciph_length,
    unsigned char *tag,
    unsigned char *final_tag,
    unsigned int final_tag_length,
    unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *subkey,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.

Parameters

unsigned char *icb
    Pointer to the initial counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is used in ica_aes_gcm_last() for the final tag computation. The length of this counter block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned long aad_length
    Overall length of authentication data, cumulated over all intermediate operations.

unsigned long ciph_length
    Length in bytes of the overall ciphertext, cumulated over all intermediate operations.

unsigned char *tag
    Contains the temporary hash/tag value computed during preceding ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() calls.

unsigned char *final_tag
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to final_tag_length bytes. If direction is 1, the buffer is not used. If direction is 0, this message authentication code (tag) is verified with the message authentication code computed over the intermediate update operations.

unsigned int final_tag_length
    Length in bytes of the final message authentication code (tag). Valid values are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *subkey
    Pointer to a writable buffer generated in ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last(). The length of this subkey block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned int direction
Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.

Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes
0    Success
EIO   If the operation fails.
EFAULT If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_new

Purpose
Allocate a GCM context for all other KMA-related GCM functions and return a pointer to this context. The context buffer is used by all other ica_aes_gcm_kma functions as a working area and must not be changed by the application. It must be freed by ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_free() when no longer needed.

Format
kma_ctx* ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_new();

Parameters
None.

Return codes
NULL Returns a NULL pointer if no memory could be allocated. Returns a pointer to a GCM context if successful.

ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_free

Purpose
Deallocates a previously allocated GCM context.

Format
void ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_free(kma_ctx *ctx);

Parameters
kma_ctx *ctx
Pointer to a previously allocated GCM context that is to be deallocated.

Return codes
None.

ica_aes_gcm_kma_init

Purpose
Initialize the GCM context as returned from ica_aes_gcm_kma_ctx_new() either for encryption (direction = 1) or decryption (direction = 0).
Format
int ica_aes_gcm_kma_init(unsigned int direction,
    const unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int iv_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    kma_ctx *ctx);

Required hardware support
- KIMD-GHASH
- KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256
If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.

Parameters
- unsigned int direction
  0 Use the decrypt function.
  1 Use the encrypt function.
- const unsigned char *iv
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains an initialization vector. The buffer size, in bytes, can be equal to the vector length (iv_length) or greater.
- unsigned int iv_length
  Length, in bytes, of the initialization vector in buffer iv. The value must be greater than 0 and less than 2**61. A length of 12 is recommended.
- const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid AES key.
- unsigned int key_length
  Length of the AES key in bytes. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.
- kma_ctx *ctx
  Pointer to a previously allocated GCM context. This buffer is internally used as a working area by all other ica_aes_gcm_kma API functions and must not be changed by the application. The ctx context must be established by calling ica_aes_gcm_ctx_new() before any call to any other ica_aes_gcm_kma function, and must be freed by calling ica_aes_gcm_ctx_free() after the last call to any ica_aes_gcm_kma function.

Return codes
- 0 Success
- EIO If the operation fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm_kma_update
Purpose
Perform encryption of plain text or decryption of cipher text with authentication, depending on the direction specified in ica_aes_gcm_kma_init(). It also processes optional additional authenticated data (parameter aad). It can be used either for a
single call when all **aad** data and the complete plain text or cipher text is known. Or it can also be used for processing chunks of **aad** data, and chunks of plain text or cipher text.

Each chunk of plain text or cipher text from parameter `in_data` or each chunk of data from **aad** must be a multiple of the AES block size (16 bytes), except of the last one.

If any chunk from **aad** or `in_data` is not a multiple of 16, the application must indicate this either in parameter `end_of_aad` or `end_of_data`. When `end_of_aad` was indicated, no more additional authenticated data can be provided. When `end_of_data` was indicated, no more message data can be provided. The process ends when both, `end_of_aad` and `end_of_data` are set.

**Format**

```c
int ica_aes_gcm_kma_update(const unsigned char *in_data,
                          unsigned char *out_data,
                          unsigned long data_length,
                          const unsigned char *aad,
                          unsigned long aad_length,
                          unsigned int end_of_aad,
                          unsigned int end_of_data,
                          const kma_ctx *ctx)
```

**Required hardware support**

- KIMD-GHASH
- KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  - Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to `data_length` bytes. If `direction` = 1, parameter `in_data` must contain a payload message of size `data_length` that is encrypted and authenticated. If `direction` = 0, parameter `in_data` must contain an encrypted message that is decrypted and verified.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  - Pointer to a writable buffer of size `data_length` bytes or greater. If `direction` = 1, then the encrypted message from parameter `in_data` is written to that buffer. If `direction` = 0, then the decrypted message from the `in_data` buffer is written to that buffer. The pointer to `out_data` may point to the same buffer as for `in_data`, or a part of it, if you want to encrypt/decrypt in place.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  - Length, in bytes, of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The value must be equal or greater than 0 and less than \(2^{36} - 32\).

- **const unsigned char *aad**
  - Pointer to a readable buffer of size `aad_length` bytes or greater. The additional authenticated data in the most significant `aad_length` bytes is subject to the authentication code computation but is not encrypted.

- **unsigned long aad_length**
  - Length, in bytes, of the additional authenticated data in parameter **aad**. It must be 0 or greater, and less than \(2^{61}\).

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unsigned int end_of_aad
Can be either 0 or 1:
0 The application indicates that the current content of aad is not the last chunk of additional authenticated data. In this case, the value of aad_length must be a multiple of the AES block size (16 bytes).
1 The application indicates that the current content of aad is a single chunk or the last chunk. Or the application indicates that the last aad chunk has been provided in an earlier call to aica_aes_gcm_kma function. In this case, parameter aad_length can have any non-negative value.

When both, end_of_aad and end_of_data are specified, the process ends.

unsigned int end_of_data
Can be either 0 or 1:
0 The application indicates that the current content of in_data is not the last chunk. In this case, the value of parameter data_length must be a multiple of the AES block size (16 bytes).
1 The application indicates that the current content of in_data is a single chunk or the last chunk. In this case, aad_length can have any non-negative value.

When both, end_of_aad and end_of_data are specified, the process ends.

cost kma_ctx *ctx
Pointer to a previously initialized GCM context.

The input GCM context must be the resulting context of a preceding ica_aes_gcm_kma_init or ica_aes_gcm_kma_update function call. The resulting context can be used as the input to a subsequent ica_aes_gcm_kma_update, ica_aes_gcm_kma_get_tag or ica_aes_gcm_kma_verify_tag call.

Return codes
0 Success
EIO If the operation fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_aes_gcm_kma_get_tag
Purpose

Returns the calculated authentication tag after an encryption process.

Format
int ica_aes_gcm_kma_get_tag(unsigned char *tag,
   unsigned int tag_length,
   const kma_ctx *ctx);

Required hardware support
z13 or earlier:
   KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256
z14: None.
If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.

**Parameters**

- `unsigned char *tag`
  Pointer to a writable buffer to return the calculated authentication tag.

- `unsigned int tag_length`
  Length in bytes of the message authentication code tag. Valid tag lengths are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

- `const kma_ctx *ctx`
  Pointer to the GCM context.

  This context is the result of the of an ica_aes_gcm_kma_update call where the parameters `end_of_aad` and `end_of_data` where set to 1.

**Return codes**

- `0`  Success
- `EFault`

  If parameter `direction` of the ica_aes_gcm_kma_init() function is 0 (indicating a decryption function).

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica_aes_gcm_kma_verify_tag**

**Purpose**

Verifies if the calculated authentication tag is identical to the known authentication tag specified in parameter `known_tag` after a decryption process.

**Format**

```c
int ica_aes_gcm_kma_verify_tag(const unsigned char* known_tag,
                                unsigned int tag_length, kma_ctx* ctx)
```

**Required hardware support**

- `z13` or earlier:
  - KIMD-GHASH
  - KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256

- `z14`:
  - None.

If available, KMA-GCM-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-192, and KMA-GCM-AES-256 are used transparently for better performance.

**Parameters**

- `const unsigned char* known_tag`
  Pointer to a readable buffer containing a known authentication tag.

- `unsigned int tag_length`
  Length in bytes of the message authentication code tag. Valid tag lengths are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

- `kma_ctx* ctx`
  Pointer to a GCM context.

  This context is the result of the of an ica_aes_gcm_kma_update call where the parameters `end_of_aad` and `end_of_data` where set to 1.
Return codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EINV</td>
<td>If at least one invalid parameter is given or <code>direction</code> is 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFAULT</td>
<td>If the verification of the message authentication code fails.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_ofb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                         unsigned char *out_data,
                         unsigned long data_length,
                         const unsigned char *key,
                         unsigned int key_length,
                         unsigned char *iv,
                         unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

KMO-AES-128, KMO-AES-192, or KMO-AES-256

Parameters

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

- **const unsigned char *key**
  
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- **unsigned int key_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions:

  - `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block, in bytes (16 bytes for AES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES), the result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_aes_ofb` call with the same key.

- **unsigned int direction**
  
  Direction for encryption (1) or decryption (0).
Use the decrypt function.
1  Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_aes_xts

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using the XEX Tweakable Bloc Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing (XTS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38E and IEEE standard 1619-2007.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_xts(const unsigned char *in_data,
                          unsigned char *out_data,
                          unsigned long data_length,
                          const unsigned char *key1,
                          const unsigned char *key2,
                          unsigned int key_length,
                          unsigned char *tweak,
                          unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

- KM-XTS-AES-128, or KM-XTS-AES-256
- PCC-Compute-XTS-Parameter-Using-AES-128, or PCC-Compute-XTS-Parameter-Using-AES-256

Parameters

- `const unsigned char *in_data`
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned char *out_data`
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned long data_length`
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`. The minimal value of `data_length` is 16.

- `const unsigned char *key1`
  Pointer to a buffer containing a valid AES key. `key1` is used for the actual encryption of the message buffer, combined with some vector computed from the `tweak` value (Key1 in IEEE Std 1619-2007).

- `const unsigned char *key2`
  Pointer to a buffer containing a valid AES key `key2` is used to encrypt the `tweak` (Key2 in IEEE Std 1619-2007).

- `unsigned int key_length`
  The length in bytes of the AES key. XTS supported AES key sizes are 16 and 32, for AES-128 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use:

```c
2 * AES_KEY_LEN128 and 2 * AES_KEY_LEN256.
```
unsigned char *tweak

Pointer to a valid 16-byte tweak value (as in IEEE standard 1619-2007). This tweak is overwritten during the function. If `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 for AES), the result value in `tweak` can be used as the `tweak` value for a chained `ica_aes_xts` call with the same key pair.

unsigned int direction

0    Use the decrypt function.
1    Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

Compatibility with earlier versions

In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following AES interfaces remain supported:

```
unsigned int ica_aes_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
                          unsigned int data_length,
                          unsigned char *input_data,
                          ica_aes_vector_t *iv,
                          unsigned int key_length,
                          unsigned char *aes_key,
                          unsigned char *output_data);

unsigned int ica_aes_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
                          unsigned int data_length,
                          unsigned char *input_data,
                          ica_aes_vector_t *iv,
                          unsigned int key_length,
                          unsigned char *aes_key,
                          unsigned char *output_data);
```

Table 3 shows libica version 2.0 AES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 AES function calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 AES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 AES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>ica_aes_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key_length,key,out_data);</code></td>
<td><code>ica_aes_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,1);</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ica_aes_encrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key_length,key,out_data);</code></td>
<td><code>ica_des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,iv,1);</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ica_aes_decrypt(MODE_ECB,data_length,in_data,NULL, key_length,key,out_data);</code></td>
<td><code>ica_aes_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,0);</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ica_aes_decrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key_length,key,out_data);</code></td>
<td><code>ica_aes_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,iv,0);</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions `ica_aes_encrypt` and `ica_aes_decrypt` remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of `ica_aes_ecb` and `ica_aes_cbc`.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see libica Programmers Reference version 2.0.

TDES/3DES functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.
These functions perform encryption and decryption or computation and verification of message authentication codes using a triple-DES (3DES, TDES or TDEA) key. A 3DES key consists of a concatenation of three DES keys, each of which has a size of 8 bytes. Note that each byte of a DES key contains one parity bit, such that each 64-bit DES key contains only 56 security-relevant bits. The cipher block size for 3DES is 8 bytes.

3DES is known in two variants: a two key variant and a three key variant. This library implements only the three key variant. The two key variant can be derived from functions for the three key variant by using the same key as the first and third key.

To securely apply 3DES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input. As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation and have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decryption according to that mode of operation also compute an output vector that can be used as the initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

Note that when decrypting a cipher text, the mode of operation, the key, the initialization vector (if applicable), and for ica_3des_cfb the lcfb value used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that was used to transform the plain text into the cipher text.

**ica_3des_cbc**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
                      unsigned char *out_data,
                      unsigned long data_length,
                      const unsigned char *key,
                      unsigned char *iv,
                      unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMC-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.
**unsigned long data_length**
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size
(8 bytes for 3DES).

**const unsigned char *key**
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

**unsigned char *iv**
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes.
This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be
used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_3des_cbc or ica_3des_cbc_cs
call with the same key.

**unsigned int direction**
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

**Return codes**
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica_3des_cbc_cs**

**Purpose**
Encrypt or decrypt data with a 3DES key using Cipher Block Chaining with
Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication
800-38A Chapter 6.2 and the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A on
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext
Stealing for CBC Mode.

ica_3des_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message
consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted
or decrypted by chained calls to ica_3des_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the
last call to ica_3des_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_3des_cbc_cs call, provided that
the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned char *iv,
   unsigned int direction,
   unsigned int variant);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMC-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

**const unsigned char *in_data**
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.
**unsigned char *out_data**  
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

**unsigned long data_length**  
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`. `data_length` must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

**const unsigned char *key**  
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

**unsigned char *iv**  
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. For `variant` equal to 1 or `variant` equal to 2, the result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_3des_cbc` or `ica_3des_cbc_cs` call with the same key, if `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size.

**unsigned int direction**  
0 Use the decrypt function.  
1 Use the encrypt function.

**unsigned int variant**  
1 Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two blocks in order.  
2 Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two blocks if `data_length` is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for 3DES).  
3 Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the last two blocks.

**Return codes**  
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

---

**ica_3des_cfb**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a 3DES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,  
                          unsigned char *out_data,  
                          unsigned long data_length,  
                          const unsigned char *key,  
                          unsigned char *iv,  
                          unsigned int lcfb,  
                          unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMF-TDEA-192
Parameters

**const unsigned char *in_data**
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

**unsigned char *out_data**
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

**unsigned long data_length**
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

**const unsigned char *key**
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

**unsigned char *iv**
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (8 bytes for 3DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_3des_cfb` call with the same key, if the `data_length` in the preceding call is a multiple of `lcfb`.

**unsigned int lcfb**
Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

**unsigned int direction**
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica_3des_cmac**

Purpose

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a 3DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. `ica_3des_cmac` can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
    unsigned long message_length,
    unsigned char *mac,
    unsigned int mac_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

- KMAC-TDEA-192
- PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-TDEA-192
Parameters

const unsigned char *message
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
    Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
    Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
    0 Verify message authentication code.
    1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

Return codes

0    Success

EFAULT
    If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_3des_cmac_intermediate

Purpose

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an 3DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_3des_cmac_intermediate and ica_3des_cmac_last can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using CMAC is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_3des_cmac_intermediate is used to process all but the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by ica_3des_cmac_intermediate must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for 3DES).

Note that ica_3des_cmac_intermediate has no direction argument. This function can be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

Format

unsigned int ica_3des_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message, unsigned long message_length, const unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
**Required hardware support**

KMAC-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

**const unsigned char **message**

Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to \texttt{message\_length} bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

**unsigned long message\_length**

Length in bytes of the message part in \texttt{message}. This value must be a multiple of the cipher block size.

**const unsigned char **key**

Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

**unsigned char **iv**

Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of zeros. For processing the \texttt{n}-th message part, this parameter must be the resulting \texttt{iv} value of the \texttt{ica\_3des\_cmac\_intermediate} applied to the \texttt{(n-1)}-th message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in \texttt{iv} can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to \texttt{ica\_3des\_cmac\_intermediate} or to \texttt{ica\_3des\_cmac\_last} with the same key.

**Return codes**

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica\_3des\_cmac\_last**

**Purpose**

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an 3DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. \texttt{ica\_3des\_cmac\_last} can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message or of the final part of a message, for which all preceding parts were processed with \texttt{ica\_3des\_cmac\_intermediate}.

**Format**

\begin{verbatim}
unsigned int ica_3des_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message,
                                unsigned long message_length,
                                unsigned char *mac,
                                unsigned int mac_length,
                                const unsigned char *key,
                                unsigned char *iv,
                                unsigned int direction);
\end{verbatim}

**Required hardware support**

KMAC-TDEA-192

PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

**const unsigned char **message**

Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to \texttt{message\_length}
bytes. It contains a message or the final part of a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

**unsigned long message_length**
Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

**unsigned char *mac**
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code that is to be verified against the message in message.

**unsigned int mac_length**
Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac in bytes that is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

**const unsigned char *key**
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

**unsigned char *iv**
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If iv is NULL, message is assumed to be the complete message to be processed. Otherwise, message is the final part of a composite message to be processed and iv contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts with chained calls to ica_des_cmac_intermediate (the value returned in iv of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate call applied to the penultimate message part.

**unsigned int direction**
0 Verify message authentication code.
1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

**Return codes**
0 Success
EFAULT  
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica_3des_ctr**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a triple-length DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of size cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES) is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block, subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment function used in ica_3des_ctr is an arithmetic increment without carry on the M least significant bytes in the counter, where M is a parameter to ica_3des_ctr.

**Format**

unsigned int ica_3des_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data,  
unsigned char *out_data,  
unsigned long data_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned char *ctr,
unsigned int ctr_width,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMCTR-TDEA-192

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *ctr
Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block
in bytes. ctr contains an initialization value for a counter function that is
replaced by a new value. The new value can be used as an initialization value
for a counter function in a chained ica_3des_ctr call with the same key, if the
data_length used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int ctr_width
A number \( M \) between 1 and the cipher block size. The value is used by the
counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing
without carry the least significant \( M \) bytes of the counter value.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_3des_ctrlist

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as
described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter
mode, each message block of the same size as the cipher block is combined with a
counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_3des_ctrlist function assumes that a list \( n \) of precomputed counter values
is provided where \( n \) is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message
size divided by the cipher block size. This function is used to optimally utilize IBM
Z hardware support for non-standard counter functions.
Format

unsigned int ica_3des_ctrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    const unsigned char *ctrlist,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMCTR-TDEA-192

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is \textit{data} length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as \textit{data} length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as \textit{data} length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of \textit{in} data.

Calls to ica_3des_ctrlist with the same key can be chained if:
• With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the \textit{data} length used is a multiple of the cipher block size.
• The \textit{ctrlist} argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that follows the counters used in the preceding call.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

const unsigned char *ctrlist
    Pointer to a readable buffer that is both of size greater than or equal to \textit{data} length, and a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). \textit{ctrlist} should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

unsigned int direction
    0  Use the decrypt function.
    1  Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_3des_ecb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.
Format

unsigned int ica_3des_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KM-DEA-192

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writeable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

c const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
    0     Use the decrypt function.
    1     Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0     Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_3des_ofb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

Format

unsigned int ica_3des_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMO-TDEA-192
Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer that contains the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

cnst unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes (8 bytes for 3DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 for 3DES), the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_3des_ofb call with the same key.

unsigned int direction
    0 Use the decrypt function.
    1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

Compatibility with earlier versions

In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following 3DES interfaces remain supported:

unsigned int ica_3des_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
    unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_triple_t *des_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);

unsigned int ica_3des_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
    unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_triple_t *des_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);

Table 4 shows libica version 2.0 TDES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 TDES function calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 TDES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 TDES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_encrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,iv,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_decrypt(MODE_ECB,data_length,in_data,NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Compatibility of libica version 2.0 TDES functions calls to libica version 2.4 TDES function calls (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 TDES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 TDES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_decrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv,key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length,,key,iv,0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions ica_3des_encrypt and ica_3des_decrypt remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of ica_3des_ecb and ica_3des_cbc.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see libica Programmers Reference version 2.0.

Information retrieval functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

**ica_get_version**

**Purpose**

Return libica version information.

**Format**

unsigned int ica_get_version(libica_version_info *version_info);

**Parameters**

*libica_version_info *version_info

Pointer to a libica_version_info structure. The structure is filled with the current libica version information.

**Return codes**

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

**ica_get_functionlist**

**Purpose**

Returns a list of crypto mechanisms supported by libica.

**Format**

unsigned int ica_get_functionlist(libica_func_list_element *mech_list,
                                      unsigned int *mech_list_len);

**Parameters**

*libica_func_list_element *mech_list

Null or pointer to an array of at least as many libica_func_list_element structures as denoted in the *mech_list_len argument. If the value in the *mech_list_len argument is equal to or greater than the number of mechanisms available in libica then the libica_func_list_element structures in *mech_list are filled (in the order of the array indices) with information for the supported otherwise the *mech_list argument remains unchanged.
unsigned int *mech_list_len

Pointer to an integer which contain the actual number of array elements (number of structures). If *mech_list was NULL the contents of *mech_list_len will be replaced by the number of mechanisms available in libica.

Return codes
0  Success
EINV   The value in *mech_list is to small

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

Recommended usage

First call ica_get_functionlist with a NULL mechanism list, then allocate the mechanism list according to number of mechanisms in libica returned by that function, and then call ica_get_functionlist with the allocated mechanism list.

FIPS mode functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

ica_fips_status

Purpose

Queries and returns a FIPS status that indicates, which self-tests were passed or failed, and whether libica is running in FIPS mode.

The output is an integer, which is interpreted as a series of 32 bits, where each bit is a flag. Each flag, if set, corresponds to one of the defined constants as described in “FIPS mode constants” on page 103. Each constant, in return indicates either a status, or whether a certain test has passed (flag or constant is not set) or failed (flag or constant is set).

For example, look at the following returned integer as a bitmap, where only the 12 rightmost bits are considered:

... 0001 0000 1000
     2^8*256 2^3*8

In this example, we see that bits with values 8 and 256 are set, which means, that ICA_FIPS_CRITICALFUNC 8 and ICA_FIPS_BYPASS 256 are set. This in turn means, that the Critical functions test and the Bypass test failed.

Format

int ica_fips_status(void);

Return codes
0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.
ica_fips_powerup_tests

Purpose

Triggers the implemented self-tests. Use the int ica_fips_status(void); function to see which tests passed or failed (see “ica_fips_status” on page 74).

Format

void ica_fips_powerup_tests(void);

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

Deprecated functions

Some of the libica application programming interfaces are meanwhile deprecated due to their insufficient security strength. For compatibility reasons, libica continues to offer these functions. However, it is recommended to replace them with more secure APIs as indicated.

The list of deprecated functions currently comprises all DES functions and the SHA1 function.

- Instead of the DES functions, use the corresponding AES functions (“AES functions” on page 35).
- Instead of the SHA1 function (ica_sha1), use one of the hash APIs listed in “Secure hash operations” on page 15.

These deprecated functions are also included in: include/ica_api.h.

DES functions

DES functions perform encryption and decryption and computation or verification of message authentication codes using a DES (DEA) key. A DES key has a size of 8 bytes. Each byte of a DES key contains one parity bit, such that each 64-bit DES key contains only 56 security-relevant bits. The cipher block size for DES is 8 bytes.

To securely apply DES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input. As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation, and have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decrypting according to a mode of operation also compute an output vector. This output vector can be used as the initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

When decrypting a cipher text, these values used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that transformed the plain text into the cipher text:

- The mode of operation
- The key
- The initialization vector (if applicable)
• For the ica_des_cfb function, the lcfb parameter

**ica_des_cbc**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_des_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMC-DEA

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  - Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. This buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  - Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  - Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for DES).

- **const unsigned char *key**
  - Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  - Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten by this function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cbc or ica_des_cbc_cs call with the same key.

- **unsigned int direction**
  - 0 Use the decrypt function.
  - 1 Use the encrypt function.

**Return codes**

- 0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

**ica_des_cbc_cs**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 76

libica Programmer’s Reference
800-38A, Chapter 6.2 and the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A on Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode.

ica_des_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted or decrypted by chained calls to ica_des_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the last call to ica_des_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_des_cbc_cs call, provided that the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

Format

unsigned int ica_des_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data, unsigned char *out_data, unsigned long data_length, const unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned int direction, unsigned int variant);

Required hardware support

KMC-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as the data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. This buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. For variant equal to 1 or variant equal to 2, the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cbc or ica_des_cbc_cs call with the same key, if data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

unsigned int variant
1 Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two blocks in order.
2 Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication
800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two blocks if data_length is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for DES).

3 Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the last two blocks.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_cfb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_des_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                         unsigned char *out_data,
                         unsigned long data_length,
                         const unsigned char *key,
                         unsigned char *iv,
                         unsigned int lcfb,
                         unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

KMF-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data

Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as the data_length parameter.

unsigned char *out_data

Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as the data_length parameter.

unsigned long data_length

Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key

Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv

Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cfb call with the same key, if data_length in the preceding call is a multiple of the lcfb parameter.

unsigned int lcfb

Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).
unsigned int direction
    0   Use the decrypt function.
    1   Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 107.

ica_des_cmac
Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
    unsigned long message_length,
    unsigned char *mac,
    unsigned int mac_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
    KMAC-DEA
    PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *message
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
    Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
    Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
    0   Verify message authentication code.
    1   Compute message authentication code for the message.
Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_cmac_intermediate
Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac_intermediate and ica_des_cmac_last can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using CMAC is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_des_cmac_intermediate is used to process all but the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by ica_des_cmac_intermediate must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

Note that ica_des_cmac_intermediate has no direction argument. This function can be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message,  
unsigned long message_length,  
const unsigned char *key,  
unsigned char *iv);

Required hardware support
KMAC-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message part in message. This value must be a multiple of the cipher block size.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size bytes (8 bytes for DES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of zeros. For processing the n-th message part, this parameter must be the resulting iv value of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate function applied to the (n-1)-th message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The resulting value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to ica_des_cmac_intermediate, or to ica_des_cmac_last with the same key.

Return codes
0 Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_cmac_last

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac_last can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message or of the final part of a message for which all preceding parts were processed with ica_des_cmac_intermediate.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message,
   unsigned long message_length,
   unsigned char *mac,
   unsigned int mac_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned char *iv,
   unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-DEA
PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
   Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message or the final part of a message, to be either authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
   Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code that is verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
   Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac that is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
   Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If iv is NULL, message is assumed to be the complete message to be processed. Otherwise, message is the final part of a composite message to be processed and iv contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts with chained calls to ica_des_cmac_intermediate (the value returned in iv of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate call applied to the penultimate message part).

unsigned int direction
   0 Verify message authentication code.
   1 Compute message authentication code for the message.
Return codes

0    Success
EFAULT
    If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_ctr

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of the same size as the cipher block (8 bytes for DES) is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block, subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment function used in ica_des_ctr is an arithmetic increment without carry on the M least significant bytes in the counter, where M is a parameter to ica_des_ctr.

Format

unsigned int ica_des_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data,
                        unsigned char *out_data,
                        unsigned long data_length,
                        const unsigned char *key,
                        unsigned char *ctr,
                        unsigned int ctr_width,
                        unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMCTR-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *ctr
    Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block in bytes. ctr contains an initialization value for a counter function, and it is replaced by a new value. That new value can be used as the initialization value for a counter function in a chained ica_des_ctr call with the same key, if the data_length used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.
unsigned int ctr_width
A number \( M \) between 1 and the cipher block size. This value is used by the counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing without carry the least significant \( M \) bytes of the counter value.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_ctlrlist

Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of the same size as the cipher block is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_des_ctlrlist function assumes that a list \( n \) of precomputed counter values is provided, where \( n \) is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message size divided by the cipher block size. This function is used to optimally utilize IBM Z hardware support for non-standard counter functions.

Format

unsigned int ica_des_ctlrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   const unsigned char *ctrlist,
   unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMCTR-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is \( \text{data} \_\text{length} \). The size of this buffer must be at least as large as \( \text{data} \_\text{length} \).

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as \( \text{data} \_\text{length} \).

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of \( \text{in} \_\text{data} \).

Calls to ica_des_ctlrlist with the same key can be chained if:
- With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the \( \text{data} \_\text{length} \) used is a multiple of the cipher block size.
- The \( \text{ctrlist} \) argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that follows the counters used in the preceding call.
const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

const unsigned char *ctrlist
   Pointer to a readable buffer of a size greater than or equal to data_length, and a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). ctrlist should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

unsigned int direction
   0   Use the decrypt function.
   1   Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

ica_des_ecb
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
           unsigned char *out_data,
           unsigned long data_length,
           const unsigned char *key,
           unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
   Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
   Pointer to a writeable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
   0   Use the decrypt function.
   1   Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0   Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

**ica_des_ofb**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_des_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                         unsigned char *out_data,
                         unsigned long data_length,
                         const unsigned char *key,
                         unsigned int key_length,
                         unsigned char *iv,
                         unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMO-DEA

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  
  Pointer to a writable buffer that contains the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

- **const unsigned char *key**
  
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES), the result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_des_ofb` call with the same key.

- **unsigned int direction**
  
  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Use the decrypt function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Use the encrypt function.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Return codes**

0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 107.

**DES function compatibility**

In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following DES interfaces remain supported:
unsigned int ica_des_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_single_t *des_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

unsigned int ica_des_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_single_t *des_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

Table 5 shows libica version 2.0 DES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 DES function calls.

Table 5. Compatibility of libica version 2.0 DES functions calls to libica version 2.4 DES function calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 DES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 DES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_encrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,iv,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_decrypt(MODE_ECB,data_length,in_data,NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,0);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_decrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,iv,0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions ica_des_encrypt and ica_des_decrypt remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of ica_des_ecb and ica_des_cbc.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see libica Programmers Reference version 2.0.

**ica_sha1**

**Purpose**

Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHA-1 algorithm.

**Format**

unsigned int ica_sha1(unsigned int message_part,
unsigned int input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha_context_t *sha_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

**Required hardware support**

KIMD-SHA-1 and KLMD-SHA-1

**Parameters**

**unsigned int message_part**

The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY

A single hash operation

SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST

The first part
**SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE**
The middle part

**SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**
The last part

**unsigned int input_length**
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm.

**unsigned char *input_data**
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

**sha_context_t *sha_context**
Pointer to the SHA-1 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha1 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha1. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

**unsigned char *output_data**
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of **SHA_HASH_LENGTH**. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

**Return codes**

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see **“Return codes” on page 107**.
Chapter 4. Accessing libica functions through the PKCS #11 API (openCryptoki)

Learn how the cryptographic functions provided by libica can be accessed using the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

For a description of the current PKCS #11 standard, see PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

openCryptoki overview

openCryptoki consists of an implementation of the PKCS #11 API, a slot manager, an API for slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs), and a set of STDLLs (or tokens). The libica token (ICA token) is such a STDLL introduced into openCryptoki.

The openCryptoki base library (libopencryptoki.so) supports the generic PKCS #11 API as outlined in the PKCS #11 specification. Currently, openCryptoki 3.6 conforms to PKCS #11 version 2.40. openCryptoki also loads token-specific modules (STDLLs) that provide the token specific implementation of the PKCS #11 API and cryptographic functions (for example, session management, object management, and crypto algorithms). So, openCryptoki 3.6 conforming to PKCS #11 2.40 requires libica version 2.5 or later. The current libica version 3.0 can be used with openCryptoki 3.4, 3.5 or later versions.

A global configuration file (/etc/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf) is provided which describes the available tokens. This configuration file can be customized for the individual tokens. The openCryptoki package contains man pages that describe the format of the configuration files. For more information, see "Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file" on page 93.

The libica token (ICA token) is a plug-in into the openCryptoki token library, providing support for several cryptographic algorithms.

Slot manager

The slot manager (pkcsslotd) runs as a daemon. Upon start-up, it creates a shared memory segment and reads the openCryptoki configuration file to acquire the available token and slot information. The openCryptoki API attaches to this memory segment to retrieve token information. Thus, the slot manager provides the openCryptoki API with the token information when required. An application in turn links to or loads the openCryptoki API.

Slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs)

The libica token is an example of an STDLL within openCryptoki. STDLLs are plug-in modules to the openCryptoki (main) API. They provide token-specific functions that implement the interfaces. Specific devices can be supported by building an appropriate STDLL. Figure 1 on page 91 illustrates the stack and the process flow in an IBM Z environment.

The STDLLs require local disk space to store persistent data, such as token information, personal identification numbers (PINs) and token objects. This
information is stored in a separate directory for each token (for example in 
/var/lib/opencryptoki/lite for the libica token). Within each of these directories 
there is a sub-directory TOK_OBJ that contains the token objects (token key store). 
Each private token object is represented by an encrypted file. Most of these 
directories are created during installation of openCryptoki.

The pkcsconf command line program

openCryptoki provides a command line program (/usr/sbin/pkcsconf) to 
configure and administer tokens that are supported within the system. The 
pkcsconf capabilities include token initialization, and security officer (SO) PIN and 
user PIN initialization and maintenance.

pkcsconf operations that address a specific token must specify the slot that 
contains the token with the -c option. You can view the list of tokens present 
within the system by specifying the -t option (without -c option). For example, 
the following code shows the options for the pkcsconf command and displays slot 
information for the system:

```
# pkcsconf ?
usage: pkcsconf [-itsmlIupPh] [-c slotnumber -U user-PIN -S SO-PIN -n new PIN]
```

The available options have the following meanings:

- **-i** display PKCS11 info
- **-t** display token info
- **-s** display slot info
- **-m** display mechanism list
- **-l** display slot description
- **-I** initialize token
- **-u** initialize user PIN
- **-p** set the user PIN
- **-P** set the SO PIN
- **-h** | **--help** | **?**
  show pkcsconf help information

- **-c** specify the token slot for the operation
- **-U** the current user PIN (for use when changing the user pin with -u and -p 
  options); if not specified, user will be prompted
- **-S** the current Security Officer (SO) pin (for use when changing the SO pin 
  with -P option); if not specified, user will be prompted
- **-n** the new pin (for use when changing either the user pin or the SO pin with 
  -u, -p or -P options); if not specified, user will be prompted

For more information about the pkcsconf command, see the pkcsconf man page.

[Figure 1 on page 91] illustrates the stack and the process flow.
Figure 1. Stack and process flow
Functions provided by openCryptoki with the ICA token

The PKCS #11 functions that manage tokens, slots, and sessions are described in the PKCS #11 standard.

For an overview of the algorithms supported by the ica token, see “Supported mechanisms for the ICA token” on page 98.

The PKCS #11 standard describes the exact API for the mentioned mechanisms. For more information, see PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

For more details about how to use openCryptoki, see “Using the ICA token” on page 98.

Installing openCryptoki

openCryptoki is shipped with the Linux on z Systems distributions. Follow the instructions in this section to install openCryptoki.

Check whether you have already installed openCryptoki in your current environment:

```
$ rpm -qa | grep -i opencryptoki
```

Note: This command example is distribution dependent. `opencryptoki` must in certain distribution be specified as `opencryptoki` (case-sensitive).

You should see all installed openCryptoki packages. If required packages are missing, use the installation tool of your Linux distribution to install the appropriate openCryptoki RPM.

Note: You must remove any previous package of openCryptoki before you install a new package.

Installing from the RPM

The current distributions already provide the openCryptoki binary RPMs.

Customers can install these openCryptoki RPM packages by using the installation tool of their selected distribution.

If you received openCryptoki as an RPM package, follow the RPM installation process that is described in the RPM man page. This process is the preferred installation method.

Installing from the source package

If you prefer, you can install openCryptoki from the source package.

As an alternative, for example for development purposes, you can get the latest openCryptoki version (inclusive latest patches) from the GitHub openCryptoki repository and build it yourself. But this version is not serviced. It is suitable for non-production systems and early feature testing, but you should not use it for production.

1. Download the latest version of the openCryptoki sources from:

   https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki/releases
2. Decompress and extract the compressed tape archive (TGZ file). There is a new directory named opencryptoki.

3. Change to that directory and issue the following scripts and commands:

```
$ ./bootstrap
$ ./configure
$ make
# make install
```

The scripts or commands perform the following functions:

- **bootstrap**: Initial setup, basic configurations
- **configure**: Check configurations and build the makefile
- **make**: Compile and link
- **make install**: Install the libraries

**Note**: When installing openCryptoki from the source package, the location of some installed files will differ from the location of files installed from an RPM.

---

**Configuring openCryptoki**

After a successful installation of openCryptoki, you need to perform certain configuration and customization tasks to enable the exploitation of the libica functions from applications. Especially, you need to set up tokens and daemons and then initialize the tokens.

openCryptoki, and in particular the slot manager, can handle several tokens, which can have different support for different hardware devices or software solutions. As shown in Figure 1 on page 91, libica interacts with the libica library host part. Libica can operate with all Crypto Express adapters in accelerator or coprocessor mode, up to CEX5S (CEX5A and CEX5C), for asymmetric cryptographic functions. Furthermore, it can operate with CPACF for symmetric cryptographic functions.

For a complete configuration of openCryptoki, finish the tasks as described in the contained subtopics:

- “Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file”
- “Configuring the ICA token” on page 96
- “Initializing the ICA token” on page 96
- “How to recognize the ICA token” on page 97

Finally, to control your configuration results, follow the instructions provided in “How to recognize the ICA token” on page 97.

---

**Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file**

A preconfigured list of all available tokens that are ready to register to the openCryptoki slot daemon is required before the openCryptoki daemon can start. This list is provided by the global configuration file. Read this topic for information on how to adapt this file according to your installation.
Table 6 provides an overview of supported libraries (tokens) that may be in place after you have successfully installed openCryptoki. The list may vary for different distributions and is dependent from the installed RPM packages.

Also, Linux on z Systems does not support the TPM token library.

A token is only available, if the token library is installed, and the appropriate software and hardware support pertaining to the stack of the token is also installed.

A token needs not be available, even if the corresponding token library is installed. Display the list of available tokens by using the command:

\$ pkcsconf -t

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so</td>
<td>openCryptoki base library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ica.so</td>
<td>ICA token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_sw.so</td>
<td>software token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.so</td>
<td>TPM token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_cca.so</td>
<td>CCA token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ep11.so</td>
<td>EP11 token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_icsf.so</td>
<td>ICSF token library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: An analogous set of libraries is available for 32 bit compatibility mode.

Sample configuration file:
# The following defaults are defined:
# hwversion = 0.0
# firmwareversion = 0.0
# description = Linux
# manufacturer = IBM
# The slot definitions below may be overridden and/or customized.
# For example:
# slot 0
# {  
#   stdll = libpkcs11_cca.so  
#   description = "OCK CCA Token"  
#   manufacturer = "MyCompany Inc."  
#   hwversion = 2.32  
#   firmwareversion = 1.0  
# }
# See man(5) opencryptoki.conf for further information.
# slot 0
# {  
# stdll = libpkcs11_tpm.so  
# }
# slot 1
# {  
# stdll = libpkcs11_ica.so  
# description = "ICA Token"  
# manufacturer = "IBM"  
# hwversion = 1.0  
# firmwareversion = 1.0  
# }
# slot 2
# {  
# stdll = libpkcs11_cca.so  
# }
# slot 3
# {  
# stdll = libpkcs11_sw.so  
# }
# slot 4
# {  
# stdll = libpkcs11_ep11.so  
# confname = ep11tok.conf  
# }

Note:

- The standard path for slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs) is: /usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/.

Use one of the following command to start the slot-daemon, which reads out the configuration information and sets up the tokens:

```bash
$ pkcs11slotd start
$ service pkcs11slotd start
$ systemctl start pkcs11slotd.service
```

For a permanent solution, for example, for an automatic start-up of the slot-daemon, refer to the distribution documentation.
Configuring the ICA token

You need to connect the libica library to the ICA token. For this purpose, you should check the slot entry definition in the openCryptoki configuration file.

Each token has its own token directory, which is used by openCryptoki to store token-specific information (like for example, key objects, user PIN, or SO PIN). The ICA token directory is /var/lib/opencryptoki/lite/.

Note: This configuration is token-based. It applies to all applications that use this ICA token.

Defining the slot entry for the ICA token in openCryptoki

Normally, the default openCryptoki configuration file opencryptoki.conf already provides a slot entry for the ICA token. It is preconfigured to slot #1. Check this default entry to find out whether you can use it as is. If it is missing, then define a slot entry that sets the stdll attribute to libpkcs11_ica.so.

Initializing the ICA token

Once the configuration files of openCryptoki and the ICA token are set up, and the pkcsslotd daemon is started, the ICA token must be initialized.

Note: PKCS #11 defines two users for each token: a security officer (SO) whose responsibility is the administration of the token, and a standard user (User) who wants to use the token to perform cryptographic operations. openCryptoki requires that for both the SO and the User a log-in PIN is defined as part of the token initialization.

The following command provides some useful slot information:

```
# pkcsconf -s

Slot #0 Info
   Description: EPII Token
   Manufacturer: IBM
   Flags: 0x1 (TOKEN_PRESENT)
   Hardware Version: 1.2
   Firmware Version: 1.0

Slot #1 Info
   Description: ICA Token
   Manufacturer: IBM
   Flags: 0x1 (TOKEN_PRESENT)
   Hardware Version: 2.32
   Firmware Version: 1.0
```

Find your preferred token in the details list and select the correct slot number. This number is used in the next initialization steps to identify your token:

```
$ pkcsconf -l -c <slot> // Initialize the Token and setup a Token Label
$ pkcsconf -p -c <slot> // change the SO PIN (recommended)
$ pkcsconf -u -c <slot> // Initialize the User PIN (SO PIN required)
$ pkcsconf -p -c <slot> // change the User PIN (optional)
```
**pkcsconf -I**
During token initialization, you are asked for a token label. Provide a meaningful name, because you might need this reference for identification purposes.

**pkcsconf -P**
For security reasons, openCryptoki requires that you change the default SO PIN (87654321) to a different value. Use the `pkcsconf -P` option to change the SO PIN.

**pkcsconf -u**
When you enter the user PIN initialization you are asked for the newly set SO PIN. The length of the user PIN must be 4 - 8 characters.

**pkcsconf -p**
You must at least once change the user PIN with `pkcsconf -p` option. After you completed the PIN setup, the token is prepared and ready for use.

**Note:** An initialization (`pkcsconf -u` option) with 12345678 will work without any issues. However, this is not recommended, because this pattern is checked internally and marked as default PIN. Therefore, change to a user PIN that is different from 12345678.

**How to recognize the ICA token**
You can use the `pkcsconf -t` command to display a table that shows all available tokens. You can check the slot and token information, and the PIN status at any time.

The following information provided by the `pkcsconf -t` command about the ICA token is returned in the `Token Info` section, where, for example, `Token #1 Info` displays information about the token plugged into slot number 1.

```
$ pkcsconf -t
Token #0 Info:
  Label: IBM ICA PKCS #11
  Manufacturer: IBM Corp.
  Model: IBM ICA
  Serial Number: 123
  Flags: 0x800045 (RNG|LOGIN_REQUIRED|CLOCK_ON_TOKEN|USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED|SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED)
  Sessions: 0/18446744073709551614
  R/W Sessions: 18446744073709551615/18446744073709551614
  PIN Length: 4-8
  Public Memory: 0xffffffffffffffff/0xffffffffffffffff
  Private Memory: 0xffffffffffffffff/0xffffffffffffffff
  Hardware Version: 1.0
  Firmware Version: 1.0
  Time: 14:48:30
```

*Figure 2. Token info before initialization*

The most important information is as follows:
- The token **Label** you assigned at the initialization phase (IBM ICA PKCS #11, in the example). You can initialize or change a token label by using the `pkcsconf -I` command. In the output from [Figure 3 on page 98](#) you see the label changed to icatest.
- The **Model** name is unique and designates the token that is in use.
- The **Flags** provide information about the token initialization status, the PIN status, and features such as *Random Number Generator* (RNG). They also
provide information about requirements, such as *Login required*, which means that there is at least one mechanism that requires a session log-in to use that cryptographic function.

The flag USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED indicates that the user PIN must be changed before the token can be used. The flag SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED indicates that the SO PIN must be changed before administration commands can be used.

For more information about the flags provided in this output, see the description of the TOKEN_INFO structure and the Token Information Flags in the PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

- The **PIN length** range declared for this token.

```
Token #0 Info:
  Label: icatest
  Manufacturer: IBM Corp.
  Model: IBM ICA
  Serial Number: 123
  Flags: 0x44D (RNG|LOGIN_REQUIRED|USER_PIN_INITIALIZED|CLOCK_ON_TOKEN|TOKEN_INITIALIZED)
  Sessions: 0/18446744073709551614
  R/W Sessions: 18446744073709551615/18446744073709551614
  PIN Length: 4-8
  Public Memory: 0x0000000000000000/0x0000000000000000
  Private Memory: 0x0000000000000000/0x0000000000000000
  Hardware Version: 1.0
  Firmware Version: 1.0
  Time: 14:56:24
```

*Figure 3. Token info after initialization*

[Figure 2 on page 97](#) shows the information for an uninitialized token, and [Figure 3](#) shows the information for an initialized one.

### Using the ICA token

Applications that are designed to work with openCryptoki can take advantage of the libica library functions by using the openCryptoki standard interface (PKCS #11 standard C API).

Applications that are designed to work with openCryptoki are also able to use the functions provided by the ICA token.

For a list of code samples, refer to “openCryptoki code samples” on page 170.

### Supported mechanisms for the ICA token

View a list of the supported mechanisms for the ICA token in the openCryptoki implementation.

Use the following command to retrieve a complete list of algorithms (or mechanisms) that are supported by the token:
The list displays all mechanisms supported by this token. The mechanism ID and name corresponds to the PKCS #11 specification. Each mechanism provides its supported key size and some further properties such as hardware support and mechanism information flags. These flags provide information about the PKCS #11 functions that may use the mechanism. Typical functions are for example, encrypt, decrypt, wrap key, unwrap key, sign, or verify.

Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_X_509</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_OFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CFB8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_OFB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB128</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CTR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_GCM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Restrictions of the ICA token

As of openCryptoki version 3.6, the C_SeedRandom function of the ICA token always returns CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED.
Chapter 5. libica constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes

Use these constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes when you program with the libica APIs.

The APIs are described in Chapter 3, “Application programming interfaces,” on page 9. To use them, include ica_api.h in your programs.

libica constants

The constants listed in this topic are provided and valid for the current libica version.

Use these constants instead of the equivalent libica version 1 constants. There is no difference in their values.

#define ICA_ENCRYPT 1
#define ICA_DECRYPT 0
#define ICA_DRBG_NEW_STATE_HANDLE NULL

FIPS mode constants

/* 'FIPS mode active'-flag */
#define ICA_FIPS_MODE 1

Powerup-test-failed flags

/* Cryptographic algorithm test (KAT or pair-wise consistency test) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CRYPTOALG 2

/* Critical functions test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CRITICALFUNC 8

Conditional-test-failed flags

/* Pair-wise consistency test for public & private keys (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CONSISTENCY 16

/* Software/Firmware load test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_LOAD 32

/* Manual key entry test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_KEYENTRY 64

/* Continuous random number generator test */
#define ICA_FIPS_RNG 128

/* Bypass test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_BYPASS 256
Type definitions

These type definitions are available to ensure compatibility with libica version 1 types.

typedef ica_des_vector_t ICA_DES_VECTOR;
typedef ica_des_key_single_t ICA_KEYDES_SINGLE;
typedef ica_des_key_triple_t ICA_KEYDES_TRIPLE;
typedef ica_aes_vector_t ICA_AES_VECTOR;
typedef ica_aes_key_single_t ICA_KEYAES_SINGLE;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_128_t ICA_KEYAESLEN128;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_192_t ICA_KEYAESLEN192;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_256_t ICA_KEYAESLEN256;
typedef sha_context_t SHA_CONTEXT;
typedef sha256_context_t SHA256_CONTEXT;
typedef sha512_context_t SHA512_CONTEXT;
typedef unsigned char ica_des_vector_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_des_key_single_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_key_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_vector_t[16];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_single_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_128_t[16];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_192_t[24];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_256_t[32];
typedef struct ica_drbg_mech ica_drbg_mech_t;
typedef struct ica_drbg ica_drbg_t;

Data structures

These structures are used in the API of the current libica version.

For the definitions of older functions, see previous versions of this book. The older functions are no longer recommended for use, but they are supported.

typedef struct {
    unsigned int key_length;
    unsigned char* modulus;
    unsigned char* exponent;
} ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t;

typedef struct {
    unsigned int key_length;
    unsigned char* p;
    unsigned char* q;
    unsigned char* dp;
    unsigned char* dq;
    unsigned char* qInverse;
} ica_rsa_key_crt_t;

typedef struct {
    unsigned int mech_mode_id;
    unsigned int flags;
    unsigned int property;
} libica_func_list_element;

typedef struct kma_ctx_t kma_ctx;

* mech_mode_id: Unique mechanism ID for each mechanism implemented in libica
#define SHA1 1
#define SHA224 2
#define SHA256 3
#define SHA384 4
#define SHA512 5
#define SHA3_224 6
#define SHA3_256 7
#define SHA3_384 8
#define SHA3_512 9
#define SHAKE_128 10
#define SHAKE_256 12
#define DES_ECB 20
#define DES_CBC 21
#define DES_CBC_CS 22
#define DES_OFB 23
#define DES_CFB 24
#define DES_CTR 25
#define DES_CTRLST 26
#define DES_CBC_MAC 27
#define DES_CMAC 28
#define DES3_ECB 41
#define DES3_CBC 42
#define DES3_CBC_CS 43
#define DES3_OFB 44
#define DES3_CFB 45
#define DES3_CTR 46
#define DES3_CTRLST 47
#define DES3_CBC_MAC 48
#define DES3_CMAC 49
#define AES_ECB 60
#define AES_CBC 61
#define AES_CBC_CS 62
#define AES_OFB 63
#define AES_CFB 64
#define AES_CTR 65
#define AES_CTRLST 66
#define AES_CBC_MAC 67
#define AES_CMAC 68
#define AES_CCM 69
#define AES_GCM 70
#define AES_XTS 71
#define P_RNG 80
#define RSA_ME 90
#define RSA_CRT 91
#define RSA_KEY_GEN_ME 92
#define RSA_KEY_GEN_CRT 93

For more details regarding these mechanisms, refer to the openCryptoki version 2.20 specification.

* flags
This flag represents the type of hardware/software support for each mechanism.

#define ICA_FLAG_SHW 4
Static hardware support (operations on CPACF). Hardware support will be available unless a hardware error occurs.

#define ICA_FLAG_DHW 2
Dynamic hardware support (operations on crypto cards). Hardware support will be available unless the hardware is reconfigured.

#define ICA_FLAG_SW 1
Software support. If both static and dynamic hardware support as well as software support are available, then software support is used as fallback if hardware support fails.
* property
This property field is optional depending on the mechanism. It is used to declare mechanism specific parameters, such as key sizes for RSA and AES.

For RSA mechanisms:
- **bit 0**
  512 bit key size support
- **bit 1**
  1024 bit key size support
- **bit 2**
  2048 bit key size support
- **bit 3**
  4096 bit key size support

For AES mechanisms:
- **bit 0**
  128 bit key size support
- **bit 1**
  192 bit key size support
- **bit 2**
  256 bit key size support

For all non-RSA/AES mechanisms this field is empty.

Take note of these considerations:
- The buffers pointed to by members of type `unsigned char *` must be manually allocated and deallocated by the user.
- Key parts must always be right-aligned in their fields.
- All buffers pointed to by members `modulus` and `exponent` in struct `ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t` must be of length `key_length`.
- All buffers pointed to by members `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, and `qInverse` in struct `ica_rsa_key_crt_t` must be of size `key_length` / 2 or larger.
- In the struct `ica_rsa_key_crt_t`, the buffers `p`, `dp`, and `qInverse` must contain 8 bytes of zero padding in front of the actual values.
- If an exponent is set in struct `ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t` as part of a public key for key generation, be aware that due to a restriction in OpenSSL, the public exponent cannot be larger than a size of unsigned long. Therefore, you must have zeros left-padded in the buffer pointed to by `exponent` in the struct `ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t` struct. Be aware that this buffer also must be of size `key_length`.
- This `key_length` value should be calculated from the length of the modulus in bits, according to this calculation:

```
key_length = (modulus_bits + 7) / 8
```

```c
typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char shaHash[LENGTH_SHA_HASH];
} sha_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char sha256Hash[LENGTH_SHA256_HASH];
} sha256_context_t;
```
typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned char sha512Hash[LENGTH_SHA512_HASH];
} sha512_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char sha3_224Hash[SHA3_224_HASH_LENGTH];
} sha3_224_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char sha3_256Hash[SHA3_256_HASH_LENGTH];
} sha3_256_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned char sha3_384Hash[SHA3_384_HASH_LENGTH];
} sha3_384_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned char sha3_512Hash[SHA3_512_HASH_LENGTH];
} sha3_512_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned int output_length;
    unsigned char shake_128Hash[200];
} shake_128_context_t;

typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned int output_length;
    unsigned char shake_256Hash[200];
} shake_256_context_t;

typedef struct {
    unsigned int major_version;
    unsigned int minor_version;
    unsigned int fixpack_version;
} libica_version_info;

### Return codes

The current libica functions use the standard Linux return codes listed in this topic.

- **0** Success
- **EFAULT** The message authentication failed.
- **EINVAL** Incorrect parameter
- **EIO** I/O error
- **EPERM** Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).
- **ENODEV** No such device
- **ENOMEM** Not enough memory

When libica calls `open`, `close`, `begin_sigill_section`, or OpenSSL function `RSA_generate_key_ex()`, the error codes of these programs are returned.
Chapter 6. libica tools

The libica packages include tools to investigate the capabilities of your cryptographic hardware and how these capabilities are used by applications that use libica.

icainfo - Show available libica functions

Use the icainfo command to find out which libica functions are available on your Linux system.

The icainfo output also indicates, whether the libica library has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state. Algorithms that are not FIPS approved are marked as blocked in both table columns when running in FIPS mode. All algorithms are marked as blocked when libica is in an error state.

Format

icainfo syntax

---

Where:

- `v` or `--version`
  Displays the version number of icainfo, then exits.

- `h` or `--help`
  Displays help information for the command.

Examples

To obtain an overview of the supported algorithms with modes of operations and how they are implemented on your Linux system (hardware, software, or both), enter:

```bash
# icainfo
```

View a sample output produced by this command. A no in column software indicates, that no software fallback for this function is implemented in libica.

The following CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF) operations are supported by libica on this system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cryptographic algorithm support</th>
<th>function</th>
<th>hardware</th>
<th>software</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ICASTATSB - Show use of libica functions

Use the ICASTATSB utility to find out whether libica uses hardware acceleration features or works with software fallbacks. ICASTATSB collects the statistical data per user and not per system.

The command also shows which specific functions of libica are used. For a standard user, ICASTATSB shows a statistics table with all crypto operations that are used by the user’s processes. For the root user, ICASTATSB provides statistics for all users, or processes, on the system.

The shared memory segment that holds the statistic data is created when a user starts ICASTATSB or when a program is started, that performs cryptographic operations using libica. Once the shared memory segment exists, it can only be removed by one of the delete options (-d or -D) provided with the ICASTATSB utility. Thus, this function collects crypto statistics independently from the process context for continuing availability of data. All cryptographic operations using libica are counted into the statistics.

Note: Before deleting the shared memory segment, ensure that there are no running applications that are using this memory segment.
Format

ICASTATS syntax

- A or --all
  Shows the statistic tables from all users (for root users only).

- d or --delete
  Removes the user specific shared memory segment.

- D or --delete-all
  Removes all shared memory segments (for root users only).

- r or --reset
  Resets the user statistic data table.

- R or --reset-all
  Resets all statistic data tables from all users (for root users only).

- S or --summary
  Shows accumulated statistics from all users (for root users only).

- U <username> or --user <username>
  Shows statistic data for a dedicated user (for root users only).

- h or --help
  Displays help information for the command.

- v or --version
  Displays the version number of ICASTATS, then exits.

Examples

To display the current use of libica functions issue:

```bash
# icastats
```

View an excerpt of a sample output produced by this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>function</th>
<th># hardware</th>
<th># software</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>CRYPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENC</td>
<td>CRYPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-224</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>libica Counter</td>
<td>libica Counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA3-384</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAKE-256</td>
<td>8276</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_RNG</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA-ME</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA-CRT</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES ECB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES CBC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES CMAC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES XTS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES GCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CRYPT**
- Indicates cryptographic functions that produce a one-way result on given data, for example, creating a digital hash value from a given input text, or creating/verifying a digital signature.

**ENC**
- Is shown for a two way function performing encryption.

**DEC**
- Is shown for a two way function performing decryption.

Note that one single libica function may increase several different counters when internally using different hardware functions. For example, performing AES GCM on a z13 involves using the AES ECB, AES CTR and GHASH hardware functions. On a z14, the AES GCM counter increases to indicate the use of the KMA instruction. Depending on the input data, other counters may also increase. Therefore, by looking at the hardware counters, it is not possible to see how often a particular API function was called.

**Logging and error handling**

Access failures to the shared memory segments that are used by the `icastats` utility, are logged once via the syslog interface. After a failed attempt to access the shared memory segment, the library no longer collects any statistic data for this application (related to application lifetime and user).

**Example** of syslog message:

<date> <machine> <application>: failed to create or access shared memory segment.

The `icastats` utility prints an error message if it cannot create, access, or remove the shared memory segment.

**Note:** The log message may indicate a permission problem with the shared memory segment. An administrator can remove the defect memory segment. The next call of `icastats` should create a new memory segment automatically.

You can view the shared memory segments and information about creators and owners with the `ips` command:
Chapter 7. Examples

These sample program segments illustrate the use of the libica APIs.

These examples are released under the Common Public License - V1.0, which is stated in full at the end of this chapter. See “Common Public License - V1.0” on page 181.

In the extracted source package, you also find test cases for all APIs in directory .../src/tests/. You can have the source of these test cases compiled using the --enable-testcases option with the configure command as described in “Installing libica version 3.2 from the source package” on page 5.

View a list of examples for libica, and the makefile used to create the library.

- “SHAKE-128 example”
- “SHA-256 example” on page 115
- “Pseudo random number generation example” on page 118
- “Key generation example” on page 119
- “RSA example” on page 125
- “AES with CFB mode example” on page 128
- “AES with CTR mode example” on page 141
- “AES with OFB mode example” on page 150
- “AES with XTS mode example” on page 158
- “CMAC example” on page 166
- “openCryptoki code samples” on page 170
- “Makefile example” on page 180
- “Common Public License - V1.0” on page 181

SHAKE-128 example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
   * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
   * with this program.
   * Copyright IBM Corp. 2009, 2017
   */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

/* The name of the file to calculate the SHAKE-128 hash from */
#define FILE_NAME "example_shake_128.c"

/* Size of the chunks in which the file is read.
   * Must be a multiple of 168 bytes (the SHAKE-128 block size).
   */
#define CHUNK_SIZE 168

/* An arbitrary output_length in case the use did not specify a value via args */
#define SAMPLE_SHAKE_OUTPUT_LENGTH 123
/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);

/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int rc=0;
    unsigned int output_length = SAMPLE_SHAKE_OUTPUT_LENGTH;

    /* Try to read the user specified output length. If none given, use our
     * sample value. */
    if (argc > 1 && argv[1] != NULL)
        output_length = atoi(argv[1]);

    /* This is the buffer where the SHAKE-128 hash is generated into.
     * The SHAKE algorithm can create output of any length greater or equal
     * to 8 bytes. Let's use an output length of 256 bytes for this example. */
    unsigned char* shake_result_p;

    /* The file will be read in several chunks into this buffer.
     * The chunks will be the input to the ica_shake_128 function which
     * we call for each chunk. */
    unsigned char shake_input[CHUNK_SIZE];

    /* This is the SHAKE-128 context. It stores intermediate values
     * needed when chaining multiple chunks (as we do). */
    shake_128_context_t context;

    /* Open the file in binary mode and read its content in chunks */
    FILE *f;
    f = fopen(FILE_NAME, "r");
    if (f == NULL)
        return handle_ica_error(errno);

    /* Allocate a buffer for the output value */
    shake_result_p = malloc(output_length);
    if (shake_result_p == NULL) {
        printf("Cannot malloc %d bytes for output value. \n", output_length);
        return EINVAL;
    }

    /* Perform the shake-128 operation ... */
    int len;
    unsigned long total_size = 0;
    memset((char*)&context, 0, sizeof(context));
    while (!feof(f)) {
        /* read a chunk of data */
        len = fread(shake_input, 1, CHUNK_SIZE, f);
        if (total_size == 0) {
            /* this is the first chunk */
            rc = ica_shake_128(SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST, len, shake_input,
                               &context, shake_result_p, output_length);
        } else if (!feof(f)) {
            /* add this chunk to the hash */
            rc = ica_shake_128(SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, len, shake_input,
                               &context, shake_result_p, output_length);
        } else {
            /* this is the last chunk */
            rc = ica_shake_128(SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, len, shake_input,
                               &context, shake_result_p, output_length);
        }
    }
    if (f != NULL)
        fclose(f);

    if (rc != 0)
        return handle_ica_error(rc);

    printf("SHAKE-128 hash complete.\n");
    dump_data(shake_result_p, output_length);
    return rc;
}
total_size += len;
if (rc)
    break;
}

/* close the file */
fclose(f);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump the generated hash to standard output, just for
 * a visual control.
 */
printf("SHAKE-128 hash with %d bytes of file ' %s' (%lu bytes):
", output_length,
    FILE_NAME, total_size);
dump_data(shake_result_p, output_length);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;
    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data + length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % 16) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    if (i % 16)
        printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) { 
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }
    return rc;
}

SHA-256 example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
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 * this program.
 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

/* The name of the file to calculate the SHA256 hash from */
#define FILE_NAME "example_sha256.c"

/* Size of the chunks in which the file is read. */
/* Must be a multiple of 64 bytes. */
#define CHUNK_SIZE 1024

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);

/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;

    /* This is the buffer where the SHA256 hash is generated into. */
    /* For SHA256, it needs to be 32 bytes in size (SHA256_HASH_LENGTH). */
    unsigned char sha_result[SHA256_HASH_LENGTH];

    /* The file will be read in several chunks into this buffer. */
    /* The chunks will be the input to the ica_sha256 function which */
    /* we call for each chunk. */
    unsigned char sha_input[CHUNK_SIZE];

    /* This is the SHA 256 context. It stores intermediate values */
    /* needed when chaining multiple chunks (as we do). */
    sha256_context_t context;

    /* Open the file in binary mode and read its content in chunks */
    FILE *f;
    f = fopen(FILE_NAME,"r");
    if (f==NULL)
        return handle_ica_error(errno);
    int len;
    unsigned long total_size = 0;
    while(!feof(f)) {
        /* read a chunk of data */
        len = fread(sha_input, 1, CHUNK_SIZE, f);
        if (total_size == 0) {
            /* this is the first chunk */
            rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST, len, sha_input, &context, sha_result);
        } else if (!feof(f)) {
            /* add this chunk to the hash */
            rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE, len, sha_input, &context, sha_result);
        }
    }
}

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else {
    /* this is the last chunk */
    rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL,
        len, sha_input,
        &context,
        sha_result);
}

total_size += len;

if (rc)
    break;

/* close the file */
fclose(f);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump the generated hash to standard output, just for
 * a visual control.
 * * Note: You can verify the displayed hash using command
 * 'sha256sum example_sha256.c'
 */
printf("SHA256 hash of file '%s' (%u bytes):
", FILE_NAME, total_size);
dump_data(sha_result, sizeof(sha_result));
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % 16) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    if (i % 16)
        printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }

    return rc;
}
Pseudo random number generation example

This example uses the libica version 1 API. Examples for using the libica version 2.4 API for random number generation are located in other examples, such as the DES with CTR mode example.

```c
/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
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 * with this program.
 */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

unsigned char R[512];
extern int errno;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", (unsigned char ) *h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

int main(int ac, char **av)
{
    int rc;
    ICA_ADAPTER_HANDLE adapter_handle;

    rc = icaOpenAdapter(0, &adapter_handle);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaOpenAdapter failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    }

    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, sizeof R, R);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    } else {
        printf("\nHere it is:\n");
    }
    dump_array(R, sizeof R);
}
```

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if (!rc) {
    printf("Well, does it look random?\n\n");
}
icaCloseAdapter(adapter_handle);
return 0;

Key generation example

This example uses the various key generation APIs, as well as those to open and close an adapter, and random number generation.

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
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/* this program. */
*/

/* (C) COPYRIGHT International Business Machines Corp. 2001, 2009 */
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <memory.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include "ica_api.h"
#define KEY_BYTES ((key_bits + 7) / 8)
#define KEY_BYTES_MAX 256
extern int errno;

void dump_array(char *ptr, int size) {
    char *ptr_end;
    char *h;
    int i = 1;
    
    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x",(unsigned char )*h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    ICA_ADAPTER_HANDLE adapter_handle;
    ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT crtkey;
    ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO wockey, wockey2;
    unsigned char decrypted[KEY_BYTES_MAX], encrypted[KEY_BYTES_MAX],
    original[KEY_BYTES_MAX];
    int rc;
    unsigned int length, length2;
    unsigned int exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED, key_bits = 1024;
length = sizeof wockey;
length2 = sizeof wockey2;
bzero(&wockey, sizeof wockey);
bzero(&wockey2, sizeof wockey2);

rc = icaOpenAdapter(0, &adapter_handle);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaOpenAdapter failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
}

exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED;
printf("a fixed exponent ...\n");
rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, wockey.keyRecord);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return -1;
}

wockey.nLength = KEY_BYTES / 2;
wockey.expLength = sizeof(unsigned long);
wockey.expOffset = SZ_HEADER_MODEXPO;
wockey.keyRecord[wockey.expLength - 1] |= 1;

if (argc > 1) {
    key_bits = atoi(argv[1]);
    if (key_bits > KEY_BYTES_MAX * 8) {
        printf("The maximum key length is %d bits.", KEY_BYTES_MAX * 8);
        exit(0);
    }
    wockey.modulusBitLength = key_bits;
    printf("Using %u-bit keys and \n", key_bits);
    if (argc > 2) {
        switch (argv[2][0]) {
        case '3':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_3;
            printf("exponent 3 ...\n");
            wockey.expLength = 1;
            break;
        case '6':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_65537;
            printf("exponent 65537 ...\n");
            wockey.expLength = 3;
            break;
        case 'R':
        case 'r':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_RANDOM;
            printf("a random exponent ...\n");
            break;
        default:
            break;
        }
    }
}

rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, sizeof(original), original);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

original[0] = 0;

rc = icaRsaKeyGenerateModExpo(adapter_handle, key_bits, exponent_type, &length, &wockey, &length2, &wockey2);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsakeyGenerateModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char *) wockey.keyRecord, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char *) wockey2.keyRecord, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("encrypt\n");
rc = icaRsamodExpo(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, original, &wockey,
    &length, encrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsamodExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}
bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("decrypt\n");
rc = icaRsamodExpo(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, encrypted, &wockey2,
    &length, decrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsamodExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}
printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char *) original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0) {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext. Failure!\n");
    icaCloseAdapter(adapter_handle);
    return errno ? errno : -1;
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext.\n");"That can't be good.\n"\n    }
    return -1;
}
}
fflush(stdout);

length = sizeof wockey;
length2 = sizeof crtkey;
bzero(&wockey, sizeof wockey);
wockey.expLength = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED) {
    wockey.keyType = KEYTYPE_MODEXPO;
    wockey.keyLength = sizeof wockey;
    wockey.modulusBitLength = key_bits;
    wockey.nLength = KEY_BYTES;
    wockey.expOffset = SZ_HEADER_MODEXPO;
    wockey.expLength = sizeof (unsigned long);
    wockey.nOffset = KEY_BYTES + wockey.expOffset;
    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, wockey.keyRecord);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d")
    } else {
return rc;
}
wockey.keyRecord[wockey.expLength - 1] |= 1;
rc = icaRsaKeyGenerateCrt(adapter_handle, key_bits, exponent_type, &length, &wockey, &length2, &crtkey);
printf("wockey.modulusBitLength = %i,
crtkey.modulusBitLength = %i\n", wockey.modulusBitLength, crtkey.modulusBitLength);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaKeyGenerateCrt failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

rc = icaRsaModExpo(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, original, &wockey, &length, encrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
}

rc = icaRsaCrt(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, encrypted, &crtkey, &length, decrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaCrt failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
}

printf("success! The key pair checks out.\n");
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
    printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext. That can't be good.\n");
    return -1;
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext. That can't be good.\n");
        return -1;
    } else {
        printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    }
}
fflush(stdout);

printf("TEST NEW API - MOD_EXP\n");
rc = ica_close_adapter(adapter_handle);
printf("ica_close_adapter rc = %i\n", rc);

rc = ica_open_adapter(&adapter_handle);
if (rc)
    printf("Adapter not open\n");
else
    printf("Adapter open\n");

ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t modexpo_public_key;
unsigned char modexpo_public_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_public_n, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char modexpo_public_e[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_public_e, KEY_BYTES);
modexpo_public_key.modulus = modexpo_public_n;
modexpo_public_key.exponent = modexpo_public_e;
modexpo_public_key.key_length = KEY_BYTES;
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_65537)
    *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char *)modexpo_public_key.exponent +
        modexpo_public_key.key_length -
        sizeof(unsigned long)) = 65537;
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_3)
    *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char *)modexpo_public_key.exponent +
        modexpo_public_key.key_length -
        sizeof(unsigned long)) = 3;

ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t modexpo_private_key;
unsigned char modexpo_private_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_private_n, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char modexpo_private_e[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_private_e, KEY_BYTES);
modexpo_private_key.modulus = modexpo_private_n;
modexpo_private_key.exponent = modexpo_private_e;
modexpo_private_key.key_length = KEY_BYTES;

rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo(adapter_handle,
                                   key_bits,
                                   &modexpo_public_key,
                                   &modexpo_private_key);
if (rc)
    printf("ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo rc = %i\n",rc);

printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char *) modexpo_public_key.exponent, KEY_BYTES);
dump_array((char *) modexpo_public_key.modulus, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char *) modexpo_private_key.exponent, KEY_BYTES);
dump_array((char *) modexpo_private_key.modulus, KEY_BYTES);

bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("encrypt \n");
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, original, &modexpo_public_key,
                      &modexpo_private_key);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("decrypt \n");
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, encrypted, &modexpo_private_key,
                      &modexpo_private_key);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;

printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char *) original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0)
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext. Failure!\n");
    return -1;
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext. That can't be good.\n");
        return -1;
    }
}
}
fflush(stdout);

printf("TEST NEW API - CRT\n");
ica_rsa_key_mod_expot(public_key);
ica_rsa_key_crt(private_key);

unsigned char public_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(public_n, KEYBYTES);
unsigned char public_e[KEYBYTES];
bzero(public_e, KEYBYTES);
public_key.modulus = public_n;
public_key.exponent = public_e;
public_key.key_length = KEYBYTES;

unsigned char private_p[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_p, KEYBYTES + 1);
unsigned char private_q[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_q, KEYBYTES);
unsigned char private_dp[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_dp, KEYBYTES + 1);
unsigned char private_dq[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2)];
bzero(private_dq, KEYBYTES);
unsigned char private_qInverse[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_qInverse, KEYBYTES + 1);
private_key.p = private_p;
private_key.q = private_q;
private_key.dp = private_dp;
private_key.dq = private_dq;
private_key.qInverse = private_qInverse;
private_key.key_length = (key_bits + 7) / 8;

if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_65537) {
    *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char*)public_key.exponent +
        public_key.key_length -
        sizeof(unsigned long)) = 65537;
    if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_3) {
        *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char*)public_key.exponent +
            public_key.key_length -
            sizeof(unsigned long)) = 3;
    }
}
rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(adapter_handle, key_bits, &public_key,
    &private_key);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("ica_rsa_key_generate_crt failed and returned %d (0x%lx)\n",
        rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char*)public_key, 2 * KEYBYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char*)private_key, 5 * KEYBYTES / 2 + 24);

bzero(encrypted, KEYBYTES);
length = KEYBYTES;
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, original, &public_key, encrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%lx)\n",
        rc, rc);
    return rc;
}
bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
rc = ica_rsa_crt(adapter_handle, encrypted, &private_key, decrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsacrt failed and returned %d (0x%x).
", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char *) original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0) {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext.
    "Failure!\n");
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext.
        "That can't be good.\n");
    }
}
fflush(stdout);
ica_close_adapter(adapter_handle);
return 0;

RSA example
/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
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 * with this program.
 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include <ica_api.h>

#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS 2048
#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS + 7) / 8
#define RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the
 * encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary,
 * that the length of the encrypted data is less or equal
 * to the RSA key length in bytes.
 */
unsigned char message[] = {
    0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x62,
    0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x73,
    0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64,
    0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00,
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;

    /* This is the RSA public/private key pair. We use libica function
       * ica_rsa_key_generate_crt to generate it. */
    ica_rsa_key_mod_exp_t public_key;
    ica_rsa_key_crt_t private_key;
    unsigned char public_modulus[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char public_exponent[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_p[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_q[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_dp[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_dq[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_qInverse[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char plain_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char cipher_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char decrypt_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];

    /* This is the adapter handle */
    ica_adapter_handle_t handle;

    /* Open the adapter */
    rc = ica_open_adapter(&handle);

    /* Error handling (if necessary). */
    if (rc)
        return handle_ica_error(rc);
    if (handle == DRIVER_NOT_LOADED)
        return handle_ica_error(-1);

    /* Setup the public_key and private_key structures */
    public_key.key_length = RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES;
    public_key.modulus = public_modulus;
    public_key.exponent = public_exponent;
    private_key.key_length = RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES;
    private_key.p = private_p;
    private_key.q = private_q;
    private_key.dp = private_dp;
    private_key.dq = private_dq;
    private_key.qInverse = private_qInverse;

    /* Zero the key fields
        Note: If the exponent element in the public key is not set,
        (i.e. all zero) it is randomly generated. */
    memset(public_modulus, 0, sizeof(public_modulus));
    memset(public_exponent, 0, sizeof(public_exponent));
    memset(private_p, 0, sizeof(private_p));
    memset(private_q, 0, sizeof(private_q));
    memset(private_dp, 0, sizeof(private_dp));
    memset(private_dq, 0, sizeof(private_dq));
    memset(private_qInverse, 0, sizeof(private_qInverse));

    /* Generate a key for RSA */
    rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(handle,
                                 RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS,
                                 &public_key, &private_key);

    /* Error handling (if necessary). */
    if (rc)
        return handle_ica_error(rc);

    printf("Public modulus:\n");
dump_data(public_modulus, sizeof(public_modulus));
printf("Public exponent:
");
dump_data(public_exponent, sizeof(public_exponent));
printf("Private p:
");
dump_data(private_p, sizeof(private_p));
printf("Private q:
");
dump_data(private_q, sizeof(private_q));
printf("Private dp:
");
dump_data(private_dp, sizeof(private_dp));
printf("Private dq:
");
dump_data(private_dq, sizeof(private_dq));
printf("Private qInverse:
");
dump_data(private_qInverse, sizeof(private_qInverse));

/* Left align the message data into the plain_data buffer
 * and pad it to the right with zeros.
 * Note: In real life you would perform proper padding of
 * the data. In this example we simply left pad the data
 * with binary zeros.
 */
memset(plain_data, 0, sizeof(plain_data));
memcpy(plain_data + sizeof(plain_data) - sizeof(message),
    message, sizeof(message));

/* Dump plain data to standard output, just for
 * a visual control.
 */
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Encrypt the plain data to cipher data, using the public key. */
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(handle, plain_data,
    &public_key, cipher_data);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypt data, using the private key. */
rc = ica_rsa_crt(handle, cipher_data,
    &private_key, decrypt_data);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data. 
 * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same. 
 */
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* In our example, the data is right alligned in the buffer, padded with
 * zeros to the left. Find first non zero byte which is the start of the
 * original data.
 * Note: In real life the data would be properly padded and thus would
 * have to be unpadded first.
 */
unsigned char *c;
for(c=decrypt_data;
    c<decrypt_data+sizeof(plain_data) && *c==0x00;
    c++);
/* Surprise... :-) */
* Note: The following will only work in this example! */
printf("%s\n", c);

/* Close the adapter */
rc = ica_close_adapter(handle);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % 16) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    case -1:
        printf("Driver not loaded\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }
    return rc;
}

AES with CFB mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
* with this program.
*/

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 12
#define NR_RANDOM_TESTS 1000

/* CFB128 data -1- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0x0e8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0x9e9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E1 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -2- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E2[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E2[] = {
  0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E2[] = {
  0xc8, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xa9, 0x3f, 0xcd, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xad, 0x9f, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x8b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E2[] = {
  0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xf8, 0xe5, 0x8b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E2[] = {
  0xc8, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xa9, 0x3f, 0xcd, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xad, 0x9f, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x8b,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E2 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB8 data -3- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E3[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E3[] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E3[] = {
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x3b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3[] = {
0x6b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E3[] = {
0x3b,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E3 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB8 data -4- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E4[] = {
0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E4[] = {
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x3b,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E4[] = {
0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x3b, 0x79,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4[] = {
0xc1,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E4[] = {
0x79,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E4 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB 128 data -5- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E5[] = {
0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52,
0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E5[] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E5[] = {
0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x8c, 0xab,
0x34, 0xc2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc9, 0x9a, 0x41, 0x74,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E5[] = {
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unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E5 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB 128 data -6- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E6[] = {
    0x0e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0x08, 0x10, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E6[] = {
    0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x8c, 0xab,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E6[] = {
    0x67, 0xce, 0x7f, 0x7f, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0x9c, 0x9e,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E6[] = {
    0x67, 0xce, 0x7f, 0x7f, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E6 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB 128 data -7- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E7[] = {
    0x0e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0x08, 0x10, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E7[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E7[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E7[] = {
    0x6b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E7[] = {
    0xcd,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E7 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB 128 data -8- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E8[] = {
    0x0e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0x08, 0x10, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E8[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xcd,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E8[] = {
    0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
    0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xcd, 0xa2,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8[] = {
    0xc1,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E8[] = {
    0xa2,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E8 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -9- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E9[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x0d,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E9[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E9[] = {
    0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b,
    0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe0, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9,
    0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E9[] = {
    0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b,
    0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E9 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -10- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E10[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x0d,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E10[] = {
    0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b,
    0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

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unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E10[] = {
    0x39, 0xff, 0xed, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x28, 0xb1, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x63, 0x31, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x7b,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x28, 0xb1, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x63, 0x31, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x7b,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E10[] = {
    0x39, 0xff, 0xed, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x28, 0xb1, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x63, 0x31, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x7b,
};
unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E10 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB8 data for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x9f, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x00, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};
unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x6b,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E11[] = {
    0xdc,
};
unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E11 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB8 data for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x9f, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};
unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x1f,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12[] = {
    0xc1,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E12[] = {
  0x1f,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E12 = 8 / 8;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", (unsigned char *)h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

void dump_cfb_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *output_data)
{
    printf("IV \n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    printf("Key \n");
    dump_array(key, key_length);
    printf("Input Data\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Output Data\n");
    dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
    unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E1);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E1);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E1);
        break;
    case 2:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E2);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E2);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E2);
        break;
    case 3:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E3);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E3);
        break;
    case 4:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E4);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E4);
        break;
    }
case 5:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E5);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E5);
  break;
case 6:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E6);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E6);
  break;
case 7:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E7);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E7);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E7);
  break;
case 8:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E8);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E8);
  break;
case 9:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E9);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E9);
  break;
case 10:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E10);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E10);
  break;
case 11:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E11);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E11);
  break;
case 12:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E12);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E12);
  break;
}

}
break;
case 3:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E3, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E3, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E3, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E3, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E3;
    break;
case 4:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E4, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E4, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E4, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E4, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E4;
    break;
case 5:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E5, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E5, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E5, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E5, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E5;
    break;
case 6:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E6, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E6, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E6, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E6, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E6;
    break;
case 7:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E7, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E7, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E7, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E7, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E7, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E7;
    break;
case 8:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E8, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E8, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E8, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E8, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E8;
    break;
case 9:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E9, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E9, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E9, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E9, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E9;
    break;
case 10:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E10, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E10, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E10, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E10, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E10;
    break;
case 11:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11, data_length);
memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E11, data_length);
memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E11, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E11, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E11, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E11;
break;
case 12:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E12, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E12, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E12, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E12, key_length);
    *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E12;
    break;
}

int kat_aes_cfb(int iteration, int silent)
{
    unsigned int data_length;
    unsigned int iv_length;
    unsigned int key_length;

    get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char result[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    unsigned int lcfb;
    memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
    memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);

    load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv, iv_length, key, key_length, &lcfb, iteration);
    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i,\n"
            " lcfb = %i\n", key_length, data_length, iv_length, lcfb);

    if (iteration == 3)
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, lcfb, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
    else
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_cfb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
    }
    if (!silent && !rc) {
        printf("Encrypt:\n");
        dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
    }

    if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length)) {

printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");
dump_array(result, data_length);
printf("Encryption Result:\n");
dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
rc++;
}

if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length)) {
    printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
printf("Updated IV:\n");
dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
printf("Original IV:\n");
dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    rc++;
}

memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
if (iteration == 3)
   rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, lcfb, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 0);
else
   rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_cfb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
        data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}

if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
        data_length, decrypt);
}

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
dump_array(input_data, data_length);
printf("Decryption Result:\n");
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
rc++;
}
return rc;

int load_random_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length)
{
    int rc;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i error = %i\n",
            rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", 
            rc, errno);
    return rc;
}
rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", 
            rc, errno);
    return rc;
}
return rc;

int random_aes_cfb(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length,
                    unsigned int lcfb)
{
    unsigned int iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128;

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    for (key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128; key_length <= AES_KEY_LEN256; key_length += 8) {
        memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        load_random_test_data(input_data, data_length, iv, iv_length, key, key_length);
        memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
        printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
        printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv_length = %i, ", 
                key_length, data_length, iv_length, lcfb);
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, 
                tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_cfb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, 
                    data_length, encrypt);
        }
        if (!silent && !rc) {
            printf("Encrypt:\n");
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, 
                    data_length, encrypt);
        }
    }
    if (rc) {
        printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
        return rc;
    }

    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

    rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, 
            tmp_iv, lcfb, 0);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_cfb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, 
                data_length, decrypt);
        return rc;
    }

    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
    dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
                     data_length, decrypt);
}

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}
return rc;

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    unsigned int endless = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
        if (strstr(argv[1], "endless"))
            endless = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++) {
        rc = kat_aes_cfb(iteration, silent);
        if (rc) {
            printf("kat_aes_cfb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
        } else
            printf("kat_aes_cfb finished successfully\n");
    }

    unsigned int data_length = 1;
    unsigned int lcfb = 1;
    unsigned int j;
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_RANDOM_TESTS; iteration++) {
        for (j = 1; j <= 3; j++) {
            int silent = 1;
            if (!data_length % lcfb) {
                rc = random_aes_cfb(iteration, silent, data_length, lcfb);
                if (rc) {
                    printf("random_aes_cfb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
                    error_count++;
                } else
                    printf("random_aes_cfb finished successfully\n");
            }
        }
    }
    switch (j) {
        case 1:
            lcfb = 1;
            break;
        case 2:
            lcfb = 8;
            break;
        case 3:
            lcfb = 16;
break;
}
}
if (data_length == 1)
data_length = 8;
else
  data_length += 8;
}
if (error_count)
  printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
else
  printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");

return rc;
}

AES with CTR mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 *
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with *
 * this program. */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 7

/* CTR data - 1 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E1[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E1[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x9b, 0xe9,
  0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x26,
  0x1b, 0xef, 0x68, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0xce,
};

/* CTR data - 2 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E2[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E2[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E2[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0x03,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0x89, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae,
    0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30,
    0xc8, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xda, 0x7b, 0xe4, 0x57,
    0x5a, 0xe4, 0x09, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52,
    0x6f, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17,
    0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E2[] = {
    0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x26,
    0x1b, 0xef, 0x68, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0xce,
    0x98, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x70, 0xdf, 0xff,
    0x86, 0x17, 0x18, 0x7b, 0xb9, 0xff, 0xdf, 0xff,
    0x5a, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xdb, 0x5d, 0x3d, 0x5e,
    0x5b, 0x4f, 0x09, 0x02, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x3e, 0xab,
    0x1e, 0x03, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x2f, 0xbe, 0x03, 0xd1,
    0x79, 0x21, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x0e,
};

/* CTR data - 3 - for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E3[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E3[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E3[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x00,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x04,
    0x89, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae,
    0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30,
    0xc8, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xda, 0x7b, 0xe4, 0x57,
    0x5a, 0xe4, 0x09, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52,
    0x6f, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17,
    0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E3[] = {
    0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x26,
    0x1b, 0xef, 0x68, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xb6, 0xce,
    0x98, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x70, 0xdf, 0xff,
    0x86, 0x17, 0x18, 0x7b, 0xb9, 0xff, 0xdf, 0xff,
    0x5a, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xdb, 0x5d, 0x3d, 0x5e,
    0x5b, 0x4f, 0x09, 0x02, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x3e, 0xab,
    0x1e, 0x03, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x2f, 0xbe, 0x03, 0xd1,
    0x79, 0x21, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x0e,
};

/* CTR data - 4 - for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E4[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E4[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x00,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E4[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x04, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E4[] = {
    0xf4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x04, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x05, 0xc5,
};

/* CTR data 5 - for AES 256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E5[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0xfe,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E5[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x03,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0x9e, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11, 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef, 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17, 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x60, 0x1e, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xb, 0xf3, 0x2d, 0x28, 0x74, 0x43, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xc, 0xf5, 0xc5, 0x2b, 0x09, 0x30, 0xda, 0x2a, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c, 0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d, 0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6, 0x13, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x80, 0x45, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa6,
};

/* CTR data 6 - for AES 256. */
#define BLOCK_SIZE (* Data is != BLOCK_SIZE */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E6[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x81,
};
unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E6[] = {
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E6[] = {
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x03,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0xe8, 0x51,
0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x90, 0x52, 0xef,
0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7,
0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x9b,
0x17,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E6[] = {
0x60, 0x1e, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5,
0x7b, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x28,
0xf4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0x5b, 0x9a,
0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xca, 0xf5, 0xc5,
0x2b, 0x09, 0x30, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c,
0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d,
0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6,
};

unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E7[] = {
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0xb1,
0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7,
0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E7[] = {
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x00,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x02,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E7[] = {
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x00,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x02,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E7[] = {
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x2e, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xe6, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0x9e, 0x6f, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc6, 0x1c, 0x46, 0x3a, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x11, 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0xc0, 0xf0, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x7e, 0x91, 0x73, 0xe9, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x2d, 0x19, 0x45, 0xe4, 0xe4, 0x17, 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10, 

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x60, 0x1e, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0x3d, 0x28, 0x8a, 0xe3, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x8e, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0x4f, 0xc5, 0x92, 0x09, 0x30, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d, 0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0x6b, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6, 0x13, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x08, 0x45, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa6,
};

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *(unsigned char *)h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("
");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

void dump_ctr_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
                     unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                     unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
                     unsigned char *output_data)
{
    printf("IV ");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    printf("Key ");
    dump_array(key, key_length);
    printf("Input Data\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Output Data\n");
    dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
                unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E1);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E1);
        break;
case 2:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E2);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E2);
    break;

case 3:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E3);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E3);
    break;

case 4:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E4);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E4);
    break;

case 5:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E5);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E5);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E5);
    break;

case 6:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E6);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E6);
    break;

case 7:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E7);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E7);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E7);
    break;
}

} /* load_test_data */

void load_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *result,
    unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *expected_iv,
    unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
        memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1, data_length);
        memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E1, data_length);
        memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E1, iv_length);
        memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E1, iv_length);
        memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E1, key_length);
        break;

    case 2:
        memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2, data_length);
        memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E2, data_length);
        memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E2, iv_length);
        memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E2, iv_length);
        memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E2, key_length);
        break;

    case 3:
        memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3, data_length);
        memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E3, data_length);
        memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E3, iv_length);
        memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E3, iv_length);
        memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E3, key_length);
        break;

    case 4:
        memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4, data_length);
        memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E4, data_length);
        memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E4, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E4, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E4, key_length);
break;
case 5:
memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E5, data_length);
memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E5, data_length);
memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E5, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E5, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E5, key_length);
break;
case 6:
memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6, data_length);
memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E6, data_length);
memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E6, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E6, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E6, key_length);
break;
case 7:
memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E7, data_length);
memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E7, data_length);
memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E7, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E7, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E7, key_length);
break;
}

int random_aes_ctr(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length, unsigned int iv_length)
{
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN256;
    if (data_length % sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t))
        iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);

    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
           key_length, data_length, iv_length);

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, input_data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

    rc = ica_aes_ctr(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                     tmp_iv, 32, 1);
    if (rc) {

printf("ica_aes_ctr encrypt failed with rc = %.i\n", rc);
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
    data_length, encrypt);
return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Encrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
    data_length, encrypt);
}
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ctr(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 32, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ctr decrypt failed with rc = %.i\n", rc);
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
    data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
    data_length, decrypt);
}
if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}
return rc;
}

int kat_aes_ctr(int iteration, int silent)
{
    unsigned int data_length;
    unsigned int iv_length;
    unsigned int key_length;
    get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);
    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %.i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %.i, data length = %.i, iv length = %.i, iv_length = %.i, iv_length, data_length, iv_length); 
    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char result[data_length];
    int rc = 0;
    load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv,
    iv_length, key, key_length, iteration);
    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
    if (iv_length == 16)
rc = ica_aes_ctr(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 32, 1);
else
rc = ica_aes_ctrlist(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 1);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ctr encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
    data_length, encrypt);
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Encrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
    data_length, encrypt);
}

if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length)) {
    printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");
    dump_array(result, data_length);
    printf("Encryption Result:\n");
dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
rc++;
}
if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length)) {
    printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
    dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Updated IV:\n");
dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Original IV:\n");
dump_array(iv, iv_length);
rc++;
}
if (rc) {
    printf("AES CTR test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}

memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ctr(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 32, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ctr decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
    data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
    data_length, decrypt);
}
if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
rc++;
}
return rc;
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    // Default mode is 0. ECB, CBC and CFQ tests will be performed.
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    unsigned int endless = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
        if (strstr(argv[1], "endless"))
            endless = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    if (!endless)
        for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++)
        {
            rc = kat_aes_ctr(iteration, silent);
            if (rc)
            {
                printf("kat_aes_ctr failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
                error_count++;
            }
            else
                printf("kat_aes_ctr finished successfully\n");
        }
    int i = 0;
    if (endless)
        while (1) {
            printf("i = %i\n", i);
            silent = 1;
            rc = random_aes_ctr(i, silent, 320, 320);
            if (rc)
            {
                printf("kat_aes_ctr failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
                return rc;
            }
            else
                printf("kat_aes_ctr finished successfully\n");
            i++;
        }
    if (error_count)
        printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
    else
        printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");

    return rc;
}

AES with OFB mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * this program.
 */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 6
#define NR_RANDOM_TESTS 10000
/* OFB data - 1 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
    0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x50, 0xfe, 0x67, 0xcc, 0x99, 0x6d, 0x32, 0xb6,
    0xda, 0x09, 0x37, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0xaf, 0xec, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x96,
    0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

/* OFB data - 2 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
    0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E2[] = {
    0xd9, 0xa4, 0xda, 0xda, 0x08, 0x92, 0x23, 0x9f,
    0x6b, 0x8b, 0x3d, 0x76, 0x80, 0xe1, 0x56, 0x74,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
    0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0xe8, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03,
    0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25,
};

/* OFB data - 3 for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52,
    0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
    0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x8e, 0x73, 0xe0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52,
    0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
    0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E3[] = {
    0xcd, 0xc8, 0x8d, 0xf3, 0xf3, 0x8d, 0xe2, 0x8c,
    0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E4[] = {
    0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe9, 0x64, 0x52,
    0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
    0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E4[] = {
    0xa6, 0x09, 0xb3, 0x8d, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0x13, 0x3d,
    0xdd, 0xff, 0x27, 0x18, 0xba, 0x09, 0x56, 0x5e,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E4[] = {
    0x52, 0xef, 0x01, 0xda, 0x52, 0x60, 0x2f, 0xe0,
    0x97, 0x5f, 0x78, 0xac, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0x50,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0xe2, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac,
    0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6w, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E4[] = {
    0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8a, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x3b, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c,
    0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0xo1,
};

unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E5[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x70, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x7d,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E5[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E5[] = {
    0xb7, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x89, 0x8d,
    0x97, 0xdf, 0xda, 0x97, 0xbf, 0xce, 0x2f, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5[] = {
    0xbe, 0xc1, 0x8e, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E5[] = {
    0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b,
    0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};
/* OFB data 6 - for AES 256 */

unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E6[] = {
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
0x2b, 0x73, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x0b, 0xd7,
0x2d, 0x90, 0xa1, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E6[] = {
0xb7, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x89, 0xdd,
0x97, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0x97, 0xeb, 0xce, 0x2f, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E6[] = {
0xe1, 0xc6, 0x56, 0x30, 0x5e, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0x9c,
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6[] = {
0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E6[] = {
0xf6, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a,
0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d,
};

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", (unsigned char *)h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

void dump_ofb_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *output_data)
{
    printf("IV \n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    printf("Key \n");
    dump_array(key, key_length);
    printf("Input Data\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Output Data\n");
    dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
    unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E1);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E1);
        break;
    case 2:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E2);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E2);
        break;
    case 3:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E3);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E3);
        break;
    case 4:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E4);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E4);
        break;
    case 5:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E5);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E5);
        break;
    case 6:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E6);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E6);
        break;
}

void load_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *result,
    unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *expected_iv,
    unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
        case 1:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E1, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E1, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E1, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E1, key_length);
            break;
        case 2:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E2, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E2, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E2, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E2, key_length);
            break;
        case 3:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E3, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E3, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E3, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E3, key_length);
            break;
        case 4:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E4, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E4, key_length);
            break;
        case 5:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E5, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E5, key_length);
            break;
        case 6:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E6, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E6, key_length);
            break;
    }
}
memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E4, data_length);
memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E4, key_length);
break;

case 5:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E5, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E5, key_length);
    break;

case 6:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E6, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E6, key_length);
    break;
}

int load_random_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
                      unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
                      unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length)
{
    int rc;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errnor = %i\n",
               rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errnor = %i\n",
               rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errnor = %i\n",
               rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    return rc;
}

int random_aes_ofb(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length)
{
    int i;
    int rc = 0;
    unsigned int iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128;
    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    for (i = 0; i <= 2; i++) {
        unsigned char key[key_length];
        memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);
load_random_test_data(input_data, data_length, iv, iv_length, key, key_length);
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n", key_length, data_length, iv_length);

rc = ica_aes_ofb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 1);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ofb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Encrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
}
if (rc) {
    printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ofb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ofb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
}
if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
    return rc;
}
key_length += 8;
}

return rc;
}

int kat_aes_ofb(int iteration, int silent) {
    unsigned int data_length;
    unsigned int iv_length;
    unsigned int key_length;

get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);
printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
    key_length, data_length, iv_length);

unsigned char iv[iv_length];
unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
unsigned char key[key_length];
unsigned char input_data[data_length];
unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
unsigned char result[data_length];

int rc = 0;

load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv,
    iv_length, key, key_length, iteration);
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ofb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 1);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ofb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
        data_length, encrypt);
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Encrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
        data_length, encrypt);
}

if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length)) {
    printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");
    printf("Expected data: \n");
    dump_array(result, data_length);
    printf("Encryption Result: \n");
    dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}

if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length)) {
    printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
    printf("Expected IV: \n");
    dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Updated IV: \n");
    dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Original IV: \n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    rc++;
}
if (rc) {
    printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}

memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ofb(decrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
    tmp_iv, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ofb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
        data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}

if (!silent && !rc) {
printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
              data_length, decrypt);
}

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
dump_array(input_data, data_length);
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
rc++;
} return rc;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    unsigned int data_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++) {
        rc = kat_aes_ofb(iteration, silent);
        if (rc) {
            printf("kat_aes_ofb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
        } else
            printf("kat_aes_ofb finished successfully\n");
    }
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_RANDOM_TESTS; iteration++) {
        int silent = 1;
        rc = random_aes_ofb(iteration, silent, data_length);
        if (rc) {
            printf("random_aes_ofb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
            goto out;
        } else
            printf("random_aes_ofb finished successfully\n");
        data_length += sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    }
out:\n    if (error_count)
        printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
    else
        printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");
    return rc;
}

AES with XTS mode example
/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * with this program.
 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static keys. In real life you would
 * use real AES keys, which is negotiated between the
 * encrypting and the decrypting entity.
 * Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128)
 */
unsigned char aes_xts_key1[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
};
unsigned char aes_xts_key2[] = {
  0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
  0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the
 * encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary,
 * that the length of the encrypted data is at least as
 * large as the AES cipher block size (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE),
 * but it does not have to be a multiple of the cipher block size.
 */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
  0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
  0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x69,
  0x66, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69, 0x74,
  0x68, 0x20, 0x41, 0x45, 0x53, 0x2d, 0x58, 0x54,
  0x53, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x61,
  0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65,
  0x61, 0x73, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00
};

#include <Chapter 7. Examples>
/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump keys, tweak value and plain data to standard output, just for
 * a visual control. */
printf("AES key1:\n\n");
dump_data(aes_xts_key1, sizeof(aes_xts_key1));
printf("AES key2:\n\n");
dump_data(aes_xts_key2, sizeof(aes_xts_key2));
printf("TWEAK:\n\n");
dump_data(random_tweak_value, sizeof(random_tweak_value));
printf("plain data:\n\n");
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Copy the generated tweak value so that we still
 * have the original one available after the call to ica_aes_xts.
 */
memcpy(tweak_value, random_tweak_value, sizeof(tweak_value));

/* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API. */
rc = ica_aes_xts(plain_data, cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data),
    aes_xts_key1, aes_xts_key2, AES_KEY_LEN128, tweak_value,
    ICA_ENCRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
printf("encrypted data:\n\n");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Get the original tweak value, because ica_aes_xts
 * has modified the tweak_value variable on encryption.
 */
memcpy(tweak_value, random_tweak_value, sizeof(tweak_value));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
 * Note: The same AES keys and tweak value must be used for
 * encryption and decryption.
 */
rc = ica_aes_xts(cipher_data, decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data),
    aes_xts_key1, aes_xts_key2, AES_KEY_LEN128, tweak_value,
    ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data. 
 * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
 */
printf("decrypted data:\n\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-) 
 * Note: The following will only work in this example!
 */
printf("%s\n", decrypt_data);
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
            printf("\n");
        if (i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
            printf("\n");
    }
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
        break;
    }

    return rc;
}

AES with CBC mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with */
/* this program. */
/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2016 */
/* */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include <ica_api.h>
#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static key. In real life you would */
/* use your real AES key, which is negotiated between the */
/* encrypting and the decrypting entity. */
/* Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128) */
unsigned char aes_key[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the

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/* encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary,
 * that the length of the encrypted data is a multiple of
 * the AES cipher block size (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE).
 */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
  0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
  0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
  0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x20,
  0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74,
  0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x73, 0x79,
  0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);

/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
  int rc;

  /* This is the initialization vector. The initialization vector
   * is of the same size as the cipher block (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE).
   * In real life you would use an initialization vector which is negotiated
   * between the encrypting and the decrypting entity.
   */
  unsigned char random_iv[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

  /* Since libica function ica_aes_cbc updates the initialization vector,
   * we let ica_aes_cbc work on a copy of the generated initialization vector.
   * We will need the original initialization vector for decrypting the data later on.
   */
  unsigned char iv[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

  unsigned char cipher_data[sizeof(plain_data)];
  unsigned char decrypt_data[sizeof(plain_data)];

  /* Generate the initialization vector by random */
  rc = ica_random_number_generate(sizeof(random_iv), random_iv);

  /* Error handling (if necessary). */
  if (rc)
  return handle_ica_error(rc);

  /*Dump key, iv and plain data to standard output, just for
   * a visual control.
   */
  printf("AES key:
");
  dump_data(aes_key, sizeof(aes_key));
  printf("IV:
");
  dump_data(random_iv, sizeof(random_iv));
  printf("plain data:
");
  dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

  /* Copy the generated initialization vector so that we still
   * have the original one available after the call to ica_aes_cbc.
   */
  memcpy(iv, random_iv, sizeof(iv));

  /* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API. */
  rc = ica_aes_cbc(plain_data, cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data),
                   aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128, iv,
                   ICA_ENCRYPT);

  /* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
printf("encrypted data:\n");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Get the original initialization vector, because ica_aes_cbc
   has modified the iv variable on encryption. */
memcpy(iv, random_iv, sizeof(iv));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
   * Note: The same AES key and IV must be used for encryption and
   * decryption. */
rc = ica_aes_cbc(cipher_data, decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data),
        aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128, iv,
        ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
   * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
   */
printf("decrypted data:\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-) */
/* Note: The following will only work in this example! */
printf("%s\n", decrypt_data);

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    if (i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
        printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
        break;
    }
}
AES with GCM mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * this program.
 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static key. In real life you would
 * use your real AES key, which is negotiated between the
 * encrypting and the decrypting entity.
 * Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128) */
unsigned char aes_key[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
  0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
  0x62, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
  0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
  0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6e,
  0x67, 0x21, 0x00
};

/* This is the initialization vector. The initialization vector
 * size must be greater than 0 and less than 2^12. A length of
 * 12 is recommended. */
unsigned char iv[12] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B
};

/* This is additional authenticated data. It is subject to the
 * message authentication code computation, but is not encrypted. */
unsigned char aad[] = {
  0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
  0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
int rc;

/* This is a buffer for the message authentication code (tag) for
* the additional authenticated data in aad and the plain text.
* Note: The authentication strength depends on the length of the
* authentication tag */
unsigned char tag[16];
unsigned char cipher_data[sizeof(plain_data)];
unsigned char decrypt_data[sizeof(plain_data)];

/* Dump key, iv, aad and plain data to standard output, just for
* a visual control. */
printf("AES key:\n");
dump_data(aes_key, sizeof(aes_key));
printf("IV:\n");
dump_data(iv, sizeof(iv));
printf("AAD:\n");
dump_data(aad, sizeof(aad));
printf("plain data:\n");
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API.
* This will also compute the authentication code (tag) from
* the plain data and the additional authenticated data. */
rc = ica_aes_gcm(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data), cipher_data,
v, sizeof(iv),
aad, sizeof(aad),
tag, sizeof(tag),
aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128,
ICA_ENCRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
  return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
printf("encrypted data:\n");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));
dump_data(tag, sizeof(tag));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
* Note: The same AES key, IV and AAD must be used for encryption and
* decryption. The authentication code (tag) is verified against the
* decrypted data and the additional authenticated data. If the
* authentication code does not match, EFAULT is returned. */
rc = ica_aes_gcm(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data), cipher_data,
v, sizeof(iv),
aad, sizeof(aad),
tag, sizeof(tag),
aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128,
ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
  return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
* Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same. */
printf("decrypted data:\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-} 
 * Note: The following will only work in this example! */
printf("%s\n", decrypt_data);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if (((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
        printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0: 
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL: 
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM: 
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO: 
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    caseEFAULT: 
        printf("The verification of the message authentication code has failed.\n");
        break;
    default: 
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }

    return rc;
}

CMAC example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 
 * 
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with 
 * with this program. 
 */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define BYTE 8
#define NUM_TESTS 12
unsigned int key_length[12] = {16, 16, 16, 16, 24, 24, 24, 24, 32, 32, 32, 32};

unsigned char key[12][32] = {{
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xda, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x15,
  0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3,
  0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xc2,
  0x6b, 0x7b},
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3,
  0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xc2,
  0x6b, 0x7b},
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3,
  0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xc2,
  0x6b, 0x7b},
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3,
  0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xc2,
  0x6b, 0x7b},
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
  0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x3b, 0x61,
  0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x4f},
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
  0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x3b, 0x61,
  0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x4f},
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
  0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x3b, 0x61,
  0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x4f},
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
  0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x3b, 0x61,
  0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x4f},
};

unsigned char last_block[3][16] = {{
  0x7d, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0xc8, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0,
  0x47, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x54, 0xf6f},
  0x22, 0x45, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x73, 0x21,
  0xce, 0xea, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x4b},
  0xe5, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x81, 0x94, 0xcf, 0x76, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x4d, 0x4c,
  0xc0, 0x43, 0x10, 0xa8, 0x54}
};

unsigned long mlen[12] = {0, 16, 40, 64, 0, 16, 40, 64, 0, 16, 40, 64};

unsigned char message[12][512] = {{
  0x00},
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e,
  0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0xa2},
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e,
  0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0xa2},
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e,
unsigned char expected_cmac[12][16] = {{
  0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x90, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46},
  0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0xb6, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44, 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c},
  0xdf, 0x66, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0x30, 0x30, 0xca, 0x32, 0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x27},
  0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92, 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe},
  0x0d, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x46, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xe5, 0x31, 0xca, 0x32, 0x83, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x67},
  0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x6f, 0xb5, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x84},
  0x8a, 0x1d, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x2e, 0xb3, 0x1a, 0xad, 0x08, 0x9a, 0x82, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0xe0},
  0xa1, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xed, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x79, 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11},
  0x02, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x7b, 0xf8, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x6b, 0x55, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x67, 0xd9, 0xb3},
  0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0xbd, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0xc8, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x5c},
  0xaaa, 0xf3, 0xd8, 0xf1, 0xde, 0x56, 0x40, 0xc2, 0x32, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x69, 0xb9, 0xc9, 0x11, 0xe6},
  0xe1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9f, 0xe6, 0xd5, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10}
};

unsigned int i = 0;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
  unsigned char *ptr_end;
  unsigned char *h;
  int i = 1, trunc = 0;
  int maxsize = 2000;
  puts("Dump:");
  if (size > maxsize) {
    trunc = size - maxsize;
    size = maxsize;
  }
  h = ptr;
  ptr_end = ptr + size;

while (h < ptr_end) {
    printf("0x%02x ", *h);
    h++;
    if (i == 16) {
        if (h != ptr_end)
            printf("\n");
        i = 1;
    } else {
        ++i;
    }
}
printf("\n");
if (trunc > 0)
    printf("... %d bytes not printed\n", trunc);
}
unsigned char *cmac;
unsigned int cmac_length = 16;

int api_cmac_test(void)
{
    printf("Test of CMAC api\n");
    int rc = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) {
        if (!(cmac = malloc(cmac_length)))
            return EINVAL;
        memset(cmac, 0, cmac_length);
        rc = (ica_aes_cmac(message[i], mlen[i],
                          cmac, cmac_length,
                          key[i], key_length[i],
                          ICA_ENCRYPT));
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_cmac generate failed with errno %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
            return rc;
        }
        if (memcmp(cmac, expected_cmac[i], cmac_length) != 0) {
            printf("This does NOT match the known result. \
" "Testcase %i failed\n", i);
            printf("\nOutput MAC for test %d:\n", i);
            dump_array((unsigned char *)cmac, cmac_length);
            printf("\nExpected MAC for test %d:\n", i);
            dump_array((unsigned char *)expected_cmac[i], 16);
            free(cmac);
            return 1;
        }
    }
    printf("Expected MAC has been generated.\n");
    rc = (ica_aes_cmac(message[i], mlen[i],
                       cmac, cmac_length,
                       key[i], key_length[i],
                       ICA_DECRYPT));
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_cmac verify failed with errno %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
        free(cmac);
        return rc;
    }
    free(cmac);
    if (!rc)
        printf("MAC was successful verified. testcase %i " "succeeded\n", i);
    else {
        printf("MAC verification failed for testcase %i " "with RC=%i\n", i, rc);
        return rc;
    }
}
return 0;
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int rc = 0;
    rc = api_cmac_test();
    if (rc) {
        printf("api_cmac_test failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("api_cmac_test was successful\n");
    return 0;
}

openCryptoki code samples

This section provides coding samples in C for dynamic library calls as well as for direct access with static shared linked libraries.

- "Dynamic library call" on page 171
- "Shared linked library" on page 171

Coding samples (C)

To develop an application that uses openCryptoki, you need to access the library.

There are two ways to access the library:

- Load shared objects using dynamic library calls (dlopen)
- Link the library (statically) to your application during built time

For a list of supported mechanisms for the ICA token, refer to "Supported mechanisms for the ICA token" on page 98.
Dynamic library call

View some openCryptoki code samples for a dynamic library call.

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <pkcs11types.h>

CK_RV init();
CK_RV cleanup();
CK_RV rc;

void *dllPtr, (*symPtr)();

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR FunctionPtr = NULL;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
    int rc = init("/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so");
    if (rc){
        printf("Error loading PKCS#11 library \n");
        return errno;
    }
    symPtr = (void (*)(void))dlsym(dllPtr, "C_GetFunctionList");
    if (!symPtr){
        printf("Error getting function list \n");
        return errno;
    }
    symPtr(&FunctionPtr);
    rc = FunctionPtr->C_Initialize(NULL); /* initialize opencryptoki/tokens */
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing the opencryptoki library: 0x%X, rc: \n", rc);
        cleanup();
        printf("Opencryptoki initialized.\n");
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}

CK_RV cleanup(void) {
    rc = FunctionPtr->C_Finalize(NULL);
    if (dllPtr) dlclose(dllPtr);
    return rc;
}
```

To compile your sample code you need to provide the path of the source/include files. Issue a command of the form:
```
gcc sample_dynamic.c -g -O0 -o sample_dynamic -I <include filepath>
```

The exact location of the include files depends on your Linux distribution.

Shared linked library

When you use your sample code with a static linked library you can access the APIs directly.

At the compile time you need to specify the openCryptoki library:
```
gcc sample_shared.c -g -O0 -o sample_shared /usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so -I /usr/<include filepath>
```
The exact location of the include files depend on your Linux distribution.

The following code samples that interact with the openCryptoki API are based on the shared linked openCryptoki library.

**Base procedures:**

View some openCryptoki code samples for base procedures, such as main program, initialization, slot and token, mechanism, and finalize information.

The following code sample provides an insight into how to deal with the openCryptoki APIs. After describing some basic functions such as initialization, session and login handling, the sample shows how to retrieve data, such as get slot and token information and also detailed mechanism information. It also provides an introduction about how to create key objects and process symmetric encryption/decryption (DES). The last section shows RSA key generation with RSA encrypt and decrypt operations.

**Main program**

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <pkcs11types.h>
#include <defs.h>

CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL;
CK_ULONG slotCount, ulCount, rsaLen = 2048, msgLen = 8, cipherLen = 8, c;
CK_FLAGS rw_sessionFlags = CKF_RW_SESSION | CKF_SERIAL_SESSION;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechList = NULL;
CK_BYTE keyValue[] = {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef};
CK_BYTE msg[] = {'T','h','e','r','i','d'};
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    init();
    getSlotList(pSlotList, &slotCount); // get the number of slots
    pSlotList = malloc(slotCount * sizeof(CK SLOT ID)); // allocate memory
    getSlotList(pSlotList, &slotCount); // retrieve slot list
    slotID = *pSlotList; // first slot provide ica-token
    getSlotInfo(slotID);
    getTokenInfo(slotID);
    getMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, &ulCount); // retrieve number of mech's
    pMechList = malloc(ulCount * sizeof(CK MECHANISM_TYPE)); // allocate memory
    getMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, &ulCount); // retrieve mechanism list
    getMechanismInfo(slotID, CKM DES3 ECB); // get mechanism information
    openSession(slotID, rw_sessionFlags, &hSession);
    loginSession(CKU_USER, "01234567", 8, hSession);
    createKeyObject(hSession, keyValue);
    CK BYTE_PTR pCipherText = malloc(DES BLOCK SIZE*sizeof(CK BYTE));
    DESencrypt(hSession, (CK BYTE_PTR)&msg, msgLen, pCipherText, &cipherLen);
    DESdecrypt(hSession, pCipherText, cipherLen, (CK BYTE_PTR)&msg, &msgLen);
    generateRSAKeyPair(hSession, rsaLen, hPublicKey, hPrivateKey);
    CK BYTE_PTR pEncryptText = malloc(rsaLen*sizeof(CK BYTE));
    RSAencrypt(hSession, hPublicKey, (CK BYTE_PTR)&msg, rsaLen, pEncryptText, &rsaLen);
    RSAdecrypt(hSession, hPrivateKey, pEncryptText, rsaLen, pClearText, &rsaLen);
    logoutSession(hSession); closeSession(hSession);
    finalize();
    return 0;
}
```
C_Initialize:

```c
CK_RV init(void){
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Initialize(NULL);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing the opencryptoki library: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return CKR_OK;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetSlotList:

```c
CK_RV getSlotList(CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, CK_ULONG_PTR pSlotCount){
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_GetSlotList(TRUE, pSlotList, pSlotCount);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error getting number of slots: 0x %\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetSlotInfo:

```c
CK_RV getSlotInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID){
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;
    rc = C_GetSlotInfo(slotID, &slotInfo);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error getting slot information: 0x %\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Slot %d Information:\n", slotID);
    printf(" Description: %.64s\n", slotInfo.slotDescription);
    printf(" Manufacturer: %.32s\n", slotInfo.manufacturerID);
    printf(" Flags: 0x%\n", slotInfo.flags);
    if (((slotInfo.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT) == CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT) {
        printf("Token Present!\n");
    }
    if (((slotInfo.flags & CKF_REMOVABLEDEVICE) ==
        CKF_REMOVABLEDEVICE) {
        printf("Removable Device!\n");
    }
    if (((slotInfo.flags & CKF_HW_SLOT) == CKF_HW_SLOT){
        printf("Hardware support!\n");
    } else { printf("Software support!\n");
    printf(" Hardware Version: %d.%d\n", 
        slotInfo.hardwareVersion.major,
        slotInfo.hardwareVersion.minor);
    printf(" Firmware Version: %d.%d\n", 
        slotInfo.firmwareVersion.major,
        slotInfo.firmwareVersion.minor);
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_GetMechanismList:

```c
CK_RV getMechanismList(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechList, CKULONG_PTR pulCount) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, pulCount);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error retrieve mechanism list: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetTokenInfo:

```c
CK_RV getTokenInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
    if (rc != CKR_OK) return rc;
    printf("getTokenInfo(CK_SLOT_ID %x)\n", slotID);
}
```
C_GetMechanismInfo:

```c
CK_RV getMechanismInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type){
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechInfo;

    rc = C_GetMechanismInfo(slotID, type, &mechInfo);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error in mechanism info: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("MinKeySize: \%d\n", (&mechinfo)->ulMinKeySize);
    printf("MaxKeySize: \%d\n", (&mechinfo)->ulMaxKeySize);
    printf("Flags: \%d\n", (&mechinfo)->flags);
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Finalize:

```c
CK_RV finalize(void) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Finalize(NULL);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during finalize: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

Session and login:

View some openCryptoki session and login code samples.

C_OpenSession:

```c
CK_RV openSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_FLAGS sFlags, CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_OpenSession(slotID, sFlags, NULL, NULL, phSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error opening session: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Open session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Login:

```c
CK_RV loginSession(CK_USER_TYPE userType, CK_CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Login(hSession, userType, pPin, ulPinLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error login session: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Login session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_Logout:

```c
CK_RV logoutSession(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Logout(hSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error logout session: 0x\x\n", rc); return rc;
    }
    printf("Logout session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_CloseSession:

```c
CK_RV closeSession(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_CloseSession(hSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error closing session: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;
    }
    printf("Close session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

Object handling:

View some openCryptoki object handling code samples.

C_CreateObject:

```c
CK_RV createKeyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE keyValue[]) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTempl[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
        {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)}, // token object
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof(false)}, // public object
        {CKA_VALUE, keyValue, sizeof(keyValue)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "Public_DES_Key", sizeof("Public_DES_Key"))
    };
    rc = C_CreateObject(hSession, keyTempl, sizeof(keyTempl)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), &hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error creating key object: 0x\x\n", rc); return rc;
    }
}
```
C_FindObjects:

```c
CK_RV getKey(CK_CHAR_PTR label, int labelLen, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR hObject, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CKULONG ulMaxObjectCount = 1;
    CKULONG ulObjectCount;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE objectMask[] = { { CKA_LABEL, label, labelLen } };

    rc = C_FindObjectsInit(hSession, objectMask, 1);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error FindObjectsInit: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_FindObjects(hSession, hObject, ulMaxObjectCount, &ulObjectCount);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error FindObjects: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_FindObjectsFinal(hSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error FindObjectsFinal: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
}
```

Cryptographic operations:

View some openCryptoki cryptographic operations code samples.

C_Encrypt (AES):

```c
/*
 * AES encrypt
 */
CK_RV AESencrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, 
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CKULONG ulClearDataLen, 
    CK_BYTE *pEncryptedData, CKULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) { 
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM myMechanism = {CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, 
        "01020304050607081123455667788", 16};
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism = &myMechanism;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    getKey("My_AES_Key", sizeof("My_AES_Key"), &hKey, hSession);
    rc = C_EncryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing encryption: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_Encrypt(hSession, pClearData, ulClearDataLen, 
        NULL, pulEncryptedDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during encryption (get length): 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    *pEncryptedData = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(*pulEncryptedDataLen * sizeof(CK_BYTE));
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during encryption: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    printf("Encrypted data: ");
    CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = *pEncryptedData;
    for (count = 0; count < *pulEncryptedDataLen; count++, tmp++) {
        printf("%X", *tmp);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return CKR_OK;
```
C_Decrypt (AES):

```c
/* AES decrypt */

CK_RV AESdecrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
    CK_BYTE **pClearData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulClearDataLen) {

    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM myMechanism = {CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, "0102030405060708112334455667788", 16};
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism = &myMechanism;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    getKey("My_AES_Key", sizeof("My_AES_Key"), &hKey, hSession);
    rc = C_DecryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing decryption: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, NULL, pulClearDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during decryption (get length): 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    pClearData = malloc(*pulClearDataLen * sizeof(CK_BYTE));
    rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pClearData,
                    pulClearDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during decryption: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    printf("Decrypted data: ");
    CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = pClearData;
    for (count = 0; count < *pulClearDataLen; count++, tmp++) {
        printf("%c", *tmp);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_GenerateKeyPair (RSA):

```c
CK_RV generateRSAKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_ULONG keySize,
                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey ) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;

    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClassPub = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClassPriv = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyTypeRSA = CKK_RSA;
    CK_ULONG modulusBits = keySize;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pModulus = malloc(sizeof(CK_BYTE)*modulusBits/8);
    CK_BYTE publicExponent[] = {1, 0, 1};
    CK_MECHANISM rsaKeyGenMech = {CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};

    CK_ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClassPub, sizeof(keyClassPub)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyTypeRSA, sizeof(keyTypeRSA)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_RSA_REF, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)},
        {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent, sizeof(publicExponent)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PubKey", sizeof("My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PubKey")},
        {CKA_MODIFIABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    };

    CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClassPriv, sizeof(keyClassPriv)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyTypeRSA, sizeof(keyTypeRSA)},
        {CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_UNWRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PrivKey", sizeof("My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PrivKey")},
        {CKA_MODIFIABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    };

    rc = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &rsaKeyGenMech, publicKeyTemplate,
                           sizeof(publicKeyTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), phPublicKey, phPrivateKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error generating RSA keys: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
}
```
C_Encrypt (RSA):

```c
CK_RV RSAEncrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CK_ULONG ulClearDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) {
CK_RV rc;
CK_MECHANISM rsaMechanism = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0};

rc = C_EncryptInit(hSession, rsaMechanism, hKey);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
    printf("Error initializing RSA encryption: \x\n", rc);
    return rc;
}
rc = C_Encrypt(hSession, pClearData, ulClearDataLen,
pEncryptedData, pulEncryptedDataLen);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
    printf("Error during RSA encryption: \x\n", rc);
    return rc;
}
CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = pEncryptedData;
for (c=0; c<*pulEncryptedDataLen; c++, pEncryptedData++) {
    printf("%X", *pEncryptedData);
}
printf("\n"); pEncryptedData = tmp;
return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Decrypt (RSA):

```c
CK_RV RSADecrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulClearDataLen) {
CK_RV rc;
CK_MECHANISM rsaMechanism = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0};

rc = C_DecryptInit(hSession, rsaMechanism, hKey);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
    printf("Error initializing RSA decryption: \x\n", rc);
    return rc;
}
rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pClearData, pulClearDataLen);
if (rc != CKR_OK) {
    printf("Error during RSA decryption: \x\n", rc);
    return rc;
}
CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = pClearData;
for (c=0; c<*pulClearDataLen; c++, pClearData++) {
    printf("%c", *pClearData);
}
printf("\n"); pClearData = tmp;
return CKR_OK;
}
```

For more information, refer to the current PKCS #11 standard/specification:
http://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs11doc/

**Makefile example**

```makefile
# Specify include directory. Leave blank for default system location.
INCDIR =

# Specify library directory. Leave blank for default system location.
LIBDIR =

# Specify library.
LIBS = -lica
```

180  libica Programmer's Reference
TARGETS = example_aes128_gcm

all: $(TARGETS)

%.c:
gcc $(INCDIR) $(LIBDIR) $(LIBS) -o $@

clean:
rm -f $(TARGETS)

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Glossary

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
A data encryption technique that improved upon and officially replaced the Data Encryption Standard (DES). AES is sometimes referred to as Rijndael, which is the algorithm on which the standard is based.

asymmetric cryptography
Synonym for public key cryptography.

Block cipher
An algorithm that encrypts plain text blocks of a fixed length into cipher text blocks. The plain text and cipher text blocks are sequences of bytes. They are always the same size, and that size is fixed by the block cipher. This is called the block cipher’s block size.

Examples for block ciphers are DES, Triple-DES, and AES. They are much more secure than stream ciphers.

The block size of AES is always 16 bytes, so input data must be padded up to a multiple of this block length. These padding bytes are removed when decrypting. Thus, the size of encrypted data is normally not equal to the original plain text size.

Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF)
Hardware that provides support for symmetric ciphers and secure hash algorithms (SHA) on every central processor. Hence the potential encryption/decryption throughput scales with the number of central processors in the system.

Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT)
A mathematical problem described by Sun Tsu Suan-Ching using the remainder from a division operation.

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC mode)
A method of reducing repetitive patterns in cipher-text by performing an exclusive-OR operation on each 8-byte block of data with the previously encrypted 8-byte block before it is encrypted.

Cipher block length
The length of a block that can be encrypted or decrypted by a symmetric cipher. Each symmetric cipher has a specific cipher block length.

clear key
Any type of encryption key not protected by encryption under another key.

Counter Mode (CTR mode)
A block cipher mode where each message block of cipher block size (16 bytes for AES) is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption. Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block, subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. However, the incrementation should generate sequences as much as possible randomly, and guaranteed not to repeat for a long time.

CPACF instructions
Instruction set for the CPACF hardware. CPACF functions for DES, TDES and SHA1 functions can be invoked by five new instructions as described
in z/Architecture Principles of Operation. As a group, these instructions are known as the Message Security Assist (MSA).

**Crypto Express6S (CEX6S)**
Successor to the Crypto Express5 feature. The PCIe adapter on a CEX6S feature can be configured in three ways: Either as cryptographic accelerator (CEX6A), or as CCA coprocessor (CEX6C) for secure key encrypted transactions, or in EP11 coprocessor mode (CEX6P) for exploiting Enterprise PKCS #11 functionality.

A CEX6P only supports secure key encrypted transactions.

**Electronic Code Book (ECB mode)**
A method of enciphering and deciphering data in address spaces or data spaces. Each 64-bit block of plain-text is separately enciphered and each block of the cipher-text is separately deciphered.

**Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)**
A standard published by the US National Institute of Science and Technology.

FIPS see Federal Information Processing Standards

**Galois Counter Mode (GCM mode)**
A block cipher mode. It is usually used together with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), but could in theory be combined with other block ciphers also, if the block size is 16 bytes.

GCM can do authenticated encryption with associated data. This means, in addition to given plain text, additional data that remains unencrypted can be authenticated, that is, protected against modification. If all data shall remain unencrypted, but authenticated, a so called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code) is created. This is simply an authentication mode on the input data.

**libica** Library for IBM Cryptographic Architecture.

**master key (MK)**
In computer security, the top-level key in a hierarchy of key-encrypting keys.

**MSA** Message Security Assist. See CPACF instructions.

**Mode of operation**
A schema describing how to apply a symmetric cipher to encrypt or decrypt a message that is longer than the cipher block length. The goal of most modes of operation is to keep the security level of the cipher by avoiding the situation where blocks that occur more than once will always be translated to the same value. Some modes of operations allow handling messages of arbitrary lengths. See also: Block cipher and Stream cipher.

**modulus-exponent (Mod-Expo)**
A type of exponentiation performed using a modulus.

**National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)**
A measurement standards laboratory and a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce. It is the federal technology agency that works with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and standards.

NIST see National Institute of Standards and Technology
public key cryptography
In computer security, cryptography in which a public key is used for encryption and a private key is used for decryption. Synonymous with asymmetric cryptography.

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
An algorithm used in public key cryptography. These are the surnames of the three researchers responsible for creating this asymmetric or public/private key algorithm.

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
A standardized cryptographic hash function to compute a unique (message) digest from a message in a way that is mathematically impossible to reverse. Different data can possibly produce the same hash value, but there is no way to use the hash value to determine the original data.

secure key
A key that is encrypted under a master key. When using a secure key, it is passed to a cryptographic coprocessor where the coprocessor decrypts the key and performs the function. The secure key never appears in the clear outside of the cryptographic coprocessor.

Stream cipher
Stream ciphers can encrypt any arbitrary number of input bytes, but have significant weaknesses. RC4 is one example of a stream cipher that was heavily used in past decades, but should not be used today. The principle of stream cipher is generating a series of random bytes based on a given key (also called the key stream), and performing an exclusive or (XOR) on the plain text with the key stream bytes.

symmetric cryptogrphy
An encryption method that uses the same key for encryption and decryption. Keys of symmetric ciphers are private keys.

zcrypt device driver
Kernel device driver to access Crypto Express adapters. Formerly, a monolithic module called z90crypt. Today, it consists of multiple modules that are implicitly loaded when loading the ap main module of the device driver.
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