libica Programmer's Reference

Version 3.0
libica Programmer's Reference

Version 3.0
Note
Before using this document, be sure to read the information in "Notices" on page 171.

Edition notice
This edition applies to libica version 3.0 for openCryptoki version 3.6 and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions.

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Summary of changes

This revision reflects changes to the Development stream for libica version 3.0.

You can find the open source version of libica at:

http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki/files/libica

Updates for libica version 3.0

Edition SC34-2602-08

• The libica library is now enabled for FIPS 140-2 certification and therefore can run in the so-called FIPS mode. When running in FIPS mode, only cryptographic algorithms approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) can be used. FIPS mode can be disabled at compile time.

• The icaInfo output now indicates whether libica has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state.

• In [Chapter 7, “Examples,” on page 99], you find three updated samples and two new AES samples, while all DES samples have been deleted.

• The following deprecated libica APIs are no longer available with libica version 3.0:

  icaAesDecrypt  icaAesEncrypt  icaCloseAdapter  icaDesDecrypt  icaDesEncrypt  icaDesMac  icaOpenAdapter  icaRsaCrt  icaRsaKeyGenerateCrt  icaRsaKeyGenerateModExpo  icaRsaModExpo  icaSha1  icaSha224  icaSha256  icaSha384  icaSha512  icaTDesDecrypt  icaTDesEncrypt  icaTDesMac

Updates for libica version 2.6

Edition SC34-2602-07

• A new deterministic random bit generator (DRBG), which is compliant to the NIST SP800-90A specifications, has been added to libica.

Updates for libica version 2.5

Edition SC34-2602-07

• libica supports the CPACF MSA4 extension (AES GCM Mode) in accordance with the current PKCS #11 specification version 2.40.

• A new function is available that analyzes an RSA CRT key and checks if the components comply with the IBM® cryptographic architecture. If required, the function converts the key to a conform format that can be used for IBM cryptographic hardware acceleration.
About this document

This document describes how to install and use version 3.0 of the Library for IBM Cryptographic Architecture (libica).

libica is a library of cryptographic functions used to write cryptographic applications on IBM z Systems™, both with and without cryptographic hardware.

You can find the latest version of this document on the developerWorks® website at:

www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html

and on the IBM Knowledge Center at:


How this document is organized

The information is divided into topics that describe installing, configuring and using libica together with descriptions of the functions and example programs.

Chapter 1, “General information about libica,” on page 1 has general information about the current libica version.

Chapter 2, “Installing and using libica version 3.0,” on page 5 contains installation and set up instructions, and coexistence information for the current libica version.

Chapter 3, “libica version 3.0 application programming interfaces,” on page 9 describes the libica APIs.

Chapter 4, “Accessing libica functions through the PKCS #11 API (openCryptoki),” on page 75 describes how the cryptographic functions provided by libica can be accessed using the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

Chapter 5, “libica constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes,” on page 89 lists the defines, typedefs, structs, and return codes for libica.

Chapter 6, “libica tools,” on page 95 contains tools to investigate the capabilities of your cryptographic hardware and how these capabilities are used by applications that use libica.

Chapter 7, “Examples,” on page 99 is a set of programming examples that use the libica APIs.

Who should read this document

This document is intended for C programmers that want to access IBM z Systems hardware support for cryptographic methods.

In particular, this publication addresses programmers who write hardware-specific plug-ins for cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL and openCryptoki.
Distribution independence

This publication does not provide information that is specific to a particular Linux distribution.

The tools it describes are distribution independent.

Other publications for Linux on z Systems

You can find publications for Linux on z Systems™ on IBM Knowledge Center and on developerWorks.

These publications are available on IBM Knowledge Center at

- Device Drivers, Features, and Commands (distribution-specific editions)
- Using the Dump Tools (distribution-specific editions)
- KVM Virtual Server Quick Start, SC34-2753
- KVM Virtual Server Management, SC34-2752
- KVM Virtual Server Management Tools, SC34-2763
- Device Drivers, Features, and Commands for Linux as a KVM Guest (distribution-specific editions)
- Installing SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 as a KVM Guest, SC34-2755
- How to use FC-attached SCSI devices with Linux on z Systems, SC33-8413
- libica Programmer’s Reference, SC34-2602
- Exploiting Enterprise PKCS #11 using openCryptoki, SC34-2713
- Secure Key Solution with the Common Cryptographic Architecture Application Programmer’s Guide, SC33-8294
- Linux on z Systems Troubleshooting, SC34-2612
- Kernel Messages, SC34-2599
- How to use Execute-in-Place Technology with Linux on z/VM®, SC34-2594
- How to Improve Performance with PAV, SC33-8414
- How to Set up a Terminal Server Environment on z/VM, SC34-2596

You can also find these publications on developerWorks at

www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html

For versions of this and other documents that have been adapted to a particular distribution, see one of the following web pages:

www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_ubuntu.html
Chapter 1. General information about libica

The libica library provides hardware support (and software fallbacks if the hardware is not available) for cryptographic functions. The information about libica version 2.6 presented in this document is valid for all libica versions 2.6.x., because the changes in version 2.6 later than 2.6.0 are not relevant for user documentation.

The cryptographic adapters are used for asymmetric encryption and decryption. The CPACF instructions are used for symmetric encryption and decryption, pseudo random number generation, message authentication, and secure hashing. For some of these functions, if the hardware is not available or failed, libica uses the low-level cryptographic functions of OpenSSL, if available.

This product includes software that is developed by the OpenSSL Project for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org). This product includes cryptographic software that is written by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

The libica library is part of the openCryptoki project in SourceForge. It is primarily used by OpenSSL through the IBM OpenSSL CA engine or by openCryptoki through the ica_s390 token. A higher level of security can be achieved by using it through the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

The libica library is optimized to work on IBM z Systems hardware.

IBM reserves the right to change or modify this API at any time. However, an effort is made to keep the API compatible with later versions within a major release.

You can use the icastats utility to obtain statistics about cryptographic processes. The icainfo command shows whether libica is using cryptographic hardware or software fallback for each specific libica function. See “icastats - Show use of libica functions” on page 96 and “icainfo - Show available libica functions” on page 95 for more information.

You can find the open source version of libica at:

http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki/files/libica

In the extracted source package, you also find test cases for all APIs in directory ...

z Systems cryptographic hardware support

The information in this topic presents the different types of cryptographic hardware support that may be available on IBM z Systems, depending on the machine model.

Supported IBM CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF):

Ciphers:

  DES, TDES, AES128, AES192, and AES256 with the following modes of operation: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR, CMAC, GCM, and XTS.

Hashes:

  SHA-1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, and GHASH.
Random:

PRNG

Cryptographic cards:

Accelerator: RSA (CRT, MOD-EXPO) with supported key sizes in the range 57 - 4096 bit.

CCA Co-processor: RSA (CRT, MOD-EXPO) with supported key sizes in the range 57 - 4096 bit, and RNG.

---

Check the prerequisites: cryptographic adapter and device driver

To exploit hardware support of asymmetric cryptographic operations, you need a loaded device driver and an installed IBM cryptographic adapter.

**Loading the Linux zcrypt device driver**

You also need an installed Linux kernel that includes the zcrypt device driver.

To check, enter the command:

```
$ lszcrypt
```

```
card06: CEX5A
```

If the following error message is displayed, load the zcrypt device driver main module:

```
error - cryptographic device driver zcrypt is not loaded!
```

The zcrypt device driver is no longer monolithic as in older distributions where the module was called z90crypt. The device driver is now loaded as separate modules, where the main module is called *ap*. There is, however, an alias name z90crypt that links to the *ap* main module.

To load the device driver *ap* main module, use the following command:

```
modprobe ap
```

See your Linux distribution documentation for how to load the module persistently.

**Checking the cryptographic adapter availability**

Check whether you have plugged in and enabled your IBM cryptographic adapter and validate your model and type configuration (accelerator or coprocessor). Use the `lszcrypt` command to retrieve basic status information.

To check, enter the command:

```
$ lszcrypt
```

```
card06: CEX5A
```

Use the `chzcrypt` command to enable (online state) or disable (offline state) the IBM crypto adapter:
Use one of the following commands to display more detailed information about the adapters, for example, to see if the adapters are online:

$$\texttt{lszcrypt -V}$$
$$\texttt{lszcrypt -VV}$$
$$\texttt{lszcrypt -VVV}$$

For more information about the IBM crypto adapter with Linux on z Systems, see *Device Drivers, Features, and Commands*, SC33-8411 available at

www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/documentation_dev.html
Chapter 2. Installing and using libica version 3.0

View the contained subtopics for information about where to obtain the libica version 3.0 library, and how to install it.

Installing libica version 3.0 from the libica RPM

To make use of the libica hardware support for cryptographic functions, it is necessary to install the libica version 3.0 package. Obtain the current libica version 3.0 as an RPM package from your distribution provider for automated installation.

Procedure

The libica library is available as an RPM named libica-<version> within your distribution package. See your Linux distribution documentation for how to install an RPM. To check whether the libica library is installed, issue, for example:

```
# rpm -qa | grep -i libica
```

Installing libica version 3.0 from the source package

If you prefer, you can install libica from the source package manually.

Procedure

1. Download the latest libica version 3.0 sources from the SourceForge website: http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki/files/libica
2. Extract the tar archive. There should be a new directory named libica-3.x.x.
3. Change to that directory and execute the following scripts and commands:

   ```
   $ ./bootstrap
   $ ./configure
   $ make
   $ make install
   ```

   where:

   bootstrap
   Initial setup, basic configurations

   configure
   Check configurations and build the makefile.
   You can use the option --enable-testcases when running the configure command to enable the build environment to automatically compile the test-suite:
   configure --enable-testcases
   You can use the option --enable-fips when running the configure command to enable the build environment to compile with FIPS mode:
   configure --enable-fips

   make
   Compile and link
make install
Install the libraries

Using libica version 3.0

The function prototypes are provided in this header file: include/ica_api.h.

Applications using these functions must link libica and libcrypto. The libcrypto library is available from the OpenSSL package. You must have OpenSSL in order to run libica version 3.0 programs.

Using libica in FIPS mode

Starting with libica version 3.0, the library is enabled for FIPS 140-2 certification and therefore can run in the so-called FIPS mode. When running in FIPS mode, only cryptographic algorithms approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) can be used.

The NIST defines so called Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). One of their publications, the FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules defines a standard for cryptography-based security systems (crypto modules) used by US Federal organizations to protect sensitive data. FIPS 140-2 certifications are done under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).

The FIPS 140-2 standard specifies four levels of security. Each level corresponds to a set of requirements wherein a higher level is a strict superset of the lower levels. Software crypto modules can maximally reach a level 1 certification. In order to make the libica FIPS 140-2 level 1 conformant, the library has been extended by the following features:

• When running in FIPS mode, only NIST approved crypto algorithms can be used and various self-tests are conducted. Approved crypto algorithms are listed in Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2. However, it is possible to disable this feature at compile time. Non-approved algorithms (like for example, DES and PRNG) are disabled when running in FIPS mode. For information on how to enable or disable the FIPS mode, see “Enabling libica for FIPS mode” on page 7.

• The software fallbacks and RSA key generation of libica is currently provided by OpenSSL. When running in FIPS mode, libica tries to load OpenSSL in FIPS mode. If the available OpenSSL build does not support this, libica consequently disables its fallbacks and RSA key generation. If loading OpenSSL in FIPS mode is successful, it allows only for the generation of RSA keys with FIPS approved parameters (moduli, exponents).

• Various self-tests required by FIPS 140-2 are implemented. If a self-test fails, libica enters an error state (FIPS error state) and does not perform any cryptographic operations. In this case, an error message is written to the syslog.

• The DRBG error state was changed to trigger the FIPS error state. In this case an error message is written to the syslog.

• New interfaces were added to enable the consuming application to trigger the self-tests on demand and to query the status (see “FIPS mode functions” on page 71). The status indicates, which self-tests were passed or failed and whether libica is running in FIPS mode.

• The icaInfo output now indicates whether libica has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state.
Algorithms that are not FIPS approved are marked as blocked when running in FIPS mode. All algorithms are marked as blocked when libica is in an error state.

For detailed information about the FIPS 140-2 standard, see [FIPS PUB 140-2](#).

### FIPS mode dependencies
Read about the dependencies on software and hardware that exist if you want to run libica in FIPS mode.

#### Dependencies on Open Source software (OpenSSL)

At startup, the library reads the kernel FIPS flag from the proc filesystem (see “Enabling the Linux kernel for FIPS mode”). If the flag is found to be 1, then the libica DRBG must be used for random number generation, because the libica PRNG is disabled with FIPS built. DRBG in turn has two options to obtain its seed material:

- Either from the `/dev/hwrng` device which is available via the CCA coprocessor adapter.
- If no `/dev/hwrng` device is available, the kernel prng module must be loaded to make the `/dev/prandom` device available for seed obtaining. This is, because the kernel prng like the libica DRBG is also FIPS compliant.

#### Dependencies on hardware

The pseudo random number generator (PRNG) provided by libica is disabled with FIPS built. So only the DRBG can be used for the generation of random data. However, the DRBG needs at least MSA 2 to work. This means that FIPS mode cannot be used if no MSA 2 (introduced with z10™) or higher is available.

### Enabling libica for FIPS mode

To use libica in FIPS mode, the library itself and also the Linux kernel need to be enabled. That is, the FIPS-enabled libica library can run in FIPS mode when the kernel FIPS flag is set.

#### Enabling the Linux kernel for FIPS mode

A prerequisite for actually running the the FIPS-enabled libica in FIPS mode is to set the FIPS flag in the used Linux kernel configured for FIPS.

For all distributions, you need to enable the kernel FIPS mode at runtime by setting the kernel FIPS flag. To set this flag in `/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled`, boot or reboot with the kernel parameter `fips=1`.

For more information about setting and checking the kernel FIPS flag, refer to Device Drivers, Features, and Commands, SC33-8411. Or, for more distribution-specific information, refer to the publications provided by the specific distributor.

### Enabling libica for FIPS mode

If you are using libica from a distribution, ensure that FIPS mode is supported, because a distribution may provide libica version 3.0 RPMs both with or without FIPS support.
If you want to install libica version 3.0 from the source package, as described in “Installing libica version 3.0 from the source package” on page 5, then refer to the INSTALL file for information on how to install, configure, and build the libica library. You can then enable the FIPS mode at compile time by running the configure script with the `enable-fips` option:

```
./configure --enable-fips
```

### Libica Version 1, Version 2, Version 2.1.0, and Up to Version 3.0 Coexistence

Some of the libica version 1 APIs are available in libica version 2, libica version 2.1.0, up to libica version 3.0.

Some of them, such as those APIs that work with an environment other than Linux on z Systems, were removed and are not present in libica version 2 or later versions. If your application program has calls to libica version 1 APIs, check to see whether these APIs are available in libica version 3.0. If they are, these API calls still work. However, we suggest that you convert your application to use the equivalent libica version 3.0 functions. See Chapter 3, “Libica Version 3.0 Application Programming Interfaces,” on page 9.

Libica key generation is restricted to the limits imposed by the OpenSSL implementation. Thus, the value of a public exponent passed to libica cannot be greater than the maximum value that would fit in an unsigned long integer.
Chapter 3. libica version 3.0 application programming interfaces

View a list of application programming interfaces (APIs) for the functions of libica version 3.0. All functions are included in `include/ica_api.h`.

**Table 1. libica version 2.6 APIs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica version 2.6 API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open and close adapter functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open adapter handle</td>
<td>“ica_open_adapter” on page 12</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13™, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close adapter handle</td>
<td>“ica_close_adapter” on page 13</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-1 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha1” on page 13</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-224 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha224” on page 14</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-256 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha256” on page 16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-384 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha384” on page 17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure hash using the SHA-512 algorithm</td>
<td>“ica_sha512” on page 18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random number generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate a pseudo random number</td>
<td>“ica_random_number_generate” on page 20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - instantiate</td>
<td>“ica_drbg_instantiate” on page 21</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - reseed</td>
<td>“ica_drbg_reseed” on page 22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - generate</td>
<td>“ica_drbg_generate” on page 22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - uninstantiate</td>
<td>“ica_drbg_uninstantiate” on page 23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate pseudo random bits NIST compliant - health_test</td>
<td>“ica_drbg_health_test” on page 23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA key generation functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate RSA keys in modulus/exponent format</td>
<td>“ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo” on page 24</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SW only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. libica version 2.6 APIs (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica version 2.6 API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate RSA keys in CRT format</td>
<td>“ica_rsa_key_generate_crt” on page 25</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SW only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA encryption and decryption operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA encryption and decryption operation using a key in modulus/exponent format</td>
<td>“ica_rsa_mod_exp” on page 27</td>
<td>Depends on supp. key size of Crypto Express feature</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Key length max. 4K bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA encryption and decryption operation using a key in Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT) format</td>
<td>“ica_rsa_crt” on page 27</td>
<td>Depends on supp. key size of Crypto Express feature</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Key length max. 4K bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cbc” on page 29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CBC-Cipher text stealing mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cbc_cs” on page 29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cfb” on page 31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac” on page 32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac_intermediate” on page 33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with CMAC mode process last chunk</td>
<td>“ica_des_cmac_last” on page 34</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Counter mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ctr” on page 35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>DES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>“ica_des_ctrlist” on page 36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Electronic Codebook mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ecb” on page 37</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_des_ofb” on page 38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES/3DES functions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cbc” on page 40</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CBC-Cipher text Stealing mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cbc_cs” on page 41</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cfb” on page 42</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac” on page 43</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>libica version 2.6 API name</td>
<td>Key length in bits</td>
<td>Supported on</td>
<td>CPACF function</td>
<td>SW fallback</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac_intermediate” on page 44</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with CMAC mode process last chunk</td>
<td>“ica_3des_cmac_last” on page 45</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Counter mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ctr” on page 46</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ctrlist” on page 47</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Electronic Codebook mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ecb” on page 48</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_3des_ofb” on page 49</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES functions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Cipher Block Chaining mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cbc” on page 51</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CBC-Cipher text stealing mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cbc_cs” on page 52</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ccm” on page 53</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Cipher Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cfb” on page 55</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cmac” on page 56</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode process intermediate chunks</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cmac_intermediate” on page 57</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with CMAC mode process last chunk</td>
<td>“ica_aes_cmac_last” on page 58</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ctr” on page 59</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Counter mode, using a list of counters</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ctrlist” on page 60</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Electronic Codebook mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ecb” on page 61</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for single operations</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm” on page 62</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>libica version 2.6 API name</td>
<td>Key length in bits</td>
<td>Supported on</td>
<td>CPACF function</td>
<td>SW fallback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - initialize</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_initialize” on page 64</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - intermediate</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_intermediate” on page 65</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for streaming operations - last</td>
<td>“ica_aes_gcm_last” on page 67</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with Output Feedback mode</td>
<td>“ica_aes_ofb” on page 69</td>
<td>128, 192, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES with XEX-based Tweaked CodeBook mode (TCB) with CipherText Stealing (CTS)</td>
<td>“ica_aes_xts” on page 70</td>
<td>128, 256</td>
<td>zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Information retrieval functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>libica version 2.6 API name</th>
<th>Key length in bits</th>
<th>Supported on</th>
<th>CPACF function</th>
<th>SW fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return version information for libica</td>
<td>“ica_get_version” on page 71</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return a list of crypto mechanisms supported by libica</td>
<td>“ica_get_functionlist” on page 72</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>z10, z196, zEC12, z13, z13s</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Open and close adapter functions

These functions open or close the crypto adapter. It is recommended to open the crypto adapter before using any of the libica crypto functions, and to close it after the last usage of the libica crypto functions. However, in this version of the libica only the RSA-related functions *ica_rsa_mod_expo* and *ica_rsa_crt* require a valid adapter handle as input. A pointer to the value DRIVER_NOT_LOADED indicates an invalid adapter handle. The parameter *ica_adapter_handle_t* is a redefine of int.

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

#### ica_open_adapter

**Purpose**

Opens an adapter.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_open_adapter(ica_adapter_handle_t *adapter_handle);
```
Parameters

ica_adapter_handle_t *adapter_handle
  Pointer to the file descriptor for the adapter or to DRIVER_NOT_LOADED if
  opening the crypto adapter failed.

Opening an adapter succeeds if a cryptographic device is accessible for reading
and writing. By default, cryptographic access must be available with the
/dev/z90crypt path name for the adapter open request to succeed. If the
environment variable LIBICA_CRYPT_DEVICE is set to a valid path name of
an accessible cryptographic device, accessing the device with that path name
takes precedence over the default path names.

Return codes

0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_close_adapter

Purpose

Closes an adapter.

Comments

This API closes a device handle.

Format

unsigned int ica_close_adapter(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle);

Parameters

ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle
  Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

Return codes

0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

Secure hash operations

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform secure hash on input data using the chosen algorithm of
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.

SHA context structs contain information about how much of the actual work was
already performed. Also, it contains the part of the hash that is already produced.
For the user, it is only interesting in cases where the message is not hashed at
once, because the context is needed for further operations.

ica_sha1

Purpose

Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHA-1 algorithm.
**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_sha1(unsigned int message_part,
unsigned int input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha_context_t *sha_context,
unsigned char *output_data);
```

**Required hardware support**

KIMD-SHA-1, or KLMD-SHA-1

**Parameters**

**unsigned int message_part**

The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

- **SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY**
  A single hash operation
- **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST**
  The first part
- **SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE**
  The middle part
- **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**
  The last part

**unsigned int input_length**

Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm.

**unsigned char *input_data**

Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

**sha_context_t *sha_context**

Pointer to the SHA-1 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part **SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST**. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to **ica_sha1** for message part **SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**. For message part **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**, the returned value can be used for a chained call of **ica_sha1**. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

**unsigned char *output_data**

Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of **SHA_HASH_LENGTH**. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

**Return codes**

0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

**ica_sha224**

**Purpose**

Performs a secure hash operation on the input data using the SHA-224 algorithm.
Format

```
unsigned int ica_sha224(unsigned int message_part,
            unsigned int input_length,
            unsigned char *input_data,
            sha256_context_t *sha256_context,
            unsigned char *output_data);
```

Required hardware support

KIMD-SHA-256, or KLMD-SHA-256

Parameters

**unsigned int message_part**
- The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
  - **SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY**
    - A single hash operation
  - **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST**
    - The first part
  - **SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE**
    - The middle part
  - **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**
    - The last part

**unsigned int input_length**
- Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-224 algorithm.

**unsigned char *input_data**
- Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

**sha256_context_t *sha256_context**
- Pointer to the SHA-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part **SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST**. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to **ica_sha224** for message part **SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**. For message part **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST** and **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**, the returned value can be used for a chained call of **ica_sha224**. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

**Note:** Due to the algorithm used by SHA-224, a SHA-256 context must be used.

**unsigned char *output_data**
- Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of **SHA224_HASH_LENGTH**. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes

```
0   Success
```

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.
ica_sha256

Purpose
Performs a secure hash on the input data using the SHA-256 algorithm.

Format
unsigned int ica_sha256(unsigned int message_part,
unsigned int input_length,
unsigned char *input_data,
sha256_context_t *sha256_context,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support
KIMD-SHA-256, or KLMD-SHA-256

Parameters
unsigned int message_part
The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
A single hash operation
SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
The first part
SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
The middle part
SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
The last part

unsigned int input_length
Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-256 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha256_context_t *sha256_context
Pointer to the SHA-256 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha256 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha256. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA256_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.
ica_sha384

Purpose

Performs a secure hash on the input data using the SHA-384 algorithm.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_sha384(unsigned int message_part,
        uint64_t input_length,
        unsigned char *input_data,
        sha512_context_t *sha512_context,
        unsigned char *output_data);
```

Required hardware support

KIMD-SHA-512, or KLMD-SHA-512

Parameters

unsigned int message_part

The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:

- **SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY**
  - A single hash operation
- **SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST**
  - The first part
- **SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE**
  - The middle part
- **SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL**
  - The last part

uint64_t input_length

Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-384 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data

Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha512_context_t *sha512_context

Pointer to the SHA-512 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha384 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha384. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

**Note:** Due to the algorithm used by SHA-384, a SHA-512 context must be used.

unsigned char *output_data

Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA384_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes

0 Success
ica_sha512

Purpose

Performs a secure hash operation on input data using the SHA-512 algorithm.

Format

unsigned int ica_sha512(unsigned int message_part,
                        uint64_t input_length,
                        unsigned char *input_data,
                        sha512_context_t *sha512_context,
                        unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support

KIMD-SHA-512, or KLMD-SHA-512

Parameters

unsigned int message_part
    The message chaining state. This parameter must be one of the following values:
    SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY
        A single hash operation
    SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST
        The first part
    SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE
        The middle part
    SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL
        The last part

uint64_t input_length
    Length in bytes of the input data to be hashed using the SHA-512 algorithm.

unsigned char *input_data
    Pointer to the input data to be hashed. This pointer must not be zero. So even in case of zero size message data, it must be set to a valid value.

sha512_context_t *sha512_context
    Pointer to the SHA-512 context structure used to store intermediate values needed when chaining is used. The contents are ignored for message part SHA_MSG_PART_ONLY and SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST. This structure must contain the returned value of the preceding call to ica_sha512 for message part SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL. For message part SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST and SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL, the returned value can be used for a chained call of ica_sha512. Therefore, the application must not modify the contents of this structure in between chained calls.

unsigned char *output_data
    Pointer to the buffer to contain the resulting hash data. The resulting output data has a length of SHA512_HASH_LENGTH. Make sure that the buffer is at least this size.

Return codes

0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.
Pseudo random number generation functions

libica provides two methods of random number (random bit) generation:

- a conventional random number generator (“ica_random_number_generate” on page 20).
- a NIST SP800-90A compliant deterministic random bit generator. This generator is implemented by a combination of five separate functional APIs and is hereafter referred to as ica_drbg to denote the complete generator as a whole.

Conventional ica_random_number_generate function

libica initialization tries to seed the CPACF random generator. To get the seed, device /dev/hwrng is opened. Device /dev/hwrng provides true random data from crypto adapters over the crypto device driver (main module name is ap, with an alias name z90crypt, which is linking to ap). If that fails, the initialization mechanism uses device /dev/urandom. Within the initialization, a byte counter s390_byte_count is set to 0. If the CPACF pseudo random generator is available, after 4096 bytes of the pseudo random number are generated, the random number generator is seeded again. If the CPACF pseudo random generator is not available, random numbers are read from /dev/urandom.

Since libica version 2.6, this API internally invokes the NIST compliant ica_drbg functionality. The original code of this API is only processed if no MSA5, or at least no MSA2 support is available, which is the prerequisite of the ica_drbg API (see “NIST compliant ica_drbg functions”).

NIST compliant ica_drbg functions

The following APIs make up the complete ica_drbg functionality:

- “ica_drbg_instantiate” on page 21
- “ica_drbg_resseed” on page 22
- “ica_drbg_generate” on page 22
- “ica_drbg_uninstantiate” on page 23
- “ica_drbg_health_test” on page 23

The IBM zEnterprise EC12 (zEC12) machines introduced an updated version 5 of the message security assist (MSA). If available, the ica_drbg function exploits this updated MSA5 version that provides full hardware support for random number generation based on SHA512 in accordance with NIST SP800-90A.

Note: If no MSA5 version is available, the ica_drbg software fallback exploits at least MSA2 support, which includes SHA512. This fallback also produces NIST SP800-90A compliant random numbers, however, without the mentioned high performance MSA5 hardware support. If no MSA2 or higher support is available, the ica_drbg mechanism cannot return any pseudorandom bytes to the requesting application. In such cases, you must use the ica_random_number_generate function.

The implementation is designed to be thread-safe such that different threads can share the same ica_drbg instantiation.

The ica_drbg functionality uses certain definitions and supports the following DRBG mechanisms as shown in Table 2 on page 20.

typedef struct ica_drbg_mech ica_drbg_mech_t;
extern ica_drbg_mech_t *const ICA_DRBG_SHA512;
Table 2. Supported DRBG mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRBG mechanism</th>
<th>supported security strengths (in bits)</th>
<th>max. byte length of pers/add parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRBG_SHA512</td>
<td>112, 128, 196, 256</td>
<td>256 / 256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following information list satisfies the NIST SP800-90A documentation requirements:

- Entropy input is read from /dev/hwrng. If /dev/hwrng is not available, the entropy input is read from /dev/prandom.
- ica_drbg provides the ica_drbg_health_test interface for validation and health testing. This function together with test parameters can be found in libica/src/include/s390_drbg.h. Nonce and entropy input can be injected via these parameters for the purpose of known answer testing.
- No further support functions other than health testing are supported.
- The only DRBG mechanism currently implemented is Hash_DRBG using SHA-512.
- ica_drbg supports 112, 128, 196, and 256 bits of security.
- ica_drbg supports prediction resistance.
- The generate function is tested every $2^{64} - 1$ calls. This interval size is chosen, because CPACF hardware failures should not happen frequently.
- The integrity of the health test can be determined by inspecting the checksum/hash of the package before install.

ica_random_number_generate

Purpose

This function generates a pseudo random number. Parameter *output_data is a pointer to a buffer of byte length output_length. output_length number of bytes of pseudo random data is placed in the buffer pointed to by output_data.

Format

unsigned int ica_random_number_generate(unsigned int output_length,
unsigned char *output_data);

Required hardware support

KMC-PRNG

Parameters

unsigned int output_length
Length in bytes of the output_data buffer, and the length of the generated pseudo random number.

unsigned char *output_data
Pointer to the buffer to receive the generated pseudo random number.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.
**ica_drbg_instantiate**

**Purpose**

This function instantiates a NIST SP800-90A compliant deterministic random bit generator.

**Format**

```c
int ica_drbg_instantiate(ica_drbg_t **sh,
    int sec,
    bool pr,
    ica_drbg_mech_t *mech,
    const unsigned char *pers,
    size_t pers_len);
```

**Parameters**

`ica_drbg_t **sh`

State handle pointer. The (invalid) state handle is set to identify the new DRBG instantiation and thus becomes valid.

`int sec`

Requested security strength in bits of the new DRBG instantiation. The security strength is set to the lowest value supported by its DRBG mechanism that is greater than or equal to your selected `sec` value (see **Table 2 on page 20**). For example, if you request security strength 160 for your instance, it is actually set to 196.

`bool pr`

Prediction resistance flag. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance may be required by the consuming application during one or more requests for pseudo random bytes.

`ica_drbg_mech_t *mech`

Pointer to the mechanism type selected for the new DRBG instantiation. The new instantiation is then of this mechanism type. For available mechanisms, see **Table 2 on page 20**.

`const unsigned char *pers`

Pointer to a personalization string. This is optional input that provides personalization information. The personalization string should be unique for all instantiations of the same mechanism type. NULL indicates that no personalization string is used (not recommended).

`size_t pers_len`

Length in bytes of the string referenced by `pers`.

**Return codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENOTSUP</td>
<td>Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPERM</td>
<td>Failed to obtain a valid timestamp from clock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA_DRBG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL</td>
<td>Health test failed, see <a href="#">“ica_drbg_health_test” on page 23</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL</td>
<td>Entropy source failed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ica_drbg_reseed**

**Purpose**

This function reseeds a NIST SP800-90A compliant DRBG instantiation from ica_drbg_instantiate.

**Format**

```c
int ica_drbg_reseed(ica_drbg_t *sh,
                     bool pr,
                     const unsigned char *add,
                     size_t add_len);
```

**Parameters**

- `ica_drbg_t *sh`  
  State handle pointer. Identifies the DRBG instantiation to be reseeded.

- `bool pr`  
  Prediction resistance request. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is required.

- `const unsigned char *add`  
  Pointer to additional optional input. NULL indicates that no additional input is used.

- `size_t add_len`  
  Length in bytes of parameter `add`.

**Return codes**

- `0` Success
- `ENOTSUP` Prediction resistance is not supported.
- `ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL` Health test failed, see "ica_drbg_health_test" on page 23.
- `ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL` Entropy source failed.

**ica_drbg_generate**

**Purpose**

This function requests pseud random bytes from an ica_drbg instantiation created by the ica_drbg_instantiate function.

**Format**

```c
int ica_drbg_generate(ica_drbg_t *sh,
                       int sec,
                       bool pr,
                       const unsigned char *add,
                       size_t add_len,
                       unsigned char *prnd,
                       size_t prnd_len);
```

**Parameters**

- `ica_drbg_t *sh`  
  State handle pointer. Identifies the DRBG instantiation from which pseudorandom bytes are requested.
int sec
Requested security strength: Minimum bits of security that the generated
pseudo random bytes shall offer.

bool pr
Prediction resistance request. Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is
required.

const unsigned char *add
Pointer to additional optional input. NULL indicates that no additional input is
used.

size_t add_len
Length in bytes of parameter add.

unsigned char *prnd
Pointer to the generated pseudo random bytes.

size_t prnd_len
Length in bytes of parameter prnd, which corresponds to the number of
generated pseudo random bytes.

Return codes
0   Success
ENOTSUP
Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.
EPERM
Reseed required.
ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL
Health test failed, see ica_drbg_health_test.
ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL
Entropy source failed.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_drbg_uninstantiate
Purpose
This function destroys an existing ica_drbg instance.

Format
int ica_drbg_uninstantiate(ica_drbg_t **sh);

Parameters
ica_drbg_t **sh
State handle pointer. The corresponding DRBG instantiation is destroyed and
the state handle is set to NULL (invalid).

Return codes
0   Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_drbg_health_test
Purpose
This function runs a health test for the complete ica_drbg function mechanism.
Format

```c
int ica_drbg_health_test(void *func,
int  sec,
bool  pr,
ica_drbg_mech_t *mech);
```

Parameters

**void *func**
Pointer indicating which function should be tested. Options are:
- ica_drbg_instantiate
- ica_drbg_reseed
- ica_drbg_generate
The ica_drbg_instantiate function is tested whenever other functions are tested.

**int sec**
Security strength. Argument for the call to the function denoted by parameter `func`.

**bool pr**
Prediction resistance. Argument for the call to the function denoted by parameter `func`.

**ica_drbg_mech_t *mech**
Pointer to the mechanism to be tested.

Return codes

- **0** Success
- **ICA_DBRG_HEALTH_TEST_FAIL** Health test failed.
- **ENOTSUP** Prediction resistance or the requested security strength is not supported.
- **ICA_DBRG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAIL** Entropy source failed.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

RSA key generation functions

These functions are included in: `include/ica_api.h`.

These functions generate an RSA public/private key pair. These functions are performed using software through OpenSSL. Hardware is not used.

**ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo**

Purpose

Generates RSA keys in modulus/exponent format.

Comments

For specific information about some of these parameters, see the considerations in “Data structures” on page 90.
Format

```c
unsigned int ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
                                          unsigned int modulus_bit_length,
                                          ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *public_key,
                                          ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *private_key);
```

Parameters

**ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle**

Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

**unsigned int modulus_bit_length**

Length in bits of the modulus. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:

```
key_length = (modulus_bits + 7) / 8
```

**ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *public_key**

Pointer to where the generated public key is to be placed. If the exponent element in the public key is not set, it is randomly generated. A poorly chosen exponent could result in the program looping endlessly. Common public exponents are 3 and 65537.

**ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *private_key**

Pointer to where the generated private key in modulus/exponent format is to be placed. The length of both the private and public keys should be set in bytes. This value should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:

```
key_length = (modulus_bits + 7) / 8
```

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see [“Return codes” on page 93.](#)

**ica_rsa_key_generate_crt**

Purpose

Generates RSA keys in Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT) format.

Comments

For specific information about some of these parameters, see the considerations in [“Data structures” on page 90.](#)

With libica version 2.5, this function has been extended to allow RSA key generation for any granularity in the range 57 - 4096 bits.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
                                       unsigned int modulus_bit_length,
                                       ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *public_key,
                                       ica_rsa_key_crt_t *private_key);
```

Parameters

**ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle**

Pointer to a previously opened device handle.
unsigned int modulus_bit_length
Length in bits of the modulus part of the key. This value should comply with
the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this calculation:
\[
\text{key_length} = \frac{\text{modulus_bits} + 7}{8}
\]

ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *public_key
Pointer to where the generated public key is to be placed. If the exponent
element in the public key is not set, it is randomly generated. A poorly chosen
exponent can result in the program looping endlessly. Common public
exponents are 3 and 65537.

ica_rsa_key_crt_t *private_key
Pointer to where the generated private key in CRT format is to be placed.
Length of both private and public keys should be set in bytes. This value
should comply with the length of the keys (in bytes), according to this
calculation
\[
\text{key_length} = \frac{\text{modulus_bits} + 7}{8}
\]

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_rsa_crt_key_check
Purpose
Analyzes an RSA CRT key and check if the components are conform with the IBM
cryptographic architecture. If necessary the key is converted to a conform format
that can be used for IBM cryptographic hardware acceleration.

Checks if the RSA key credentials in CRT format are presented in privileged form,
respectively whether prime p is greater than prime q (\( p > q \)) In case of \( p < q \), key
credentials p and q as well as dp and dq are swapped and qInverse is recalculated.

Format
unsigned int ica_rsa_crt_key_check(ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key);

Parameters
ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key
Pointer to the key to be used in CRT format.

Return codes
0 All key credentials are in the correct format.
1 Key credentials were recalculated.
ENOMEM Memory allocation fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

RSA encrypt and decrypt operations
These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform a modulus/exponent operation using an RSA key whose
type is either ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t or ica_rsa_key_crt_t.
**ica_rsa_mod_expo**

**Purpose**

Performs an RSA encryption or decryption operation using a key in modulus/exponent format.

**Comments**

Make sure that your message is padded before using this function.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_rsa_mod_expo(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
                             unsigned char *input_data,
                             ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *rsa_key,
                             unsigned char *output_data);
```

**Parameters**

- **ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle**
  Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

- **unsigned char *input_data**
  Pointer to the input data to be encrypted or decrypted. This data must be in big endian format. Make sure that the input data is not longer than the bit length of the key. The byte length for the input data and the key must be the same. Right align the input data inside the data block.

- **ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t *rsa_key**
  Pointer to the key to be used, in modulus/exponent format.

- **unsigned char *output_data**
  Pointer to the location where the output results are to be placed. This buffer has to be at least the same size as `input_data` and therefore at least the same size as the size of the modulus.

**Return codes**

- **0**  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see [“Return codes” on page 93.](#)

**ica_rsa_crt**

**Purpose**

Performs an RSA encryption or decryption operation using a key in CRT format.

**Comments**

Make sure that your message is padded before using this function.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_rsa_crt(ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle,
                         unsigned char *input_data,
                         ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key,
                         unsigned char *output_data);
```
Parameters

**ica_adapter_handle_t adapter_handle**
Pointer to a previously opened device handle.

**unsigned char *input_data**
Pointer to the input data to be encrypted or decrypted. This data must be in big endian format. Make sure that the input data is not longer than the bit length of the key. The byte length for the input data and the key must be the same. Right align the input data inside the data block.

**ica_rsa_key_crt_t *rsa_key**
Pointer to the key to be used, in CRT format.

**unsigned char *output_data**
Pointer to the location where the output results are to be placed. This buffer must be as large as the input data, and as large as the length of the modulus specified in rsa_key.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

**DES functions**

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform encryption and decryption and computation or verification of message authentication codes using a DES (DEA) key. A DES key has a size of 8 bytes. Each byte of a DES key contains one parity bit, such that each 64-bit DES key contains only 56 security-relevant bits. The cipher block size for DES is 8 bytes.

To securely apply DES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input. As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation, and have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decrypting according to a mode of operation also compute an output vector. This output vector can be used as the initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

When decrypting a cipher text, these values used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that transformed the plain text into the cipher text:

- The mode of operation
- The key
- The initialization vector (if applicable)
- For the ica_des_cfb function, the lcfb parameter
ica_des_cbc

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_des_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
             unsigned char *out_data,
             unsigned long data_length,
             const unsigned char *key,
             unsigned char *iv,
             unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

KMC-DEA

Parameters

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. This buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`. `data_length` must be a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for DES).

- **const unsigned char *key**
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten by this function. The result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cbc or ica_des_cbc_cs call with the same key.

- **unsigned int direction**
  0 Use the decrypt function.
  1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_des_cbc_cs

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication.
ica_des_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted or decrypted by chained calls to ica_des_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the last call to ica_des_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_des_cbc_cs call, provided that the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_des_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data,
  unsigned char *out_data,
  unsigned long data_length,
  const unsigned char *key,
  unsigned char *iv,
  unsigned int direction,
  unsigned int variant);
```

Required hardware support

KMC-DEA

Parameters

- **const unsigned char **\*in_data
  
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as the data_length.

- **unsigned char **\*out_data
  
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. This buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

- **unsigned long** data_length
  
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

- **const unsigned char **\*key
  
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

- **unsigned char **\*iv
  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. For variant equal to 1 or variant equal to 2, the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cbc or ica_des_cbc_cs call with the same key, if data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size.

- **unsigned int** direction
  
  0 Use the decrypt function.
  
  1 Use the encrypt function.

- **unsigned int** variant
  
  1 Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two blocks in order.
  
  2 Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication
800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two blocks if data_length is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for DES).

3 Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the last two blocks.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_des_cfb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

Format

unsigned int ica_des_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,
       unsigned char *out_data,
       unsigned long data_length,
       const unsigned char *key,
       unsigned char *iv,
       unsigned int lcfb,
       unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMF-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as the data_length parameter.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as the data_length parameter.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_des_cfb call with the same key, if data_length in the preceding call is a multiple of the lcfb parameter.

unsigned int lcfb
  Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).
unsigned int direction
0  Use the decrypt function.
1  Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_des_cmac

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
          unsigned long message_length,
          unsigned char *mac,
          unsigned int mac_length,
          const unsigned char *key,
          unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-DEA
PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
  Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
  Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
  Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
0  Verify message authentication code.
1  Compute message authentication code for the message.
Return codes
0  Success
EFAULT
   If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication
code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_des_cmac_intermediate
    Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block
Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST
Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac_intermediate and ica_des_cmac_last can
be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using CMAC is
supplied in multiple chunks. ica_des_cmac_intermediate is used to process all but
the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by ica_des_cmac_intermediate
must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

Note that ica_des_cmac_intermediate has no direction argument. This function can
be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message,
   unsigned long message_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned char *iv);

Required hardware support
KMAC-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
   Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length
   bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message to be authenticated, or
   of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
   Length in bytes of the message part in message. This value must be a multiple
   of the cipher block size.

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
   Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size bytes (8 bytes for
   DES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of
   zeros. For processing the n-th message part, this parameter must be the
   resulting iv value of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate function applied to the
   (n-1)-th message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result
   value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to
   ica_des_cmac_intermediate, or to ica_des_cmac_last with the same key.

Return codes
0  Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_des_cmac_last

Purpose

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_des_cmac_last can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message or of the final part of a message for which all preceding parts were processed with ica_des_cmac_intermediate.

Format

unsigned int ica_des_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message,
                                unsigned long message_length,
                                unsigned char *mac,
                                unsigned int mac_length,
                                const unsigned char *key,
                                unsigned char *iv,
                                unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMAC-DEA
PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *message
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a message or the final part of a message, to be either authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
    Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code that is verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
    Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac that is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If iv is NULL, message is assumed to be the complete message to be processed. Otherwise, message is the final part of a composite message to be processed and iv contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts with chained calls to ica_des_cmac_intermediate (the value returned in iv of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate call applied to the penultimate message part).

unsigned int direction

  0    Verify message authentication code.
  1    Compute message authentication code for the message.
Return codes

0   Success
EFAULT
     If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication
code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_des_ctr

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described
in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each
message block of the same size as the cipher block (8 bytes for DES) is combined
with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block,
subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are
derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment
function used in ica_des_ctr is an arithmetic increment without carry on the M
least significant bytes in the counter, where M is a parameter to ica_des_ctr.

Format

unsigned int ica_des_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data,
     unsigned char *out_data,
     unsigned long data_length,
     const unsigned char *key,
     unsigned char *ctr,
     unsigned int ctr_width,
     unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMCTR-DEA

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
     Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
     Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
     Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
     Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned char *ctr
     Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block
in bytes. ctr contains an initialization value for a counter function, and it is
replaced by a new value. That new value can be used as the initialization
value for a counter function in a chained ica_des_ctr call with the same key, if
the data_length used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.
unsigned int ctr_width
A number \( M \) between 1 and the cipher block size. This value is used by the
counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing
without carry the least significant \( M \) bytes of the counter value.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_des_ctrlist
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described
in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each
message block of the same size as the cipher block is combined with a counter
value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_des_ctrlist function assumes that a list \( n \) of precomputed counter values is
provided, where \( n \) is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message
size divided by the cipher block size. This function is used to optimally utilize IBM
z Systems hardware support for non-standard counter functions.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_ctrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    const unsigned char *ctrlist,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMCTR-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
the beginning of in_data.

Calls to ica_des_ctrlist with the same key can be chained if:
• With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the data_length used
  is a multiple of the cipher block size.
• The ctrlist argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that
  follows the counters used in the preceding call.
const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

const unsigned char *ctrlist
   Pointer to a readable buffer of a size greater than or equal to data_length, and a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES). ctrlist should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

unsigned int direction
   0 Use the decrypt function.
   1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_des_ecb

Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.

Format
unsigned int ica_des_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
unsigned char *out_data,
unsigned long data_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-DEA

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
   Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
   Pointer to a writeable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES).

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
   0 Use the decrypt function.
   1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

**ica_des_ofb**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a DES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_des_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                         unsigned char *out_data,
                         unsigned long data_length,
                         const unsigned char *key,
                         unsigned int key_length,
                         unsigned char *iv,
                         unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMO-DEA

**Parameters**

- `const unsigned char *in_data`  
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned char *out_data`  
  Pointer to a writable buffer that contains the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned long data_length`  
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

- `const unsigned char *key`  
  Pointer to a valid DES key of 8 bytes in length.

- `unsigned char *iv`  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes (8 bytes for DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for DES), the result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_des_ofb` call with the same key.

- `unsigned int direction`  
  0 Use the decrypt function.  
  1 Use the encrypt function.

**Return codes**

- 0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

**Compatibility with earlier versions**

In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following DES interfaces remain supported:
unsigned int ica_des_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_single_t *des_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

unsigned int ica_des_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_single_t *des_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

Table 3 shows libica version 2.0 DES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 DES function calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 DES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 DES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length, in_data, NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_ecb(in_data, out_data, (long)data_length, key, 1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_encrypt(MODE_CBC, data_length, in_data, iv, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_cbc(in_data, out_data, (long)data_length, key, iv, 1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_decrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length, in_data, NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_ecb(in_data, out_data, (long)data_length, key, 0);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_des_decrypt(MODE_CBC, data_length, in_data, iv, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_cbc(in_data, out_data, (long)data_length, key, iv, 0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions ica_des_encrypt and ica_des_decrypt remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of ica_des_ecb and ica_des_cbc.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see libica Programmers Reference version 2.0.

**TDES/3DES functions**

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform encryption and decryption or computation and verification of message authentication codes using a triple-DES (3DES, TDES or TDEA) key. A 3DES key consists of a concatenation of three DES keys, each of which has a size of 8 bytes. Note that each byte of a DES key contains one parity bit, such that each 64-bit DES key contains only 56 security-relevant bits. The cipher block size for 3DES is 8 bytes.

3DES is known in two variants: a two key variant and a three key variant. This library implements only the three key variant. The two key variant can be derived from functions for the three key variant by using the same key as the first and third key.

To securely apply 3DES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input. As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation and have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decryption according to that mode of operation also compute an output vector that...
can be used as the initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

Note that when decrypting a cipher text, the mode of operation, the key, the initialization vector (if applicable), and for ica_3des_cfb the lcfb value used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that was used to transform the plain text into the cipher text.

ica_3des_cbc

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

Format

unsigned int ica_3des_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
        unsigned char *out_data,
        unsigned long data_length,
        const unsigned char *key,
        unsigned char *iv,
        unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMC-TDEA-192

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_3des_cbc or ica_3des_cbc_cs call with the same key.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.
ica_3des_cbc_cs

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with a 3DES key using Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2 and the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A on Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode.

ica_3des_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted or decrypted by chained calls to ica_3des_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the last call to ica_3des_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_3des_cbc_cs call, provided that the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

Format

unsigned int ica_3des_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data,
                               unsigned char *out_data,
                               unsigned long data_length,
                               const unsigned char *key,
                               unsigned char *iv,
                               unsigned int direction,
                               unsigned int variant);

Required hardware support

KMC-TDEA-192

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. For variant equal to 1 or variant equal to 2, the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_3des_cbc or ica_3des_cbc_cs call with the same key, if data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int direction
  0    Use the decrypt function.
  1    Use the encrypt function.

unsigned int variant
1 Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two blocks in order.

2 Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two blocks if \( data_length \) is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 bytes for 3DES).

3 Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the last two blocks.

**Return codes**

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

**ica_3des_cfb**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with a 3DES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                            unsigned char *out_data,
                            unsigned long data_length,
                            const unsigned char *key,
                            unsigned char *iv,
                            unsigned int lcfb,
                            unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMF-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is \( data_length \). The size of this buffer must be at least as large as \( data_length \).

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as \( data_length \).

- **unsigned long data_length**
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of \( in_data \).

- **const unsigned char *key**
  Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (8 bytes for 3DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in \( iv \) can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_3des_cfb call with the same key, if the \( data_length \) in the preceding call is a multiple of \( lcfb \).
unsigned int lcfb
Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_3des_cmac
Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a 3DES key using the
Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in
NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_3des_cmac can be used to authenticate or
verify the authenticity of a complete message.

Format
unsigned int ica_3des_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
unsigned long message_length,
unsigned char *mac,
unsigned int mac_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-TDEA-192
PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-TDEA-192

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length
bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated, or of which the
authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction
is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code
for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If
direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message
authentication code to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac, which is less than or
equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). It is recommended to use a
mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code.
Compute message authentication code for the message.

Return codes
0   Success
EFAULT
    If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication
code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_3des_cmac_intermediate

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with a 3DES key using the
Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in
NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_3des_cmac_intermediate and
ica_3des_cmac_last can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be
verified using CMAC is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_3des_cmac_intermediate
is used to process all but the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by
ica_3des_cmac_intermediate must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block
size (a multiple of 8 bytes for 3DES).

Note that ica_3des_cmac_intermediate has no direction argument. This function
can be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

Format
unsigned int ica_3des_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message,
    unsigned long message_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned char *iv);

Required hardware support
KMAC-TDEA-192

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length
    bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message to be authenticated, or
    of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
    Length in bytes of the message part in message. This value must be a multiple
    of the cipher block size.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of size cipher block size (8 bytes for
    3DES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of
    zeros. For processing the n-th message part, this parameter must be the
    resulting iv value of the ica_3des_cmac_intermediate applied to the (n-1)-th
    message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value
    in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to
    ica_3des_cmac_intermediate or to ica_3des_cmac_last with the same key.
Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_3des_cmac_last

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an 3DES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_3des_cmac_last can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message or of the final part of a message, for which all preceding parts were processed with ica_3des_cmac_intermediate.

Format
unsigned int ica_3des_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message, unsigned long message_length, unsigned char *mac, unsigned int mac_length, const unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMAC-TDEA,-192
PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-TDEA-192

Parameters
const unsigned char *message
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. It contains a message or the final part of a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

unsigned long message_length
Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

unsigned char *mac
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to mac_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in message of size mac_length bytes is written to the buffer. If direction is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code that is to be verified against the message in message.

unsigned int mac_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code mac in bytes that is less than or equal to the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). It is recommended to use a mac_length of 8.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If iv is NULL, message is assumed to be the complete message to be processed. Otherwise, message is the final part of a composite message to be processed and iv contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts with chained calls to ica_des_cmac_intermediate (the value returned in iv of the ica_des_cmac_intermediate call applied to the penultimate message part.

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unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code.
1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_3des_ctr
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a triple-length DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of size cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES) is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block, subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment function used in ica_3des_ctr is an arithmetic increment without carry on the M least significant bytes in the counter, where M is a parameter to ica_3des_ctr.

Format
unsigned int ica_3des_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data, unsigned char *out_data, unsigned long data_length, const unsigned char *key, unsigned char *ctr, unsigned int ctr_width, unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMCTR-TDEA-192

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *ctr
Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block
in bytes. `ctr` contains an initialization value for a counter function that is replaced by a new value. The new value can be used as an initialization value for a counter function in a chained ica_3des_ctr call with the same key, if the `data_length` used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.

### unsigned int `ctr_width`
A number `M` between 1 and the cipher block size. The value is used by the counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing without carry the least significant `M` bytes of the counter value.

### unsigned int `direction`

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Use the decrypt function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Use the encrypt function.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Return codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Return code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

### ica_3des_ctrlist

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each message block of the same size as the cipher block is combined with a counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_3des_ctrlist function assumes that a list `n` of precomputed counter values is provided where `n` is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message size divided by the cipher block size. This function is used to optimally utilize IBM z Systems hardware support for non-standard counter functions.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_ctrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    const unsigned char *ctrlist,
    unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMCTR-TDEA-192

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.  

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Calls to \texttt{ica_3desCtrList} with the same key can be chained if:
\begin{itemize}
  \item With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the \texttt{data_length} used is a multiple of the cipher block size.
  \item The \texttt{ctrlist} argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that follows the counters used in the preceding call.
\end{itemize}

\begin{verbatim}
const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

const unsigned char *ctrlist
  Pointer to a readable buffer that is both of size greater than or equal to \texttt{data_length}, and a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES). \texttt{ctrlist} should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

unsigned int direction
  0    Use the decrypt function.
  1    Use the encrypt function.
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Return codes}
\begin{align*}
  0 & \quad \text{Success} \\
\end{align*}

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "\textit{Return codes}" on page 93.

\textbf{ica_3des_ecb}

\textbf{Purpose}
Encrypt or decrypt data with an 3DES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.

\textbf{Format}
\begin{verbatim}
unsigned int ica_3des_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
  unsigned char *out_data,
  unsigned long data_length,
  const unsigned char *key,
  unsigned int direction);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Required hardware support}

KM-DEA-192

\textbf{Parameters}
\begin{verbatim}
const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is \texttt{data_length}. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as \texttt{data_length}.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writeable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as \texttt{data_length}.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of \texttt{in_data}. \texttt{data_length} must be a multiple of the cipher block size (8 bytes for 3DES).

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.
\end{verbatim}
unsigned int direction
   0 Use the decrypt function.
   1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_3des_ofb
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with a 3DES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as
described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

Format
unsigned int ica_3des_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
   unsigned char *out_data,
   unsigned long data_length,
   const unsigned char *key,
   unsigned int key_length,
   unsigned char *iv,
   unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMO-TDEA-192

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
   Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
   Pointer to a writable buffer that contains the resulting encrypted or decrypted
message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
   Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
   Pointer to a valid 3DES key of 24 bytes in length.

unsigned char *iv
   Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in
bytes (8 bytes for 3DES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If
data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 8 for 3DES), the
result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained
ica_3des_ofb call with the same key.

unsigned int direction
   0 Use the decrypt function.
   1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
0 Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

Compatibility with earlier versions

In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following 3DES interfaces remain supported:

```c
unsigned int ica_3des_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
    unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_triple_t *des_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);
unsigned int ica_3des_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
    unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
    ica_des_vector_t *iv, ica_des_key_triple_t *des_key,
    unsigned char *output_data);
```

Table 4 shows libica version 2.0 TDES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 TDES function calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 TDES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 TDES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key, out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_encrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,iv,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_decrypt(MODE_ECB,data_length,in_data,NULL, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,0);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_3des_decrypt(MODE_CBC,data_length,in_data,iv, key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_3des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length,,, key,iv,0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions **ica_3des_encrypt** and **ica_3des_decrypt** remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of **ica_3des_ecb** and **ica_3des_cbc**.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see *libica Programmers Reference version 2.0*.

AES functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

These functions perform encryption and decryption or computation or verification of message authentication codes using an AES key. Supported key lengths are 16, 24 or 32 bytes for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. The cipher block size for AES is 16 bytes.

To securely apply AES encryption to messages that are longer than the cipher block size, modes of operation can be used to chain multiple encryption, decryption, or authentication operations. Most modes of operation require an initialization vector as additional input.

As long as the messages are encrypted or decrypted using such a mode of operation, have a size that is a multiple of a particular block size (mostly the cipher block size), the functions encrypting or decryption according to a mode of operation also compute an output vector. The output vector can be used as the
initialization vector of a chained encryption or decryption operation in the same mode with the same block size and the same key.

Note that when decrypting a cipher text the mode of operation, the key, the initialization vector (if applicable), and for ica_aes_cfb the lcfb value used for the decryption function must match the corresponding settings of the encryption function that transformed the plain text into the cipher text.

**ica_aes_cbc**

**Purpose**

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_cbc(const unsigned char *in_data,
                         unsigned char *out_data,
                         unsigned long data_length,
                         const unsigned char *key,
                         unsigned int key_length,
                         unsigned char *iv,
                         unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMC-AES-128, KMC-AES-192, or KMC-AES-256

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *in_data**
  
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned char *out_data**
  
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- **unsigned long data_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`. `data_length` must be a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 for AES).

- **const unsigned char *key**
  
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- **unsigned int key_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_aes_cbc or ica_aes_cbc_cs call with the same key.

- **unsigned int direction**
  
  0 Use the decrypt function.
  1 Use the encrypt function.
Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_aes_cbc_cs
Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing (CBC-CS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.2, and the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A on Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode.

ica_aes_cbc_cs can be used to encrypt or decrypt the last chunk of a message consisting of multiple chunks, where all chunks except the last one are encrypted or decrypted by chained calls to ica_aes_cbc. To do this, the resulting iv of the last call to ica_aes_cbc is fed into the iv of the ica_aes_cbc_cs call, provided that the chunk is greater than the cipher block size (greater than 16 bytes for AES).

Format

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_cbc_cs(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int direction,
    unsigned int variant);
```

Required hardware support

KMC-AES-128, KMC-AES-192 or KMC-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. data_length must be greater than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES).

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.
unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. This vector is overwritten during the function. For variant equal to 1 or variant equal to 2, the result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_aes_cbc or ica_aes_cbc_cs call with the same key, if data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

unsigned int variant
1 Use variant CBC-CS1 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always keep last two blocks in order.
2 Use variant CBC-CS2 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: switch order of the last two blocks if data_length is not a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 bytes for AES).
3 Use variant CBC-CS3 of the Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A to encrypt or decrypt the message: always switch order of the last two blocks.

Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_aes_ccm
Purpose
Encrypt and authenticate or decrypt data and check authenticity of data with an AES key using Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CCM) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38C. Formatting and counter functions are implemented according to NIST 800-38C Appendix A.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_ccm(unsigned char *payload,
unsigned long payload_length,
unsigned char *ciphertext_n_mac,
unsigned int mac_length,
const unsigned char *assoc_data,
unsigned long assoc_data_length,
const unsigned char *nonce,
unsigned int nonce_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256
KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192, or KMAC-AES-256

Parameters
unsigned char *payload
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to payload_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the payload buffer must be readable and contain a
payload message of size \textit{payload\_length} to be encrypted. If direction is equal to 0, the payload buffer must be writable. If the authentication verification succeeds, the decrypted message in the most significant \textit{payload\_length} bytes of \textit{ciphertext\_n\_mac} is written to this buffer. Otherwise, the contents of this buffer is undefined.

\textbf{unsigned long payload\_length}
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. This value can be 0 unless \textit{assoc\_data\_length} is equal to 0.

\textbf{unsigned char *ciphertext\_n\_mac}
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to \textit{payload\_length} plus \textit{mac\_length} bytes. If \textit{direction} is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and the encrypted message from \textit{payload} followed by the message authentication code for the nonce, the payload, and associated data are written to that buffer. If direction is equal to 0, then the buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of length \textit{payload\_length} followed by a message authentication code of length \textit{mac\_length}.

\textbf{unsigned int mac\_length}
Length in bytes of the message authentication code. Valid values are: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 16.

\textbf{const unsigned char *assoc\_data}
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to \textit{assoc\_data\_length} bytes. The associated data in the most significant \textit{assoc\_data\_length} bytes is subject to the authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

\textbf{unsigned long assoc\_data\_length}
Length of the associated data in \textit{assoc\_data}. This value can be 0 unless \textit{payload\_length} is equal to 0.

\textbf{const unsigned char *nonce}
Pointer to readable buffer of size greater than or equal to \textit{nonce\_length} bytes, which contains a nonce (number used once) of size \textit{nonce\_length} bytes.

\textbf{unsigned int nonce\_length}
Length of the \textit{nonce} in bytes. Valid values are greater than 6 and less than 14.

\textbf{const unsigned char *key}
Specifies a pointer to a valid AES key.

\textbf{unsigned int key\_length}
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: \texttt{AES\_KEY\_LEN128}, \texttt{AES\_KEY\_LEN192}, and \texttt{AES\_KEY\_LEN256}.

\textbf{unsigned int direction}
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

\textbf{Return codes}
0 Success
EFAULT If \textit{direction} is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see \textquotedblleft Return codes\textquotedblright{} on page 93.
ica_aes_cfb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.3.

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_cfb(const unsigned char *in_data,
unsigned char *out_data,
unsigned long data_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned char *iv,
unsigned int lcfb,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KMF-AES-128, KMF-AES-192, or KMF-AES-256

Parameters

cost unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

cost unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32, for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
    Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block in bytes (16 bytes for AES). This vector is overwritten during the function. The result value in iv can be used as the initialization vector for a chained ica_aes_cfb call with the same key, if the data_length in the preceding call is a multiple of lcfb.

unsigned int lcfb
    Length in bytes of the cipher feedback, which is a value greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES).

unsigned int direction
    0    Use the decrypt function.
    1    Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0    Success
For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

**ica_aes_cmac**

**Purpose**

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. ica_aes_cmac can be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a complete message.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac(const unsigned char *message,
             unsigned long message_length,
             unsigned char *mac,
             unsigned int mac_length,
             const unsigned char *key,
             unsigned int key_length,
             unsigned int direction);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192 or KMAC-AES-256


**Parameters**

**const unsigned char *message**

Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to `message_length` bytes. This buffer contains a message to be authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

**unsigned long message_length**

Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.

**unsigned char *mac**

Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to `mac_length` bytes. If `direction` is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code for the message in `message` of size `mac_length` bytes is written to this buffer. If `direction` is equal to 0, this buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the message in `message`.

**unsigned int mac_length**

Length in bytes of the message authentication code `mac` in bytes, which is less than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). It is recommended to use values greater than or equal to 8.

**const unsigned char *key**

Pointer to a valid AES key.

**unsigned int key_length**

Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

**unsigned int direction**

- 0: Verify message authentication code.
- 1: Compute message authentication code for the message.

**Return codes**

- 0: Success
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

### ica_aes_cmac_intermediate

**Purpose**

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. **ica_aes_cmac_intermediate** and **ica_aes_cmac_last** can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using CMAC is supplied in multiple chunks. **ica_aes_cmac_intermediate** is used to process all but the last chunk. All message chunks to be processed by **ica_aes_cmac_intermediate** must have a size that is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 bytes for AES).

Note that **ica_aes_cmac_intermediate** has no direction argument. This function can be used during authentication and during authenticity verification.

**Format**

```c
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac_intermediate(const unsigned char *message,
                                       unsigned long message_length,
                                       const unsigned char *key,
                                       unsigned int key_length,
                                       unsigned char *iv);
```

**Required hardware support**

KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192, or KMAC-AES-256

**Parameters**

- **const unsigned char *message**
  
  Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to message_length bytes. This buffer contains a non-final part of a message, to be authenticated or of which the authenticity is to be verified.

- **unsigned long message_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the message part in message. This value must be a multiple of the cipher block size.

- **const unsigned char *key**
  
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- **unsigned int key_length**
  
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

- **unsigned char *iv**
  
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes (16 bytes for AES). For the first message part, this parameter must be set to a string of zeros. For processing the n-th message part, this parameter must be the resulting iv value of the **ica_aes_cmac_intermediate** function applied to the (n-1)-th message part. This vector is overwritten during the function. The result
value in \( iv \) can be used as the initialization vector for a chained call to
\texttt{ica_aes_cmac_intermediate} or to \texttt{ica_aes_cmac_last} with the same key.

\textbf{Return codes}

\begin{itemize}
  \item [0] Success
\end{itemize}

For return codes indicating exceptions, see \textquote{Return codes} on page 93.

\textbf{ica_aes_cmac_last}

\textbf{Purpose}

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the
Block Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) mode, as described in
NIST Special Publication 800-38B. \texttt{ica_aes_cmac_last} can be used to authenticate or
verify the authenticity of a complete message, or of the final part of a message for
which all preceding parts were processed with \texttt{ica_aes_cmac_intermediate}.

\textbf{Format}

\begin{verbatim}
unsigned int ica_aes_cmac_last(const unsigned char *message,
        unsigned long message_length,
        unsigned char *mac,
        unsigned int mac_length,
        const unsigned char *key,
        unsigned int key_length,
        unsigned char *iv,
        unsigned int direction);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Required hardware support}

- KMAC-AES-128, KMAC-AES-192 or KMAC-AES-256
- PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-AES-128, PCC-Compute-Last_block-
  CMAC-Using-AES-192, or PCC-Compute-Last_block-CMAC-Using-AES-256

\textbf{Parameters}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{const unsigned char *message}
    Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to \texttt{message_length}
    bytes. This buffer contains a message or the final part of a message to be
    authenticated, or of which the authenticity is to be verified.
  
  \item \texttt{unsigned long message_length}
    Length in bytes of the message to be authenticated or verified.
  
  \item \texttt{unsigned char *mac}
    Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to \texttt{mac_length} bytes. If \texttt{direction}
    is equal to 1, the buffer must be writable and a message authentication code
    for the message in \texttt{message} of size \texttt{mac_length} bytes is written to the buffer. If
    \texttt{direction} is equal to 0, the buffer must be readable and contain a message
    authentication code that is verified against the message in \texttt{message}.
  
  \item \texttt{unsigned int mac_length}
    Length in bytes of the message authentication code \texttt{mac} in bytes, which is less
    than or equal to the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). It is recommended to
    use values greater than or equal to 8.
  
  \item \texttt{const unsigned char *key}
    Pointer to a valid AES key.
  
  \item \texttt{unsigned int key_length}
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128,
AES-128, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: 
AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a valid initialization vector of cipher block size number of bytes. If
iv is NULL, message is assumed to be the complete message to be processed.
Otherwise, message is the final part of a composite message to be processed,
and iv contains the output vector resulting from processing all previous parts
with chained calls to ica_aes_cmac_intermediate (the value returned in iv of
the ica_aes_cmac_intermediate call applied to the penultimate message part).

unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code.
1 Compute message authentication code for the message.

Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT
If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication
code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_aes_ctr
Purpose
Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described
in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each
message block of size cipher block size (16 bytes for AES) is combined with a
counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

Starting with an initial counter value to be combined with the first message block,
subsequent counter values to be combined with subsequent message blocks are
derived from preceding counter values by an increment function. The increment
function used in ica_aes_ctr is an arithmetic increment without carry on the M
least significant bytes in the counter where M is a parameter to ica_aes_ctr.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_ctr(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *ctr,
    unsigned int ctr_width,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters
const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
buffer must be at least as large as data_length.
unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
    message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
    the beginning of in_data.

const unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128,
    AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions:
    AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *ctr
    Pointer to a readable and writable buffer of the same size as the cipher block
    in bytes. ctr contains an initialization value for a counter function, and it is
    replaced by a new value. That new value can be used as an initialization value
    for a counter function in a chained ica_aes_ctr call with the same key, if the
    data_length used in the preceding call is a multiple of the cipher block size.

unsigned int ctr_width
    A number M between 1 and the cipher block size. The value is used by the
    counter increment function, which increments a counter value by incrementing
    without carry the least significant M bytes of the counter value.

unsigned int direction
    0    Use the decrypt function.
    1    Use the encrypt function.

Return codes
    0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_aes_ctrlist

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Counter (CTR) mode, as described
in NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Chapter 6.5. With the counter mode, each
message block of the same size as the cipher block in bytes is combined with a
counter value of the same size during encryption and decryption.

The ica_aes_ctrlist function assumes that a list n of precomputed counter values is
provided, where n is the smallest integer that is less than or equal to the message
size divided by the cipher block size. This function optimally uses IBM z Systems
hardware support for non-standard counter functions.

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_ctrlist(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    const unsigned char *ctrlist,
    unsigned int direction);
Required hardware support

KMCTR-DEA,KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR-AES-192, or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data.

Calls to ica_aes_ctrlist with the same key can be chained if:
• With the possible exception of the last call in the chain the data_length used is a multiple of the cipher block size.
• The ctrlist argument of each chained call contains a list of counters that follows the counters used in the preceding call.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

const unsigned char *ctrlist
Pointer to a readable buffer that is both of a size greater than or equal to data_length, and a multiple of the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES). ctrlist should contain a list of precomputed counter values, each of the same size as the cipher block.

unsigned int direction
0 Use the decrypt function.
1 Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_aes_ecb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.1.
Format

unsigned int ica_aes_ecb(const unsigned char *in_data,
unsigned char *output,
unsigned int data_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192, or KM-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or
  decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this
  buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
  Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted
  message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at
  the beginning of in_data. data_length must be a multiple of the cipher block size
  (a multiple of 16 for AES).

const unsigned char *key
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128,
  AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions:
  AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned int direction
  0  Use the decrypt function.
  1  Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0  Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_aes_gcm

Purpose

Encrypt data and authenticate data or decrypt data and check authenticity of data
with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST
Special Publication 800-38D. If no message needs to be encrypted or decrypted and
only authentication or authentication checks are requested, then this method
implements the GMAC mode.

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_gcm(unsigned char *plaintext,
unsigned long plaintext_length,
unsigned char *ciphertext,
const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned int iv_length,
const unsigned char *aad,
unsigned long aad_length,
unsigned char *tag,
unsigned int tag_length,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192 or KM-AES-256
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters

unsigned char *plaintext
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, the plaintext buffer must be readable and contain a payload message of size plaintext_length to be encrypted. If direction is equal to 0, the plaintext buffer must be writable and if the authentication verification succeeds, the decrypted message in the most significant plaintext_length bytes of ciphertext is written to the buffer. Otherwise, the contents of the buffer are undefined.

unsigned long plaintext_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. This value can be 0 unless aad_length is equal to 0. The value must be greater than or equal to 0 and less than (2**36) - 32.

unsigned char *ciphertext
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, then this buffer must be writable and the encrypted message from plaintext is written to that buffer. If direction is equal to 0, then this buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of length plaintext_length.

const unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to iv_length bytes, which contains an initialization vector of size iv_length.

unsigned int iv_length
Length in bytes of the initialization vector in iv. The value must be greater than 0 and less than 2**61. A length of 12 is recommended.

const unsigned char *aad
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to aad_length bytes. The additional authenticated data in the most significant aad_length bytes is subject to the message authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

unsigned int aad_length
Length in bytes of the additional authenticated data in aad. The value must be greater than or equal to 0 and less than 2**61.

unsigned char *tag
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to tag_length bytes. If direction is equal to 1, this buffer must be writable, and a message authentication code for the additional authenticated data in aad and the plain text in plaintext of size tag_length bytes is written to this buffer. If direction is equal to 0, this buffer must be readable and contain a message authentication code to be verified against the additional authenticated data in aad and the decrypted cipher text from ciphertext.
unsigned int tag_length
Length in bytes of the message authentication code tag. Valid values are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

const unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned int direction
0 Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
1 Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes
0 Success
EFAULT If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_aes_gcm_initialize
Purpose
Start and initialize a new session of AES-GCM for stream cipher requests.

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_initialize(const unsigned char *iv,
    unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *icb,
    unsigned char *ucb,
    unsigned char *subkey,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KM-AES-128, KM-AES-192 or KM-AES-256
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters
unsigned char *iv
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to iv_length bytes, that contains an initialization vector of size iv_length.

unsigned int iv_length
Length in bytes of the initialization vector in iv. It must be greater than 0 and less than 2**61. A length of 12 is recommended.

unsigned char *key
Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128,
AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *icb

Pointer to the initial counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is used in ica_aes_gcm_last() for the final tag computation. The length of this counter block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned char *ucb

Pointer to the usage counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is updated (increased) during the intermediate update operations. The length of this counter block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned char *subkey

Pointer to a writable buffer generated in ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last(). The length of this subkey block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned int direction

0 Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
1 Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes

0 Success
EIO If the operation fails.
EFAUL T

If direction equals 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_aes_gcm_intermediate

Purpose

Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D. ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last() can be used when the message to be authenticated or to be verified using GCM is supplied in multiple chunks. ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() is used to process all data chunks. Be aware that all chunks, with the possible exception of the last one, must be a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). The last data chunk might be any size. In any cases the ica_aes_gcm_last() must be called at the end to calculate the final authentication tag.

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_intermediate(unsigned char *plaintext,
unsigned long plaintext_length,
unsigned char *ciphertext,
unsigned char *ucb,
unsigned char *aad,
unsigned long aad_length,
unsigned char *tag,
unsigned int tag_length,
unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_length,
unsigned char *subkey,
unsigned int direction);
Required hardware support
KIMD-GHASH
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256

Parameters

unsigned char *plaintext
Pointer to a buffer of size greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes.

If direction equals 1, the plaintext buffer must be readable and contain a
payload message of size plaintext_length that is encrypted. If direction
equals 0 the plaintext buffer must be writable.

If the authentication verification succeeds, the decrypted message in the most
significant plaintext_length bytes of ciphertext is written to the buffer.
Otherwise the contents of the buffer is undefined.

unsigned long plaintext_length
Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted. It must be equal
or greater than 0 and less than (2**36)-32. With the exception of the call
followed by a call to ica_aes_gcm_last(), the value must be a multiple of
AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Only in the call followed by ica_aes_gcm_last(), the value does
not have to be a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Padding is done automatically.

unsigned char *ciphertext
Pointer to a buffer of a size which is a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE and which
is greater than or equal to plaintext_length bytes.

If direction equals 1, then the buffer must be writable and the encrypted
message from plaintext is written to that buffer. If direction equals 0, then
the buffer is readable and contains an encrypted message of a length which is
equal to the least multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE that is greater than or equal to
plaintext_length.

unsigned char *ucb
Pointer to the usage counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created
during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is updated (increased) during the
intermediate update operations. The length of this counter block is
AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes). It is assumed that with the call to
ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() the contents of the usage counter block was
returned in the ucb parameter of a preceding call to ica_aes_gcm_init() or
ica_aes_gcm_intermediate().

unsigned char *aad
Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to aad_length bytes.
The additional authenticated data in the most significant aad_length bytes is
subject to the authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.

unsigned long aad_length
Length in bytes of the additional authenticated data in aad. It must be equal to
or greater than 0 and less than 2**61, and the following constraints must apply:

- If the aad_length is not a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE or 0, then in all
  subsequent calls to ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() that belong to the same AES
  GCM computation, the aad_length must be 0 which implies that only the
  last aad chunk can have a length that is not a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
- If in a preceding call to ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() belonging to the same
  AES GCM computation, the plaintext_length was greater than 0, then
  aad_length must be 0, which implies that plaintext or ciphertext can only be
  supplied when all additional authenticated data is supplied.
unsigned char *tag
    Contains the temporary hash/tag value.

unsigned int tag_length
    This parameter is currently not used.

unsigned char *key
    Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length
    Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *subkey
    Pointer to a writable buffer, generated in ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last(). The length of this buffer is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned int direction
    0    Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
    1    Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes
0    Success
EIO   If the operation fails.
EFAULT  If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_aes_gcm_last

Purpose
Authenticate data or verify the authenticity of data with an AES key using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D. ica_aes_gcm_last() must be used to authenticate or verify the authenticity of a message for which all preceding parts were processed with ica_aes_gcm_intermediate().

Format
unsigned int ica_aes_gcm_last(unsigned char *icb,
                           unsigned long aad_length,
                           unsigned long ciph_length,
                           unsigned char *tag,
                           unsigned char *final_tag,
                           unsigned int final_tag_length,
                           unsigned char *key,
                           unsigned int key_length,
                           unsigned char *subkey,
                           unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support
KIMD-GHASH  
KMCTR-AES-128, KMCTR_AES-192 or KMCTR-AES-256  

Parameters

unsigned char *icb

Pointer to the initial counter block, which is a writable buffer that is created during ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and is used in ica_aes_gcm_last() for the final tag computation. The length of this counter block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned long aad_length

Overall length of authentication data, cumulated over all intermediate operations.

unsigned long ciph_length

Length in bytes of the overall ciphertext, cumulated over all intermediate operations.

unsigned char *tag

Contains the temporary hash/tag value computed during preceding ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() calls.

unsigned char *final_tag

Pointer to a readable buffer of size greater than or equal to final_tag_length bytes. If direction is 1, the buffer is not used. If direction is 0, this message authentication code (tag) is verified with the message authentication code computed over the intermediate update operations.

unsigned int final_tag_length

Length in bytes of the final message authentication code (tag). Valid values are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

unsigned char *key

Pointer to a valid AES key.

unsigned int key_length

Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the macros: AES_KEY_LEN128, AES_KEY_LEN192, and AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *subkey

Pointer to a writable buffer generated in ica_aes_gcm_initialize() and used in ica_aes_gcm_intermediate() and ica_aes_gcm_last(). The length of this subkey block is AES_BLOCK_SIZE (16 bytes).

unsigned int direction

0 Verify message authentication code and decrypt encrypted payload.
1 Encrypt payload and compute message authentication code for the additional authenticated data and the payload.

Return codes

0 Success
EIO If the operation fails.
EFAULT If direction is equal to 0 and the verification of the message authentication code fails.

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.
ica_aes_ofb

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using Output Feedback (OFB) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A Chapter 6.4.

Format

```
unsigned int ica_aes_ofb(const unsigned char *in_data,
                          unsigned char *out_data,
                          unsigned long data_length,
                          const unsigned char *key,
                          unsigned int key_length,
                          unsigned char *iv,
                          unsigned int direction);
```

Required hardware support

KMO-AES-128, KMO-AES-192, or KMO-AES-256

Parameters

- `const unsigned char *in_data`
  Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is `data_length`. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned char *out_data`
  Pointer to a writable buffer that to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as `data_length`.

- `unsigned long data_length`
  Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of `in_data`.

- `const unsigned char *key`
  Pointer to a valid AES key.

- `unsigned int key_length`
  Length in bytes of the AES key. Supported sizes are 16, 24, and 32 for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use the definitions: `AES_KEY_LEN128`, `AES_KEY_LEN192`, and `AES_KEY_LEN256`.

- `unsigned char *iv`
  Pointer to a valid initialization vector of the same size as the cipher block, in bytes (16 bytes for AES). This vector is overwritten during the function. If `data_length` is a multiple of the cipher block size (16 bytes for AES), the result value in `iv` can be used as the initialization vector for a chained `ica_aes_ofb` call with the same key.

- `unsigned int direction`
  
  0    Use the decrypt function.
  1    Use the encrypt function.

Return codes

0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see the documentation on page 93.
ica_aes_xts

Purpose

Encrypt or decrypt data with an AES key using the XEX Tweakable Bloc Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing (XTS) mode, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-38E and IEEE standard 1619-2007.

Format

unsigned int ica_aes_xts(const unsigned char *in_data,
    unsigned char *out_data,
    unsigned long data_length,
    const unsigned char *key1,
    const unsigned char *key2,
    unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *tweak,
    unsigned int direction);

Required hardware support

KM-XTS-AES-128, or KM-XTS-AES-256
PCC-Compute-XTS-Parameter-Using-AES-128, or PCC-Compute-XTS-Parameter-Using-AES-256

Parameters

const unsigned char *in_data
    Pointer to a readable buffer that contains the message to be encrypted or decrypted. The size of the message in bytes is data_length. The size of this buffer must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned char *out_data
    Pointer to a writable buffer to contain the resulting encrypted or decrypted message. The size of this buffer in bytes must be at least as large as data_length.

unsigned long data_length
    Length in bytes of the message to be encrypted or decrypted, which resides at the beginning of in_data. The minimal value of data_length is 16.

const unsigned char *key1
    Pointer to a buffer containing a valid AES key. key1 is used for the actual encryption of the message buffer, combined with some vector computed from the tweak value (Key1 in IEEE Std 1619-2007).

const unsigned char *key2
    Pointer to a buffer containing a valid AES key key2 is used to encrypt the tweak (Key2 in IEEE Std 1619-2007).

unsigned int key_length
    The length in bytes of the AES key. XTS supported AES key sizes are 16 and 32, for AES-128 and AES-256 respectively. Therefore, you can use:

2 * AES_KEY_LEN128 and 2 * AES_KEY_LEN256.

unsigned char *tweak
    Pointer to a valid 16-byte tweak value (as in IEEE standard 1619-2007). This tweak is overwritten during the function. If data_length is a multiple of the cipher block size (a multiple of 16 for AES), the result value in tweak can be used as the tweak value for a chained ica_aes_xts call with the same key pair.

unsigned int direction
    0    Use the decrypt function.
    1    Use the encrypt function.
Return codes
0 Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

Compatibility with earlier versions
In order to stay compatible with earlier versions of libica, the following AES interfaces remain supported:

unsigned int ica_aes_encrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_aes_vector_t *iv, unsigned int key_length, unsigned char *aes_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

unsigned int ica_aes_decrypt(unsigned int mode,
unsigned int data_length, unsigned char *input_data,
ica_aes_vector_t *iv, unsigned int key_length, unsigned char *aes_key,
unsigned char *output_data);

Table 5 shows libica version 2.0 AES functions calls, and their corresponding libica version 2.4 AES function calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling this libica version 2.0 AES function</th>
<th>Corresponds to calling this libica version 2.4 AES function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ica_aes_encrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key_length,key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_aes_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_aes_encrypt(MODE_CBC, data_length,in_data,iv, key_length,key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_des_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,iv,1);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_aes_decrypt(MODE_ECB, data_length,in_data,NULL, key_length,key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_aes_ecb(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,0);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ica_aes_decrypt(MODE_CBC, data_length,in_data,iv, key_length,key,out_data);</td>
<td>ica_aes_cbc(in_data,out_data,(long)data_length, key,key_length,iv,0);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The functions ica_aes_encrypt and ica_aes_decrypt remain supported, but their use is discouraged in favor of ica_aes_ecb and ica_aes_cbc.

For a detailed description of the earlier APIs, see libica Programmers Reference version 2.0.

Information retrieval functions
These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.

ica_get_version

Purpose
Return libica version information.

Format
unsigned int ica_get_version(libica_version_info *version_info);
Parameters

libica_version_info *version_info

Pointer to a libica_version_info structure. The structure is filled with the current libica version information.

Return codes

0    Success

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

ica_get_functionlist

Purpose

Returns a list of crypto mechanisms supported by libica.

Format

unsigned int ica_get_functionlist(libica_func_list_element *mech_list,
unsigned int *mech_list_len);

Parameters

libica_func_list_element *mech_list

Null or pointer to an array of at least as many libica_func_list_element structures as denoted in the *mech_list_len argument. If the value in the *mech_list_len argument is equal to or greater than the number of mechanisms available in libica then the libica_func_list_element structures in *mech_list are filled (in the order of the array indices) with information for the supported otherwise the *mech_list argument remains unchanged.

unsigned int *mech_list_len

Pointer to an integer which contain the actual number of array elements (number of structures). If *mech_list was NULL the contents of *mech_list_len will be replaced by the number of mechanisms available in libica.

Return codes

0    Success
EINV   The value in *mech_list is to small

For return codes indicating exceptions, see "Return codes" on page 93.

Recommended usage

First call ica_get_functionlist with a NULL mechanism list, then allocate the mechanism list according to number of mechanisms in libica returned by that function, and then call ica_get_functionlist with the allocated mechanism list.

FIPS mode functions

These functions are included in: include/ica_api.h.
ica_fips_status

**Purpose**

Queries and returns a FIPS status that indicates, which self-tests were passed or failed, and whether libica is running in FIPS mode.

The output is an integer, which is interpreted as a series of 32 bits, where each bit is a flag. Each flag, if set, corresponds to one of the defined constants as described in “FIPS mode constants” on page 89. Each constant, in return indicates either a status, or whether a certain test has passed (flag or constant is not set) or failed (flag or constant is set).

For example, look at the following returned integer as a bitmap, where only the 12 rightmost bits are considered:

```
... 0001 0000 1000
```

```
\[2^8=256\quad 2^{^3}=8\]
```

In this example, we see that bits with values 8 and 256 are set, which means, that ICA_FIPS_CRITICALFUNC 8 and ICA_FIPS_BYPASS 256 are set. This in turn means, that the Critical functions test and the Bypass test failed.

**Format**

```
int ica_fips_status(void);
```

**Return codes**

```
0   Success
```

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.

ica_fips_powerup_tests

**Purpose**

Triggers the implemented self-tests. Use the `int ica_fips_status(void);` function to see which tests passed or failed (see “ica_fips_status”).

**Format**

```
void ica_fips_powerup_tests(void);
```

**Return codes**

```
0   Success
```

For return codes indicating exceptions, see “Return codes” on page 93.
Chapter 4. Accessing libica functions through the PKCS #11 API (openCryptoki)

Learn how the cryptographic functions provided by libica can be accessed using the PKCS #11 API implemented by openCryptoki.

For a description of the current PKCS #11 standard, see PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

openCryptoki overview

openCryptoki consists of an implementation of the PKCS #11 API, a slot manager, an API for slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs), and a set of STDLLs (or tokens). The libica token is such a STDLL introduced into openCryptoki.

The openCryptoki base library (libopencryptoki.so) supports the generic PKCS #11 API as outlined in the PKCS #11 specification. Currently, openCryptoki 3.6 conforms to PKCS #11 version 2.40. openCryptoki also loads token-specific modules (STDLLs) that provide the token specific implementation of the PKCS #11 API and cryptographic functions (for example, session management, object management, and crypto algorithms). So, openCryptoki 3.6 conforming to PKCS #11 2.40 requires libica version 2.5 or later. The current libica version 3.0 can be used with openCryptoki 3.4, 3.5 or later versions.

A global configuration file (/etc/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf) is provided which describes the available tokens. This configuration file can be customized for the individual tokens. The openCryptoki package contains man pages that describe the format of the configuration files. For more information, see "Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file" on page 79.

The libica token is a plug-in into the openCryptoki token library, providing support for several cryptographic algorithms.

Slot manager

The slot manager (pkcssltd) runs as a daemon. Upon start-up, it creates a shared memory segment and reads the openCryptoki configuration file to acquire the available token and slot information. The openCryptoki API attaches to this memory segment to retrieve token information. Thus, the slot manager provides the openCryptoki API with the token information when required. An application in turn links to or loads the openCryptoki API.

Slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs)

The libica token is an example of an STDLL within openCryptoki. STDLLs are plug-in modules to the openCryptoki (main) API. They provide token-specific functions that implement the interfaces. Specific devices can be supported by building an appropriate STDLL. Figure 1 on page 77 illustrates the stack and the process flow in a z Systems environment.

The STDLLs require local disk space to store persistent data, such as token information, personal identification numbers (PINs) and token objects. This information is stored in a separate directory for each token (for example in
For each directory there is a sub-directory (10k 08) that contains the token objects (token key store). Each private token object is represented by an encrypted file. Most of these directories are created during installation of openCryptoki.

Figure 1 on page 77 illustrates the stack and the process flow.
Figure 1. Stack and process flow
Functions provided by openCryptoki with the ICA token

The PKCS #11 functions that manage tokens, slots, and sessions are described in the PKCS #11 standard.

For an overview of the algorithms supported by the ica token, see “Supported mechanisms for the ICA token” on page 84.

The PKCS #11 standard describes the exact API for the mentioned mechanisms. For more information, see PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

For more details about how to use openCryptoki, see “Using the ICA token” on page 84.

Installing openCryptoki

openCryptoki is shipped with the Linux on z Systems distributions. Follow the instructions in this section to install openCryptoki.

Check whether you have already installed openCryptoki in your current environment:

$ rpm -qa | grep -i opencryptoki

Note: This command example is distribution dependent. opencryptoki must in certain distribution be specified as openCryptoki (case-sensitive).

You should see all installed openCryptoki packages. If required packages are missing, use the installation tool of your Linux distribution to install the appropriate openCryptoki RPM.

Note: You must remove any previous package of openCryptoki before you install a new package.

Installing from the RPM

The current distributions already provide the openCryptoki binary RPMs.

Customers can install these openCryptoki RPM packages by using the installation tool of their selected distribution.

If you received openCryptoki as an RPM package, follow the RPM installation process that is described in the RPM man page. This process is the preferred installation method.

Installing from the source package

If you prefer, you can install openCryptoki from the source package.

As an alternative, for example for development purposes, you can get the latest openCryptoki version (inclusive latest patches) from the SourceForge repository (sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki) and build it yourself. But this version is not serviced. It is suitable for non-production systems and early feature testing, but you should not use it for production.

1. Download the latest version of the openCryptoki sources from:

   http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki/files/opencryptoki/
2. Decompress and extract the compressed tape archive (TGZ file). There is a new directory named opencryptoki.
3. Change to that directory and issue the following scripts and commands:

```
$ ./bootstrap
$ ./configure
$ make
$ make install
```

The scripts or commands perform the following functions:

- **bootstrap**: Initial setup, basic configurations
- **configure**: Check configurations and build the makefile
- **make**: Compile and link
- **make install**: Install the libraries

**Note:** When installing openCryptoki from the source package, the location of some installed files will differ from the location of files installed from an RPM.

---

**Configuring openCryptoki**

After a successful installation of openCryptoki, you need to perform certain configuration and customization tasks to enable the exploitation of the libica functions from applications. Especially, you need to set up tokens and daemons and then initialize the tokens.

openCryptoki, and in particular the slot manager, can handle several tokens, which can have different support for different hardware devices or software solutions. As shown in Figure 1 on page 77, libica interacts with the libica library host part. libica can operate with all Crypto Express adapters in accelerator or coprocessor mode, up to CEX5S (CEX5A and CEX5C), for asymmetric cryptographic functions. Furthermore, it can operate with CPACF for symmetric cryptographic functions.

For a complete configuration of openCryptoki, finish the tasks as described in the contained subtopics:

- "Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file"
- "Configuring the ICA token" on page 82
- "Initializing the ICA token" on page 82
- "How to recognize the ICA token" on page 83

Finally, to control your configuration results, follow the instructions provided in "How to recognize the ICA token" on page 83.

**Adjusting the openCryptoki configuration file**

A preconfigured list of all available tokens that are ready to register to the openCryptoki slot daemon is required before the openCryptoki daemon can start. This list is provided by the global configuration file. Read this topic for information on how to adapt this file according to your installation.
Table 6 provides an overview of supported libraries (tokens) that may be in place after you have successfully installed openCryptoki. The list may vary for different distributions and is dependent from the installed RPM packages.

Also, Linux on z Systems does not support the TPM token library.

A token is only available, if the token library is installed, and the appropriate software and hardware support pertaining to the stack of the token is also installed.

A token needs not be available, even if the corresponding token library is installed. Display the list of available tokens by using the command:

```
$ pkcsconf -t
```

### Table 6. openCryptoki libraries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so</td>
<td>openCryptoki base library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ica.so</td>
<td>ICA token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_sw.so</td>
<td>software token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.so</td>
<td>TPM token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_cca.so</td>
<td>CCA token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ep11.so</td>
<td>EP11 token library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_icsf.so</td>
<td>ICSF token library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** An analogous set of libraries is available for 32 bit compatibility mode.

Sample configuration file:
--- content of opencryptoki.conf ---

version opencryptoki-3.4

# The following defaults are defined:
#   hwversion = 0.0
#   firmwareversion = 0.0
#   description = Linux
#   manufacturer = IBM
#
# The slot definitions below may be overridden and/or customized.
# For example:
# slot 0
#   { stdll = libpkcs11_cca.so
description = "OCK CCA Token"
#   manufacturer = "MyCompany Inc."
#   hwversion = 2.32
#   firmwareversion = 1.0
# }
#
# See man(5) opencryptoki.conf for further information.
# slot 0
# { stdll = libpkcs11_tpm.so
#
# slot 1
# { stdll = libpkcs11_ica.so
description = "ICA Token"
#   manufacturer = "IBM"
#   hwversion = 1.0
#   firmwareversion = 1.0
# }

# slot 2
# { stdll = libpkcs11_cca.so
#
# slot 3
# { stdll = libpkcs11_sw.so
#
# slot 4
# { stdll = libpkcs11_ep11.so
#   confname = ep11tok.conf
#

------------------------------------------------------------------------
end
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note:

- The standard path for slot token dynamic link libraries (STDLLs) is:
  /usr/lib64/opencryptoki/stdll/.

Use one of the following commands to start the slot-daemon, which reads out the
configuration information and sets up the tokens:

$ pkcs11sdstart
$ service pkcs11sdstart
$ systemctl start pkcs11sdstart.service

For a permanent solution, for example, for an automatic start-up of the
slot-daemon, refer to the distribution documentation.
Configuring the ICA token

You need to connect the libica library to the ICA token. For this purpose, you should check the slot entry definition in the openCryptoki configuration file.

Each token has its own token directory, which is used by openCryptoki to store token-specific information (like for example, key objects, user PIN, or SO PIN). The ICA token directory is `/var/lib/opencryptoki/lite/`.

Note: This configuration is token-based. It applies to all applications that use this ICA token.

Defining the slot entry for the ICA token in openCryptoki

Normally, the default openCryptoki configuration file `opencryptoki.conf` already provides a slot entry for the ICA token. It is preconfigured to slot #1. Check this default entry to find out whether you can use it as is. If it is missing, then define a slot entry that sets the `stdll` attribute to `libpkcs11_ica.so`.

Initializing the ICA token

Once the configuration files of openCryptoki and the ICA token are set up, and the `pkcsslotd` daemon is started, the ICA token must be initialized.

Note: PKCS #11 defines two users for each token: a security officer (SO) whose responsibility is the administration of the token, and a standard user (User) who wants to use the token to perform cryptographic operations. openCryptoki requires that for both the SO and the User a log-in PIN is defined as part of the token initialization.

The following command provides some useful slot information:

```
# pkcsconf -s
Slot #0 Info
   Description: EP11 Token
   Manufacturer: IBM
   Flags: 0x1 (TOKEN_PRESENT)
   Hardware Version: 1.2
   Firmware Version: 1.0

Slot #1 Info
   Description: ICA Token
   Manufacturer: IBM
   Flags: 0x1 (TOKEN_PRESENT)
   Hardware Version: 2.32
   Firmware Version: 1.0
```

Find your preferred token in the details list and select the correct slot number. This number is used in the next initialization steps to identify your token:

```
$ pkcsconf -I -c <slot> // Initialize the Token and setup a Token Label
$ pkcsconf -P -c <slot> // change the SO PIN (recommended)
$ pkcsconf -u -c <slot> // Initialize the User PIN (SO PIN required)
$ pkcsconf -p -c <slot> // change the User PIN (optional)
```
pkcsconf -I
During token initialization, you are asked for a token label. Provide a meaningful name, because you might need this reference for identification purposes.

pkcsconf -P
For security reasons, openCryptoki requires that you change the default SO PIN (87654321) to a different value. Use the pkcsconf -P option to change the SO PIN.

pkcsconf -u
When you enter the user PIN initialization you are asked for the newly set SO PIN. The length of the user PIN must be 4 - 8 characters.

pkcsconf -p
You must at least once change the user PIN with pkcsconf -p option. After you completed the PIN setup, the token is prepared and ready for use.

Note: An initialization (pkcsconf -u option) with 12345678 will work without any issues. However, this is not recommended, because this pattern is checked internally and marked as default PIN. Therefore, change to a user PIN that is different from 12345678.

How to recognize the ICA token
You can use the pkcsconf -t command to display a table that shows all available tokens. You can check the slot and token information, and the PIN status at any time.

The following information provided by the pkcsconf -t command about the ICA token is returned in the Token Info section, where, for example, Token #1 Info displays information about the token plugged into slot number 1.

```
$ pkcsconf -t
Token #0 Info:
  Label: IBM ICA PKCS #11
  Manufacturer: IBM Corp.
  Model: IBM ICA
  Serial Number: 123
  Flags: 0x880045 (RNG|LOGIN_REQUIRED|CLOCK_ON_TOKEN|USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED|SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED)
  Sessions: 0/18446744073709551614
  R/W Sessions: 18446744073709551615/18446744073709551614
  PIN Length: 4-8
  Public Memory: 0xffffffffffffff/0xffffffffffffff
  Private Memory: 0xffffffffffffff/0xffffffffffffff
  Hardware Version: 1.0
  Firmware Version: 1.0
  Time: 14:48:30

Figure 2. Token info before initialization
```

The most important information is as follows:

- The token **Label** you assigned at the initialization phase (IBM ICA PKCS #11, in the example). You can initialize or change a token label by using the pkcsconf -I command. In the output from Figure 3 on page 84 you see the label changed to icatest.
- The **Model** name is unique and designates the token that is in use.
- The **Flags** provide information about the token initialization status, the PIN status, and features such as Random Number Generator (RNG). They also
provide information about requirements, such as Login required, which means that there is at least one mechanism that requires a session log-in to use that cryptographic function.

The flag USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED indicates that the user PIN must be changed before the token can be used. The flag SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED indicates that the SO PIN must be changed before administration commands can be used.

For more information about the flags provided in this output, see the description of the TOKEN_INFO structure and the Token Information Flags in the PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard.

- The PIN length range declared for this token.

![Token #0 Info:](image)

Figure 2 on page 83 shows the information for an uninitialized token, and Figure 3 shows the information for an initialized one.

### Using the ICA token

Applications that are designed to work with openCryptoki can take advantage of the libica library functions by using the openCryptoki standard interface (PKCS #11 standard C API).

Applications that are designed to work with openCryptoki are also able to use the functions provided by the ICA token.

For a list of code samples, refer to “openCryptoki code samples” on page 154.

### Supported mechanisms for the ICA token

View a list of the supported mechanisms for the ICA token in the openCryptoki implementation.

Use the following command to retrieve a complete list of algorithms (or mechanisms) that are supported by the token:
The list displays all mechanisms supported by this token. The mechanism ID and name corresponds to the PKCS #11 specification. Each mechanism provides its supported key size and some further properties such as hardware support and mechanism information flags. These flags provide information about the PKCS #11 functions that may use the mechanism. Typical functions are for example, encrypt, decrypt, wrap key, unwrap key, sign, or verify.

Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_X_509</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_OFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CFB8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4. Accessing libica through openCryptoki 85
Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_HMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_OFB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_MAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_KEY_GEN</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_ECB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB64</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CFB128</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Supported mechanism list for the ica token (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>ica token</th>
<th>supported with openCryptoki version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CBC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CBC_PAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_CTR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_AES_GCM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5. libica constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes

Use these constants, type definitions, data structures, and return codes when you program with the libica APIs.

The APIs are described in Chapter 3, “libica version 3.0 application programming interfaces,” on page 9. To use them, include ica_api.h in your programs.

libica constants

The constants listed in this topic are provided and valid for the current libica version.

Use these constants instead of the equivalent libica version 1 constants. There is no difference in their values.

#define ICA_ENCRYPT 1
#define ICA_DECRYPT 0
#define ICA_DRBG_NEW_STATE_HANDLE NULL

FIPS mode constants

/* 'FIPS mode active'-flag */
#define ICA_FIPS_MODE 1

Powerup-test-failed flags

/* Cryptographic algorithm test (KAT or pair-wise consistency test) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CRYPTOALG 2

/* Critical functions test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CRITICALFUNC 8

Conditional-test-failed flags

/* Pair-wise consistency test for public & private keys (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_CONSISTENCY 16

/* Software/Firmware load test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_LOAD 32

/* Manual key entry test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_KEYENTRY 64

/* Continuous random number generator test */
#define ICA_FIPS_RNG 128

/* Bypass test (N/A) */
#define ICA_FIPS_BYPASS 256
**Type definitions**

These type definitions are available to ensure compatibility with libica version 1 types.

```c
typedef ica_des_vector_t ICA_DES_VECTOR;
typedef ica_des_key_single_t ICA_KEY_DES_SINGLE;
typedef ica_des_key_triple_t ICA_KEY_DES_TRIPLE;
typedef ica_aes_vector_t ICA_AES_VECTOR;
typedef ica_aes_key_single_t ICA_KEY_AES_SINGLE;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_128_t ICA_KEY_AES_LEN128;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_192_t ICA_KEY_AES_LEN192;
typedef ica_aes_key_len_256_t ICA_KEY_AES_LEN256;
typedef sha_context_t SHA_CONTEXT;
typedef sha256_context_t SHA256_CONTEXT;
typedef sha512_context_t SHA512_CONTEXT;
typedef unsigned char ica_des_vector_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_des_key_single_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_vector_t[16];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_single_t[8];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_128_t[16];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_192_t[24];
typedef unsigned char ica_aes_key_len_256_t[32];
typedef struct ica_drbg_mech ica_drbg_mech_t;
typedef struct ica_drbg ica_drbg_t;
```

**Data structures**

These structures are used in the API of the current libica version.

For the definitions of older functions, see previous versions of this book. The older functions are no longer recommended for use, but they are supported.

```c
typedef struct {
  unsigned int key_length;
  unsigned char* modulus;
  unsigned char* exponent;
} ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t;

typedef struct {
  unsigned int key_length;
  unsigned char* p;
  unsigned char* q;
  unsigned char* dp;
  unsigned char* dq;
  unsigned char* qInverse;
} ica_rsa_key_crt_t;

typedef struct {
  unsigned int mech_mode_id;
  unsigned int flags;
  unsigned int property;
} libica_func_list_element;
```

* mech_mode_id: Unique mechanism ID for each mechanism implemented in libica
For more details regarding these mechanisms, refer to the openCryptoki version 2.20 specification.

* flags
  This flag represents the type of hardware/software support for each mechanism.

#define ICA_FLAG_SHW 4
  Static hardware support (operations on CPACF). Hardware support will be available unless a hardware error occurs.

#define ICA_FLAG_DHW 2
  Dynamic hardware support (operations on crypto cards). Hardware support will be available unless the hardware is reconfigured.

#define ICA_FLAG_SW 1
  Software support. If both static and dynamic hardware support as well as software support are available, then software support is used as fall back if hardware support fails.

* property
  This property field is optional depending on the mechanism. It is used to declare mechanism specific parameters, such as key sizes for RSA and AES.

For RSA mechanisms:
- **bit 0**  
  512 bit key size support  
- **bit 1**  
  1024 bit key size support  
- **bit 2**  
  2048 bit key size support  
- **bit 3**  
  4096 bit key size support

For AES mechanisms:

- **bit 0**  
  128 bit key size support  
- **bit 1**  
  192 bit key size support  
- **bit 2**  
  256 bit key size support

For all non-RSA/AES mechanisms this field is empty.

Take note of these considerations:

- The buffers pointed to by members of type `unsigned char *` must be manually allocated and deallocated by the user.
- Key parts must always be right-aligned in their fields.
- All buffers pointed to by members `modulus` and `exponent` in struct `ica_rsa_key_modexpo_t` must be of length `key_length`.
- All buffers pointed to by members `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, and `qInverse` in struct `ica_rsa_key_crt_t` must be of size `key_length` / 2 or larger.
- In the struct `ica_rsa_key_crt_t`, the buffers `p`, `dp`, and `qInverse` must contain 8 bytes of zero padding in front of the actual values.
- If an exponent is set in struct `ica_rsa_key_modexpo_t` as part of a public key for key generation, be aware that due to a restriction in OpenSSL, the public exponent cannot be larger than a size of unsigned long. Therefore, you must have zeros left-padded in the buffer pointed to by `exponent` in the struct `ica_rsa_key_modexpo_t` struct. Be aware that this buffer also must be of size `key_length`.
- This `key_length` value should be calculated from the length of the modulus in bits, according to this calculation:

  ```plaintext
  key_length = (modulus_bits + 7) / 8
  ```

```c
typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char shaHash[LENGTH_SHA_HASH];
} sha_context_t;
```

```c
typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLength;
    unsigned char sha256Hash[LENGTH_SHA256_HASH];
} sha256_context_t;
```

```c
typedef struct {
    uint64_t runningLengthHigh;
    uint64_t runningLengthLow;
    unsigned char sha512Hash[LENGTH_SHA512_HASH];
} sha512_context_t;
```
typedef struct {
    unsigned int major_version;
    unsigned int minor_version;
    unsigned int fixpack_version;
} libica_version_info;

## Return codes

The current libica functions use the standard Linux return codes listed in this topic.

0   Success
EFAULT  The message authentication failed.
EINVAL  Incorrect parameter
EIO    I/O error
EPERM  Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).
ENODEV No such device
ENOMEM  Not enough memory
errno  When libica calls open, close, begin_sigill_section, or OpenSSL function RSA_generate_key_ex(), the error codes of these programs are returned.
Chapter 6. libica tools

The libica package includes tools to investigate the capabilities of your cryptographic hardware and how these capabilities are used by applications that use libica.

icainfo - Show available libica functions

Use the icainfo command to find out which libica functions are available on your Linux system.

The icainfo output also indicates, whether the libica library has built-in FIPS support, whether it is running in FIPS mode, and whether it is in an error state. Algorithms that are not FIPS approved are marked as blocked in both table columns when running in FIPS mode. All algorithms are marked as blocked when libica is in an error state.

Format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>icainfo syntax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>icainfo -v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>icainfo -h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where:

- **v or --version**
  - Displays the version number of icainfo, then exits.
- **h or --help**
  - Displays help information for the command.

Examples

To obtain an overview of the supported algorithms with modes of operations and how they are implemented on your Linux system (hardware, software, or both), enter:

```bash
# icainfo
```

View the output produced by this command. A no in column software indicates, that no software fallback for this function is implemented in libica.

The following CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF) operations are supported by libica on this system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cryptographic algorithm support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_RNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRBG-SHA-512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA CRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES CBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES OFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES CFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES CTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES CMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES CBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES OFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES CFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES CTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DES CMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES CBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES OFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES CFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES CTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES CMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES XTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Built-in FIPS support: FIPS mode active.

**ICASTATS - Show use of libica functions**

Use the **ICASTATS** utility to find out whether libica uses hardware acceleration features or works with software fallbacks. **ICASTATS** collects the statistical data per user and not per system.

The command also shows which specific functions of libica are used. For a standard user, **ICASTATS** shows a statistics table with all crypto operations that are used by the user’s processes. For the root user, **ICASTATS** provides statistics for all users, or processes, on the system.

The shared memory segment that holds the statistic data is created when a user starts **ICASTATS** or when a program is started, that performs cryptographic operations using libica. Once the shared memory segment exists, it can only be removed by one of the delete options (**-d** or **-D**) provided with the **ICASTATS** utility. Thus, this function collects crypto statistics independently from the process context for continuing availability of data. All cryptographic operations using libica are counted into the statistics.

**Note:** Before deleting the shared memory segment, ensure that there are no running applications that are using this memory segment.
Format

ICASTATS SYNTAX

-i castats

-A or --all
Shows the statistic tables from all users (for root users only).

-d or --delete
Removes the user specific shared memory segment.

-D or --delete-all
Removes all shared memory segments (for root users only).

-r or --reset
Resets the user statistic data table.

-R or --reset-all
Resets all statistic data tables from all users (for root users only).

-S or --summary
Shows accumulated statistics from all users (for root users only).

-U <username> or --user <username>
Shows statistic data for a dedicated user (for root users only).

-h or --help
Displays help information for the command.

-v or --version
Displays the version number ofICASTATS, then exits.

Examples

To display the current use of libica functions issue:

# ICASTATS

View an excerpt of a sample output produced by this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>function</th>
<th># hardware</th>
<th># software</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENC  CRYPT DEC</td>
<td>ENC  CRYPT DEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-224</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Logging and error handling

Access failures to the shared memory segments that are used by the icas\_stats utility, are logged once via the syslog interface. After a failed attempt to access the shared memory segment, the library no longer collects any statistic data for this application (related to application lifetime and user).

**Example** of syslog message:
<date> <machine> <application>: failed to create or access shared memory segment.

The icas\_stats utility prints an error messages if it cannot create, access, or remove the shared memory segment.

**Note:** The log message may indicate a permission problem with the shared memory segment. An administrator can remove the defect memory segment. The next call of icas\_stats should create a new memory segment automatically.
Chapter 7. Examples

These sample program segments illustrate the use of the libica APIs.

These examples are released under the Common Public License - V1.0, which is stated in full at the end of this chapter. See “Common Public License - V1.0” on page 165.

In the extracted source package, you also find test cases for all APIs in directory .../src/tests/. You can have the source of these test cases compiled using the --enable-testcases option with the configure command as described in “Installing libica version 3.0 from the source package” on page 5.

View a list of examples for libica, and the makefile used to create the library.

- “SHA-256 example”
- “Pseudo random number generation example” on page 101
- “Key generation example” on page 102
- “RSA example” on page 109
- “AES with CFB mode example” on page 112
- “AES with CTR mode example” on page 125
- “AES with OFB mode example” on page 134
- “AES with XTS mode example” on page 142
- “CMAC example” on page 150
- “openCryptoki code samples” on page 154
- “Makefile example” on page 164
- “Common Public License - V1.0” on page 165

### SHA-256 example

```c
/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with */
/* this program. */
/* * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016 */
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include <ica_api.h>

/* The name of the file to calcualte the SHA256 hash from */
#define FILE_NAME  "example_sha256.c"

/* Size of the chunks in which the file is read. */
/* Must be a multiple of 64 bytes. */
#define CHUNK_SIZE  1024

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
```

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2009, 2016
print a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;
    /* This is the buffer where the SHA256 hash is generated into.
    * For SHA256, it needs to be 32 bytes in size (SHA256_HASH_LENGTH).
    */
    unsigned char sha_result[SHA256_HASH_LENGTH];
    /* The file will be read in several chunks into this buffer.
    * The chunks will be the input to the ica_sha256 function which
    * we call for each chunk.
    */
    unsigned char sha_input[CHUNK_SIZE];
    /* This is the SHA 256 context. It stores intermediate values
    * needed when chaining multiple chunks (as we do).
    */
    sha256_context_t context;
    /* Open the file in binary mode and read its content in chunks */
    FILE *f;
    f = fopen(FILE_NAME, "rb");
    if (f == NULL)
        return handle_ica_error(errno);
    int len;
    unsigned long total_size = 0;
    while (!feof(f)) {
        /* read a chunk of data */
        len = fread(sha_input, 1, CHUNK_SIZE, f);
        if (total_size == 0) {
            /* this is the first chunk */
            rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_FIRST,
                            len, sha_input,
                            &context,
                            sha_result);
        } else if (!feof(f)) {
            /* add this chunk to the hash */
            rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_MIDDLE,
                            len, sha_input,
                            &context,
                            sha_result);
        } else {
            /* this is the last chunk */
            rc = ica_sha256(SHA_MSG_PART_FINAL,
                            len, sha_input,
                            &context,
                            sha_result);
        }
        total_size += len;
        if (rc)
            break;
    }
    /* close the file */
    fclose(f);
/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
  return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump the generated hash to standard output, just for
* a visual control.
* 
* Note: You can verify the displayed hash using command
* 'sha256sum example_sha256.c'
*/
printf("SHA256 hash of file '%s' (%u bytes):
", FILE_NAME, total_size);
dump_data(sha_result, sizeof(sha_result));
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
  unsigned char *ptr;
  int i;
  for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
    printf("0x%02x", *ptr);
    if ((i % 16) == 0)
      printf("\n");
  }
  if (i % 16)
    printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
  switch (rc) {
  case 0:
    printf("OK\n");
    break;
  case EINVAL:
    printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
    break;
  case EPERM:
    printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
    break;
  case EIO:
    printf("I/O error.\n");
    break;
  default:
    printf("unknown error.\n");
    break;
  }
  return rc;
}

Pseudo random number generation example

This example uses the libica version 1 API. Examples for using the libica version
2.4 API for random number generation are located in other examples, such as the
DES with CTR mode example.

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * with this program.
 */

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

unsigned char R[512];

extern int errno;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x",(unsigned char) *h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

int main(int ac, char **av)
{
    int rc;
    ICA_ADAPTER_HANDLE adapter_handle;

    rc = icaOpenAdapter(0, &adapter_handle);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaOpenAdapter failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    }

    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, sizeof R, R);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    } else {
        printf("\nHere it is:\n");
    }

dump_array(R, sizeof R);

    if (!rc) {
        printf("\nWell, does it look random?\n\n");
    }

    icaCloseAdapter(adapter_handle);

    return 0;
}
```

**Key generation example**

This example uses the various key generation APIs, as well as those to open and close an adapter, and random number generation.
/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
* with this program.
*/

/ (C) COPYRIGHT International Business Machines Corp. 2001, 2009 */
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <memory.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define KEY_BYTES ((key_bits + 7) / 8)
#define KEY_BYTES_MAX 256

extern int errno;

void dump_array(char *ptr, int size)
{
    char *ptr_end;
    char *h;
    int i = 1;
    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", (unsigned char) *h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    ICA_ADAPTER_HANDLE adapter_handle;
    ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT crtkey;
    ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO wockey, wockey2;
    unsigned char decrypted[KEY_BYTES_MAX], encrypted[KEY_BYTES_MAX],
                        original[KEY_BYTES_MAX];
    int rc;
    unsigned int length, length2;
    unsigned int exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED, key_bits = 1024;

    length = sizeof wockey;
    length2 = sizeof wockey2;
    bzero(&wockey, sizeof wockey);
    bzero(&wockey2, sizeof wockey2);

    rc = icaOpenAdapter(0, &adapter_handle);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaOpenAdapter failed and returned %d (0x%lx).\n", rc,
                rc);
    }
    exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED;
    printf("a fixed exponent . . .\n");
    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES,
                                wockey.keyRecord);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return -1;
}
wockey.nLength = KEY_BYTES / 2;
wockey.expLength = sizeof(unsigned long);
wockey.expOffset = SZ_HEADER_MODEXPO;
wockey.keyRecord[wockey.expLength - 1] |= 1;
if (argc > 1) {
    key_bits = atoi(argv[1]);
    if (key_bits > KEY_BYTES_MAX * 8) {
        printf("The maximum key length is %d bits.\n", KEY_BYTES_MAX * 8);
        exit(0);
    }
    wockey.modulusBitLength = key_bits;
    printf("Using %u-bit keys and \n", key_bits);
    if (argc > 2) {
        switch (argv[2][0]) {
        case '3':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_3;
            printf("exponent 3 . . .\n");
            wockey.expLength = 1;
            break;
        case '6':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_65537;
            printf("exponent 65537 . . .\n");
            wockey.expLength = 3;
            break;
        case 'R':
        case 'r':
            exponent_type = RSA_PUBLIC_RANDOM;
            printf("a random exponent . . .\n");
            break;
        default:
            break;
        }
    }
    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, sizeof(original),
                        original);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
        return rc;
    }
    original[0] = 0;
    rc = icaRsaKeyGenerateModExpo(adapter_handle, key_bits, exponent_type,
                       &length, &wockey, &length2, &wockey2);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRsaKeyGenerateModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char *) wockey.keyRecord, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
    printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char *) wockey2.keyRecord, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
    length = KEY_BYTES;
    printf("encrypt \n");
    rc = icaRsaModExpo(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, original, &wockey,
&length, encrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%lx).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}
bzero(decrypted, KEY.GetBytes);
length = KEY.GetBytes;
printf("decrypt \n");
rc = icaRsaModExpo(adapter_handle, KEY.GetBytes, encrypted, &wockey2,
        &length, decrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x).
", rc,
            rc);
    return rc;
}
printf("Original: \n");
dump_array((char *)original, KEY.GetBytes);
printf("Result of encrypt: \n");
dump_array((char *)encrypted, KEY.GetBytes);
printf("Result of decrypt: \n");
dump_array((char *)decrypted, KEY.GetBytes);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY.GetBytes) != 0) {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext. Failure!\n");
    icaCloseAdapter(adapter_handle);
    return errno ? errno : -1;
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY.GetBytes) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext."
                "That can't be good.\n")
        return -1;
    }
}
fflush(stdout);

length = sizeof wockey;
length2 = sizeof crtkey;
bzero(&wockey, sizeof wockey);
wockey.expLength = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_FIXED) {
    wockey.keyType = KEYTYPE_MODEXPO;
    wockey.keyLength = sizeof wockey;
    wockey.modulusBitLength = key_bits;
    wockey.nLength = KEY.GetBytes;
    wockey.expOffset = SZ_HEADER_MODEXPO;
    wockey.expLength = sizeof (unsigned long);
    wockey.nOffset = KEYgetBytes + wockey.expOffset;
    rc = icaRandomNumberGenerate(adapter_handle, KEY.GetBytes, wockey.keyRecord);
    if (rc != 0) {
        printf("icaRandomNumberGenerate failed and returned %d"
                "(0x%lx).\n", rc, rc);
        return rc;
    }
    wockey.keyRecord[wockey.expLength - 1] |= 1;
}
rc = icaRsaKeyGenerateCrt(adapter_handle, key_bits, exponent_type, 
        &length, &wockey, &length2, &crtkey);
printf("wockey.modulusBitLength = %i, crtkey.modulusBitLength = %i"
        " \n", wockey.modulusBitLength, crtkey.modulusBitLength);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("icaRsaKeyGenerateCrt failed and returned %d (0x%lx)"
            "\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}
printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char *) wockey.keyRecord, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char *) crtkey.keyRecord, 5 * KEY_BYTES / 2 + 24);

bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
rc = icaRSAModExpo(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, original, &wockey, &length, encrypted);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("icaRSAModExpo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);

bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
rc = icaRsaCrt(adapter_handle, KEY_BYTES, encrypted, &crtkey, &length, decrypted);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("icaRsaCrt failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);

printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char *) original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0)
    {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext. Failure!\n");
    icaCloseAdapter(adapter_handle);
    return errno ? errno : -1;
    }
else
    {  
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0)
    {
    printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext. That can't be good.\n");
    return -1;
    }
    }
fflush(stdout);

printf("TEST NEW API - MOD_EXPO\n");
rc = ica_close_adapter(adapter_handle);
printf("ica_close_adapter rc = %i\n", rc);

rc = ica_open_adapter(&adapter_handle);
if (rc)
    printf("Adapter not open\n");
else
    printf("Adapter open\n");

ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t modexpo_public_key;
unsigned char modexpo_public_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_public_n, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char modexpo_public_e[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_public_e, KEY_BYTES);
modexpo_public_key.modulus = modexpo_public_n;
modexpo_public_key.exponent = modexpo_public_e;
modexpo_public_key.key_length = KEY_BYTES;
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_65537)
    *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char *)modexpo_public_key.exponent +
    modexpo_public_key.key_length - sizeof(unsigned long)) = 65537;
if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_3)
    *(unsigned long*)((unsigned char *)modexpo_public_key.exponent +
    modexpo_public_key.key_length - sizeof(unsigned long)) = 3;

ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t modexpo_private_key;
unsigned char modexpo_private_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_private_n, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char modexpo_private_e[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(modexpo_private_e, KEY_BYTES);
modexpo_private_key.modulus = modexpo_private_n;
modexpo_private_key.exponent = modexpo_private_e;
modexpo_private_key.key_length = KEY_BYTES;

rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo(adapter_handle,
    key_bits,
    &modexpo_public_key,
    &modexpo_private_key);
if (rc)
    printf("ica_rsa_key_generate_mod_expo rc = %i\n", rc);

printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char *)(char *)modexpo_public_key.exponent, KEY_BYTES);
dump_array((char *)(char *)modexpo_public_key.modulus, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char *)(char *)modexpo_private_key.exponent, KEY_BYTES);
dump_array((char *)(char *)modexpo_private_key.modulus, KEY_BYTES);

bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("encrypt \n");
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, original, &modexpo_public_key, encrypted);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;

bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
printf("decrypt \n");
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, encrypted, &modexpo_private_key, decrypted);
if (rc != 0)
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%x).\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;

printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char *) original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char *) decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0) {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext. Failure!\n");
    return -1;
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext. That can't be good.\n");
        return -1;
    }
}
fflush(stdout);

printf("TEST NEW API - CRT\n");
ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t public_key;
ica_rsa_key_crt_t private_key;

unsigned char public_n[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(public_n, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char modexpo_private_n[KEY_BYTES];
unsigned char modexpo_private_e[KEY_BYTES];
unsigned char public_e[KEY_BYTES];
bzero(public_e, KEY_BYTES);
public_key.modulus = public_n;
public_key.exponent = public_e;
public_key.key_length = KEY_BYTES;

unsigned char private_p[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_p, KEY_BYTES + 1);
unsigned char private_q[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_q, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char private_dp[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_dp, KEY_BYTES + 1);
unsigned char private_dq[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2)];
bzero(private_dq, KEY_BYTES);
unsigned char private_qInverse[(key_bits + 7) / (8 * 2) + 8];
bzero(private_qInverse, KEY_BYTES + 1);

private_key.p = private_p;
private_key.q = private_q;
private_key.dp = private_dp;
private_key.dq = private_dq;
private_key.qInverse = private_qInverse;
private_key.key_length = (key_bits + 7) / 8;

if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_65537)
    *(unsigned long*)((char*)public_key.exponent +
                   public_key.key_length -
                   sizeof(unsigned long)) = 65537;
    if (exponent_type == RSA_PUBLIC_3)
        *(unsigned long*)((char*)public_key.exponent +
                           public_key.key_length -
                           sizeof(unsigned long)) = 3;

rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(adapter_handle, key_bits, &public_key,
                            &private_key);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("ica_rsa_key_generate_crt failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

printf("Public key:\n");
dump_array((char*)(char*)&public_key, 2 * KEY_BYTES);
printf("Private key:\n");
dump_array((char*)(char*)&private_key, 5 * KEY_BYTES / 2 + 24);

bzero(encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(adapter_handle, original, &public_key, encrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("ica_rsa_mod_expo failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

bzero(decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
length = KEY_BYTES;
rc = ica_rsa_crt(adapter_handle, encrypted, &private_key, decrypted);
if (rc != 0) {
    printf("ica_rsa_crt failed and returned %d (0x%x)\n", rc, rc);
    return rc;
}

printf("Original:\n");
dump_array((char*)original, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of encrypt:\n");
dump_array((char*)encrypted, KEY_BYTES);
printf("Result of decrypt:\n");
dump_array((char*)decrypted, KEY_BYTES);
if (memcmp(original, decrypted, KEY_BYTES) != 0) {
    printf("This does not match the original plaintext."
    "Failure!\n");
} else {
    printf("Success! The key pair checks out.\n");
    if (memcmp(original, encrypted, KEY_BYTES) == 0) {
        printf("But the ciphertext equals the plaintext."
        "That can't be good.\n");
    }
} 
fflush(stdout);
ica_close_adapter(adapter_handle);
return 0;

RSA example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * with this program.
 */
/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
 */
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS 2048
#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS + 7) / 8
#define RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the
 * encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary,
 * that the length of the encrypted data is less or equal
 * to the RSA key length in bytes.
 */
unsigned char message[] = {
    0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
    0x62, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
    0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
    0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00,
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;

    /* This is the RSA public/private key pair. We use libica function
     * ica_rsa_key_generate_crt to generate it.
     */
    ica_rsa_key_mod_expo_t public_key;
    ica_rsa_key_crt_t private_key;
    unsigned char public_modulus[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char public_exponent[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_p[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
    unsigned char private_q[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
unsigned char private_dp[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
unsigned char private_dq[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
unsigned char private_qInverse[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];

unsigned char plain_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];
unsigned char cipher_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];
unsigned char decrypt_data[RSA_DATA_SIZE_BYTES];

/* This is the adapter handle */
ica_adapter_handle_t handle;

/* Open the adapter */
rc = ica_open_adapter(&handle);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);
if (handle == DRIVER_NOT_LOADED)
    return handle_ica_error(-1);

/* Setup the public_key and private_key structures */
public_key.key_length = RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES;
public_key.modulus = public_modulus;
public_key.exponent = public_exponent;
private_key.key_length = RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES;
private_key.p = private_p;
private_key.q = private_q;
private_key.dp = private_dp;
private_key.dq = private_dq;
private_key.qInverse = private_qInverse;

/* Zero the key fields
   Note: If the exponent element in the public key is not set,
   (i.e. all zero) it is randomly generated.*/
memset(public_modulus, 0, sizeof(public_modulus));
memset(public_exponent, 0, sizeof(public_exponent));
memset(private_p, 0, sizeof(private_p));
memset(private_q, 0, sizeof(private_q));
memset(private_dp, 0, sizeof(private_dp));
memset(private_dq, 0, sizeof(private_dq));
memset(private_qInverse, 0, sizeof(private_qInverse));

/* Generate a key for RSA */
rc = ica_rsa_key_generate_crt(handle,
   RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS,
   &public_key, &private_key);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

print("Public modulus:\n");
dump_data(public_modulus, sizeof(public_modulus));
print("Public exponent:\n");
dump_data(public_exponent, sizeof(public_exponent));
print("Private p:\n");
dump_data(private_p, sizeof(private_p));
print("Private q:\n");
dump_data(private_q, sizeof(private_q));
print("Private dp:\n");
dump_data(private_dp, sizeof(private_dp));
print("Private dq:\n");
dump_data(private_dq, sizeof(private_dq));
print("Private qInverse:\n");
dump_data(private_qInverse, sizeof(private_qInverse));

/* Left allign the message data into the plain_data buffer*/
* and pad it to the right with zeros.
* Note: In real life you would perform proper padding of
* the data. In this example we simply left pad the data
* with binary zeros.
*/
memset(plain_data, 0, sizeof(plain_data));
memcpy(plain_data + sizeof(plain_data) - sizeof(message),
        message, sizeof(message));

/* Dump plain data to standard output, just for
* a visual control.
*/
printf("plain data:\n");
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Encrypt the plain data to cipher data, using the public key. */
rc = ica_rsa_mod_expo(handle, plain_data,
                      &public_key, cipher_data);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
printf("encrypted data:\n");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using the private key. */
rc = ica_rsa_crt(handle, cipher_data,
                &private_key, decrypt_data);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
* Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
*/
printf("decrypted data:\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* In our example, the data is right alligned in the buffer, padded with
* zeros to the left. Find first non zero byte which is the start of the
* original data.
* Note: In real life the data would be properly padded and thus would
* have to be unpadded first.
*/
unsigned char *c;
for(c=decrypt_data;
    c<decrypt_data+sizeof(plain_data) && *c==0x00;
     c++)

/* Surprise... :-)
* Note: The following will only work in this example!
*/
printf("%s\n", c);

/* Close the adapter */
rc = ica_close_adapter(handle);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
unsigned char *ptr;
int i;

for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
  printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
  if ((i % 16) == 0)
    printf("\n");
  } if (i % 16)
    printf("\n");

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
  switch (rc) {
    case 0:
      printf("OK\n");
      break;
    case EINVAL:
      printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
      break;
    case EPERM:
      printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
      break;
    case EIO:
      printf("I/O error.\n");
      break;
    case -1:
      printf("Driver not loaded\n");
      break;
    default:
      printf("unknown error.\n");
      break;
  }
  return rc;
}

AES with CFB mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
 * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
 * with this program.
 */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 12
#define NR_RANDOM_TESTS 1000

/* CFB128 data -1- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x80, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E1[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};
unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E1[] = {
    0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E1[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E1[] = {
    0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E1 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -2- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E2[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x08, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E2[] = {
    0x3b, 0x3f, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E2[] = {
    0xc8, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xa9, 0x3f, 0xcd, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xad, 0x9f, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x8b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E2[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0xe8, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E2[] = {
    0xc8, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xa9, 0x3f, 0xcd, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0xad, 0x9f, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x8b,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E2 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB8 data -3- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E3[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x08, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E3[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E3[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x3b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3[] = {
    0x6b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E3[] = {
    0x3b,
unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E3 = 8 / 8;

*sizeof CFB data -4- AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E4[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E4[] = {
  0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
  0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x3b,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E4[] = {
  0xc1,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4[] = {
  0x79,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E4 = 8 / 8;

*sizeof CFB 128 data -5- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E5[] = {
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe, 0x64, 0x52,
  0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
  0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E5[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E5[] = {
  0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2,
  0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5[] = {
  0x79,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E5 = 128 / 8;

*sizeof CFB 128 data -6- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E6[] = {
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe, 0x64, 0x52,
  0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
  0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E6[] = {
  0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2,
  0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E6[] = {
  0xcd, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2,
  0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6[] = {
  0x79,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E6 = 128 / 8;
0x34, 0xc2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc9, 0x9a, 0x41, 0x74,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E6[] = {
  0x67, 0xce, 0x7f, 0x7f, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21,
  0x96, 0x1a, 0x2b, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1d, 0x3d, 0x7a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6[] = {
  0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
  0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E6[] = {
  0x67, 0xce, 0x7f, 0x7f, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21,
  0x96, 0x1a, 0x2b, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1d, 0x3d, 0x7a,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E6 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB 128 data -7- for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E7[] = {
  0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52,
  0x8c, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
  0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E7[] = {
  0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
  0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E7[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E8[] = {
  0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
  0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xcd, 0xa2,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8[] = {
  0xc1,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E8[] = {
  0xa2,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E8 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -9- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E9[] = {
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0xb1, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E9[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E9[] = {
  0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x40, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E9[] = {
  0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_LCFB_E9 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB128 data -10- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E10[] = {
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0xb1, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E10[] = {
  0xdc, 0x7e, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E10[] = {
  0x39, 0xff, 0xed, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x28, 0xb1, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x63, 0x31, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10[] = {
  0xae, 0x2d, 0xa8, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E10[] = {
  0x39, 0xff, 0xed, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x28, 0xb1, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x63, 0x31, 0xe5, 0x40, 0x7b,
};
unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E10 = 128 / 8;

/* CFB8 data -11- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x00, 0x0d,
    0x90, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x72,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
    0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xdc,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11[] = {
    0xc1,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E11[] = {
    0x1f,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E11 = 8 / 8;

/* CFB8 data -12- for AES256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x00, 0x0d,
    0x90, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x72,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xdc,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
    0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x1f,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12[] = {
    0xc1,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E12[] = {
    0x1f,
};

unsigned int NIST_LCFB_E12 = 8 / 8;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
    printf("0x%02x ", (unsigned char *)h);
    h++;
    if (i == 8) {
        printf("\n");
        i = 1;
    } else {
        ++i;
    }
    printf("\n");
}

void dump_cfb_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
                    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                    unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
                    unsigned char *output_data)
{
    printf("IV \n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    printf("Key \n");
    dump_array(key, key_length);
    printf("Input Data\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Output Data\n");
    dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
               unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E1);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E1);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E1);
        break;
    case 2:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E2);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E2);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E2);
        break;
    case 3:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E3);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E3);
        break;
    case 4:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E4);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E4);
        break;
    case 5:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E5);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E5);
        break;
    case 6:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E6);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E6);
        break;
    case 7:
        *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E7);
        *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E7);
        *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E7);
        break;
    }
case 8:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E8);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E8);
  break;

case 9:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E9);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E9);
  break;

case 10:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E10);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E10);
  break;

case 11:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E11);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E11);
  break;

case 12:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CFB_E12);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CFB_E12);
  break;
}

void load_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
                     unsigned char *result,
                     unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *expected_iv,
                     unsigned int iv_length,
                     unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                     unsigned int *lcfb, unsigned int iteration)
{
  switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E1, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E1, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E1, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E1, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E1, key_length);
      *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E1;
      break;
    case 2:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E2, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E2, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E2, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E2, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E2, key_length);
      *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E2;
      break;
    case 3:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E3, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E3, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E3, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E3, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E3, key_length);
      *lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E3;
      break;
    case 4:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E4, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E4, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E4, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E4, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E4, key_length);
      break;
  }
}
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E4;
bbreak;
case 5:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E5, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E5, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E5, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E5, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E5, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E5;
bbreak;
case 6:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E6, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E6, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E6, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E6, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E6, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E6;
bbreak;
case 7:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E7, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E7, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E7, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E7, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E7, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E7;
bbreak;
case 8:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E8, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E8, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E8, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E8, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E8, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E8;
bbreak;
case 9:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E9, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E9, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E9, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E9, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E9, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E9;
bbreak;
case 10:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E10, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E10, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E10, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E10, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E10, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E10;
bbreak;
case 11:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E11, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E11, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E11, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E11, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E11, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E11;
bbreak;
case 12:
mempcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CFB_E12, data_length);
mempcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CFB_E12, data_length);
mempcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CFB_E12, iv_length);
mempcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CFB_E12, iv_length);
mempcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CFB_E12, key_length);
*lcfb = NIST_LCFB_E12;
bbreak;
}
int kat_aes_cfb(int iteration, int silent)
{
    unsigned int data_length;
    unsigned int iv_length;
    unsigned int key_length;

    get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char result[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    unsigned lcfb;

    memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
    memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);

    load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv, iv_length, key, key_length, &lcfb, iteration);
    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i,"\n"	"lcfb = %i\n", key_length, data_length, iv_length, lcfb);

    if (iteration == 3)
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, lcfb, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
    else
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
    if (rc)
    {
        printf("ica_aes_cfb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
    }
    if (!silent && !rc)
    {
        printf("Encrypt:\n");
        dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
    }

    if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length))
    {
        printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");
        printf("Expected data:\n");
        dump_array(result, data_length);
        printf("Encryption Result:\n");
        dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
        rc++;
    }

    if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length))
    {
        printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
        printf("Expected IV:\n");
        dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
        printf("Updated IV:\n");
        dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
        printf("Original IV:\n");
    }
dump_array(iv, iv_length);
rc++;
}
if (rc) {
    printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
if (iteration == 3)
    rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, lcfb, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 0);
else
    rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_cfb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
}
if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}
return rc;

int load_random_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
               unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
               unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length)
{
    int rc;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    return rc;
}

int random_aes_cfb(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length,
unsigned int lcfb)
{
    unsigned int iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128;

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    for (key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128; key_length <= AES_KEY_LEN256; key_length += 8) {
        memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        load_random_test_data(input_data, data_length, iv, iv_length, key, key_length);
        memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
        printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i
", iteration);
        printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i,
" " lcfb = %i\n", key_length, data_length, iv_length, lcfb);
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 1);
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_cfb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
        }
        if (!silent && !rc) {
            printf("Encrypt: \n");
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
        }
        if (rc) {
            printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
            return rc;
        }
        memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
        rc = ica_aes_cfb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, lcfb, 0);
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_cfb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
            return rc;
        }
        if (!silent && !rc) {
            printf("Decrypt: \n");
            dump_cfb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
        }
        if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
            printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
            printf("Original data: \n");
            dump_array(input_data, data_length);
            printf("Decryption Result: \n");
            dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
        }
    }
}

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rc++;
}
return rc;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    unsigned int endless = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
        if (strstr(argv[1], "endless"))
            endless = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++) {
        rc = kat_aes_cfb(iteration, silent);
        if (rc) {
            printf("kat_aes_cfb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
        } else
            printf("kat_aes_cfb finished successfully\n");
    }
    unsigned int data_length = 1;
    unsigned int lcfb = 1;
    unsigned int j;
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_RANDOM_TESTS; iteration++) {
        for (j = 1; j <= 3; j++) {
            int silent = 1;
            if (!(data_length % lcfb)) {
                rc = random_aes_cfb(iteration, silent, data_length, lcfb);
                if (rc) {
                    printf("random_aes_cfb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
                    error_count++;
                } else
                    printf("random_aes_cfb finished successfully\n");
            }
            switch (j) {
            case 1:
                lcfb = 1;
                break;
            case 2:
                lcfb = 8;
                break;
            case 3:
                lcfb = 16;
                break;
            }
        }
        if (data_length == 1)
            data_length = 8;
        else
            data_length += 8;
    }
    if (error_count)
        printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
    else
        printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");
    return rc;
}
AES with CTR mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with */
/* this program. */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 7

/* CTR data - 1 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E1[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0x7f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E1[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0x7f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x00,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
  0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E1[] = {
  0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0x6b, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x26,
  0x1b, 0xef, 0x88, 0x64, 0x99, 0xd0, 0xb6, 0xce,
};

/* CTR data - 2 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E2[] = {
  0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
  0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E2[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0x7f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E2[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0x7f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x03,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x96,
  0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
  0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
  0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
  0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E2[] = {
  0x87, 0x4d, 0x61, 0x91, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x26,
  0x1b, 0xef, 0x6b, 0x64, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x6b, 0xce,
  0x98, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf0, 0xff,
  0x86, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x69, 0xff, 0xfd, 0xff,
  0x5a, 0xe4, 0xdf, 0xe3, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0xdc, 0x5e,
  0x5b, 0x4f, 0x09, 0x02, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x3e, 0xab,
  0x1e, 0x03, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x2f, 0xbe, 0x03, 0x1d1,
  0x79, 0x21, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x9c, 0xeee,
};

/* CTR data - 3 - for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E3[] = {
  0xb0, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
  0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
  0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x2b, 0xd7,
  0x2d, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E3[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E3[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3[] = {
  0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
  0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E3[] = {
  0x60, 0xe0, 0xe3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5,
  0xb7, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x28,
};

/* CTR data - 4 - for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E4[] = {
  0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
  0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
  0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x2b, 0xd7,
  0x2d, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E4[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E4[] = {
  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4[] = {
  0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0xe1, 0x03, 0xac, 0xc9,
  0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0xe8, 0x51,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E4[] = {
    0xf4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a,
    0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xca, 0xf5, 0x5c,
};

/* CTR data 5 - for AES 256 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xdd,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E5[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E5[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
    0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
    0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
    0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef,
    0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0xf4, 0x9b, 0x17,
    0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E5[] = {
    0x60, 0x1e, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5,
    0xb7, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x28,
    0xf4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0xca, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a,
    0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xca, 0xf5, 0xc5,
    0x2b, 0x09, 0x30, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c,
    0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d,
    0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6,
    0x13, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x08, 0x45, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa6,
};

/* CTR data 6 - for AES 256. */
* Data is != BLOCK_SIZE */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E6[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xdf,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E6[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E6[] = {
    0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0x40, 0x9f,
    0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x77, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17,
    0x2a,
}
unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E6[] = {
    0x60, 0xe1, 0xc3, 0xf3, 0x77, 0x57, 0x89, 0xa5,
    0xe3, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x04, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x28,
    0xe4, 0x43, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x9a,
    0xca, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x90, 0xca, 0xca, 0xf5, 0xc5,
    0x2b, 0xe9, 0x30, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x4c,
    0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d,
    0xdf, 0xc9, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6,
};

UNSIGNED char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6[] = {
    0x47, 0x1f, 0x60, 0x9e, 0x77, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0x9a,
    0xe9, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x84, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xf8, 0x1f,
    0x60, 0x9e, 0xae, 0x2b, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x17,
};

/* CTR data 7 - for AES 256
 * Counter as big as the data. Therefore the counter
 * should not be updated. Because it is already pre
 * computed. */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x60, 0x3d, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x15, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x9e,
    0x2b, 0x73, 0x9e, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
    0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x98, 0x0d,
    0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x0f, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x0f, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
    0x0f, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
    0x8f, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x60, 0x2a, 0x08, 0x57, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x0a, 0x9e,
    0xe9, 0x77, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x57, 0x0a, 0x89, 0x9a,
    0x2b, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x0e, 0x0a,
    0xe5, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x0a,
    0xe5, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x0a,
    0xe5, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x0a,
    0xe5, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x0a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E7[] = {
    0x2b, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9,
    0x2b, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9,
    0x2b, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xe9,
0xe8, 0x70, 0x17, 0xba, 0x2d, 0x84, 0x98, 0x8d,
0xdf, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xa6,
0x13, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x08, 0xe4, 0x79, 0x41, 0xa6,
);

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1;
    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ",(unsigned char )*h);
        h++;
        if (i == 8) {
            printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
}

void dump_ctr_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
    unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
    unsigned char *output_data)
{
    printf("IV
");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    printf("Key
");
    dump_array(key, key_length);
    printf("Input Data
");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Output Data
");
    dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
    unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
        case 1:
            *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1);
            *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E1);
            *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E1);
            break;
        case 2:
            *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2);
            *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E2);
            *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E2);
            break;
        case 3:
            *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3);
            *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E3);
            *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E3);
            break;
        case 4:
            *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4);
            *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_CTR_E4);
            *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_CTR_E4);
            break;
        case 5:
            break;
    }
}
```c
void load_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
                   unsigned char *result,
                   unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *expected_iv,
                   unsigned int iv_length,
                   unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                   unsigned int iteration)
{
    switch (iteration) {
        case 1:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E1, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E1, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E1, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E1, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E1, key_length);
            break;
        case 2:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E2, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E2, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E2, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E2, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E2, key_length);
            break;
        case 3:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E3, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E3, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E3, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E3, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E3, key_length);
            break;
        case 4:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E4, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E4, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E4, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E4, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E4, key_length);
            break;
        case 5:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E5, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E5, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E5, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E5, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E5, key_length);
            break;
        case 6:
            memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E6, data_length);
            memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E6, data_length);
            memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E6, iv_length);
            memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E6, iv_length);
            memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E6, key_length);
    }
}
```
break;
case 7:
    memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_CTR_E7, data_length);
    memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_CTR_E7, data_length);
    memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_CTR_E7, iv_length);
    memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_CTR_E7, iv_length);
    memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_CTR_E7, key_length);
    break;
}

int random_aes_ctr(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length, unsigned int iv_length)
{
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN256;
    if (data_length % sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t))
        iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);

    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
            key_length, data_length, iv_length);

    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];

    int rc = 0;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, input_data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
    if (rc) {
        printf("random number generate returned rc = %i, errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }

    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
    rc = ica_aes_ctr(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                        tmp_iv, 32, 1);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_ctr encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
                        data_length, encrypt);
        return rc;
    }
    if (!silent && !rc) {
        printf("Encrypt:\n");
        dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
                        data_length, encrypt);
    }

    memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
    rc = ica_aes_ctr(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                        tmp_iv, 32, 0);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_ctr decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    }
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
             data_length, decrypt);
return rc;
}

if (!silent && !rc) {
printf("Decrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt,
             data_length, decrypt);
}

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
dump_array(input_data, data_length);
printf("Decryption Result:\n");
dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
rc++;
}
return rc;
}

int kat_aes_ctr(int iteration, int silent)
{
unsigned int data_length;
unsigned int iv_length;
unsigned int key_length;

get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);

printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
        key_length, data_length, iv_length);

unsigned char iv[iv_length];
unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
unsigned char key[key_length];
unsigned char input_data[data_length];
unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
unsigned char result[data_length];

int rc = 0;

load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv,
                iv_length, key, key_length, iteration);
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

if (iv_length == 16)
rc = ica_aes_ctr(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                tmp_iv, 32, 1);
else
rc = ica_aes_ctrlist(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                    tmp_iv, 1);

if (rc){
printf("ica_aes_ctr encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
             data_length, encrypt);
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
printf("Encrypt:\n");
dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
             data_length, encrypt);
}
if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length)) {
    printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");
    printf("Expected data:\n");
    dump_array(result, data_length);
    printf("Encryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}

if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length)) {
    printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
    printf("Expected IV:\n");
    dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Updated IV:\n");
    dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Original IV:\n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    rc++;
}
if (rc) {
    printf("AES CTR test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}

memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ctr(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, 
    tmp_iv, 32,0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ctr decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, 
        data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}

if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
    dump_ctr_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, 
        data_length, decrypt);
}

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
}
return rc;

int main(int argc, char **argv) {

    // Default mode is 0. ECB,CBC and CFQ tests will be performed.
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    unsigned int endless = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
        if (strstr(argv[1], "endless"))
            endless = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    if (!endless)
for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++) {
    rc = kat_aes_ctr(iteration, silent);
    if (rc) {
        printf("kat_aes_ctr failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        error_count++;
    } else
        printf("kat_aes_ctr finished successfully\n");
}

int i = 0;
if (endless)
    while (1) {
        printf("i = %i\n", i);
        silent = 1;
        rc = random_aes_ctr(i, silent, 320, 320);
        if (rc) {
            printf("kat_aes_ctr failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            return rc;
        } else
            printf("kat_aes_ctr finished successfully\n");
        i++;
    }

if (error_count)
    printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
else
    printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");
return rc;
}

AES with OFB mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
*  
*  You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
*  with this program.
*  */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define NR_TESTS 6
#define NR_RANDOM_TESTS 10000

/* OFB data - 1 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
    0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x50, 0xfe, 0x67, 0xcc, 0x99, 0x6d, 0x32, 0xb6,
    0xda, 0x09, 0x37, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0xaf, 0xec, 0x60,
};
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe0, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E1[] = {
    0x3b, 0x3f, 0x9d, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x20,
    0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0xfb, 0x4a,
};

/* OFB data - 2 for AES128 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
    0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x50, 0xfe, 0x67, 0xcc, 0x99, 0x6d, 0x32, 0xb6,
    0xda, 0x09, 0x37, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0xff, 0xe5,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x9b, 0x6a, 0x15, 0x89, 0x37, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0xff,
    0xe5, 0x3c, 0x28, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2[] = {
    0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
    0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E2[] = {
    0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03,
    0x75, 0x3c, 0xd8, 0x25, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

/* OFB data - 3 for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52,
    0x8e, 0x10, 0xf3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0x90, 0x18, 0xe5,
    0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x9b, 0x6a, 0x15, 0x89, 0x37, 0xe9, 0x9b, 0xff,
    0xe5, 0x3c, 0x28, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3[] = {
    0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe0, 0x9f, 0x96,
    0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E3[] = {
    0xcd, 0xc8, 0x6f, 0xd1, 0x8c, 0xab, 0x34, 0xc2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc9, 0x9a, 0x41, 0x74,
};

/* OFB data - 4 for AES192 */
unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E4[] = {
    0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52,
    0x8e, 0x10, 0xf3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0x90, 0x18, 0xe5,
};

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unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E4[] = {
0xa6, 0x09, 0xb3, 0x8d, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0x13, 0x3d, 
0xdd, 0xff, 0x27, 0x18, 0xba, 0x09, 0x56, 0x5e,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E4[] = {
0x52, 0xef, 0x01, 0xda, 0x52, 0x60, 0x2f, 0xe0, 
0x97, 0x5f, 0x78, 0xac, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x88, 0x50,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4[] = {
0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xa6, 0x00, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E4[] = {
0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, 
0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01,
};

unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E5[] = {
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 
0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 
0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x7d, 
0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E5[] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 
0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E5[] = {
0xb7, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x89, 0xdd, 
0x97, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x2f, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, 
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E5[] = {
0xdc, 0xe1, 0x84, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4b, 
0x7e, 0xcd, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x60,
};

unsigned char NIST_KEY_OFB_E6[] = {
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 
0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 
0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0x7d, 
0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4,
};

unsigned char NIST_IV_OFB_E6[] = {
0xb7, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x89, 0xdd, 
0x97, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x2f, 0x4a,
};

unsigned char NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E6[] = {
0xe1, 0xc6, 0x56, 0x30, 0x5e, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xa6, 
0x56, 0x38, 0x05, 0x74, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x3e, 0xdc,
unsigned char NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6[] = {
  0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
  0x99, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
};

unsigned char NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E6[] = {
  0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a,
  0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d,
};

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
  unsigned char *ptr_end;
  unsigned char *h;
  int i = 1;

  h = ptr;
  ptr_end = ptr + size;
  while (h < (unsigned char *)ptr_end) {
    printf("0x%02x\n", (unsigned char *)h);
    h++;
    if (i == 8) {
      printf("\n");
      i = 1;
    } else {
      ++i;
    }
  }
  printf("\n");
}

void dump_ofb_data(unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
                    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                    unsigned char *input_data, unsigned int data_length,
                    unsigned char *output_data)
{
  printf("IV \n");
  dump_array(iv, iv_length);
  printf("Key \n");
  dump_array(key, key_length);
  printf("Input Data\n");
  dump_array(input_data, data_length);
  printf("Output Data\n");
  dump_array(output_data, data_length);
}

void get_sizes(unsigned int *data_length, unsigned int *iv_length,
                unsigned int *key_length, unsigned int iteration)
{
  switch (iteration) {
  case 1:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E1);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E1);
    break;
  case 2:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E2);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E2);
    break;
  case 3:
    *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3);
    *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E3);
    *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E3);
  }
break;
case 4:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E4);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E4);
  break;
case 5:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E5);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E5);
  break;
case 6:
  *data_length = sizeof(NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6);
  *iv_length = sizeof(NIST_IV_OFB_E6);
  *key_length = sizeof(NIST_KEY_OFB_E6);
  break;
}

void load_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
                    unsigned char *result,
                    unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *expected_iv,
                    unsigned int iv_length,
                    unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length,
                    unsigned int iteration)
{
  switch (iteration) {
    case 1:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E1, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E1, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E1, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E1, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E1, key_length);
      break;
    case 2:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E2, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E2, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E2, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E2, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E2, key_length);
      break;
    case 3:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E3, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E3, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E3, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E3, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E3, key_length);
      break;
    case 4:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E4, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E4, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E4, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E4, key_length);
      break;
    case 5:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E5, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E5, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
      memcpy(expected_iv, NIST_EXPECTED_IV_OFB_E5, iv_length);
      memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E5, key_length);
      break;
    case 6:
      memcpy(data, NIST_TEST_DATA_OFB_E6, data_length);
      memcpy(result, NIST_TEST_RESULT_OFB_E6, data_length);
      memcpy(iv, NIST_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
  }
memcpy(expected_iv, NISTEXPECTED_IV_OFB_E6, iv_length);
memcpy(key, NIST_KEY_OFB_E6, key_length);
break;
}

int load_random_test_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_length,
                           unsigned char *iv, unsigned int iv_length,
                           unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_length)
{
    int rc;
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(data_length, data);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(iv_length, iv);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(key_length, key);
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_random_number_generate with rc = %i errno = %i\n", rc, errno);
        return rc;
    }
    return rc;
}

int random_aes_ofb(int iteration, int silent, unsigned int data_length)
{
    int i;
    int rc = 0;
    unsigned int iv_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    unsigned int key_length = AES_KEY_LEN128;
    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    for (i = 0; i <= 2; i++) {
        unsigned char key[key_length];
        memset(encrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        memset(decrypt, 0x00, data_length);
        load_random_test_data(input_data, data_length, iv, iv_length, key,
                              key_length);
        memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
        printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
        printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
                key_length, data_length, iv_length);
        rc = ica_aes_ofb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length,
                         tmp_iv, 1);
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_ofb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data,
                           data_length, encrypt);
        }
        if (!silent && !rc) {
            printf("Encrypt:\n");
        }
    }

dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);

if (rc) {
    printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;
}
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ofb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 0);
if (rc) {
    printf("ica_aes_ofb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
}
if (!silent && !rc) {
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
}
if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length)) {
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
    return rc;
    key_length += 8;
}
return rc;
}

int kat_aes_ofb(int iteration, int silent)
{
    unsigned int data_length;
    unsigned int iv_length;
    unsigned int key_length;
    get_sizes(&data_length, &iv_length, &key_length, iteration);
    printf("Test Parameters for iteration = %i\n", iteration);
    printf("key length = %i, data length = %i, iv length = %i\n",
            key_length, data_length, iv_length);
    unsigned char iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char tmp_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char expected_iv[iv_length];
    unsigned char key[key_length];
    unsigned char input_data[data_length];
    unsigned char encrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char decrypt[data_length];
    unsigned char result[data_length];
    int rc = 0;
    load_test_data(input_data, data_length, result, iv, expected_iv, iv_length, key, key_length, iteration);
memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);

rc = ica_aes_ofb(input_data, encrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 1);
if (rc)
    printf("ica_aes_ofb encrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);
} else if (!silent)
    printf("Encrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, input_data, data_length, encrypt);

if (memcmp(result, encrypt, data_length))
    printf("Encryption Result does not match the known ciphertext!\n");  
    printf("Expected data:\n");
    dump_array(result, data_length);
    printf("Encryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(encrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
} else if (memcmp(expected_iv, tmp_iv, iv_length))
    printf("Update of IV does not match the expected IV!\n");
    printf("Expected IV:\n");
    dump_array(expected_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Updated IV:\n");
    dump_array(tmp_iv, iv_length);
    printf("Original IV:\n");
    dump_array(iv, iv_length);
    rc++;
} else if (rc)
    printf("AES OFB test exited after encryption\n");
    return rc;

memcpy(tmp_iv, iv, iv_length);
rc = ica_aes_ofb(encrypt, decrypt, data_length, key, key_length, tmp_iv, 0);
if (rc)
    printf("ica_aes_ofb decrypt failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);
    return rc;
} else if (!silent)
    printf("Decrypt:\n");
    dump_ofb_data(iv, iv_length, key, key_length, encrypt, data_length, decrypt);

if (memcmp(decrypt, input_data, data_length))
    printf("Decryption Result does not match the original data!\n");
    printf("Original data:\n");
    dump_array(input_data, data_length);
    printf("Decryption Result:\n");
    dump_array(decrypt, data_length);
    rc++;
    return rc;
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    unsigned int silent = 0;
    if (argc > 1) {
        if (strstr(argv[1], "silent"))
            silent = 1;
    }
    int rc = 0;
    int error_count = 0;
    int iteration;
    unsigned int data_length = sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_TESTS; iteration++) {
        rc = kat_aes_ofb(iteration, silent);
        if (rc) {
            printf("kat_aes_ofb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
        } else
            printf("kat_aes_ofb finished successfully\n");
    }
    for(iteration = 1; iteration <= NR_RANDOM_TESTS; iteration++) {
        int silent = 1;
        rc = random_aes_ofb(iteration, silent, data_length);
        if (rc) {
            printf("random_aes_ofb failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
            error_count++;
            goto out;
        } else
            printf("random_aes_ofb finished successfully\n");
        data_length += sizeof(ica_aes_vector_t);
    }
    out:
    if (error_count)
        printf("%i testcases failed\n", error_count);
    else
        printf("All testcases finished successfully\n");
    return rc;
}

AES with XTS mode example

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static keys. In real life you would
   * use real AES keys, which is negotiated between the
   * encrypting and the decrypting entity.
   *
   * Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128)
   */
unsigned char aes_xts_key1[] = {

unsigned char aes_xts_key2[] = {
  0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
  0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the *
* encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary,
* that the length of the encrypted data is at least as *
* large as the AES cipher block size (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE), *
* but it does not have to be a multiple of the cipher block size. */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
  0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
  0x62, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69, 0x74,
  0x68, 0x20, 0x41, 0x45, 0x53, 0x2d, 0x58, 0x53,
  0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x61,
  0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65,
  0x61, 0x73, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
  int rc;

  /* This is the AES XTS tweak value. *
   * We are generating it per random number generator. In real life *
   * you would use an tweak value which is negotiated between the *
   * encrypting and the decrypting entity. */
  unsigned char random_tweak_value[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

  /* Since libica function ica_aes_xts updates the tweak value *
   * we let ica_aes_xts work on a copy of the generated tweak *
   * value. We will need the original tweak value for decrypting *
   * the data later on. */
  unsigned char tweak_value[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

  unsigned char cipher_data[sizeof(plain_data)];
  unsigned char decrypt_data[sizeof(plain_data)];

  /* Generate the tweak value by random */
  rc = ica_random_number_generate(sizeof(random_tweak_value),
                                 random_tweak_value);

  /* Error handling (if necessary). */
  if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

  /* Dump keys, tweak value and plain data to standard output, just for *
   * a visual control. */
  printf("AES key1:\n");
  dump_data(aes_xts_key1, sizeof(aes_xts_key1));
  printf("AES key2:\n");
  dump_data(aes_xts_key2, sizeof(aes_xts_key2));
  printf("TWEAK:\n");
  dump_data(random_tweak_value, sizeof(random_tweak_value));
  printf("plain data:\n");
}
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Copy the generated tweak value so that we still
 * have the original one available after the call to ica_aes_xts.
 */
memcpy(tweak_value, random_tweak_value, sizeof(tweak_value));

/* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API.
 */
rc = ica_aes_xts(plain_data, cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data),
    aes_xts_key1, aes_xts_key2, AES_KEY_LEN128, tweak_value,
    ICA_ENCRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data.
 */
printf("encrypted data:\n");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Get the original tweak value, because ica_aes_xts
 * has modified the tweak_value variable on encryption.
 */
memcpy(tweak_value, random_tweak_value, sizeof(tweak_value));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
 * Note: The same AES keys and tweak value must be used for
 * encryption and decryption.
 */
rc = ica_aes_xts(cipher_data, decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data),
    aes_xts_key1, aes_xts_key2, AES_KEY_LEN128, tweak_value,
    ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
 * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
 */
printf("decrypted data:\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-) 
 * Note: The following will only work in this example!
 */
printf("%s\n", decrypt_data);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
        if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
            printf("\n");
        if (i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
            printf("\n");
    }

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
switch (rc) {
  case 0:
    printf("OK\n");
    break;
  case EINVAL:
    printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
    break;
  case EPERM:
    printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
    break;
  case EIO:
    printf("I/O error.\n");
    break;
  default:
    printf("unknown error.\n");
}
return rc;

AES with CBC mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with */
/* this program. */
/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2016 */
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static key. In real life you would */
/* use your real AES key, which is negotiated between the */
/* encrypting and the decrypting entity. */
/* Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128) */
unsigned char aes_key[] = {
  0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
  0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt. For the */
/* encryption mode used in this example, it is necessary, */
/* that the length of the encrypted data is a multiple of */
/* the AES cipher block size (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE). */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
  0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
  0x62, 0x69, 0x66, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x20,
  0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
  0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00,
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);
int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;

    /* This is the initialization vector. The initialization vector
     * is of the same size as the cipher block (AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE).
     * We are generating it per random number generator. In real life
     * you would use an initialization vector which is negotiated
     * between the encrypting and the decrypting entity.
     */
    unsigned char random_iv[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

    /* Since libica function ica_aes_cbc updates the initialization
     * vector, we let ica_aes_cbc work on a copy of the generated
     * initialization vector. We will need the original initialization
     * vector for decrypting the data later on.
     */
    unsigned char iv[AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE];

    unsigned char cipher_data[sizeof(plain_data)];
    unsigned char decrypt_data[sizeof(plain_data)];

    /* Generate the initialization vector by random */
    rc = ica_random_number_generate(sizeof(random_iv), random_iv);

    /* Error handling (if necessary). */
    if (rc)
        return handle_ica_error(rc);

    /* Dump key, iv and plain data to standard output, just for
     * a visual control.
     */
    printf("AES key:\n");
    dump_data(aes_key, sizeof(aes_key));
    printf("IV:\n");
    dump_data(random_iv, sizeof(random_iv));
    printf("plain data:\n");
    dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

    /* Copy the generated initialization vector so that we still
     * have the original one available after the call to ica_aes_cbc.
     */
    memcpy(iv, random_iv, sizeof(iv));

    /* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API.
     */
    rc = ica_aes_cbc(plain_data, cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data),
                    aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128, iv, ICA_ENCRYPT);

    /* Error handling (if necessary). */
    if (rc)
        return handle_ica_error(rc);

    /* Dump encrypted data. */
    printf("encrypted data:\n");
    dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));

    /* Get the original initialization vector, because ica_aes_cbc
     * has modified the iv variable on encryption.
     */
    memcpy(iv, random_iv, sizeof(iv));

    /* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
     * Note: The same AES key and IV must be used for encryption and
     * decryption.
     */
rc = ica_aes_cbc(cipher_data, decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data),
                aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128, iv,
                ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
    return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
 * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
 */
printf("decrypted data:\n");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-) */
/* Note: The following will only work in this example! */
printf(\"%s\n", decrypt_data);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int i;

    for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
        printf("0x\%02x \", *ptr);
        if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
            printf("\n");
    }
    if (i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
        printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }
    return rc;
}

AES with GCM mode example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0 */
/* You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with */
/* this program. */
/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2016 */
/* */
```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ica_api.h>

#define AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16

/* This example uses a static key. In real life you would
 * use your real AES key, which is negotiated between the
 * encrypting and the decrypting entity.
 * 
 * Note: AES-128 key size is 16 bytes (AES_KEY_LEN128)
 */
unsigned char aes_key[] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F
};

/* This is the plain data, you want to encrypt.
 */
unsigned char plain_data[] = {
0x55, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x62, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
0x73, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x79, 0x21, 0x00
};

/* This is the initialization vector. The initialization vector
 * size must be greater than 0 and less than 2**61. A length of
 * 12 is recommended.
 */
unsigned char iv[12] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B
};

/* This is additional authenticated data. It is subject to the
 * message authentication code computation, but is not encrypted.
 */
unsigned char aad[] = {
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F
};

/* Prints hex values to standard out. */
static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length);
/* Prints a description of the return value to standard out. */
static int handle_ica_error(int rc);

int main(char **argv, int argc)
{
    int rc;

    /* This is a buffer for the message authentication code (tag) for
     * the additional authenticated data in aad and the plain text.
     * Note: The authentication strength depends on the length of the
     * authentication tag
     */
    unsigned char tag[16];

    unsigned char cipher_data[sizeof(plain_data)];
    unsigned char decrypt_data[sizeof(plain_data)];

    /* Dump key, iv, aad and plain data to standard output, just for
     * a visual control.
     */
```
printf("AES key:
");
dump_data(aes_key, sizeof(aes_key));
printf("IV:
");
dump_data(iv, sizeof(iv));
printf("AAD:
");
dump_data(aad, sizeof(aad));
printf("plain data:
");
dump_data(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Encrypt plain data to cipher data, using libica API.
 * This will also compute the authentication code (tag) from
 * the plain data and the additional authenticated data.
 */
rc = ica_aes_gcm(plain_data, sizeof(plain_data), cipher_data, iv, sizeof(iv),
   aad, sizeof(aad),
   tag, sizeof(tag),
   aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128,
   ICA_ENCRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
   return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump encrypted data. */
printf("encrypted data:
");
dump_data(cipher_data, sizeof(plain_data));
printf("Authentication code:
");
dump_data(tag, sizeof(tag));

/* Decrypt cipher data to decrypted data, using libica API.
 * Note: The same AES key, IV and AAD must be used for encryption and
 * decryption. The authentication code (tag) is verified against the
 * decrypted data and the additional authenticated data. If the
 * authentication code does not match, EFAULT is returned.
 */
rc = ica_aes_gcm(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data), cipher_data, iv, sizeof(iv),
   aad, sizeof(aad),
   tag, sizeof(tag),
   aes_key, AES_KEY_LEN128,
   ICA_DECRYPT);

/* Error handling (if necessary). */
if (rc)
   return handle_ica_error(rc);

/* Dump decrypted data.
 * Note: Please compare output with the plain data, they are the same.
 */
printf("decrypted data:
");
dump_data(decrypt_data, sizeof(plain_data));

/* Surprise... :-)
 * Note: The following will only work in this example!
 */
printf("%s\n", decrypt_data);
}

static void dump_data(unsigned char *data, unsigned long length)
{
   unsigned char *ptr;
   int i;

   for (ptr = data, i = 1; ptr < (data+length); ptr++, i++) {
      printf("0x%02x ", *ptr);
```c
if ((i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
    printf("n");
}
if (i % AES_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE)
    printf("\n");
}

static int handle_ica_error(int rc)
{
    switch (rc) {
    case 0:
        printf("OK\n");
        break;
    case EINVAL:
        printf("Incorrect parameter.\n");
        break;
    case EPERM:
        printf("Operation not permitted by Hardware (CPACF).\n");
        break;
    case EIO:
        printf("I/O error.\n");
        break;
    caseEFAULT:
        printf("The verification of the message authentication code has failed.\n");
        break;
    default:
        printf("unknown error.\n");
    }
    return rc;
}

CMAC example

/* This program is released under the Common Public License V1.0
   *
   * You should have received a copy of Common Public License V1.0 along with
   * with this program.
   */

/* Copyright IBM Corp. 2010, 2011 */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ica_api.h"

#define BYTE 8
#define NUM_TESTS 12

unsigned int key_length[12] = {16, 16, 16, 24, 24, 24, 24, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32};
unsigned char key[12][32] = {
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c},
    {0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3},
    {0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x7b},
    {0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3},
}*/
0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b},
0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b},
0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b},
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61,
0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xfa},
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61,
0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xfa},
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61,
0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xfa},
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61,
0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xfa},
0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae,
0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61,
0x08, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xfa} 

unsigned char last_block[3][16] = {{
    0x7d, 0xf7, 0xb6, 0x0c, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x42, 0xf0, 0x47, 0xb9, 0x1b, 0x54, 0x6f},
    0x22, 0x45, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x73, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x4b},
    0x45, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x81, 0x94, 0xcf, 0x76, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x4d, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0x43, 0x10, 0xa8, 0x54}
};

unsigned long mlen[12] = { 0, 16, 40, 64, 0, 16, 40, 64, 0, 16, 40, 64};
unsigned char message[12][512] = {{
    0x00},
    0xb6, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0xe40, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a},
    0xb6, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x11},
    0xb6, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x11},
    0xb6, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x11},
    0xb6, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x9f, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0xb7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x8e, 0x51, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x11},
};

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unsigned char expected_cmac[12][16] = {
    {0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46},
    {0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c},
    {0xdf, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x47, 0xde, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0x30, 0x30, 0xca, 0x32, 0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc4},
    {0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92, 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe},
    {0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x27},
    {0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90, 0x06, 0x82, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x15, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f},
    {0x0a, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x0f2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9f}
};

unsigned int i = 0;

void dump_array(unsigned char *ptr, unsigned int size)
{
    unsigned char *ptr_end;
    unsigned char *h;
    int i = 1, trunc = 0;
    int maxsize = 2000;

    puts("Dump: ");

    if (size > maxsize) {
        trunc = size - maxsize;
        size = maxsize;
    }

    h = ptr;
    ptr_end = ptr + size;
    while (h < ptr_end) {
        printf("0x%02x ", *h);
        h++;
        if (i == 16) {
            if (h != ptr_end) printf("\n");
            i = 1;
        } else {
            ++i;
        }
    }
    printf("\n");
    if (trunc > 0)
        printf("... %d bytes not printed\n", trunc);
}

unsigned char *cmac;
unsigned int cmac_length = 16;

int api_cmac_test(void)
{
    printf("Test of CMAC api\n");
    int rc = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) {
        if (cmac = malloc(cmac_length))
            return EINVAL;
        memset(cmac, 0, cmac_length);
        rc = (ica_aes_cmac(message[i], mlen[i],
                          cmac, cmac_length,
                          key[i], key_length[i],
                          ICA_ENCRYPT));
        if (rc) {
            printf("ica_aes_cmac generate failed with errno %d (0x%x).\n", rc);
            return rc;
        }
        if (memcmp(cmac, expected_cmac[i], cmac_length) != 0)
            printf("This does NOT match the known result. Testcase %i failed\n", i);
        free(cmac);
    }
    printf("Expected MAC has been generated.\n");
    rc = (ica_aes_cmac(message[i], mlen[i],
                       cmac, cmac_length,
                       key[i], key_length[i],
                       ICA_DECRYPT));
    if (rc) {
        printf("ica_aes_cmac verify failed with errno %d (0x%x).\n", rc);
        free(cmac);
        return rc;
    }
    free(cmac);
    if (!rc)
        printf("MAC was successful verified. testcase %i "
               "succeeded\n", i);
    else {
        printf("MAC verification failed for testcase %i "
               "with RC=%i\n", i, rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int rc = 0;
    rc = api_cmac_test();
    if (rc) {
        printf("api_cmac_test failed with rc = %i\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("api_cmac_test was successful\n");
    return 0;
}
openCryptoki code samples

This section provides coding samples in C for dynamic library calls as well as for direct access with static shared linked libraries.

- “Dynamic library call” on page 155
- “Shared linked library” on page 155

Coding samples (C)

To develop an application that uses openCryptoki, you need to access the library.

There are two ways to access the library:

- Load shared objects using dynamic library calls (dlopen)
- Link the library (statically) to your application during built time

For a list of supported mechanisms for the ICA token, refer to “Supported mechanisms for the ICA token” on page 84.
Dynamic library call
View some openCryptoki code samples for a dynamic library call.

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <pkcs11types.h>

CK_RV init();
CK_RV cleanup();
CK_RV rc;        /* return code */
void *dllPtr, (*symPtr)();   /* pointer to the ock library */
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR FunctionPtr = NULL; /* pointer to function list */

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
   init("/usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so"); /* opencryptoki initialization */
   /* .... other opencryptoki commands.... */
   cleanup();   /* cleanup/close shared library */
   return 0;
}

CK_RV init(char *libPath){
   dllPtr = dlopen(libPath, RTLD_NOW);   /* open the PKCS11 library */
   if (!dllPtr){
      printf("Error loading PKCS#11 library \n");
      return errno;
   }
   symPtr = (void (*)())dlsym(dllPtr, "C_GetFunctionList"); /* Get ock function list */
   if (!symPtr){
      printf("Error getting function list \n");
      return errno;
   }
   symPtr(&FunctionPtr);
   rc = FunctionPtr->C_Initialize(NULL);   /* initialize opencryptoki/tokens */
   if (rc != CKR_OK){
      printf("Error initializing the opencryptoki library: 0x%X\n", rc);
      cleanup();
   }
   printf("Opencryptoki initialized.\n");
   return CKR_OK;
}

CK_RV cleanup(void){
   rc = FunctionPtr->C_Finalize(NULL);
   if (dllPtr)
      dlclose(dllPtr);
   return rc;
}
```

To compile your sample code you need to provide the path of the source/include files. Issue a command of the form:
```
gcc sample_dynamic.c -g -00 -o sample_dynamic -I <include filepath>
```

The exact location of the include files depends on your Linux distribution.

Shared linked library
When you use your sample code with a static linked library you can access the APIs directly.

At the compile time you need to specify the openCryptoki library:
```
gcc sample_shared.c -g -00 -o sample_shared /usr/lib64/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.so
-L /usr/<include filepath>
```

The exact location of the include files depend on your Linux distribution.
The following code samples that interact with the openCryptoki API are based on the shared linked openCryptoki library.

**Base procedures:**

View some openCryptoki code samples for base procedures, such as main program, initialization, slot and token, mechanism, and finalize information.

The following code sample provides an insight into how to deal with the openCryptoki APIs. After describing some basic functions such as initialization, session and login handling, the sample shows how to retrieve data, such as get slot and token information and also detailed mechanism information. It also provides an introduction about how to create key objects and process symmetric encryption/decryption (DES). The last section shows RSA key generation with RSA encrypt and decrypt operations.

**Main program**

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <pkcs11types.h>
#include <defs.h>

K_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL;
CK_FLAGS rw_sessionFlags = CKF_RW_SESSION | CKF_SERIAL_SESSION;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechList = NULL;
CK_BYTE keyValue[] = {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef};
CK_BYTE msg[] = {'T', 'h', 'e', 'r', 'd'};
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    /* <insert helper functions (provided below) here> */
    int init();
    getSlotList(pSlotList, &slotCount); // get the number of slots
    pSlotList = malloc(slotCount * sizeof(CK SLOT ID)); // allocate memory
    getSlotList(pSlotList, &slotCount); // retrieve slot list
    slotID = *pSlotList; // first slot provide ica-token
    getSlotInfo(slotID);
    getTokenInfo(slotID);
    getMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, &ulCount); // retrieve number of mech's
    pMechList = malloc(ulCount * sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR)); // allocate memory
    getMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, &ulCount); // retrieve mechanism list
    getMechanismInfo(slotID, CKM_DES3 ECB);
    openSession(slotID, rw_sessionFlags, &hSession);
    loginSession(CKU USER, "01234567", 8, hSession);
    createKeyObject(hSession, keyValue);
    CK_BYTE_PTR pCipherText = malloc(DES_BLOCK_SIZE*sizeof(CK BYTE));
    DESencrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)&msg, msgLen, pCipherText, &cipherLen);
    DESdecrypt(hSession, pCipherText, cipherLen, (CK BYTE_PTR)&msg, &msgLen);
    generateRSAKeyPair(hSession, rsaLen, &hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey);
    CK BYTE_PTR pEncryptText = malloc(rsaLen*sizeof(CK BYTE));
    CK BYTE_PTR pClearText = malloc(rsaLen*sizeof(CK BYTE));
    RSAencrypt(hSession, hPublicKey, (CK BYTE_PTR)&msg, msgLen, pEncryptText, &rsaLen);
    RSAdecrypt(hSession, hPrivateKey, pEncryptText, rsaLen, pClearText, &rsaLen);
    logoutSession(hSession);
    closeSession(hSession);
    finalize();
    return 0;
}
```

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C_Initialize:

```c
CK_RV init(void){
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Initialize(NULL);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing the opencryptoki library: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return CKR_OK;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetSlotList:

```c
CK_RV getSlotList(CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, CK_ULONG_PTR pSlotCount){
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_GetSlotList(TRUE, pSlotList, pSlotCount);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error getting number of slots: 0x %\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetSlotInfo:

```c
CK_RV getSlotInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID){
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;
    rc = C_GetSlotInfo(slotID, &slotInfo);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error getting slot information: 0x %\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Slot %d Information:\n", slotID);
    printf(" Description: %.64s\n", slotInfo.slotDescription);
    printf(" Manufacturer: %.32s\n", slotInfo.manufacturerID);
    printf(" Flags: 0x%x\n", slotInfo.flags);
    if ((slotInfo.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT) == CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT) {
        printf("Token Present!\n");
    }
    if ((slotInfo.flags & CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE) ==
        CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE) {
        printf("Removable Device!\n");
    }
    if ((slotInfo.flags & CKF_HW_SLOT) == CKF_HW_SLOT){
        printf("Hardware support!\n");
    }
    else { printf("Software support!\n");
    print(" Hardware Version: %d.%d\n", 
        slotInfo.hardwareVersion.major, 
        slotInfo.hardwareVersion.minor);
    printf(" Firmware Version: %d.%d\n", 
        slotInfo.firmwareVersion.major, 
        slotInfo.firmwareVersion.minor);
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_GetTokenInfo:

```
CK_RV C_GetTokenInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID)
{
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_TOKENINFO tokinfo;
    rc = C_GetTokenInfo(slotID, &tokinfo);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error getting token info: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    printf("Token Info:\n");
    printf("Serial Number: \%d\x\n", (Atokinfo)->serialNumber);
    printf("Flags: \%x\x\n", (Atokinfo)->flags);
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED) != CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
        printf("PIN locked!!!\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED) != CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED)
        printf("PIN lock\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED) != CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
        printf("PIN initialized\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS) != CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS)
        printf("Dual crypto operations\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN) != CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN)
        printf("Clock on token\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED) != CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED)
        printf("Restore key not needed\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED) != CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
        printf("User Pin initialized\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED) != CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED)
        printf("User PIN to be changed\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED) != CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
        printf("User PIN locked\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY) != CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY)
        printf("User PIN final try\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW) != CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW)
        printf("User PIN count low\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_ROOT_KEY_INITIALIZED) != CKF_ROOT_KEY_INITIALIZED)
        printf("Root key initialized\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY) != CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY)
        printf("SO PIN final try\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED) != CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED)
        printf("SO PIN locked\n");
    if (((&tokinfo)->flags & CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED) != CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED)
        printf("SO PIN to be changed\n");
    printf("Sessions: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->numSessionCount, (Atokinfo)->maxSessionCount);
    printf("R/W Sessions: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->numRWSessionCount, (Atokinfo)->maxRWSessionCount);
    printf("PIN Length: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->maxPinLen, (Atokinfo)->minPinLen);
    printf("Public Memory: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->memoryLength, (Atokinfo)->maxMemory);
    printf("Private Memory: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->privateMemoryLength, (Atokinfo)->maxPrivateMemory);
    printf("Hardware Version: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->hardwareVersion.major, (Atokinfo)->hardwareVersion.minor);
    printf("Firmware Version: \%d\\n", (Atokinfo)->firmwareVersion.major, (Atokinfo)->firmwareVersion.minor);
    printf("Time: \%d\x\n", (Atokinfo)->utcTime);
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_GetMechanismList:

```
CK_RV C_GetMechanismList(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechList, CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount)
{
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, pMechList, pulCount);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error retrieving mechanism list: \%x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_GetMechanismInfo:

```c
CK_RV getMechanismInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechInfo;

    rc = C_GetMechanismInfo(slotID, type, &mechInfo);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error in mechanism info: %x", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("MinKeySize: %d\n", (&mechinfo)->ulMinKeySize);
    printf("MaxKeySize: %d\n", (&mechinfo)->ulMaxKeySize);
    printf("Flags: %d\n", (mechinfo)->flags);
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Finalize:

```c
CK_RV finalize(void) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Finalize(NULL);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during finalize: %x", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

Session and login:

View some openCryptoki session and login code samples.

C_OpenSession:

```c
CK_RV openSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_FLAGS sFlags,
                  CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_OpenSession(slotID, sFlags, NULL, NULL, phSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error opening session: %x\n", rc); return rc;
    }
    printf("Open session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Login:

```c
CK_RV loginSession(CK_USER_TYPE userType, CK_CHAR_PTR pPin,
                    CK_ULONG ulPinLen,
                    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Login(hSession, userType, pPin, ulPinLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error login session: %x\n", rc); return rc;
    }
    printf("Login session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_Logout:

```c
CK_RV logoutSession(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_Logout(hSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error logout session: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Logout session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_CloseSession:

```c
CK_RV closeSession(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {
    CK_RV rc;
    rc = C_CloseSession(hSession);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error closing session: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Close session successful.\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

Object handling:

View some openCryptoki object handling code samples.

C_CreateObject:

```c
CK_RV createKeyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE keyValue[]) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTempl[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
        {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)}, // token object
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof(false)}, // public object
        {CKA_VALUE, keyValue, sizeof(keyValue)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "Public_DES_Key", sizeof("Public_DES_Key")}
    };
    rc = C_CreateObject(hSession, keyTempl, sizeof(keyTempl)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), &hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error creating key object: 0x%llx\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_FindObjects:

```c
CK_RV getKey(CK_CHAR_PTR label, int labelLen, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR hObject, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) {  
CK_RV rc;  
CK ULONG ulMaxObjectCount = 1;  
CK ULONG ulObjectCount;  
CK_ATTRIBUTE objectMask[] = { { CKA_LABEL, label, labelLen } };  
rc = C_FindObjectsInit(hSession, objectMask, 1);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error FindObjectsInit: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}  
rc = C_FindObjects(hSession, hObject, ulMaxObjectCount, &ulObjectCount);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error FindObjects: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}  
rc = C_FindObjectsFinal(hSession);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error FindObjectsFinal: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}

Cryptographic operations:

View some openCryptoki cryptographic operations code samples.

C_Encrypt (AES):

```c
/*  
* AES encrypt  
*/  
CK_RV AESencrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CKULONG ulClearDataLen,  
    CK_BYTE **pEncryptedData, CKULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) {  
CK_RV rc;  
CK_MECHANISM myMechanism = {CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, "01020304050607081122334455667788", 16};  
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism = &myMechanism;  
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;  
getKey("My_AES_Key", sizeof("My_AES_Key"), &hKey, hSession);  
rc = C_EncryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error initializing encryption: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}  
rc = C_Encrypt(hSession, pClearData, ulClearDataLen,  
    NULL, pulEncryptedDataLen);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error during encryption (get length): 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}  
*pEncryptedData = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(*pulEncryptedDataLen * sizeof(CK_BYTE));  
rc = C_Encrypt(hSession, pClearData, ulClearDataLen,  
    *pEncryptedData, pulEncryptedDataLen);  
if (rc != CKR_OK) {  
    printf("Error during encryption: 0x%X\n", rc); return rc;  
}  
printf("Encrypted data: ");  
CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = *pEncryptedData;  
for (count = 0; count < *pulEncryptedDataLen; count++, tmp++) {  
    printf("%X", *tmp);  
}  
printf("\n");  
return CKR_OK;
```
C_Decrypt (AES):

```c
/* AES decrypt */
CK_RV AESDecrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
    CK_BYTE **pClearData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulClearDataLen) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM mehanism = {CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, "01203040506070811234567788", 16};
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism = &mehanism;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    getKey("My_AES_Key", sizeof("My_AES_Key"), &hKey, hSession);
    rc = C_DecryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing decryption: 0x%X\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, NULL, pulClearDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during decryption (get length): 0x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    *pClearData = malloc(*pulClearDataLen * sizeof(CK_BYTE));
    rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, *pClearData,
                   pulClearDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during decryption: 0x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
    printf("Decrypted data: ");
    CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = *pClearData;
    for (count = 0; count < *pulClearDataLen; count++, tmp++) {
        printf("%c", *tmp);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```
C_GenerateKeyPair (RSA):

```c
CK_RV generateRSAKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
                       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
                       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
{
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;

    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClassPub = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClassPriv = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyTypeRSA = CKK_RSA;
    CKULONG modulusBits = keySize;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pModulus = malloc(sizeof(CK_BYTE)*modulusBits/8);
    CK_BYTE publicExponent[] = {1, 0, 1};
    CK_MECHANISM rsaKeyGenMech = {CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};

    CK_ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClassPub, sizeof(keyClassPub)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyTypeRSA, sizeof(keyTypeRSA)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)},
        {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent, sizeof(publicExponent)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PubKey",
                     sizeof("My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PubKey")},
        {CKA_MODIFIABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    };

    CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClassPriv, sizeof(keyClassPriv)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyTypeRSA, sizeof(keyTypeRSA)},
        {CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_UNWRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_LABEL, "My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PrivKey",
                     sizeof("My_Private_Token_RSA1024_PrivKey")},
        {CKA_MODIFIABLE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    };

    rc = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &rsaKeyGenMech, publicKeyTemplate,
                              privateKeyTemplate,
                              sizeof(publicKeyTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE),
                              phPublicKey, phPrivateKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error generating RSA keys: 0x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }
}
```
C_Encrypt (RSA):

```c
CK_RV RSAEncrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CK_ULONG ulClearDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM rsaMechanism = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0};

    rc = C_EncryptInit(hSession, rsaMechanism, hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing RSA encryption: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_Encrypt(hSession, pClearData, ulClearDataLen,
        pEncryptedData, pulEncryptedDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during RSA encryption: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = pEncryptedData;
    for (c=0; c<*pulEncryptedDataLen; c++, pEncryptedData++) {
        printf("%X", *pEncryptedData);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

C_Decrypt (RSA):

```c
CK_RV RSADecrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClearData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulClearDataLen) {
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_MECHANISM rsaMechanism = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0};

    rc = C_DecryptInit(hSession, rsaMechanism, hKey);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error initializing RSA decryption: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    rc = C_Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
        pClearData, pulClearDataLen);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        printf("Error during RSA decryption: %x\n", rc);
        return rc;
    }

    CK_BYTE_PTR tmp = pClearData;
    for (c=0; c<*pulClearDataLen; c++, pClearData++) {
        printf("%c", *pClearData);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return CKR_OK;
}
```

For more information, refer to the current PKCS #11 standard/specification:
http://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs11ldoc/

Makefile example

```
# Specify include directory. Leave blank for default system location.
INCDIR =

# Specify library directory. Leave blank for default system location.
LIBDIR =

# Specify library.
LIBS = -lica
```

164 libica Programmer's Reference
TARGETS = example_aes128_gcm

all: $(TARGETS)

%: %.c
gcc $(INCDIR) $(LIBDIR) $(LIBS) -o $@

clean:
rm -f $(TARGETS)

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Glossary

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
A data encryption technique that improved upon and officially replaced the Data Encryption Standard (DES). AES is sometimes referred to as Rijndael, which is the algorithm on which the standard is based.

asymmetric cryptography
Synonym for public key cryptography.

Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF)
Hardware that provides support for symmetric ciphers and secure hash algorithms (SHA) on every central processor. Hence the potential encryption/decryption throughput scales with the number of central processors in the system.

Chinese-Remainder Theorem (CRT)
A mathematical problem described by Sun Tsu Suan-Ching using the remainder from a division operation.

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
A method of reducing repetitive patterns in cipher-text by performing an exclusive-OR operation on each 8-byte block of data with the previously encrypted 8-byte block before it is encrypted.

Cipher block length
The length of a block that can be encrypted or decrypted by a symmetric cipher. Each symmetric cipher has a specific cipher block length.

clear key
Any type of encryption key not protected by encryption under another key.

CPACF instructions
Instruction set for the CPACF hardware. CPACF functions for DES, TDES and SHA1 functions can be invoked by five new instructions as described in z/Architecture Principles of Operation. As a group, these instructions are known as the Message Security Assist (MSA).

Crypto Express4S (CEX4S)
Successor to the Crypto Express3 feature. The PCIe adapter on a CEX4S feature can be configured in three ways: Either as cryptographic accelerator (CEX4A), or as CCA coprocessor (CEX4C) for secure key encrypted transactions, or in EP11 coprocessor mode (CEX4P) for exploiting Enterprise PKCS #11 functionality.

A CEX4P only supports secure key encrypted transactions.

electronic code book mode (ECB mode)
A method of enciphering and deciphering data in address spaces or data spaces. Each 64-bit block of plain-text is separately enciphered and each block of the cipher-text is separately deciphered.

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
A standard published by the US National Institute of Science and Technology.

FIPS see Federal Information Processing Standards

libica Library for IBM Cryptographic Architecture.
master key (MK)
In computer security, the top-level key in a hierarchy of key-encrypting keys.

MSA  Message Security Assist. See CPACF instructions.

Mode of operation
A schema describing how to apply a symmetric cipher to encrypt or decrypt a message that is longer than the cipher block length. The goal of most modes of operation is to keep the security level of the cipher by avoiding the situation where blocks that occur more than once will always be translated to the same value. Some modes of operations allow handling messages of arbitrary lengths.

modulus-exponent (Mod-Expo)
A type of exponentiation performed using a modulus.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
A measurement standards laboratory and a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce. It is the federal technology agency that works with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and standards.

NIST  see National Institute of Standards and Technology

public key cryptography
In computer security, cryptography in which a public key is used for encryption and a private key is used for decryption. Synonymous with asymmetric cryptography.

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
An algorithm used in public key cryptography. These are the surnames of the three researchers responsible for creating this asymmetric or public/private key algorithm.

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
A standardized cryptographic hash function to compute a unique (message) digest from a message in a way that is mathematically impossible to reverse. Different data can possibly produce the same hash value, but there is no way to use the hash value to determine the original data.

secure key
A key that is encrypted under a master key. When using a secure key, it is passed to a cryptographic coprocessor where the coprocessor decrypts the key and performs the function. The secure key never appears in the clear outside of the cryptographic coprocessor.

symmetric cryptography
An encryption method that uses the same key for encryption and decryption. Keys of symmetric ciphers are private keys.

zcrypt device driver
Kernel device driver to access Crypto Express adapters. Formerly, a monolithic module called $z9crypt$. Today, it consists of multiple modules that are implicitly loaded when loading the ap main module of the device driver.
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